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Abstract: For those communities in Kenya that identify as indigenous, and with the 
indigenous movement, land is the core of their collective existence. To remove them 
from their ancestral lands violates their customary rights to land and says to them that 
they do not matter. For years they have been the victims of those in power who have 
used their political influence as well as the law to denigrate and invalidate those rights. 
This has been through forced assimilation of these communities into larger groups, 
forced evictions, damaging of property, killings, inhuman and degrading treatment; 
and broken promises. Judgments of regional bodies under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights framework affirming those rights have gone 
unimplemented. This thesis therefore looks at what law has been, what it is and what 
it could do with a particular focus on the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and its harbinger- 
on land- the National Land Policy 2009. Alternatives existing under the East African 
Community Treaty and also the World Bank’s framework on indigenous communities, 
-are also examined. The conclusion reached is that land in Kenya is a political chalice,
howbeit, progressive law has been enacted. This must have an intended purpose, and 
where that purpose is not fulfilled, law may as well not exist. There is opportunity in 
the law for both communities and law makers to close in on this disparateness and 
bring out the realisation of these land rights.  
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‘Legal focus stems from the reality that the legal treatment 
of property rights is the ultimate determinant of tenure 
security.’1  
Introduction 
1 A discussion on law relating to indigenous communities’ land rights is 
multifarious and complex in nature. It reeks of a power game in which the 
players are the Government, its agencies, politicians and funding donors, other 
citizens and finally the indigenous communities. Whoever has the most power 
possesses the land or determines what happens to it. Kenya’s land politics has 
in fact been described as ‘first and foremost a redistributive game that creates 
winners and losers’.2 Land has been used to gain power in Kenya;3 and law, 
whether imposed, respected or disregarded has played a pivotal role in that.  
2 This thesis observes that land law has evolved from a communal land tenure-
form in the pre-colonial period, where members of communities were allowed 
to use community land as they wanted as long as this was in line with the 
customary laws,4 and where the concept of individual or private ownership 
was unknown,5 to a codified pro-individualised and public-tenure system 
under the colonial regime. In introducing its systems, the colonial 
administration imposed measures that were alien to the native population and 
which ignored their existing and political patterns.6 This affected the Kenyan 
native population as a whole including indigenous communities and led to 
1 Liz Alden Wily, ‘The Community Land Act in Kenya Opportunities and Challenge for Communities’ (MDPI 2018) 
<https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/1/12> accessed 5 June 2018. 
2 Catherine Boone, ‘Land Conflicts and Distributive Politics in Kenya’ (2012) Volume 55 Number 1 African Studies 
Review 75. 
3 Cyprian Fisiy puts it more aptly: ‘Control over land has served as an important component of control over people’, 
cited in Catherine Boone, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2014). 
4 Walter Odhiambo and Hezron Nyangito, Land Laws and Land Use in Kenya: Implications for Agricultural 
Development (Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2002). 
5 Peter Ng’ang’a Mburu, ‘Strategies to Modernize the Land Registration System in Kenya’ (DPhil Thesis University 
of Groningen 2017).  
6 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press 2002) 211. 
Introductory Chapter 
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mass disinheritance of individuals and communities of their land, inequitable 
access to land and contributed to land tenure insecurity particularly for 
indigenous peoples.7 The post-colonial era has seen perpetuation of the 
colonial system by Governments which have been run by individuals from 
dominant communities, much larger and more powerful than indigenous 
communities.  
3 The communities that these individuals belong to have chosen to follow the 
individual rather than collective system of land ownership, partly as this has 
aligned with the agenda of donors, until now.  The law in its current form, as 
introduced by the 2009 National Land Policy (NLP) and established by the 2010 
Constitution, is a departure from the law as it was and re-introduces 
communal land tenure as a valid land regime. This is referred to as community 
land under the Constitution and is the category of land which enshrines 
indigenous communities’ land rights. The language used in both the NLP and 
the Constitution are progressive in the articulation of indigenous communities’ 
land rights. There is also the Community Land Act 2016; and other 
constitutionally-inspired laws dating from 2012 to 2016 relating to land, 
forest-management, natural resources and human rights etc., which have the 
potential to impact on indigenous communities one way or the other, which 
are some of the opportunities this thesis will explore. 
Background 
4 Kenya became a British protectorate in 1895. Protectorates were those 
territories which were not yet fully brought into the dominion of the British 
Crown but where Britain controlled the external affairs. In Kenya’s case, this 
period of protectionism marked the beginning of imposition of laws by the 
British which began the stripping off of Kenyan native communities of their 
land rights. As an example, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 and the Crown 
7 Republic of Kenya Ministry of Lands, ‘Sessional Paper No.3 of 2009 on National Land Policy’ (Ministry of Lands 
2009), para 23. Hereon NLP. 
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Lands Ordinance of 1915 converted land formerly held by Africans to Crown 
Land.8 The Rift Valley region of Kenya, home to several indigenous 
communities was taken from these communities and apportioned to white 
settlers who ‘created mixed farms, huge ranches, large plantations, 
commercial estates’ using African labour.9  
5 When Kenya became a British colony in 1920 it meant that Kenya’s external 
and internal affairs came under the territory of Britain. This period saw further 
enforcement of laws by the colonial administration to entrench its hold on the 
territory. The use of the law this way did not only happen in Kenya but 
throughout colonised Africa. H.W.O Okoth-Ogendo observed in a presentation 
on ‘The Last Colonial Question’ that:  
‘European powers took the view that political sovereignty in and of 
itself vested radical title to land comprised in the subject territory in 
much the same way as it would have done had such land been part of 
their domestic possessions ……... thus these powers issued decrees 
and/or proclamations soon after the Berlin conference, declaring that 
they had acquired both the territory under jurisdiction, and the 
property comprised therein ……… (and) those decrees/proclamations 
purported to convert all land under their various jurisdictions, 
ownership of which could not be established by documentary 
evidence, into the private property of respective sovereigns. Thus by 
the mere stroke of the pen, title to all land in undocumented Africa, 
was appropriated to colonial authorities.’10 
6 Centuries earlier the Europeans had used ‘national flags and religious symbols’ 
in Canada, United States, New Zealand and Australia, to ‘undertak(e) a well-
recognised legal procedure and ritual mandated by international law and 
8 Bahame Tom Nyanduga, ‘Applicant’s Final Submissions on the Merits in Application 006, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights vs Republic of Kenya’ (The African Court on Human And Peoples’ Rights 27 to 28 
November 2014). 
9 Boone (n 2). 
10 H.W.O Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Keynote Presentation’ (Workshop on Norwegian Land Tools Relevant to Africa, Oslo, 
Norway, 3-4 May 2007) <https://learning.uonbi.ac.ke/courses/GPR203_001/document/Property_Law_GPR216-
September,_2014/Articles/HWOOkoth-Ogendo_THELASTCOLONIALQUESTION.pdf> accessed 14 May 2016. 
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designed to create their country’s legal claim over ‘newly discovered lands’ 
and peoples’,11 i.e. the doctrine of discovery.  
7 In Kenya, the manner in which the English regime’s decrees and proclamations 
were applied created a very complex land management system with a myriad 
of statutes on land administration and management involving multiple 
institutions.12 The system was deliberately set up to favour individual 
ownership,13 and thus white settlers. By the 1940s the majority of Africans in 
Kenya had now become squatters, and were working, on land that was theirs 
but for its expropriation by the settlers and were being prevented from using 
land for their own benefit.14 Patrick McAuslan observes that this situation 
became untenable and led to ‘armed insurrection in the 1950s’15 and forced 
the colonial government to ‘commence programmes to meet the demands for 
land but in a way which was designed to maintain the underlying principle of 
private ownership of land’.16  The basis of the reforms pursued thereafter by 
the colonial administration and after independence, by the Kenyan 
Government, was the 1955 report of the East Africa Royal Commission.17 It is 
important to underscore certain excerpts from this report as these preface 
some of the developments that took place thereafter, which were detrimental 
to indigenous communities’ communal land rights.  
8 The Commission was asked by the colonial government to: 
‘examine the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved 
standard of living, including the introduction of capital to enable 
peasant farming to develop and expand production; and frame 
11 Robert J Miller, Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: the Doctrine 
of Discovery (Oxford University Press 2010). 
12 NLP (n 7). 
13 ibid. 
14 Boone (n 2). 
15 Patrick McAuslan, Land law Reform in Eastern Africa: Traditional or Transformative? A critical review of 50 
years of land law reform in Eastern Africa 1961-2011 (Routledge 2013). 
16 ibid. 
17 East Africa Royal Commission, ‘East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Presented by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty June 1955’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Cmd 
9475. (Hereon EARC Report). 
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recommendations with particular reference to: (1) the economic 
development of the land already in occupation by the introduction of 
better farming methods; (2) the adaptations or modifications in 
traditional tribal systems of tenure necessary for the full development 
of the land; (3) the opening for cultivation and settlement of land at 
present not fully used; (4) the development and siting of industrial 
activities; (5) conditions of employment in industry, commerce, mining 
and plantation agriculture with special reference to social conditions 
and the growth of large urban populations; and (6) the social problems 
which arise from the growth of permanent urban and industrial 
populations’. 18 
9 In its examination of ‘The Relationship of Land Tenure and Land Usage: 
Individualization’, the Commission recommended promotion of individual 
tenure over communal tenure. Its justification for this was as follows: 
’We turn now to the relationship of land tenure and land usage. We 
have said it permeates all the faults of the present systems. In order to 
establish a system of consolidated small-holdings the community has 
to be persuaded to forgo the tradition of running stock communally 
over the land…….to deal with displacement it has to forgo the tradition 
of keeping others out of unused land on the plea that the clan 
concerned has its own responsibility for its future children. In order to 
promote specialization it has to forgo the tradition of forbidding 
outsiders to use land to plant permanent crops and build permanent 
houses. To do all these things it has to be persuaded that the 
continuation of traditions designed to preserve a clan or tribal security 
are now leading to a dangerous dead-end and that the road to a higher 
standard of living for all lies in giving security to the individual stable 
unit. The greatest allies for persuading the community to make these 
18 ibid. 
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changes must be those individuals who are convinced that their own 
personal future is at stake therein....... individualization has …… the 
virtue of developing a political as well as an economic sense of 
responsibility…….’19 
10 The plan therefore seems to have been, as observed by Paul Keal in respect of 
other European-colonised territories, the ‘decimation of indigenous peoples, 
or if not that, at least destruction of their cultures’,20 to prevent these cultures 
from hampering any economic benefit that could be derived from 
individualisation of lands. Any aspiration therefore to maintain traditional 
cultures, keep lands for future generations and retain communal relationships 
with land i.e. common features of indigenous community existence, was to be 
thwarted.  
11 The Commission further recommended the creation of ‘a process of 
adjudication and registration’ not only of the individual holdings area but of 
whole areas. In cases where interests in land were not considered to confer 
full ownership rights, the Commission considered that registration of those 
lands would ultimately ‘bring into being full ownership interests’;21 and where 
there were any residual interests in land, the Commission recommended that 
legislation be passed to ‘enable governments to confer residual interests on 
individuals’.22  Focus clearly being individual tenure. The recommendations 
proposed by the Commission were ratified in Kenya by the 1962 Registered 
Land Ordinance, strategically passed before Kenya became independent. The 
drive of the recommendations was to create a system of ‘private ownership of 
land and …….. (ratify) the titles of colonial settlers as absolute owners of 
19 ibid, 323. 
20 Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International 
Society (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
21 EARC Report (n 17) 353. 
22 ibid. 
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expropriated land………(thereby) sealing the fate of the landless and squatters 
(and) intensifying the tenure insecurity of the poor’.23 
12 Kenyan gained its independence in 1963. Within 3 years of this point 20% of 
land in the Rift Valley’s White highlands- land previously expropriated by white 
settlers- was purchased back by the Government,24 through a scheme called 
the One Million Acre Settlement Scheme, funded by the World Bank, the 
British and German Governments. Christopher Leo opines that the Scheme 
satisfied a lot of demands including paying off the white settlers, meeting 
nationalist political demands, satisfying the conditions set by the funding 
bodies and even meeting ‘the land grievances of Kenya’s poor people’.25 It is 
not clear how the land grievances of indigenous communities were met 
through this scheme given that the focus of those in power, the agenda of the 
World Bank and thrust of the East Africa Royal Commission beforehand. 
Moreover if they had been settled the problems that indigenous communities 
experience today would not be continuing. 
13 Instead the Government’s plans, upon independence, became more focused 
on securing African farmers’ land holding, resettling African farmers on lands 
previously owned by white settlers, furtherance of ‘cash-cropping and dairying 
and increased production for the market’; and expanding export 
productivity.26 It was not in the Government’s interests to restructure the laws 
to reverse the systemic problems created by the colonial administration on the 
status of community owned-lands. This is for example evident in the provisions 
of Kenya’s first two post-colonial Constitutions of 1963 and 1969. They both 
designated land into three categories: public land or alternatively land vested 
23 McAuslan (n 15) , quoting K Karuti, O Lumumba and KS Amanor, The Struggle for Sustainable Land Management 
and Democratic Development in Kenya: A History of Greed and Grievances’, in KS Amanor and S Moyo (eds) Land 
& Sustainable Development in Africa, London, ZedBooks, 100-126. 
24 Boone (n 2). 
25 Christopher Leo, ‘Who Benefited from the Million Acre- Scheme?  Toward a Class Analysis of Kenya’s Transition 
to Independence’, (1981) Volume 15. No. 2 Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines/Canadian Journal of African 
Studies. 
26 World Bank, ‘Land Reform Sector Policy Paper’, 1975. 
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in the Government of Kenya,27 private land and trust land.28 The only way that 
indigenous communities would have had access to land, if at all, was via the 
trust land regime in exercise of their African customary laws. However, the 
land reforms pursued by the post-independence Government made it possible 
for this land to be compulsorily acquired through registration and adjudication 
for Government or private purposes. Once this happened it was no longer 
vested for the community benefit. And any interests they had were 
extinguished,29 as will be seen in the example of the Endorois indigenous 
community, to be discussed later. 
Marketization and politicisation of land 
14 Property rights have been found to ‘lie at the confluence of the political-legal 
order and the economic order’.30 Communal land tenure has been from the 
outset an antithesis to Kenya’s land reforms which have been founded on 
neoliberalism, for exactly the reasons set out by the East Africa Royal 
Commission.  Patrick McAuslan notes that the Royal Commission’s 1955 
recommendations, discussed above, actually ‘influenced World Bank policy 
and set in train policies and legal developments to support them which have 
lasted to this day’,31   the main one being an ‘emphasis….on issues of land 
titling and registration’ and extirpation of customary tenure.32 In fact the 
World Bank in its 1975 Sector Policy Paper on Land Reforms hailed ‘the 
implementation and results of (Kenya’s) reforms (as being) quite successful’ 
although noting that ‘16% of the rural population’ remained landless33 which 
27 1963 Constitution, s 205 of the 1963 Constitution defined this as land that as of 31 May 1963 encompassed all 
land in Nairobi (the capital city) previously vested in the British Monarch or the Governor of Kenya whilst Kenya 
was a Colony and Protectorate; and land in any region which similarly had been vested in the Governor and as of 
1 June 1963 was vested or re-vested in the same. Also see decision of Bahola Mkalindi v Michael Seth Kaseme & 2 
others, Land Case 168 of 2012, (Environment And Land Court At Malindi). 
28 1963 Constitution, s 208 defined trust lands as special areas, temporary special reserves, special leasehold areas, 
special settlements areas, communal reserves, areas where permits of occupation were in force and freehold areas 
registered in the name of the county council. See 1969 Constitution, s114. 
29 The 1969 Constitution rehashed this position in s117 and 118.  
30 Boone (n 3). 
31 McAuslan (n 15) 
32 Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa: From Communal Tenure to Free Markets (Zedbooks 
2006). 
33 EARC Report (n 17). 
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appears to counter Christopher Leo’s perspective on the One Million Acre 
Scheme. This policy paper further noted that the measures employed by the 
Kenyan Government which included more conversion of customary tenure to 
freehold, created tenancy that enabled ‘in the temperate production 
areas……….increased on-farm investment and helped raise output’.34 This 
actually aligned with aspirations set out by the Bank in the policy paper, of 
supporting land reform that led to ‘increasing output, improving income 
distribution and expanding employment’.35  
15 This reform agenda was to be part of a wider neoliberal agenda advocated by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bretton 
Woods institutions, whose advice to borrower nations was that they ought to 
focus on ‘fiscal austerity, privatisation and market liberalization’.36 To fulfil this 
neoliberalist agenda, borrower nations like Kenya were required by these 
institutions, by imposition of conditions, to pursue policy reforms ‘in exchange 
for access to resources’.37 Notably the World Bank has been Kenya’s main 
financer of development projects- with a recorded 35 active, 113 closed, 6 
pipeline and 14 dropped projects- dating from August 17, 1964 to the present 
date.38  This has of course meant that as with other borrower nations, these 
institutions have had ‘unprecedented influence over’ them,39 and creates a 
situation where the role of the state is reduced.40  
16 That is of course the purpose of the neoliberalist agenda. It creates a situation 
where ‘competition is the only legitimate organising principle for human 
34 ibid, 34. 
35 World Bank, ‘Land Reform Sector Policy Paper’, 1975, 11. 
36 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Penguin 2002). 
37 Sarah Babb and Alexander Kentikelenis, ‘International Financial Institutions as Agents of Neoliberalism’ in D. 
Cahill, M Cooper, M Knonings & D Primrose (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications 2018). 
38 The World Bank, ‘Projects & Operations’ (The World Bank IBRD-
IDA)<http://projects.worldbank.org/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=KE >accessed 16 June 
2017. 
39 Babb (n 37).  
40 ibid. 
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activity’.41 IMF economists actually accept that in the ‘80s there existed a 
neoliberalist agenda founded on ‘two main planks’, these being ‘increased 
competition’ and ‘a smaller role for the state achieved through privatisation’.42 
In their view the agenda has ‘rescued millions from abject poverty’, increased 
technological knowledge to developing states, streamlined  services and also 
reduced the ‘fiscal burden on governments’ but they also acknowledge that it 
has led to ‘increased inequality’ amongst other negative outcomes.43 Joseph 
Stiglitz agrees that the policies pursued by the Bretton Woods institutions 
were meant to be applied to nations with worrying fiscal deficit, which called 
for ‘fiscal discipline’. However, he observes that this discipline was not applied 
‘in the right way and at the right pace’ thereby failing to achieve ‘more 
equitable and sustainable growth’.44   
17 However, this only explains in part why communal land rights have been 
suppressed. Another factor explaining the communal land quagmire in Kenya 
is that it has been the culvert through which those in power have reinforced 
their power.45 The design or redesign of land regimes is not by default, it is by 
design, to facilitate governance.46 In other words, those in power will not 
permit reforms if these do not advance their agenda. As will become apparent 
from discussions in the thesis, the process of land management and 
administration pursued by the post-independent Government has been ‘one 
of the most pronounced manifestations of corruption and patronage’,47 
further decimating indigenous communities’ land rights. The One Million Acre 
41 Stephen Metcalf, ‘Neoliberalism: The Idea that Swallowed the World’ (The Guardian, 18 August 
2017)<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-
world>accessed 5 October 2019. 
42 Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani and David Furceri, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’, Finance & Development 
June 2016. 
43 ibid. 
44 Stiglitz (n 36). 
45 Ambreena Manji, ‘The Grabbed State: Lawyers, Politics and Public Land in Kenya’ (2012) 50 The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 467 < https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-
studies/article/grabbed-state-lawyers-politics-and-public-land-in-
kenya/EC25B795BE332A1B352670D1B92DC6D5> accessed 17 October 2018. 
46 Boone (n 3). 
47 ibid. 
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Scheme benefited those in power in independent Kenya than any other groups in 
society and because they could take land, they did. 
18 It is observed that unlike in other African states where the central focus is ‘use 
and abuse of ostensible customary authority’, allocation of land by the state 
has been a tool in the hands of ‘all of Kenya’s governments’ used for ‘granting 
land access strategically  to engineer political constituencies that would bolster 
them against their rivals’,48 evident from the 1960s to the present date where 
even the new constitutional land dispensation is viewed as the latest in a series 
of ‘acts in an ongoing drama over structuring and the use of state power to 
distribute and redistribute land’.49 Notwithstanding this is the law that 
currently is. Despite the negative effect that the law has had on their land 
rights, indigenous communities have used and continue to use law as a tool 
for adjudication of their land rights, a process that has not been without its 
challenges. Before we discuss those challenges it is important to discuss who 
indigenous communities are.  
Identification of indigenous communities- regional and international position 
19 The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ position is that there are 4 
identifying characteristics for indigenous communities, namely: ‘1. the 
occupation and use of a specific territory; 2. The voluntary perpetuation of 
cultural distinctiveness, which may include aspects of language, social 
organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and 
institutions. 3. Self-identification, as well as recognition, by other groups, as a 
distinct collectivity; 4. An experience of subjugation, marginalisation, 
dispossession, exclusion or discrimination’.50 This is but a working definition 
that does not constitute an agreed global definition of the term ‘indigenous’.  
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘Report 
of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities’ (ACHPR and 
IWGIA 2005). 
17 
20 The African Commission51 has considered it unnecessary to have a definition 
of indigenous peoples, as a single definition is unable to encapsulate all the 
characteristics of indigenous peoples. The Commission avers that focus should 
instead be placed on accentuating the ‘main characteristics allowing the 
identification of the indigenous peoples and communities in Africa.’52 Article 
33 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) provides that ‘indigenous peoples have the right to determine their 
own identity or membership in accordance with their customs and traditions,’ 
but that is as far as it goes on that front. The International Labour 
Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No.169 is globally 
the only legally binding instrument on indigenous communities, rather than 
offer a definition, talks in the following terms: 
‘1. This Convention applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time
of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions
of this Convention apply.’
51 In relation to legal problems, its functions include giving its views or making recommendations to Governments, 
formulating and laying down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' 
rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislations, ensuring the 
protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter and interpreting all 
the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State party, an institution of the OAU or an African 
Organization recognized by the OAU: See Article 45 of the African Charter. 
52 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 2007). 
18 
21 The absence of a globally agreed definition is understandable as the 
experiences of indigenous communities differ globally. For example José 
Martínez Cobo,53 in the 1980s defined indigenous communities as ‘having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors 
of societies now prevailing in those territories…form non-dominant societies 
and are determined to preserve, develop…their ancestral territories, and their 
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence….’54 Whilst the 
majority of this definition may be applicable to a huge cohort of indigenous 
communities globally, the first part does not adequately capture indigenous 
groups in Africa in the same way that the ILO Convention’s description of tribal, 
rather than indigenous groups does. 
22 The African Commission states that the indigenous peoples’ concept is 
contentious in the African context because from an autochthonous 
perspective/understanding of the concept or in comparison to European 
colonists, all communities in Africa, not just those identifying as indigenous 
communities today, can claim to be indigenous to Africa. However, it considers 
that those communities in Africa who do identify as indigenous today are those 
who have embraced that identity in order to address their post-colonial 
situation of marginalisation, discrimination, suppression and dispossession of 
their lands, i.e. their ‘human rights sufferings’.55 These human rights sufferings 
include: ‘being left on the margins of development, being negatively perceived 
by more dominating mainstream development paradigms, having their 
cultures and ways of life discriminated against and facing threats of 
extinction’,56 which although to some degree echoes the Martinéz Cobo 
53 When he was Special UN rapporteur of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities in a 1982 Study: José Martínez Cobo, ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations Final report submitted by the Special Rapporteur’ (10 August 1982E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2 United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 1982). 
54 ibid. 
55 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50). 
56 ibid, 87. 
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definition, is a human rights construct. According to the African Commission’s 
Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities,57 the: 
‘concept of indigenous peoples is indeed a human rights construct 
aimed at redressing specific violations of rights linked to cultural 
identities, livelihoods, and cultural existence as community. Factors 
that make certain communities self-identify as indigenous peoples, as 
a way of seeking redress and justice, are to be found in most working 
definitions or meanings of the term “indigenous peoples”. They include 
“conquest”, “settlements”, “subjugation” “domination” and 
“colonisation”.’58 
23 The term ‘indigenous’ was used by colonial administrations, not just in Kenya 
but in other colonies to describe those found in those territories and was 
interchanged with terms such as ‘natives, aborigines (and) populations found 
on those territories’.59 In colonial Kenya, native communities, including those 
now self-identifying as indigenous, were not considered to be ‘legal entities 
capable of having property rights in land’.60 The laws enacted by the colonial 
administration disadvantaged all native communities. Had the indigenous 
movement in Africa that now exists, existed then, the majority of the 
communities in Kenya would have been able to claim that identity in the hope 
that it would highlight and address their human rights sufferings. The 
distinguishing event(s) must have therefore surfaced after independence. As 
noted earlier independence did not bear the fruits all communities had hoped 
as those who identify as indigenous today continued to experience 
subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion and discrimination. 
Arguably, absent these factors, there would be no need for identification as 
indigenous in the African context.61 
57 The Working Group was created by a resolution: ‘51: Resolution on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Communities in Africa’ of the African Commission in November 2000 with a mandate to: i) examine the concept of 
indigenous peoples and communities in Africa; ii) Study the implications of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the well-being of indigenous peoples; and iii) recommend ways to monitor and protect 
indigenous communities.  
58 Albert Kwame Barume, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa with Special Focus on Central, Eastern and 
Southern Africa (IWGIA 2014). 
59 ibid, 25. 
60 Collins Odote, ‘Debunking The Fallacies, Community Land Rights: Which Way Forward, Now That They Are a 
Reality?’ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 6 May 2013). 
61 Barume (n 58). 
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24 Therefore although all Africans are indigenous to Africa, it is this kind of 
continuing ‘structural subordination’62 of certain communities by far more 
dominant groups and the State, and the need to have that subordination and 
all its by-products uprooted, that the African Commission opines necessitates 
their reliance on the indigenous concept. Indigenous groups in Africa are 
therefore said to have, in an attempt to ‘address (their situation) and 
overcome these human rights violations, aligned themselves with the 
international movement for the rights of indigenous peoples’.63 Although the 
efficacy of construing indigenous identity in Africa in the manner above is 
understandable, one could question what happens when the structural root 
causes- the structural subordination- no longer exist(s).64 One may argue that 
addressing and redressing structural subordination in other contexts has not 
led to questioning why equality laws remain in force, and this is possibly 
because discrimination and subjugation in human society will always exist one 
way or another.  
25 In any event whilst it remains, one theme that is characteristic of both the 
African human rights construct of indigenousness and elsewhere, is self-
identification. The African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities, has averred that self-identification and 
recognition of the self-identity and distinctiveness of indigenous peoples by 
other groups is descriptive of who is or is not indigenous;65 and that the term 
‘indigenous populations/communities’ has evolved over the years from being 
a reference to native inhabitants of territories in the colonial period in many 
African states, to a principle underpinned by self-identification and recognition 
of the self-identity of peoples.66 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on 
62 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50). 
63 ibid. 
64 Felix Ndahinda, ‘Historical Development of Indigenous Identification and Rights in Africa' in Laher R and Sing’Oei 
K (eds), Indigenous People In Africa, Contestations, Empowerment And Group Rights (Africa Institute Of South Africa 
2012) 27. 
65 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50) 12, 93; See also the Endorois case (n 114), para 157. 
66 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50), introduction. 
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Human Rights has found that ‘the criterion of self-identification is the principal 
one for determining the condition of indigenous people, both individually and 
collectively.’67 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that it is up 
to the community and not the State to determine ‘its own name, composition 
and ethnic affiliation, without having the State or other external entities do it 
or contest it’.68 The High Court of Australia has also considered self-
identification as being fundamental to the question of whether native title to 
land for indigenous peoples survives:  
‘But so long as the people remain as an identifiable community, the 
members of whom are identified by one another as members of that 
community living under its laws and customs, the communal native 
title survives to be enjoyed by the members according to the rights and 
interests to which they are respectively entitled under the traditionally 
based laws and customs.’69 
26 Returning to Africa, as of now there appears not to be a plan to address the 
post-prejudice position once the basis for the self-identification ceases to exist. 
Self- identification therefore remains the only non-structuralist criterion for 
indigenous identity in Africa, and this can be problematic as it places no 
containment on who can so identify and as there is no exhaustive list of 
indigenous communities, it makes the identity susceptible to use by 
communities, marginalised or otherwise, to highlight their own sufferings.70 
Be that as it may, it has so far done more good than harm in terms of ensuring 
that these sufferings remain in the limelight, as seen in regional cases of the 
Endorois and the Ogiek. The Endorois case is described as ‘an important victory 
for indigenous rights advocates in efforts aimed at translating such rights into 
enforceable ones’.71 Given the continuing nature of the problems indigenous 
communities face, self-identification remains relevant but there should be 
67 IACHR, ‘Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia’ (Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 34, June 28, 2007), para 216 in IACHR 2009 (n 81). 
68 IACHR 2009 (n 81) referring to the case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 24 
August 2010, Merits, Reparations and Costs (Inter-American Court of Human Rights)  
69 Mabo (n 127) para 68. 
70 Ndahinda (n 64) 24. 
71 ibid. 
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some thinking at some point about the characteristics.72 In 2011, in adopting 
the African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African /on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights73 (the ‘Principles and Guidelines’), the Commission accentuated some 
characteristics of indigenous communities to be: 
‘Any group of people whose culture and way of life and mode of 
production differ considerably from the dominant of society, whose 
culture depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the 
natural resources thereon, and whose cultures are under threat. They 
suffer from discrimination as they are regarded as less developed and 
less advanced than other more dominant sectors of society, which 
often prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in 
deciding their own future and forms of development.’ 
27 For the indigenous communities in Kenya who are seeking realisation of their 
land rights, this encapsulates their experience. 
Kenya’s indigenous communities 
28 In Kenya the following communities self-identify as indigenous: Endorois, 
Ogiek, Sengwer, Yaaku, Waata, El Molo, Aweri (Boni), Malakote, Wagoshi, 
Sanye, Turkana, Rendille, Borana, Maasai, Samburu, Ilchamus, Somali, Gabra 
and Pokot.74 These communities have a distinctive collective attachment to 
certain lands which they claim as their ancestral homes, on which their social, 
economic, cultural and political provenance is founded. These communities 
are repeatedly being clamped together with other communities and classed as 
illegal squatters and encroachers on what are essentially their own lands. This 
72ibid. 
73 These were adopted on 24th October 2011. Their primary purpose is to assist State Parties to comply with their 
obligations under the Charter. They are said to draw inspiration from other international human rights instruments 
that promote and protect economic, social and cultural rights, decisions of domestic courts within the jurisdiction 
of states, reports of Special Mechanisms of the African Commission and Special Procedures of the United Nations 
human rights system and other declarations, reports and guidelines issued by the United Nations and African 
Union.   
74 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘The Indigenous World 2013’ (IWGIA 2013); and African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘Indigenous 
Peoples: A Forgotten Peoples?’ (ACHPR and IWGIA 2006). 
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failure to recognise and protect their collective forms of land tenure75 and 
their self-identity as indigenous has resulted in violation of their land rights as 
encompassing their right to land, religion, culture, natural resources and 
development and in some cases has been found to have violated their right to 
life as it has resulted in loss of their livelihood76 and death.77 
29 To further understand the Kenyan position, it would be helpful to set out here 
brief accounts of three indigenous communities, to illustrate the customary 
ownership of land and also to introduce them to the discussion as they will 
intermittently appear in this thesis. The first two will be the Ogiek and the 
Endorois as these two communities have used law to pursue their land rights’ 
claims not only under the Kenyan jurisdiction but regionally under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and their cases under the latter have 
resulted in landmark decisions: 276/03: Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council) v Kenya in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights78 in respect of the Endorois; and Application No 006/2012: African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya in the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in respect of the Ogiek 
community, which have underscored recognition of indigenous communities’ 
in Africa, reinforced entitlement of indigenous communities to land rights and 
State obligations to recognise, respect and protect these rights; and have 
brought to the fore the question of implementation of decisions-relating to 
indigenous communities’ land rights. Both these regional decisions remain 
unimplemented by the Kenyan State, an issue that this thesis will examine. 
75 Endorois case (n 114). In this case the Endorois community argued that: ‘(a) the failure to provide adequate 
recognition and protection in domestic law of the community’s over land, in particular the failure of Kenyan law to 
acknowledge collective ownership of land’ was an encroachment of their rights that went to the core of the 
‘community’s identity as a people’, Endorois case (n 114), para 99. 
76 See case of: Joseph Letuya & 21 others v Attorney General & 5 others [2014] Elc Civil Suit 821 of 2012 (Os). 
77 In January 2018 a member of the Kenyan Sengwer community- identifying as indigenous- was killed by the Kenya 
Forestry Services and others shot at in the course of forcibly evicting them from their ancestral home during a EU 
funded water towers project. In 2011, a member of the Sengwer community was shot at during a World Bank-IDA 
funded project whilst the community was being forcibly evicted from their homes. 
78 The Commission is a quasi-judicial body created by the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) to 
inter alia consider claims against violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter): See 
Article 30 of the African Charter. 
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30 The third community this thesis will introduce is the Sengwer community. 
Their continuing experience highlights possible defects in the application of 
law and policy by the Kenya Government- an important issue in this thesis, and 




31 The Ogiek are hunter-gatherers,79 and they total about 30,000 people. They 
claim the Mau Forest as their ancestral home, their school, their cultural 
identity, way of life and as heritage that gives them pride and a destiny.80 The 
fact that it is their ancestral home has been confirmed in various reports: i) 
Kenya Legislative Council report of 1927 recommended leaving the Ogiek in 
the Cheplangu forest, one of the Mau forests; ii) Carter Land Commission 
report of 1933 reported that the Ogiek lived in the Mau forest although it then 
sought to appendage them to larger communities; iii) Independent Kenya 
Parliament report of 1965 reported the Ogiek living there;81 and iv) the Mau 
Forest Task Force Report which observed that the Mau Forests Complex is the 
‘home of a minority group of indigenous forest dwellers, the Ogiek,’ but sought 
to have them settled elsewhere.82  
32 As early as 1000AD the Ogiek community initially occupied the coastal regions 
of East Africa and were forced to move due to attacks by slave traders and 
79 They can be found in the Mau forest and Mt Elgon. This thesis examines the Mau forest Ogiek as they have 
resorted to the law and informed the indigenous discourse in Kenya which makes them a suitable case study for 
this thesis. 
80 Julius Muchemi and Albrecht Ehrensperger, Ogiek Peoples Ancestral Territories Atlas: Safeguarding Territories, 
Cultures and Natural Resources of Ogiek Indigenous Peoples in Kenya (ERMIS Africa and CDE 2011). 
81 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, ‘African Commission’s Written Submissions to the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27-8 November 2014 in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v The Republic of Kenya, Application 006/2012’ (The African Court on Human And Peoples’ Rights 27- 28 November 
2014). Hereon the Ogiek case. 
82 Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex, ‘Report of the Prime Minister’s 
Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex’ (Prime Minister’s Task Force on the 
Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex March 2009). (Hereon Mau Task Force Report). 
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other migrating communities. One group moved to Tanzania where they were 
assimilated by the Maasai there and the second group moved to the plains of 
Laikipia bordering Mt. Kenya forest from where they dispersed to various 
locations in northern, central and western Kenya and by the turn of the 
century could be found in Mt Elgon, Cherangany, Koibatek and Nandi and the 
Mau forest region.83 
33 The Ogiek speak Okiek,84 a language of the Southern Nilotic group.85 Some 
have opined that the Ogiek speak the same language as another community, 
the Kipsigis and other Kalenjin sub-groups and the only way to distinguish them 
is from their way of life in the forest,86 but the Ogiek have maintained they are 
a distinct community and have been found by domestic87 and regional courts88 
to be a distinct community.  
34 A 2011 study of the Ogiek history is helpful in understanding the community’s 
relationship with their land.89 This study states that: 
a. The Ogiek’s clan/tribe system is made up of 3 sub-tribes: Tyepkwereg,
Morisionig and Gipchorng’woneg.90 They have divided the Mau Forest
into clan territories which are marked using natural markers,
topography and vegetation features, respected by all clan members.91
Trespass to another territory or destruction of the forests and hunting
game in another territory was rapidly addressed to ensure consultative
utilisation of the territory.92 The author interviewed an Ogiek elder in
2013 who told her:
83 Towett J. Kimaiyo, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Land Injustices 1902-2004 (Ogiek Welfare Council 2004). 
84 Ecoterra Intl, ‘Ogiek Language’ (Ecoterra Intl. 1992-2015)<http://ogiek.org/indepth/ogiek-language.htm> 
accessed November 2013. 
85 Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project, ‘Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (Ogiek and 
Sengwer)’ (KAPAP 2009). 
86 Interview with Faith Rotich, Lawyer, Kituo cha Sheria, Nairobi (Nairobi, Kenya, 11 September 2013). 
87 Joseph Letuya (n 76). 
88 Ogiek case (n 81). 
89 Muchemi and Ehrensperger (n 80). The actual number of clans is 22, Twitter Message from Daniel Kobei, 





‘If when hunting, our game fled into another territory, we 
would not dare chase after it otherwise there would be serious 
consequences.’93 
b. Ogiek territories are held as cultural heritage and are passed on by oral
traditions, songs, dances, ceremonies, folklore and riddles. The clan
territories form the basis of their occupation, ownership, utilisation,
protection, conservation, governance of the forest and its resources.
Their territories run from lowlands to highlands due to climate change
which has enabled the Ogiek manage their utilisation of game, quality
of honey and protection of the more vulnerable members of the
community.94
c. The Ogiek have three levels of leadership: i) the clan leaders who
represent the clan members on issues affecting them; ii) the council of
elders, who are leaders of the constituent clans and deal with family
issues and tribal conflicts with neighbouring communities; iii) the chief
council which governs the whole community, with the help of
assistants and adjudicates on issues such as boundary disputes, theft
of hives, inter-clan conflicts and community rules and regulations. They
try to resolve minor conflict through reconciliation.95
d. The Ogiek have always used their traditional knowledge of the water-
divide, temperature, humidity, rainfall, wind and topographical
knowledge of location, altitude, aspects and relationship of terrain
features to define, delineate and define their territories into eco-
climatic regions.96 It is this traditional knowledge and need to preserve
forests as they depend on these for their survival as a community that
makes them the best candidates for forest management and
conservation, far more ideal than the State itself.97
e. In terms of cultural practices, the Ogiek consider several sites sacred,
for instance, sites marked by springs and trees, rivers producing
extraordinary sounds and any place declared sacred by the leaders.
The sanctity of the place is inferred from history, declared by elderly
traditional herbalists and foreseers and announced after a ritual had
been performed.98
35 The Ogiek of today maintain this close attachment to the Mau forest. They 
continue to claim this forest as their ancestral home, source of life, food, 
93 Interview with Kiprono Chuma, Ogiek elder, Timboroa, Nakuru (Nakuru, Kenya, 16 September 2013). 
94 Muchemi and Ehrensperger (n 80). 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
97 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
98 Muchemi and Ehrensperger (n 80). 
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firewood, pharmacy, religious site and cultural home on which they have 
access to their cultural sites. They have faced forcible evictions from the forest 
by Government agencies on grounds that the Mau forest constitutes Kenya’s 
largest water catchment area and is therefore public land, and their presence 
on it is unlawful, despite acceptance, as noted earlier, that the Mau Forest is 
their ancestral home. This has destructed their lifestyle and amounted to an 
encroachment of their rights.99 
ii) The Endorois
36 The Endorois are a pastoralist community from Kenya of about 60,000 people 
who self-identify as indigenous.100 They claim the Lake Bogoria area has been 
their ancestral home for centuries and that it had been accepted by all tribal 
neighbours that they were bona fide owners of this land. They claim that their 
way of life - their health, livelihood, religion and culture- is inextricably linked 
to Lake Bogoria.101 They had remained undisturbed on this land and had 
continued to occupy and enjoy their land during the colonial era despite this 
land being converted to Crown (Government) land.102 In the post-colonial era 
their land was held in trust for them by the County Councils under Article 115 
of the Kenyan Constitution at the time.103 They therefore maintained the right 
to remain on the land and continued to hold, use and enjoy the land without 
interference.  
99 Pacifique Manirakiza, ‘Oral Submissions/Introduction’, Ogiek case (n 81). 
100 The African Commission has found those communities identifying as indigenous communities in Kenya to be 
pastoralist groups such as the Maasai, Pokot, Samburu, Turkana, Rendille, Endorois, Borana, El Molo, Somali and 
the Gabra; and hunter-gatherer groups like the Waata, Ogiek, Sengwer and Yaaku, Waata, see Indigenous Peoples: 
A Forgotten Peoples? (n 74), 15. 
101 This summary is extracted from the Endorois case (n 114). 
102 Under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902 and 1915, all public land was ‘summarily’ acquired by the colonial 
administration and land from that point on, could only be apportioned under English law. See Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy Framework, 
Constitutional Position of Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration, Chairman: Charles M. 
Njonjo Presented to His Excellency Hon, Daniel T Arap Moi, November 2002, 24. 
103 Constitution of Kenya 1969, Article 115 provided: ‘Trust Land to vest in county councils. (1) All Trust land shall 
vest in the county council within whose area of jurisdiction it is situated: Provided that they shall not vest in any 
county council by virtue of this subsection- (i) any body of water immediately before 12 December 1964 was vested 
in any person or authority in right of the government; or (ii) any minerals or mineral oils; (2) Each county council 
shall hold the Trust land vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land and shall give 
effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of the land as may, under the African customary law for 
the time being in force and applicable thereto, be vested in any tribe, group, family or individual (……..).’ 
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37 In 1973, the Lake Hannington Game Reserve was created in the area. In 1978, 
the area was re-gazetted as Lake Bogoria Game Reserve without any 
consultation with the Endorois community. This resulted in the Endorois being 
denied access to the land which effectively meant denial of their collective 
ownership of land, restricted access to religious sites, ability to take part in 
their cultural life as a community including access to cultural sites in Lake 
Bogoria, restricted free access to their natural resources which were vital to 
their existence and as result faced damage to their pastoralist way of 
life.104They pursued legal proceedings in the High Court of Kenya in 2000.105 
They argued that they were entitled to collective ownership of land as that is 
how they had always held land. The court rejected the concept of a collective 
right to property based on historical occupation and cultural rights106 and 
concluded that: ‘there is no proper identity of the people who were affected 
by the setting aside of the land….that has been shown to the Court’.107 
38 The Endorois like other indigenous communities in Kenya view themselves as 
distinct from other communities with distinct cultural expressions, historical 
continuity and relationship with the Lake Bogoria area. Therefore in finding 
that the identity of the Endorois peoples had not been shown to the Court, the 
Court essentially found the Endorois community’s identity as a distinct group 
utilising a collective land tenure system unrecognisable in law.108 Hence the 
importance of having the guidance not only under the ILO Convention but also 
under the Principles and Guidelines of the ACHPR and also the Commission’s 
approach to indigenous peoples’ discourse in Africa. 
104 Endorois decision (n 50). 
105 ibid, para 12, referring to the case of William Yatch Sitetalia, William Arap Ngasia et al. v Baringo County Council, 
High Court Judgment of 19 April 2002, Civil Case No. 183 of 2000. 
106 Endorois case (n 114), para 12. 
107 ibid. 
108 ibid. 




iii) The Sengwer 
 
39 The Sengwer are hunter-gatherers. The Sengwer comprise 21 clans, who are 
governed by traditional structures developed by the community itself and 
informs their whole existence. Their ancestral home is Embobut Forest. And it 
is this forest that they collectively rely on for food; religion, retention of their 
culture; medicines and their eco-friendly livelihood.109They have experienced 
repeated violation of their land rights in the form of forced eviction from the 
forest, destroying of their property and means of livelihood, physical attacks 
threats to life and killing of community members by Government agencies 
during forced evictions. A 2018 report by Amnesty International, ‘Families Torn 
Apart: Forest Eviction of Indigenous Peoples in Embobut Forest, Kenya’,110 
touching on the experiences of the Sengwer community confirms that these 
violations against the community have been long running and for what is 
approaching a century. That in 1932, during the Carter Land Commission,111 as 
discussed above in respect of the Ogiek community, their distinctive 
collectivity was not recognised and they were subjected to forced assimilation. 
Their land was gazetted into a public forest in 1954 even before the East Africa 
Royal Commission report. 
 
40 Over the years huge tracts of land in the Embobut Forest have been irregularly 
allocated by the political elite, which has impacted on the community, their 
land rights and how they have been perceived by the authorities.112 During a 
2007-2013 World Bank development project- the Natural Resource 
Management Project- in Kenya, the Sengwer were subjected to mass evictions 
which resulted in the establishment of the Embobut Task Force which looked 
into genuine and economic opportunistic seekers. Although the Task Force 
                                                          
109Amnesty International, ‘Families Torn Apart: Forest Eviction of Indigenous Peoples in Embobut Forest, Kenya’ 
(Amnesty International 2018). 
110 ibid. 
111 This is briefly discussed in Chapter 1. 
112 Amnesty International (n 109). 
30 
considered the Sengwer to have resided in the forest for generations, it 
concluded that they had done so illegally,113 thus perpetuating their 
perception by the Government and others, as squatters on what is essentially 
their ancestral home. 
41 In January 2018 in the course of an EU- funded Water Towers Project the 
community were subjected to human rights violations. A community member 
was shot dead, others shot, forcibly ejected, properties burnt and so on. This 
violating treatment was perpetrated by the Kenya Forestry Service, a 
Government Agency. Its actions were justified on the basis that the 
community's presence in the forest was unlawful as they were considered to 
be squatters and encroachers.   
Indigenous communities’ cases and common issues 
42 As seen with Kenyan indigenous communities, the failure to recognise and 
protect collective forms of land tenure- and return indigenous communities’ 
to the position they were in prior to colonisation- has been a major contention 
for indigenous communities.114 Whether this is in fact possible is an issue that 
has arisen in a number of cases including those pursued by Paraguayan 
indigenous communities in the Inter-American human rights system, where 
the court has considered that if restitution by means including expropriation 
of former lands is not possible, that the Government should allocate 
alternative lands with the communities’ consent.115  
113 ibid. 
114 Communication 276/03: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya [2009] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, para 91. This case will hereinafter be referred to as the Endorois case. 
115 See cases of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of June 17, 2005 (Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of March 29, 2006 (Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights) and Case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of August 24, 
2010 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). 
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Survival of native title 
43 A common feature of indigenous communities’ land rights cases is whether in 
fact customary land tenure or native title has survived colonisation and 
domestic legal developments.  Jérémie Gilbert and Valérie Couillard,116 
observe that ‘a major problem leading to the loss of indigenous peoples’ land 
in Africa is that customary collective tenure (is) neither recognised nor 
secured’117 and that this forms one of the major requests of indigenous 
communities.118 This is a global predicament which the Rights and Resources 
Initiative’s ‘Who Owns the World’s Land? 2015 Report discusses.119 The report 
found that indigenous groups’ land contestations result from, like in the 
Kenyan example, forceful expropriation of communities’ lands by 
colonial/Europeans powers, entrenched further by post-colonial Governments 
using statutory mechanisms that converted those lands into private and public 
land; and despite communities continuing to agitate for recognition of their 
land rights, there is a reluctance by Governments to formally recognise their 
rights, which continues to leave the communities susceptible to human rights 
violations.120  
44 This predicament has been created, as Paul Keal, explains by the ‘expansion of 
the European society of states to an international society global in scope 
entail(ing) the progressive dispossession and subordination of non-European 
peoples’.121 He considers that the continuing failure by states to properly 
address the indigenous communities’ land rights question is not a failure only 
116 Jérémie Gilbert and Valérie Couillard, ‘International Law and Land Rights in Africa: The Shift from States’ 
Territorial Possessions to Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership Rights’ in Robert Home (ed), Essays in African Land Law 
(Pretoria University Law Press 2011). 
117 Ibid, 55. 
118 ibid. 
119 Rights and Resources Initiative, ‘Who Owns the World’s Land? A Global Baseline of Formally Recognized 
Indigenous & Community Land Rights’ (Rights and Resources Initiative September 2015). 
120 ibid. 
121 Keal (n 20). 
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of the states concerned but a failure of the international society of states as a 
whole.122 And therefore more widely in places such as North, Central and 
South America, the Pacific as well as Asia,123 indigenous communities whose 
rights were ‘gradually eroded in response to the changing demands of 
European colonists’ are demanding restoration of the same.124  
45 In the 1973 case of Calder v The Attorney General of British Coloumbia 125 the 
Court held that native title to land existed and had not been extinguished by 
subsequent statutory dispensations. Aboriginal title to land has been 
confirmed as existing in Canada’s Constitution Act 1982.126 In the Australian 
case of Mabo and Others127 the High Court examined whether native title to 
land had been extinguished when the territory was annexed by the Europeans. 
The  Court held that Australia: 
‘recognizes a form of native title which, in the cases where it has not 
been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous 
inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their 
traditional lands and that, subject to the effect of some particular 
Crown leases, the land entitlement of the Murray Islanders in 
accordance with their laws or customs is preserved, as native title, 
under the law of Queensland.’128   
46 The decision as left would suggest that there will be cases where native title 
will be deemed extinguished. However, the Australia’s Native Title Act 1993, 
recognises and protects native title129 and provides that this shall not be 
extinguished contrary to the Act.130 
122 ibid. 
123 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘The Indigenous World 2018’ (IWGIA 2018). 
124 Keal (n 20). 
125 Calder v The Attorney General of British Coloumbia [1973] SCR 313, [1973]. 
126 s35(1). 
127 Mabo and Others v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014 (High Court of Australia). 
128 Ibid, para 2. 
129 Section 10 of the Act. 
130 Section 11 of the Act. 
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47 Cynthia Morel,131 observes that jurisprudence before the Human Rights 
Committee Lovelace v Canada132 and under the Inter-American system Awas 
Tingni v Nicaragua case,133 has shown that realisation of indigenous peoples’ 
rights is contingent upon the indigenous community’s identity being 
recognised. In the Lovelace case she notes that once the plaintiff’s native 
status had been restored, other land rights accrued. In other words 
recognition of native status, or in the alternative pre-existing land rights that 
were not extinguished by colonial land policies and those that only certain 
communities were said to still possess, had resulted in accruement of other 
land rights. In respect of indigenous peoples of Nicaragua, in the Awas Tingni 
case, she notes that the Government did not contest that these peoples 
existed but argued that the community lacked legal standing/juridical 
personality as their identity as individuals or as a collective had not been 
registered. However, the Inter-American Commission accepted that they were 
indigenous, that they did have such standing and recognised them as collective 
rights-holders. She observes that this case made it possible for indigenous 
communities to make land claims as collectives under Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.134 
48 In the cases brought in the African human rights jurisdiction,135 the argument 
has mainly concerned recognition of communal land rights under current laws 
rather than a question of whether native title has survived legal developments 
in the colonial and post-colonial eras, which it may be argued is immaterial as 
it leads to the same answer, this being recognition of land rights. However, 
significantly the cases have also raised the issue of recognition of indigenous 
131 Cynthia Morel, ‘From theory to practice, Holistic strategies for effective strategy’ in Corinne Lennox and Damien 
Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routledge 2016) 357. 
132 Lovelace v Canada, Merits, Communication No 24/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (HRC). 
133 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Merits, reparations and costs [2001] IACHR Series C 
No 79. 
134 Morel (n131) 357. 
135 The Endorois and Ogiek decisions which will be discussed extensively in this thesis. 
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identity in the African context, an issue that certainly distinguishes discourse 
of indigeneity in the African context and other continents.136 
 
The extent of rights 
 
49 Another issue that arises in indigenous communities’ land rights cases is the 
extent of the land rights. For indigenous communities, their land rights exist 
concurrently with other rights due to the fact that their whole existence is 
founded on attachment to their land. So when they seek recognition and 
protection of their land rights, their claims are likely to also constitute claims 
for protection of other rights. The South African Government, for instance, in 
the Richtersveld community case contended that whatever rights to land the 
community claimed to have on the disputed land, this did not include the right 
to minerals and precious stones. The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
disagreed and held that ‘under the indigenous law of the Richtersveld 
Community communal ownership of the land included communal ownership 
of the minerals and precious stones’.137 It also examined whether the 
community was ‘dispossessed of its land rights ….as a result of discriminatory 
laws or practices’ which goes to show the entwining of the right to land with 
other rights.138   
 
50 The Endorois community of Kenya in their claim against the Kenyan 
Government before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
contended that their rights under Articles 8, 14, 17, 21 and 22 of the African 
Charter had been violated. The Commission observed that ‘the Complainants 
claim that the Endorois community’s health, livelihood, religion and culture 
are all intimately connected with their traditional land, as grazing lands, sacred 
religious sites and plants used for traditional medicine are all situated around 
                                                          
136 See discussion on the Identification of indigenous communities- regional and international position in this 
chapter. 
137 Alexkor Ltd and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Richtersveld Community and Others [2003] Case 
CCT 19/03 (Constitutional Court of South Africa), para 63-64.  
138 ibid, para 45. 
   
35 
 
the shores of Lake Bogoria.’139 The Commission went on to find a violation of 
all these provisions as well as Article 1. Worth noting is the Commission’s 
finding in this case that Article 17 not only enshrined the right of individuals to 
participate in community life but was a ‘complex whole’140 encompassing all 
manner of things including spiritual and physical connection to ancestral land, 
morals, customs and others that are capable of distinguishing one community 
from another. 141 
 
51 Similarly in the Ogiek community of Kenya’s case before the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the community contended that their rights under 
Articles 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 17(2), 17(3), 21 and 22 of the Charter had been violated. 
The Court found a violation of these provisions save Article 4. 142 
 
52 In the Nigerian case of the Ogoni people,143 an indigenous community who 
although not basing their case on indigenousness, alleged that the Nigerian 
authorities had failed to protect them from the adverse effects of oil 
exploration on their lands by the company, Shell and had perpetrated violent 
attacks against them. Amongst other findings the Court found that where 
housing is destroyed, this has the potential to impact on ‘property, health and 
family life’.144  
 
53 In the Inter-American human rights system, Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights which enshrines the right to property, has been 
relied on by indigenous communities for recognition also of associated rights 
such as rights to natural resources, socioeconomic rights such as water, food, 
                                                          
139Endorois case (n 114), para 16.  
140 ibid, para 241. 
141 ibid. 
142 In combination, the provisions relied on under the Endorois and Ogiek cases enshrine: the freedom to enjoy 
the rights enshrined in the Charter without distinction on grounds of race, ethnic group, language, religion, national 
and social origin and any other status amongst some (Art 2); the right to life (Art 4); right to freedom of conscience 
which includes religion (Art 8); right to property (Art 14); right to take part in the cultural life of a community and 
to have traditional values recognised by the State (Art 17); right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources 
(Art 21); and a right to economic, social and cultural development (Art 22).  
143 Communication no: 155/96 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR) versus Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
144 ibid, para 60. 
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health, religion, honour, culture and identity; and civil political rights such as 
rights of association, life, dignity, movement and residence.145  Article 21 is 
therefore said to encompass the ‘fundamental basis for the development of 
indigenous communities’ culture, spiritual life, integrity and economic 
survival’.146 The Kichwa indigenous group of Sarayaku has argued for instance 
that their right to property under Article 21 has been violated in relation to the 
obligation to respect rights under Article 1(1), their freedom of thought and 
expression (Article 13(1)) and their political rights under Article 23 
respectively.147 
54 Similar protections are found under the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and C169- Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention 1989 (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (Convention 169). It is worth observing that as these 
instruments specifically enshrine indigenous peoples’ rights they go into 
further detail as to what these rights are.148 
Why this thesis is necessary 
55 This thesis is pursued because there is a need to understand the impact the 
legal landscape created by the 2009 National Land Policy (NLP) and the 2010 
Constitution will have on the aforementioned communities: the Endorois, the 
Ogiek, the Sengwer and others like them in Kenya, and the problems they 
continue to experience. In as much as it has been shown that the law has been 
an imperfect tool and susceptible to the various forces which have impacted 
on the force it could otherwise have, the fact remains it is a method that 
145 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands 
And Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System’ 
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.  Doc. 56/09 IACHR 2009).  
146 ibid, 1. 
147 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgment of 27 June 
2012. 
148 See respectively Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the ILO Convention; and Articles 3, 5, 12, 18, 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 
32, 37 and 40 of UNDRIP 2007. 
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indigenous communities have continued to use to ventilate their land claims 
and are likely to continue to use.  
 
56 To a large degree the cases pursued by the Endorois and Ogiek communities 
under the African human rights system have quelled the debate on existence 
of indigenous communities in Africa, crystallised their entitlement to land and 
associated rights and confirmed the obligations states (through the example 
of the Kenyan state) have towards indigenous communities. However, the 
recommendations made in both judgments remain on the whole 
unimplemented. In 2013 there was a Workshop in Kenya organised by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights titled ‘Workshop on the 
Status of the Implementation of the Endorois Decision of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’149 to discuss the factors causing 
the delay in the implementation of the judgment.150 Non-implementation of 
this judgment effectively means that the position of the Endorois remains the 
same. Further, Daniel Kobei, the Director of the Ogiek Peoples’ Development 
Programme has observed that whilst the Ogiek community has not seen the 
positive effect the law could have on their situation, they remain encouraged 
by the fact that the 2010 Constitution enshrines community land. The 
community is hopeful that through the new laws, and the fact that they 
together with the Endorois community have had positive judgments on their 
lands rights, their rights will finally be realised.  This thesis is therefore 
necessary as an examination of the legal landscape to establish what the 
opportunities are, and concomitantly any impeding issues or themes these 
communities will have to face.  
 
57 It is a decade since the 2009 NLP and 9 years since the Constitution was 
promulgated. This length of time enables a review of the law as written and 
applied. This review may assist in the navigation of the law by those pursuing 
claims in Kenya as they can hold the Government to account as to the intention 
                                                          
149 The author was in attendance. 
150 Endorois case (n 114). 
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behind the provisions; and can assist those in other countries whose laws on 
the issues discussed here may not be as progressive, to lobby for similar 
provisions. In respect of some of the other laws such as the Community Land 
Act 2016 and the Forest Conservation and Management Act 2016, which will 
be discussed, it may be argued that not sufficient time has passed since 
enactment. However, when laws are passed they create legal powers, duties, 
obligations and expectations for which there needs to be some move towards 
meeting. In respect of these newer laws, this review process will allow scrutiny 
of the enforced provisions to see how they align with the Constitution and land 
policy and spirit of both. It will also enable investigation of whether any 
frictions exist between, and within, all these laws; and hopefully provide some 
illustration as to how, in spite of the inconsistencies, the laws can still be used 
to advance strong arguments.  
 
58 This thesis also allows for examination of the external and what impact that 
could have on the internal. The position Kenya is in now, is unique in terms of 
the landmark decisions that have been made by the regional bodies. How can 
African nation States with a colonial history exacerbated by a post-
independence period marred by political impunity deal with land rights they 
deem controversial particularly those affirmed by bodies like the Commission 
and the Court i.e. bodies created under a regime they have created 
themselves? Essentially, whatever happens with these decisions is likely to 
have wider ramifications external to Kenya. Governments and communities in 
other states will observe how Kenya behaves. Communities in particular will 
want to see what indigenous communities in Kenya do to engender 
implementation of the decisions. 
 
59 Further research on land in Kenya has focused on the land-politics dichotomy 
but this has lacked an examination of the impact the sub-regional forum could 
have on indigenous communities’ land rights. And in a similar way, research 
on the rights of indigenous communities in Kenya has focused on the impact 
39 
of international law, but has not deeply examined pragmatic steps that can be 
taken domestically using national bodies to make the international law a 
reality. This may be because the reason for seeking extraterritorial 
adjudication of cases is because the domestic system has failed. This thesis 
argues that the opportunities available in regional, sub-regional and 
international law are only possible where the domestic infrastructure works 
and the law is made to produce what it says it will.  
60 This thesis will therefore examine the nitty gritty of the internal past to 
understand the internal present and looks at the external with the purpose of 
extracting from that, elements that can cause the domestic to shift. Of course 
the challenge of making international human rights law make sense at home 
is not only a struggle for Kenya and African States but one experienced in 
several other countries, if not all. 
Chapter Overview 
61 In light of the foregoing discussion, the Chapters in this thesis will look at the 
opportunities that exist for the realisation of indigenous communities’ land 
rights: domestically- Chapters 1, 2 and 3; sub-regionally- Chapter 4; and 
through development projects- Chapter 5. 
Chapter 1 
62 The Kenyan Government has appointed a variety of commissions and task 
forces in the last 20 years which have included in their investigation the land 
question as this has been a recurring grievance raised by Kenyan people. 
Chapter 1 looks at six bodies151 established to get to the bottom of these 
problems for which land has been a central feature.  The cyclical appointment 
of these bodies, to repeatedly investigate historical problems could be read as 
151 Kenya has appointed so many more but this thesis can only discuss so many. The Embobut Forest Task Force 
for example is not discussed. It may be fitting to discuss this in subsequent research dealing solely with forest 
community specific issues. 
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indicative of something more sinister: political manipulation of the 
vulnerabilities of the have-nots to gain advantage or silence dissent, as has 
been discussed earlier. However, as indigenous communities have contributed 
to these exercises, Chapter 1 argues that this contribution, in spite of how 
things may appear, has not been in vain but has created an opportunity for 
indigenous peoples to highlight their human rights sufferings and seek redress; 
and that the communities ought to be more robust and creative in relying on 
the recommendations made by these bodies and challenging the failure to 
implement. Chapter 1 also serves another purpose, it provides a discussion on 
the politicisation of land in Kenya, because this has played a significant role in 
land allocation. 
Chapter 2 
63 Despite the law being progressive in many respects- it speaks of creating 
mechanisms to recognise, respect, protect and promote indigenous 
communities’ land rights and therefore appears to address the historic issues 
described above- the manner in which some provisions are drafted is likely to 
detract from this. This has the risk of stifling some of the gains made and 
causing communities to lose out on potential opportunities for addressing 
their land problems. This Chapter examines the new legal landscape focusing 
in particular on the Constitution’s land provisions, the Community Land Act 
2016 and other laws brought in to enforce under the Constitution including 
the opportunities and the challenges. 
Chapter 3 
64 The African Charter is the only human rights instrument that recognises 
‘peoples’ rights. The drafters of the Charter were ‘opposed to every attempt 
by one people to dominate another no matter the importance attached to 
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people’.152 The basis on which indigenous peoples in Kenya and other African 
States can rely on the Charter’s provisions is set out in Article 1 of the Charter 
itself. This confirms that all member states including Kenya have given an 
undertaking to recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the 
Charter and to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to them. 
This means that the rights in the Charter are undebatable. The non-
implementation of the Endorois and the Ogiek communities’ decisions is a 
contravention of Article 1 of the Charter. This chapter argues that Kenya’s 
obligations not only arise from Article 1 of the Charter but from Article 21 of 
its own Constitution which requires the State to implement human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Although implementation can benefit from regional 
efforts,153 it is first and foremost a domestic process. Where there is no 
domestic infrastructure to implement regional body decisions, then the 
process falters. This chapter therefore argues that there are various 
mechanisms in Kenya which can bring about implementation of these two 
decisions and they should be used by indigenous communities and triggered 




65 This chapter appraises the East African Community (EAC) whose raison d’etre 
is described in Article 2 of the East African Community Treaty as being to 
‘establish an East African Customs Union and a Common Market’.154 Granting 
this the Treaty nevertheless contains within it matters to be taken into account 
in respect of applicant nations (those seeking to join the Community) which 
include their adherence to universally accepted human rights principles and 
social justice; objectives which include raising the standard of living and 
improving the quality of life of the citizens in the partner states; and 
                                                          
152 ACHPR and IWGIA 2005 (n 50) 72. 
153 From the regional bodies themselves including the African Union, the Parliament and other bodies created 
under the African Charter- For further information of these efforts on regional decisions, see Rachel Murray and 
Debra Long, Implementation of the findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge 
University Press 2015). 
154 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1994, Article 2. 
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fundamental principles which similarly include adherence to human rights 
standards and the rule of law which existing members are bound  by.155 The 
Treaty also provides for the establishment of the East African Court of Justice 
(EACJ) which has since its establishment determined cases raising human 
rights issues despite a treaty provision which provides that the court’s 
jurisdiction to do that is not yet in force. Notwithstanding, the apparent 
dichotomy between the reason for the creation of the Community, its 
underlying objectives and principles and the jurisdictional uncertainty of the 
Court, there has been some progress made to develop a human rights 
framework on the Community.  
66 This Chapter argues that the EAC creates an alternative forum for indigenous 
communities’ land rights issues to be deliberated where the domestic and the 
regional systems fail, notwithstanding some omissions. 
Chapter 5 
67 Development has been described inter alia as the conduit through which 
‘major sources of unfreedom’156 caused by personal poverty, mismanagement 
of public infrastructure, absence of law and order and political suppression and 
repression can be uprooted.157 The World Bank’s development pursuits, in 
respect of communal rights, because of its neoliberal focus, have had the 
opposite effect and decimated these rights. The World Bank’s position now is 
that it works with indigenous communities to ‘enhance their sustainable 
economic growth and livelihoods, implement culturally appropriate 
conservation and development, as well as implementing and developing 
strategies to address multiple sources of disadvantage by taking into account 
indigenous peoples’ views, experience, and development priorities.’158 It 
155 ibid, Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
156 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999). 
157 ibid. 
158 The World Bank, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ (The World Bank IBRD-IDA) 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/indigenouspeoples<accessed 8 October 2018. 
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considers that improving of access to land tenure, capacity building, good 
resource governance are among interventions that contribute to improving 
the situation of indigenous communities.159  Catherine Weaver considers that 
is possible that the ‘increasingly vigilant NGOs……pushing a “civil society” 
agenda, premised on the idea of empowerment of the poor’, has led to the 
Bank changing its rhetoric.160 Be that as it may, this Chapter examines whether 
development projects create a further alternative for realisation of indigenous 
communities’ land rights, as Governments may be more willing to listen to 
international funders because of the money they receive from them than they 
otherwise would. The argument pursued is that development projects have 
the potential to address indigenous communities’ land rights as chances are, 
if they impact on indigenous communities, they will have to contend with their 
land rights situation one way or the other.  However, there are number of 
factors which impact on the achievement of this. To test the efficacy of this 
argument, this chapter examines the 2007-2013 Natural Resource 
Management Project (NRMP), a Kenyan development project financed by the 
International Development Association (IDA), one of the 5 institutions making 




68 Here the thesis sets out the conclusion to the issues discussed in the various 
chapters. 
 
Original contribution of thesis 
69 Firstly, this research makes an original contribution as other studies 
encountered either touch on the position prior to the coming into force of 
2010 Constitution itself161 and do not cover the post- enforcement period,162 
                                                          
159 ibid. 
160 Catherine Weaver, Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform (Princeton University Press 2008). 
161 George Mukundi Wachira, ‘Vindicating Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in Kenya’ (DPhil Thesis University of 
Pretoria 2008). 
162 McAuslan (n 15). 
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and if they do163 they do not deal with the registration challenges under the 
Community Land Act 2016, dealt with in chapter 2, to the extent that this 
research does.  
70 In respect of Chapter 1, the manner in which this thesis draws together the 
findings and recommendations of the bodies, as raising the legitimate 
expectation in indigenous communities that their land rights issues would be 
addressed, coupled with its argument that communities could rely on the 
statutes creating the legally-constructed bodies to push for implementation of 
recommendations, albeit itself ultimately at the mercy of political will, is also 
novel. 
71 There has been research conducted on the role of the African Commission, the 
African Court and other African Union bodies on implementation of their 
decisions;164 and the role of communities themselves and NGOs in 
implementation,165 but little has been said about implementation using 
domestic mechanisms such as constitutionally-established bodies, parliament 
and national courts to engender implementation. This contribution is 
therefore original in that respect. 
72 This thesis further makes an original contribution in its discussion of the East 
African Community as a potential forum for bringing indigenous communities’ 
peoples land rights claims. There has been research conducted on indigenous 
communities land rights issues and equally on recognition of and litigation of 
human rights in the sub-regional arena.166 Some of the human rights issues 
163 Barume (n 58). 
164 Murray and Long (n 153); and Frans Viljoen, ‘The African Human Rights System and Domestic Enforcement’ in 
M. Langford, C. Rodríguez-Garavito, & J. Rossi (eds.), Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of Compliance:
Making it Stick (Cambridge University Press 2017) 351. 
165 See Michael Ochieng Odhiambo, ‘A solution to the forced displacement of the Endorois in Kenya: Working
Towards the Implementation of the African Commission on Human Rights’ Decision (November 2008 – October
2011): Report of Final Evaluation’ (Minority Rights Group International February 2012).
166 Wachira (n 161); Murray and Long (n 153); Lucyline Nkatha Murungi and Jacqui Gallinetti, ‘The Role of Sub-
regional Courts in the African Human Rights System’ (2010) Volume 7 n13 International Human Rights Journal; Kofi 
Oteng Kufuor, African Human Rights System, Origin and Evolution (Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Solomon T. Ebobrah, 
‘Litigating Human Rights before sub-regional courts in Africa: Prospects and Challenges’ (2009) Volume 17 Issue 1
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 79; Frans Viljoen, The Realisation of Human Rights in Africa
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that have been acted upon by sub-regional bodies, are: HIV and AIDS, 
Refugees, Human Trafficking, Women’s Equality and Gender Issues; and 
Children’s Rights.167 However there has been no research that has specifically 
considered whether the legal framework of the East African Community (EAC) 
as a regional economic community (REC) could offer an alternative avenue, to 
that offered domestically and regionally, for indigenous communities to have 
their land rights recognised, promoted and protected. In view of domestic 
challenges and what some describe as ‘flaws within the AU’ system i.e. the 
regional system,168 this chapter’s focus on indigenous communities’ land rights 
in the EAC is likely to be the first contribution on this subject.  
73 The case-study of the World Bank project is original in that it asks whether 
development agencies can be the conduit through which indigenous 
communities’ land rights are realised. Money is a powerful tool and can create 
a paradigm shift in entities. The discussion encourages the adoption of a 
different approach by indigenous communities, using the law, when things go 
wrong but also proposes ways in which development agencies can be 
constructive rather than destructive.  
Research Methodology 
74 This research undertakes a qualitative research of various source materials- 
legislation, policies, case law, reports, articles and various other documents. 
This has been for the purpose of assessing Kenya’s policy direction, the 
intentions behind the laws, shortcomings of the law, frictions between various 
laws, deviation from the law and also possible innovations of the law. 
Through Sub-Regional Institutions (Oxford University Press 2012); Ridwan Laher and Korir Sing’Oei, Indigenous 
People in Africa, Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights (Africa Institute of South Africa 2012); Barume (n 
58); Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of 
Marginalised Communities’ (INTERVICT 2011); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Addendum, MISSION TO KENYA’ 
(United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/4/32/Add.3 2006); McAuslan (n 15). 
167 Viljoen (n 166) 484. 
168 Murray and Long (n 153) 185. 
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75 In addition to the written source materials, the author has also conducted oral 
interviews with legal practitioners working on indigenous communities’ land 
rights cases, experts, researchers, community members, community 
representatives, a member of the National Land Commission and community 









































Chapter 1: A reluctant opportunity? Commissions and Task Forces impacting on 
indigenous communities’ land rights in Kenya 
Introduction 
1 The bodies this chapter will examine are: i) The 1997 Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (CKRC); ii) The 1999 Commission of Inquiry into the Land 
Law Systems of Kenya (Njonjo Commission); iii) The 2003 Task Force on the 
Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC Task 
Force); iv) The 2003 Commission of Inquiry into the Irregular and Illegal 
Allocation of Public Land (Ndungu Commission); v) The 2008-established 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); and vi) The 2009 Task 
Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forest (Mau Forest Task Force).169  
2 The creation of so many of these bodies especially at pivotal periods in Kenyan 
history, as will be seen, is sometimes a frontage rather than a genuine attempt 
at progressing issues, but nonetheless their findings have impacted on the land 
discourse in Kenya and have resulted, partly, in changes in Kenya’s land laws, 
with an impact on indigenous communities. It is therefore important to 
consider them at the outset because, to their credit, the majority have treated 
the land question with the seriousness and profundity it requires. They have 
sought to understand the developments in the Kenyan sphere that created 
land contestations in the colonial era, why and how these problems have been 
perpetuated by post-colonial administrations, how the Kenyan people 
including indigenous communities perceive these problems and the redress 
they desire for violations suffered. Their findings and recommendations - the 
unadulterated and authentic versions - therefore count as a true reflection of 
169 As noted in the introductory chapter there are other land-related task forces which have not been considered 
in detail in this thesis including the Embobut Forest Restoration Task Force set up in 2009.  
48 
the land position and if the majority170 are followed through, could lead to 
realisation of indigenous communities’ land rights. The first segment of this 
chapter will seek to show this and act as a helpful background to the rest of 
the thesis.  
3 The second segment argues that these bodies, especially those created by 
statute like bodies (i) and (v), can raise a legitimate expectation founded in law 
that if their recommendations are not implemented, the failure to do so could 
be challengeable in law. Any challenge to body (i) cannot be mounted at this 
stage as its objective was to prepare a Draft Bill subject to voting and this was 
done. However, for body (v) a challenge could be formulated against the delay 
in implementing its recommendations or triggering the implementation 
process contrary to its enforcing statute,171 particularly as this included 
reparations for land rights abuses suffered by indigenous communities. Its 
process ‘provided the most explicit forum for the expression of indigenous 
issues’,172 in an era when other transitional justice mechanisms in South Africa 
and Rwanda for example,173 have not addressed indigenous identity at all and 
have in fact, ‘ignored and denied’ its existence.  
What is their real objective? 
4 The earliest Commissions of Inquiry date back to the 12th Century under 
English law;174 and Kenya’s first such inquiry dates back to 1913.175 Their 
170 This thesis disagrees with the recommendation made by the Mau Forest Task Forest to resettle the Ogiek in a 
different area to where it found they were lawfully settled which led to the forced eviction from the forest 
precipitating their application to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
171 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 (Act No. 6 of 2008). 
172 Laura A. Young, ‘A Challenging Nexus, Transitional Justice and Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ in Laher and Sing’Oei 
(n 166) 124. 
173 Laura Young and Korir Sing’Oei, ‘Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples’ in ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Access to 
Justice, Including Truth and Reconciliation Processes’ (Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Colombia University 
2014) 89. 
174 The Native Labour Commission, established to investigate why Africans had refused to work for the colonists, 




continued use in Kenya, for land related inquiries, is unsurprising in view of the 
politicised nature of land.  
5 Commissions and task forces are used in Kenya: 'to seek solutions to the issues 
facing (the nation) such as ethnic violence, marginalisation, electoral injustice, 
corruption and historical injustices'.176 These grievances have manifested in 
community uprising like that seen in 1991 and 1992 when ‘pogroms targeted 
at settlers on settlement schemes killed hundreds and drove thousands off 
their land’;177 in 1997 ethnic clashes ‘where land-related skirmishes occurred 
in the settlement scheme areas of Coastal Province’.178 These Commissions 
and task forces are also used to purge out alleged wrongdoers or when the 
public/someone needs to be appeased or to obtain support.179 As always 
seems to be the case with elections, the 2017 elections caused political and 
security concerns and led to civil unrest. The police were brutal, people were 
killed and injured.  
6 This was a trying time for Kenya and some considered the situation conducive 
for a Commission of Inquiry: ‘Why not use commissions of inquiry 
recommendations to solve the country’s problems? This was the Big Question 
in various platforms, especially on television talk shows’.180  
7 Ten years previously on 27 December 2007 Kenya held its presidential 
elections. The Government led by Mwai Kibaki claimed that it had won the 
election race but the main opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) led by Raila Odinga claimed that the elections had been rigged.181 The 
176 Eliud Kibii, ‘Commissions or Omissions of Inquiry? Why Kenya has failed to address historical and other 
injustices’ The Elephant (5 April 2018) <https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/04/05/commissions-or-
omissions-of-inquiry-why-kenya-has-failed-to-address-historical-and-other-injustices/>accessed 27 December 
2018. 
177 Boone (n 2). 
178 ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Kibii (n 176). 
181 Human Rights Watch, ‘Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 16 March 2008) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/16/ballots-bullets/organized-political-
violence-and-kenyas-crisis-governance> accessed 12 January 2018. 
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result was 2-3 months of post- election violence which led to fracas, civil 
unrest, approximately 1000 deaths, human rights abuses, forced evictions of 
people from their homes and areas associated with one ethnic group or 
another; and internal displacement of thousands, leading to the establishment 
of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to look into 
historical abuses in Kenya, dating back to 1963 when Kenya became a 
Republic. The scope of its purview suggested that the violence was 
symptomatic of entrenched and unresolved long-running issues.   
 
8 In Kenya there is a ‘very close linkage between land injustices and ethnic 
violence'182 and so although the ‘immediate trigger’ for the 2007 post-election 
violence was alleged election rigging,183 the other deep-seated trigger was 
land. Ownership of this resource was said to have been central to the 
contestations.184 As discussed in the introductory chapter, these agitations are 
stereotypical of Kenyan politics and were also a key component of the violence 
experienced after the elections in 1992 and 1997;185 and in the 1980s in the 
Rift Valley region in Kenya.186 Tellingly, it is land injustices and ethnic violence 
and denigration, allegorical of British imperialism that led to the establishment 
of the 1932 Carter Land Commission, a public inquiry, established by the 
colonial administration, into the land question in Kenya. Hansard recorded:  
 
‘In view of the nervousness among the native population as regards the 
land question, a full and authoritative inquiry should be undertaken 
immediately into the needs of the native population, present and 
prospective, with respect to land within or without the reserves, held 
either on tribal or on individual tenure.’187 
 
                                                          
182 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, ‘Final Report of the Truth Justice And Reconciliation Commission’ 
(Truth Justice And Reconciliation Commission 2013), Volume IV. 
183 ibid. 
184 Boone (n 2). 
185 Oluwafemi Atanda Adeagbo, ‘Post Election Crisis in Kenya and Internally Displaced Persons: A Critical Appraisal’ 
(2011) Vol 4. No. 2 Journal of Politics and Law. 
186 Boone (n 2). 
187 Statement by The Chairman of Committees (The Earl of Onslow), ‘Kenya Land Commission’, HL Deb 04 May 
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9 The Commission’s recommendations were in the main unhelpful to the African 
quest for justice and the White Highlands remained with the colonists.188 The 
Commission did not address the needs of the native population. For example 
the Ogiek’s claim to their ancestral land was refused by the Commission which 
instead recommended that they assimilate with larger tribes:  
‘Whenever possible the Dorobo (Ogiek) should become members of 
and be absorbed into the tribe in which they have most affinity. Where 
... this is done, a reasonable addition should be made to the reserve 
concerned, if there is any land available for this purpose.’189 
10 It is reported that those likely to suffer most from politically instigated clashes 
are indigenous communities as they lack representation in the political and 
governance spheres.190 This is reinforced by above-like examples but also by 
the continued political dominance by larger communities in Kenya, which acts 
as their protection during the clashes.191 After the 2007 elections, the Ogiek 
complained that their houses were destroyed by larger communities with full 
knowledge of the police authorities;192and that they experienced political 
shootings, intimidation, threats, sexual violence against women and were 
unable to ‘access food and shelter’ during this time.193 There was also 
heightened politically-instigated land conflict between the Endorois and the 
Pokot, both indigenous groups, during this time with the Pokot allegedly being 
incited by politicians to expand their territory.194 Human rights organisations 
188 Paul Syagga, ‘Public Land, Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution’ (2018) Society for International 
Development Constitution Working Paper Series No.9 < http://sidint.net/docs/WP9.pdf> accessed 3 January 
2019). 
189 Kimaiyo (n 118) citing Kenya Land Commission, Report of the Kenya Land Commission’ (Cmd 4556, 1934). 
190 Ecoterra Intl, ‘Facts of the Post-Election Violence’ (Ecoterra Intl. 1992-2015)< http://ogiek.org/news-1/facts-
post-el-violence.htm> accessed 21 January 2018. 
191 The communities that enjoy most political dominance in Kenya are the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin and the Luo. The 
Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group and Kenya’s first President, its last one and current one have been/are Kikuyu. 
Kenya’s second President was Kalenjin as is its current Deputy President. Kenya’s first Vice President was Luo and 
its first and only Republic-era Prime Minister was Luo. 
192 Ecoterra Intl, ‘Paramilitary Units Hunt Ogiek, while Kikuyu Arsonists Burn Houses of Fleeing Ogiek to the Ground’ 
(Ecoterra Intl. 1992-2015 19 January 2008) <http://www.ogiek.org/news-1/news-post-08-01-213.htm>accessed 
21 January 2018. 
193 Survival International, ‘Honey-hunting Ogiek Tribe Caught up in Violence’ (Survival International, 30 January 
2008) <https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/3057> accessed 21 January 2018. 
194 Leah Kimathi, ‘Contesting Local Marginalization through International Instruments: The Endorois Community 
Case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (IDEA Case Study Research on “Successful 
Marginalized Group Inclusion in Democratic Governance Structures and Processes” March 2012). 
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commenting on the political crisis at the time were able to see a link between 
the violence and the failure to resolve historical land rights issues. Human 
Rights Watch for instance recommended that the Government should, 
amongst its actions going forward, resolve historical land rights cases relating 
to indigenous  communities in line with past land commissions’ 
recommendations.195  
 
11 So in 2017 when the question was posed about whether an inquiry was 
needed to hold the country together, it is because these bodies have been the 
go-to forums for resolution of national problems. This it seems is always by 
design to create an appearance, to the rural voters - as the conflict tends to 
begin in the rural areas - and to international donors, that the land grievances 
are being addressed.196 
 
12 Out of the six bodies considered in this chapter, only one, the Mau forest Task 
Force, dealt with a specific region in Kenya whilst the others involved the bulk 
of the Kenyan citizenry or focused on issues pertaining to the nation as a 
whole. The objective of these bodies has been to listen, consider, find and 
recommend, notwithstanding what has been a restrictive mandate for 
some.197 
 
The analysis, findings and recommendations of the bodies  
13 The thrust of the exercise in this segment is three pertinent questions:198 i) 
what happened? ii) why did it happen and who is to blame? iii) what can be 
done to prevent this from happening again?199 These questions are derived 
from the exercise carried out in the public inquiry system in the UK which seeks 
to prevent recurrence of national problems, and given the perception that 
                                                          
195 Human Rights Watch (n 181). 
196 Manji (n 32).  
197 See the Mau Forest Task Force mandate. 
198 Basing this on the three UK public inquiry model. 
199 Institute for Government, ‘Public Inquiries’ (Institute for Government) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/public-inquiries>accessed 20 October 2018. 
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national inquiries in Kenya are purposed to resolve national problems, it seems 
fitting to adopt them here, where the exercise permits, for the purposes of 
establishing how effective these bodies have been. 
i) CKRC
14 The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) was established in 1997 
via an Act of Parliament,200 to: ‘without let or hindrance…..collate and collect 
people’s views and opinions’201 in every constituency, on the Constitution and 
on various organs of the state; review human rights institutions; comparatively 
analyse constitutions and educate people on their rights.202 The end result of 
this process was to be a Draft Bill - for a new Constitution - which would be 
presented to the National Assembly.203 It was therefore a pivotal exercise in 
Kenya’s historical, political and legal landscape(s). The process was required to 
engender diversity taking into account: socio-economic status, ethnicity, 
religion and disadvantage amongst other status. The Commission was 
expected to ensure free, active and meaningful participation of the Kenyan 
people in the process which is ordinarily denied of indigenous communities 
and would have enabled them to give evidence. Essentially the Commission 
was required to ensure that the end result of the review faithfully reflected 
the wishes of the Kenyan people.204 
15 Amongst the indigenous communities the Commission heard from, were the 
Ogiek who expressed concern that forcible eviction from forests constituting 
their ancestral homes would lead to their extinction as communities;205 
pastoralist communities who felt ‘their way of life is despised, and their need 
for land is misunderstood’;206 communities living adjacent to game parks, who 
200 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act 1997 (Act No. 13 of 1997). 
201 ibid. 
202 ibid, s10. 
203 ibid, s10 and 16(1)(c). 
204 ibid, s2.  
205 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘The Peoples’ Choice, The Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission, Short Version’ (CKRC Report 2002). 
206 ibid. 
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felt marginalised by exclusion from their lands and actions which implied 
preference for wildlife than their human lives.207   
16 Communities complained that public land and land allocated for them was 
instead allocated to the elites; and that forests were being ‘deforested, in 
disregard of environmental and resource considerations or even of resident 
communities’.208 Communities complained that they were not able to obtain 
titles to land and that they wanted restoration of community land rights. They 
further complained about feeling the ‘effects of unjust land deprivation during 
the colonial period’;209 of being deprived of cultural sites; and of trust lands 
being allocated by county councils to individuals.210  
17 In respect of human rights, communities told the CKRC that they faced 
discrimination from the Government and were marginalised; had been 
omitted from the national census; had faced restriction of their rights; and that 
there was lack of respect for their language, expression of culture and 
religion.211 They further complained of ‘degradation of the environment and 
destruction of forests’.212 
18 In terms of what happened to lead to this and who was to blame, the CKRC 
found that the colonial administration had introduced a land regime that had 
resulted in the unfair appropriation of ancestral land from communities and 
that these wrongs had not been addressed by post-independence regimes. In 
terms of why it had happened, the CKRC observed that human rights 
protection in Kenya was somewhat ‘limited’.213  It found that there was no 
protection for social, economic and cultural rights encompassing what it called 
‘solidarity rights- rights which pertain to the whole community (which) include 
207 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘Final Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission’ 








the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment…to nurturing of 
one’s culture and to development….rights which are important for the 
community as well as for the individual’.214 It also found a limitation of 
communal rights; that Courts had applied rights restrictively; and the judiciary 
and the police, rather than being protectors of rights, had been ‘the cause of 
major violations of rights’.215 It also noted that the Constitution did not contain 
specific protection for minorities; that not all political and civil rights were 
protected; that the Bill of Rights was weak and that there was no human rights 
body to protect and enforce rights.  
19 And to prevent this from happening again, the CKRC observed that Kenyans 
wanted a Constitution that offered better protection of their human rights 
particularly those who had faced past discrimination; that disadvantaged 
groups wanted affirmative action to enable them to ‘catch up with other 
groups in social and economic development’; 216  ‘better protection of 
property, particularly land’;217 ‘access to and guarantees of preservation of the 
cultural sites and shrines’;218 ‘equal and equitable rights to land’;219 and better 
‘machinery’ for protecting rights’.220 They also wanted a Constitution that 
provided a land system capable of addressing these past injustices; one that 
accepted, respected and recognised freedom to express cultural beliefs; that 
created a Government that was ‘responsive to everyone’s needs, more 
accountable’221  and created a just society.222  
20 In relation to land, the Commission considered that rather than provide a 
‘blueprint’223  on land issues, a new Constitution would better serve if it 
214 ibid. 
215 ibid. 
216 CKRC Report 2002 (n 205). 
217 ibid. 
218 CKRC Report 2005 (n 207). 
219 ibid. 
220 ibid. 




provided ‘principles’224 to guide ‘land policy and law in the future’.225 The 
proposed principles included the following: that land belonged to the people. 
It proposed 3 categories of land: public, private and commons with the 
commons vested in communities or their agents. It called for respect of 
property rights and proposed that land ‘however acquired or held’226 be 
subject to the ‘inherent power of the State’227 to designate it in the public 
interest or benefit.  
21 It further proposed that a Land Commission be established with functions 
including ‘holding title to public land, periodic review of land law and policies; 
and development of policies for sustainable use and management of land’.228 
It recommended creation of a land law within 2 years of the new Constitution 
for: resolving land disputes and problems, expeditious and cost-effective land 
alienation, equitable distribution of land, addressing landlessness, 
investigation of historic land claims; and that this be the basis for consolidation 
of land laws.229  These proposals, in particular the introduction of the 
commons, addressing of landlessness and investigation of historical land 
claims, were all new (absent from previous Constitutions) and of particular 
significance for indigenous communities given what they had complained 
about to the CKRC and the action they wanted taken. 
22 In relation to the environment, the Commission proposed that the new 
Constitution recognise amongst other things that legislators must have regard 
to principles of sustainable development including principles applied by 
communities in the management of their environment and natural resources; 
that although the National Land Commission would have the responsibility of 








public to whom those resources belonged; and that where there were profits 
to be made from resources, these would be shared with the community whose 
land the resources were found. It also encouraged, where ‘as far as reasonably 
practicable’230 the involvement of communities in the administration of 
natural resources.231 Such recommendations, although not explicitly 
articulated in the CKCR’s reports as indigenous communities’ rights were in 
concordance with rights enshrined in the ILO Convention and UNDRIP. 
23 In respect of addressing the deficiencies identified in the human rights 
framework, the Commission proposed the establishment of the Commission 
for Human Rights and Administrative Justice to, inter alia act as: ‘the 
peoples’232 protector, to investigate and conciliate complaints on its own 
initiative, provide accessible machinery and prompt remedies for people’.233 
This would have been in response to the complaints that there was a lack of a 
body in the country to deal with these issues. 
24 In terms of timescales, both the Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice and the Land Commission were to be established before 
the end of 2003. In respect of the latter, the Commission observed that it was 
anticipated that policies seeking to address historical land issues would be 
challenging and would require attention, however, it was important that the 
process was not unduly delayed.234 The proposed bodies were not established, 
as proposed due to political interference and no new Constitution was 
adopted within the said timeframe. 
25 Ambreena Manji refers to the Shivji Commission in Tanzania in her text.235 She 








to ‘accurately reflect the many land problems about which it had heard 
evidence and to answer the grievances of land users ‘from below’ (and) put in 
place mechanisms to guarantee security of tenure’. However, the government 
there rejected the recommendations, choosing instead to ‘publish a National 
Land Policy’.236 Such a move would have had no other purpose but to subdue 
any rural dissent and to signal to donors. And indeed this is what happened, as 
she notes that the British Overseas Development Agency shortly provided 
funding after for the drafting of a land law based on the policy.237 
26 The work of the CKRC culminated in the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission Draft Bill 2002.  Like the Shivji Commission in Tanzania, the CKRC’s 
Draft Bill reflected what the people had said and a lot of effort was made to 
ensure that the people considered it. Later the Commission observed that ‘its 
multimedia strategy …..(in respect of the Draft Bill) was one of the most 
publicized institutions ever established in Kenya.’238 The people were told that 
they had 30 days to debate and comment on the Draft Bill after which a 
National Constitutional Conference of MPs, representatives from every 
political party, representatives from civil society, women’s organisations, 
professional associations, trade unions, religious groups and other NGOs, and 
the Commissioners themselves would convene and make a decision on the 
Draft Bill. The people were further advised that if it was agreed, the Draft Bill 
would then be presented to Parliament, for acceptance or rejection.239 Of this 
latter end, the people were told that ‘since the MPs will have been part of the 
Conference we can see no reason why they should not accept the draft 
accepted there as an expression of the peoples’ will’.240 This process as 
described was mainly as it appeared in the mandating Review Act.241 In other 
words the CKRC were acting as mandated statutorily.  
236 ibid. 
237 Manji (n 32). 
238 CKRC Report 2005 (n 207). 
239 CKRC Report 2002 (n 205) 2. 
240 ibid. 
241 CKRC Act (n 200), s16A (6)(a) & (8). 
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27 The CKRC observed that the recommended Constitution ‘departed in radical 
ways’242 from previous Constitutions and contained ambitious provisions, 
several proposed institutions which, in its view, were required to ensure 
participation of the public, accountability of public officers and 
transparency.243 It was a Constitution that would have provided communities 
with ‘dignity’244 and social justice amongst other benefits.245 Like the Shivji 
Commission in Tanzania which was acclaimed for ‘making a number of key 
recommendations that had the explicit goal of increasing security of tenure for 
the peasant producer’ and ‘divesting (land) from the government’ as well as 
creating an independent Commission of lands in place of the Government’s 
ministry of lands,246 but whose recommendations were not followed through, 
the recommendations made by the CKRC were not followed through because 
President Moi dissolved Parliament on 25 October 2002,247 an act that was 
believed to be politically motivated, as the ‘implications of constitution-making 
for substance’,248 had suddenly dawned on him and others in power. Those in 
power sought to ‘dominate the process (going forward) and sought to side-
line others from ‘decision-making’.249 The Draft Bill was therefore not adopted 
as had been hoped. 
28 In 2004 another draft of the Bill was prepared following deliberations, this 
became known as the 2004 Bomas Draft. This draft was adopted on 15 March 
2004 by the National Constitutional Conference. However, the process set out 
in the Review Act to enforce the Draft was not activated due to further political 
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manipulation as the ‘Government was equivocated, divided with many 
searching for a way to modify’250 the draft and were successful in doing so.251 
29 Moreover several cases all seeking to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Review Act and particularly the process of adoption of the Constitution as set 
out in the Review Act, were initiated. The case(s) argued that Parliament or 
alternatively the Kenyan people should have the final say on the Draft 
Constitution in a referendum instead.252 The Courts agreed which led to 
Parliament passing the Constitution of Kenya Review (Amendment) Bill 2004 
which called for more civic education on the Draft Constitution; and provided 
for a Constitutional referendum to take place.253 It is said that although a draft 
Constitution should be amply assessed for suitability, the Kenyan process of 
parliamentary, court and the public’s approval on what was a ‘nearly finished 
process….placed hurdles in the way of enactment’.254 
30 The Commission having concluded its work, produced its final report on 10 
February 2005. The report detailed the challenges above.255 All this 
interference meant that the 2004 Bomas Draft was amended and it is this 
revised version, known as the 2005 Wako Draft that was put to the Kenyan 
people in a referendum256 on 21 November 2005. It was said to be a 
‘catastrophe’;257 and was rejected by 58% of the voters.258 Reportedly the 
rejection by the people resonated their political dissent and unhappiness with 
how the draft Constitution seemed to ‘renege on previous promises’.259 It is 
said that the draft had been ‘considerably amended by the NAKdominated (sic) 
parliament and thus fell far short of promised institutional reforms’.260  
250 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence (I.B Taurus 2012). 
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Differences in the Draft Bills vis á vis the 2010 Constitution 
31 To establish the extent to which the present Constitution reflects the CKRC 
process, this discussion will compare a few issues as set out in the 2002 Draft 
Bill (2002 non-adopted Bill), the 2004 draft (Bomas draft), the final 2005 draft 
(Wako draft) vis á vis the 2010 Constitution, which further evidences the 
politicisation of land issues in Kenya, on what essentially began as a legal 
process. Here are some examples.  
32 The Draft Bill’s definition of community land included: ‘all land held, managed 
or used by specific communities as community forests, water sources, grazing 
areas or shrines and identified by them as such…’261 (emphasis added). Water 
sources and community identification of land are omitted in the 2010 
Constitution. Any reference to water sources in the 2010 constitution is 
reference to public land262 and not community land.263 The Endorois in Lake 
Bogoria and the Ogiek in the Mau Forest have faced forced evictions from 
water sources. Would leaving the community land definition as including 
water sources have prevented such evictions? Secondly, it is observed that the 
Draft Bill envisaged that community land would be identified by the 
communities themselves but the 2010 Constitution removes reference to 
community land being that which is identified by the communities 
themselves.264 
33 Other variations of note are the 2002 Draft Bill are in respect of state 
acquisition of land. In the 2002 Draft the state was permitted to acquire land 
in circumstances where: it was for public interest reasons, where the state had 
261 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘Draft Bill to Amend the Constitution’ (Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission 2002), Clause 234(3). 
262 2010 Constitution, Article 62(1)(g). 
263 Under Article 63. 
264 Article 63(1) of the Constitution refers to the communities themselves being ‘identified on the basis of ethnicity, 
culture or similar community of interest’. It makes no reference to community land being identified by the 
communities but rather describes what constitutes such land, see subsections 63(3) to (4). 
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provided reasonable justification for the hardship such acquisition would 
cause265 and where the law relied on by the state provided for ‘prompt 
payment of full compensation prior to occupation of such land’.266 In other 
words for the state to acquire land for public interest reasons, it could not do 
so without first having due regard to the impact those being deprived of the 
land would face, which would have necessitated consideration of which 
communities used the land and the manner of their existence, their livelihood, 
their culture and religion. And where such impact amounted to hardship, state 
acquisition could only be lawful where there was reasonable justification 
nonetheless; and thirdly, the acquisition could only take place under a 
statutory regime that provided full compensation before state occupation of 
the land. Compensation under the Draft Bill could therefore not be an 
afterthought as it was in the Endorois case267 and would have required the 
state to show the statutory authority or basis for its actions and that that 
authority created a concomitant obligation to compensate. These were far 
more generous safeguarding provisions against unlawful state acquisition of 
land than are contained within the current constitution.268  
34 In respect of the National Land Commission (NLC), the 2002 Draft Bill provided 
that the NLC’s functions included holding ‘title to public land in trust for use by 
the people of Kenya’;269 and correlated to this, described public land ‘as the 
collective property of present and future generations and shall vest in and be 
held by the National Land Commission in trust for the people’.270 However, in 
the 2010 constitution, the NLC’s function limited to managing public land on 
behalf of the national and county governments271 not to holding title of public 
land for the people. Furthermore, under the constitution, public land is not 
vested in and held by the NLC but by the National Government in trust for the 
265 2002 Draft Bill (n 261), Clause 236(2)(b). 
266 ibid. 
267 Endorois case (n 114), para 7. 
268 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 40(3). Hereon 2010 Constitution. 
269 2002 Draft Bill (n 261), Clause 237(2)(a). 
270 ibid, Clause 235(1)(a). 
271 2010 Constitution, Article 67(2). 
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people.272 It is therefore clear from these variations that under the 2010 
constitution, holding of public land has been left as the preserve of the 
Government, rather than the Land Commission. The Draft Bill’s provisions 
would have created safeguards for public land thus preventing illegal 
allocation of public land by Government officials. Notably the 2004 and 2005 
drafts echo the 2010 Constitution and proposed that public land be vested in 
and held by the Government in trust for Kenyan people; and made the 
Government title holder of public land and the NLC manager of public lands 
on behalf of the Government.273 Given people’s grievances about irregular 
allocation of public land by the Government, the only explanation for keeping 
the Government the holder of public land is the knowledge by those in power 
that public land is where true power lies. 
35 In relation to human rights, the 2004 Bomas Draft proposed that there be a 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice whose membership 
was to include a Peoples Protector and a Minority Rights Commissioner with 
‘special responsibility for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and 
marginalised communities’.274 The 2010 constitution established, as separate 
constitutional entities, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and 
the Commission on the Administration of Justice but neither have a peoples’ 
protector or a minority rights commissioner. Arguably such a Commissioner 
would have acted as a representative of indigenous communities amongst 
other marginalised communities. 
36 Essentially the CKRC process, like the Shivji Commission process in Tanzania 
engaged citizens, who in the Kenyan example included indigenous groups, 
about constitutional land reform and human rights amongst other issues but 
due to political interference failed to deliver, in the manner originally set out 
under the law.   
272 ibid, Article 62(3). 
273 Draft Constitution of Kenya (Bomas Draft) 15 March 2004, Clause 85(2)(a). 
274 ibid, Clause 298(1)(d). 
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ii) Njonjo Commission
37 In November 1999 President Moi ‘being of the opinion that it is in the public 
interest’275  to inquire into the country’s land law system, appointed this 
Commission under Gazette Notice No. 6593.276 Like the CKRC the Commission 
‘collated oral and written submissions from Kenyans on a wide variety of 
issues’277 relating to land.  
38 It recommended a system of land that secured the rights of all landholders. It 
recognised that communities hold land customarily and that there should be 
a community land category to secure these rights. It recognised that if 
unallocated, such land may vest in district land authorities thus recommending 
introduction of a framework to allocate land to the communities themselves 
and for such land to be held under customary law principles. 
39 It further recommended that pastoral land be held by the pastoral community 
as their property and if, and only if, the community desired to obtain corporate 
title to the land, would this be done. It recommended a pastoral land policy to 
ensure promotion of pastoralism as proper land use, 278 which given the views 
expressed to the CKRC as well would have been welcome by pastoralist 
communities. In respect of public land, the Commission considered that this 
should be held by a national land body in trust for the Kenyan people; and that 
there should be a proper system for allocation of public land to prevent abuse. 
275 The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CI-No.78] Gazette Notice No. 6593 (26 November 1999) 2278. 
276 ibid. 
277 Ibrahim Mwathane, ‘The Contribution of Land to the Recent Violence in Kenya: Implications for the Ongoing 
Land Policy Dialogue’ (Land Development and Governance Institute (LDGI) 2010). 
278 Kenya Ministry of Lands and Settlement, ‘A Summary of Land Policy Principles drawn from the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (‘Njonjo Commission’), The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC), Proceedings of the National Civil Society Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question’ (Kenya 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement 2004)< http://mokoro.co.uk/land-rights-article/a-summary-of-land-policy-
principles-drawn-from-the-commission-of-inquiry-into-the-land-law-system-of-kenya-njonjo-commission-the-
constitution-of-kenya-review-commission-ckrc-pr/>accessed 30 December 2018. 
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Further it recommended a mechanism for which historical land claims could 
be investigated and resolved.279  
40 In respect of natural resources, it recommended benefit-sharing; community 
participation in decision-making concerning resources they depend on; co-
management of resources by communities; recognition of the value of 
community principles relating to sustainability of natural resources and the 
need to strengthen these; and in instances where communities had been 
stripped of their land to make way for exploration projects, the Commission 
recommended compensation for loss suffered by present and future 
communities. It also recommended consulting with communities prior to 
pursuing land-related projects, as part of environmental impact assessments 
and recording their views in these assessments.280  
41 Would these recommendations have made a difference to indigenous 
communities if realised? Arguably yes. The recommendations encompass 
what indigenous communities agitate for in their land rights claims. They were 
certainly in stark contrast to what had been recommended by the East Africa 
Royal Commission in 1955 and the land reforms pursued thereafter by the 
colonial and post-colonial administrations.   
42 The Commission’s report was produced in 2002. Looking at the NLP and 2010 
constitution, it is noteworthy that although the Commission’s 
recommendations for a pastoralist land policy are yet to be adopted, some 
provisions in respect of community land have been enacted which could either 
mean that there is a move to genuinely reverse some of the injustices 
indigenous communities have suffered in the past or a move to align 





43 This Taskforce was appointed on 17 April 2003 by Gazette Notice.281 It was 
tasked, by Mwai Kibaki, the new President with establishing whether the 
Kenyan people wanted a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate the abuses perpetrated by earlier post-colonial governments; and 
if the answer was affirmative, to recommend the kind of Commission to be 
established. Similar to the CKRC and Njonjo Commission, the Task Force 
undertook ‘fact-finding, research, public hearings, written submissions, data 
collection, interviews, consultations, a national conference (and) an 
international conference’.282 It even received written submissions from the 
Ogiek Welfare Council.283 In the executive summary of its report the Task Force 
stated that at the core of its work was the ‘sovereign will of the Kenyan 
people’.284  
44 Those in favour of the establishment of a TJRC, said they wanted it to 
‘investigate political, social, economic, land-related and religious wrongs 
committed since the colonial period’,285 land grabbing, land rights, illegal 
allocations of lands including public lands by council leaders, land 
dispossession by foreigners; and the ‘plight’286 of those forcibly evicted from 
their homes ‘by state agents’.287 In terms of the period of investigation the 
Task Force observed that some thought 1897 was a sensible point for the 
commission to commence its investigations from, as this ‘marked influx of 
settlers…. alienating land’; and others said 1885 at the portioning of states by 
European countries during the Berlin conference.288 
281 The Kenya Gazette, Gazette Notice No. 2701 (17 April 2003). 
282 Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, ‘Report of the Task Force 
on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’ (Task Force on the Establishment of a 








45 In terms of what happened and who was to blame, the Task Force found that 
land grabbing had been perpetuated in spite of constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing human rights; 289 that ‘land……is an economic asset, and the 
killing or forcible eviction of the lawful owners from their lands constitutes 
both economic crimes and human rights violations’;290 and that economic 
crimes in turn set in motion a catalogue of other economic, social and cultural 
rights abuses.291 The Task Force observed that the Kenyan State, albeit being 
party to international human rights treaties that required it to protect and 
promote human rights including economic, social and cultural rights, had failed 
to do so. 292 It also found that land had been used by the previous Government 
to turn community against community particularly those communities 
considered to be unsupportive of the Government.293 Some of these 
Government-instigated ‘land clashes’ in regions such as the Rift Valley and 
Coastal regions had resulted in the ostracising of certain communities who 
were deemed not to belong to those areas, killing, forcible dispossession of 
their lands, internal displacement, experiences all of which had left ‘deep 
wounds….on the Kenyan psyche’.294 
46 To prevent this from happening again, it proposed that the truth commission 
investigate not only civil and political rights’ breaches but also economic, social 
and cultural rights emphasising the fact that it is the vulnerable in society that 
are more likely to be impacted by such breaches.295  
47 It recommended that a truth commission should ‘establish culpability and 
make recommendations for redressing these most abominable of 










investigating land issues pay particular regard to ‘historical claims and 
distortions brought about by colonialism’297 i.e. land injustices resulting from 
colonialism which the post-colonial administration had not addressed.298 It 
further encouraged the ‘recently appointed land commission to fully 
investigate and settle historical land problems with finality’.299 The land 
commission being referred to here was the Ndungu Commission, to be 
discussed below. The frustrations of the Task Force in relation to the 
complexities and injustices associated with land are apparent from their 
proposals- they wanted the issue dealt with- and so not only proposed that 
the truth commission address land injustices but also that the Ndungu 
commission ‘investigate and settle historical land problems with finality’.300 It 
is notable that it shared similar views with the CKRC in respect of the need to 
investigate and provide redress for these injustices.  
48 In recognition of the enormity and existing logistical challenges of investigating 
injustices perpetrated during the colonial era, it recommended this task be 
undertaken not by a truth commission but ‘a committee of eminent Kenyans 
to examine a limited set of issues relating to the colonial period’.301 
49 At a conference held on 4-5 July 2003 the Justice Minister further ‘assured 
delegates that the Government was deeply committed to the exercise and 
would be faithful to the wishes of Kenyans as expressed in the Task Force 
report.’302 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission was to be 
established by ‘a presidential decree by June 2004’.303 However, no 
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TJRC five years later and no committee of eminent Kenyans was tasked with 
investigating colonial injustices.304 
50 Unsurprisingly, the failure to establish a TJRC at the time is attributed to 
politicisation of the process. The ‘formation of a Government of National 
Unity’ is said to have enabled KANU, the previous ruling party, to resurface and 
even assume 2 posts in the cabinet on grounds that this was necessary to 
restore ‘a strong social fabric’ and a ‘leadership….(that) reflect(s) the entire 
people of Kenya’.305 The remit of the TJRC had been to establish whether the 
people wanted a truth, justice and reconciliation commission to investigate 
what previous ruling parties including KANU had done. 306 Having members of 
that party existing within the new government surely prevented that. The 
agenda to form a TJRC was therefore ‘lost’ within these developments.307 
51 The Kenya Human Rights Commission,308 although noting that President Mwai 
Kibaki in the first 100 days of his appointment had shown that he was a 
‘committed reformer’ who was seeking to deal with human rights concerns 
such as corruption, abuse of power and engendered ‘respect’ for NGOs, also 
observed the inconsistency in his failing to address police brutality and 
endorsement of a patronage system that retained some of the old guard.309 
This, they said, was difficult to reconcile with the ‘hopeful mood’ he had set 
nationally.310  
304 Article 67(2)(e) 2010 Constitution; and Section 15(2) National Land Commission Act 2012 provide that this  
task now falls under the remit of the National Land Commission. 
305 Independent Online (IOL), ‘Kibaki Hails Government of National Unity’, (IOL, 30 June 2004) < 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/kibaki-hails-government-of-national-unity-216081>accessed 11 January 2018. 
306 TJRC Task Force Report (n 282). 
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for their human rights and seeks to hold state bodies and official accountable. See Kenya National Human Rights 
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52 Of the people whose views the TJRC Task Force gauged, 90% were in favour of 
a truth commission. They told the Task Force that they wanted a truth 
commission to get to the bottom of where, how, why and who had caused the 
country to err in the manner it had in the preceding years. Notably, the Justice 
Minister at the time was reported as saying: ‘We want to diagnose the disease 
that assailed the Kenyan state for the last 40 years or so’.311 Those against it 
thought the country did not need any more commissions, as past commissions 
had made recommendations which had not been implemented, and in some 
cases were unknown and yet public funds had been incurred. They felt yet 
another commission would be a ‘waste of scarce public resources and valuable 
national time’312 and instead the Government should adopt a ‘futuristic 
attitude’313 rather than seek to set right wrongs of the past.  
 
53 According to Prof. Makau Mutua, the Chairperson of the Task Force, the 
implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations for a truth, justice and 
reconciliation commission may have averted the 2007 post-election violence 
in Kenya.314 It is opined by some that those establishing truth-related 
mechanisms do so sometimes ‘without due regard to other TJ 
mechanisms….which serves as a whitewash measure where Governments 
attempt to sweep the past injustices under the rug while appearing to be 
advancing the aims of transitional justice’.315 Perceptively some of the people 
the TJRC Task force interviewed were ‘vehemently opposed to the formation 
of a commission’316 as they believed it was the Government’s way of 
‘hoodwinking’317 the people into believing it was taking action whilst in fact it 
was not.318  
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54 Specific to land, the Task Force observed that some people thought it might 
be best to have a ‘preliminary process that addressed land injustices meted 
against certain communities’319  before actually having a truth commission 
whilst others considered a truth commission to be unnecessary given that the 
perpetrators were already known. This latter sentiment was accurate as the 
Task Force had confirmed what had happened, why it had happened and who 
was to blame. Thus it could be argued that it was not really necessary to have 
a truth commission as action could have been taken based on the evidence 
collated by the Task Force, but there was no willingness to do that or even 
establish one in June 2004 in line with the majority view. This process, 
unfortunately, seems also to confirm the political posturing inherent in land-
related matters in Kenya. 
iv) Ndungu Commission
55 This Commission, named after the Chair of the Commission, Paul Ndungu, was 
appointed by President Kibaki and its establishment confirmed by Legal Notice 
no. 4559 dated 30 June 2003 and published on 4 July 2003.320  
56 The Commission’s mandate was very specific: to investigate by the collation of 
evidence from 'ministry-based committees or from any other source' the 
'nature and extent of unlawful or irregular allocations' of public lands including 
establishing which land had been so allocated and to whom i.e. specifically 
identify which 'private individuals or corporations' were allocated such land 
and by whom.321 The Commission was asked to make recommendations, 
bearing in mind that some of the allottees may have proper title to some of 
the lands (for instance where they genuinely bought land at the asking price 
and were issued with title); propose what action could be taken from a legal 
319 ibid. 
320 Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land’, (Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land 
2003). Hereon ‘Ndungu Report’. 
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and administrative standpoint to restore such lands to ‘their proper title or 
purpose’ and in circumstances where such lands could not be ‘restored to their 
proper title or purpose’; to make recommendations for criminal liability for 
those found ‘involved in the unlawful or irregular allocation of such lands’; and 
propose measures for preventative action i.e. to refrain such allocations in the 
future.322 
57 It is reported, and it is evident from the above mandate, that the spirit with 
which President Kibaki was elected was to ‘purge and purify a government 
thoroughly soaked in corruption and stained by human rights abuses on a vast 
scale.’323 This Commission, plus the 2003 Task Force, were presented as 
conduits through which that could happen. The political elite in government 
had leading up to that point used land as ‘a political reward and for speculative 
purposes’,324 and abused the public land system in reckless abandonment 
including the excision of intact forest reserves (….) mainly for private 
purposes’,325 the extent of which needed to be investigated.326 Through the 
Commission’s mandate, all lands not allocated legally or regularly, in 
accordance with the law, would be recovered.327 As the majority of lands 
indigenous communities claim as their ancestral lands are amongst these 
lands, the scope of the Commission's investigations were crucial to their land 
rights.  
58 In terms of what happened and who was to blame, the Commission found that 
the Government and the political elite had unlawfully allocated trust land to 
individuals and companies,328 contrary to the constitution (at the time) and 
attendant laws on trust land. It further found that at independence land 
previously belonging to European settlers was purchased back through loans, 
322 ibid. 
323 Boone (n 2). 
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and although intended for settlement schemes to settle landless Kenyans and 
promote agricultural production, the system fell prey to abuse by the District 
Plot Allocation Committees whose role had been to implement the scheme. 
These Committees allocated land to the Agricultural Development Corporation 
‘under the guise of settlement schemes which in turn allocated land to 
individuals including civil servants and politicians; and companies. The 
consequence was that the landless people the land was meant for were left 
landless.329  
59 The verbatim entry of this finding on the Commission’s report was this: 
‘The Commission also established that settlement schemes were 
established in forest areas ostensibly to resettle indigenous minorities 
whose lifestyles depend on forest habitats. Such minorities have been 
systematically displaced from their ancestral lands by the government 
through protectionist policies that do not recognize the historical 
claims of the people to the forest areas. A leading example of the 
displaced minorities is the OGIEK PEOPLE. The Ogiek have struggled 
and continue to struggle to make successive governments recognize 
their way of life as a forest dwelling community. Thus, sometime in 
1997, the Government decided to establish a settlement scheme in the 
NAKURU/OLENGURUONE/ KIPTAGICH EXTENSION forest area, to 
resettle the OGIEK. A total of 1, 812 HA of forest land was set aside for 
this purpose. The requisite de-gazettement was not carried out by the 
Minister. (However, interviews with the former Commissioner of Lands 
by the Commission revealed that the real reason for hiving off this land 
from the forest was to establish an out-grower TEA ZONE for the 
Kiptagich Tea Estates Limited which stands on an area measuring 937.7 
Ha within Transmara Forest Reserve and which is owned by former 
President Moi.) The area was duly surveyed, subdivided and allocated 
to prominent individuals and companies in the former President Moi's 
Government. Only a small number of the OGIEK people was allocated 
land in the area. The allottees have since been issued with title deeds. 
The forest was surveyed and subdivided and allocated contrary to the 
provisions of the Forests Act. From the list of the beneficiaries of this 
illegal allocation, the Commission concluded that the real intention of 
excising this forest was definitely not to resettle the Ogiek community. 
329 Kenya Land Alliance and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Ndung’u-Land Report’ (Kenya Land 
Alliance and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights)<http://cemusstudent.se/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Ndungu-Land-Report.pdf> accessed 20 December 2017. 
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The objective was to allocate forestland as political reward to 
influential personalities in the former KANU regime. The listed allottees 
can neither be described as Ogiek or Landless. Many of these allottees 
got land far in excess of what would be recommended for an ordinary 
settlement scheme.’330 
60 The Commission further found that the Government/political elite, had 
illegally allocated forestlands, national parks, game reserves, wetlands, 
riparian reserves, protected areas, museums and historical monuments, to 
individuals, schools, the Agriculture Society of Kenya and the Nyayo Tea Zones 
Development Corporation.331 This last Corporation here being owned by 
President Moi. 
61 The Commission attributed why all this had happened to corruption. Its 
overarching view was that ‘illegal allocation of public land is one of the most 
pronounced manifestations of corruption and political patronage in (Kenyan) 
society’.332 
62 To prevent it from happening again, and to provide redress for the wrongs 
committed, in respect of trust land, the Commission recommended that in 
cases where there was no ongoing litigation, those allocations should be 
revoked. This recommendation would arguably address a situation where 
indigenous communities residing on those trust lands before the allocation 
could return to occupying such lands unless those lands were in use by those 
individuals and corporations or had been allocated to other entities by those 
individuals and corporations. This would also mean that indigenous 
communities previously occupying such lands, who are likely to have been 
doing so under custom as these lands constituted their ancestral homes, 
would have these lands registered as community land.  




63 It also recommended that where such land would lawfully have been set apart 
for public purposes but for the unlawful allocation, such land should revert to 
the original set public purpose. The Commission further recommended that 
the Ministry for Lands and Settlement, catalogue all trust lands for the 
purposes of identifying land adjudicated for public purposes.333  
64 In respect of settlement schemes, the Commission recommended that (i) all 
titles issued under the scheme be revoked; (ii) that the lands be repossessed; 
(iii) 60% be reallocated to local residents and 40% be reallocated to the
landless non-residents; and (iv) that the Government formulate a policy paper
on settlement schemes management.334 These recommendations would have
the effect of returning land rightly belonging to indigenous communities to
them.
65 In respect of forestlands, the Commission recommended: (i) that all unlawful 
allocations of forestlands and wetlands be revoked; ii) forest zones be 
resurveyed; iii) that the Forest Bill be tabled in parliament; iv) a wetlands 
management policy be formulated; and v) that the tea zones be abolished 
amongst others.335 Implementing these recommendations in the case of the 
Mau or Embobut forests for example, would be capable of reversing some of 
the environmental degradation, forest depletion and water erosion said to be 
taking place there due to settlements and logging and enable indigenous 
communities to contribute to sustainable forest management and 
conservation strategies; and ultimately remain on their ancestral lands.  
66 In respect of past wrongs, similar to the CKRC and the Njonjo Commission, the 
Commission recommended: (i) establishment of a national body, separate 
from the Executive, to manage public land i.e. allocate public land, a power 





be Land Titles Tribunal with power to revoke and rectify titles; (iii) that there 
be a land division in the High Court; (iv) that there be a computerised catalogue 
of public lands; (v) harmonisation of land law; (vi) a policy on development of 
public land; (vii) upgrading of informal settlements; and viii) enhancement of 
capacity of land institutions,336 all of which would undoubtedly, ultimately, 
would have a positive effect on indigenous communities’ land rights. 
67 The Commission is acclaimed as having provided ‘sound proposals for 
reforming land management and outlining viable legal, institutional, and policy 
strategies by which to surmount the expected implementation 
challenges....(and thus constituting) a possible way out of a crucial aspect of 
Kenya’s land dilemma’.337 However, its findings and recommendations have 
not been implemented. Notably, there was inordinate delay in releasing its 
report. The delay formed part of parliamentary debates over some time with 
various Ministers seeking clarity as to when it would be promulgated.  
68 On 11 November 2004, the Assistant Minister of Lands and Housing was asked 
the following questions: ‘a) Is the Minister aware that the current landlessness 
and unlawful seizure of public land is a prelude to turmoil and instability and 
in the country? b) What urgent measures is the Minister taking to formulate a 
comprehensive land policy to solve the land problems once and for all?’338 
69 On 9 December 2004 the Minister for Lands and Housing made the following 
Ministerial statement on the implementation of the report. The Minister 
confirmed that Cabinet had concluded its deliberations on the report and had 
made the following direction: ‘That all the recommendations contained in the 
report of the Commission of Inquiry Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public 
336 ibid. 
337 Africa Centre for Open Governance (n 321). 
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land be implemented in full, in order to facilitate the speedy implementation 
of the recommendations…’339 
70 On 3 October 2007, a parliamentarian contended that the Government had 
failed to table the report for discussion in Parliament and to take any action 
on the report. Another argued that in one particular case an Assistant 
Government Minister had assured citizens in a certain area that, based on the 
report no further development would go on a particular site and that the 
government was intent on implementing the report, however, the 
development had recently been reinstated with the developers claiming that 
the Ndungu report did not exist.340 
71 On 22 April 2008 the Assistant Minister for Medical Services, Mr Mungatana, 
referred to a report produced by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
(KACC) which had recommended that the recommendations made by the 
Ndungu Commission be implemented and commented on how pleased he was 
that the Minister for Lands had ‘pledged to implement’ the report albeit 
noting: ‘We hope our Minister for Lands will keep his word this time. We have 
had many other Ministers who went to the Ministry with steam, but 
somewhere along the road they have left the matter alone’.341 
72 On 20 January 2009,342 the Minister for Lands was asked two questions about 
the Commission’s report: i) how much the Commission had cost the Exchequer 
to which he confirmed Kshs79,399,768; and ii) what the status of 
implementation of the report was. In response the Minister explained that 
some work had begun on implementation but that amendment of legislation 
was needed to create a ‘legal framework to implement the recommendations 
339 Parliamentary Debates 9 December 2004 ‘Ministerial Statement Implementation of the Ndung’u Report on 
Irregular or Irregular Land Allocations’, Kenya National Assembly Office Record (Hansard). 
340 Parliamentary Debates 3 October 2007, Kenya National Assembly Office Record (Hansard). 
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of the Commission’. 343 To date, no such legal framework exists and the report 
remains on the whole unimplemented. 
73 Despite having the potential to benefit indigenous communities, the 
Commission’s recommendations were, and remain, a political nightmare and 
have not been implemented, in the inveterate way these land-related 
exercises seem to end. It is opined that ‘there has never been much political 
will to implement findings of Land Commissions’,344 which has been proved 
true. 
v) The TJRC
74 The Commission was established through the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Act 2008.345 The Preamble of this Act acknowledged that: ‘since independence 
there has occurred in Kenya gross violation of human rights, abuse of power 
and misuse of public office and that there is a desire to give the people of 
Kenya, a fresh start where justice is accorded to the victims of injustice and 
past transgressions are adequately addressed.’  
75 The Commission’s functions included the following: ‘inquire into the irregular 
and illegal acquisition of public land and make recommendations on the 
repossession of such land or the determination of cases relating thereto; 
inquire into and establish the reality or otherwise of perceived economic 
marginalization of communities and make recommendations on how to 
address the marginalization; inquire into the causes of ethnic tensions and 
make recommendations on the promotion of healing, reconciliation and co-
existence among ethnic communities; investigate into the whereabouts of 
victims and restore the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting 
343 ibid. 
344 Lillian Aluanga, ‘A dozen reports on land later, but no remedy’ The Standard Media (Nairobi, 15 November 
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them the opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which 
they are victims. Finally it was to recommend reparation measures in respect 
of victims’, 346 from 1963 to 2008 when the statute was passed.  
76 One may question why the public land-related tasks were necessary in light of 
the Ndungu Commission’s findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, the 
Commission clearly focused on hearing the ‘perspectives of the victims’.347 It 
had 14 thematic hearings including one on land and another on economic 
marginalisation and minorities. The Commission took 40,000 statements 
which is more than any other transitional justice process; and 60% of those 
statements related to land claims including some from indigenous groups 
which had been taken by the peoples themselves in their own regions. 
Indigenous communities gave evidence about their ancestral land claims, 
conflicts with other communities and state and corporation human rights 
abuses against them.348 They took ownership of their evidence and although 
the Commission had not been specifically mandated to investigate indigenous 
land rights claims or issues, the indigenous peoples framed their evidence in 
that way and the Commission had to accept the evidence as given.349  
77 It is therefore no surprise that in 2010 it was observed that the ‘TJRC has an 
important opportunity to create a new paradigm of engagement and begin to 
reshape the way that Kenya’s diversity contributes to the Kenyan polity’350 
including realising indigenous peoples’ rights.351 In view of the general attitude 
towards indigenous peoples, the fact that the report was committed to them 
in this way, must have raised a legitimate expectation that their land rights 
would be realised.  
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78 The Commission found that the State was to blame for the following 
happenings: it had failed to recognise indigenous communities’ existence, 
unique culture and contributions; discriminated against them; failed to protect 
communities in predominantly pastoralist areas from inter-communal 
violence and that this failure had resulted in loss of property and destruction 
of entire homesteads and villages over a period of more than 40 years; 
engaged in a pattern of oppressive security operations in pastoralist areas 
since independence that, in some areas, amounted to crimes against 
humanity; failed to engage pastoralist communities in addressing boundary 
disputes and this had led to constant conflicts, displacement of thousands and 
loss of livelihood; expelled communities such as the Endorois, Ogiek and 
Sengwer and others from their ancestral lands; allocated forest lands to other 
communities which had led to the destruction of forests upon which the 
traditional livelihood of forest communities depended, rendering it impossible 
for them to practice their customs; created a land regime in Kenya that was de 
facto discriminatory and had led to the massive dispossession of ancestral 
lands of pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities; failed to protect the 
rights of minorities and indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed 
consent;  permitted development projects that had deepened marginalisation 
and exclusion of minority groups; and had failed to implement judicial 
decisions, such as the African Commission’s judgment on the Endorois 
community which had their, and other communities’, confidence in the ability 
of the Kenyan justice system to deliver substantive justice.352 
79 Specifically on land, the Commission found like the preceding inquiry bodies, 
that there had been land-related injustices including: ‘illegal alienation and 
acquisition of individual and community land by public and private entities, 
illegal alienation of public land and trust lands, preferential treatment of 
members of specific ethnic groups in settlement schemes at the expense of 
352 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, ‘Final Report of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission’ 
(Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2013), Volume IV. 
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the most deserving landless…forceful evictions and the phenomenon of land 
grabbing, especially by government officials,’353 and all for ‘personal gain’.354 
It also blamed the British in the pre-independence Kenyan era for commission 
of land injustices as well as the post-colonial Governments for failing to 
address and redress these injustices. In respect of land policy in the post-
colonial era, the Commission found that little had been done to deal with 
communal land claims and that the Government’s Sessional Paper No. 10 titled 
‘African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya’, discussed in the 
introductory chapter, had justified a focus on securing private ownership of 
land for economic growth purposes at the expense of other types of tenure 
including communal tenure. Correspondingly, the Commission found that the 
‘effects of dispossession during the colonial era (had not been) taken into 
account’.355 
80 Further, and dissimilar to the previous bodies, the Commission found that 
pastoralists, in the North Eastern region were marginalised as a result of the 
region itself being marginalised by the colonial administration.356 The 
Commission found that albeit starting in the colonial period, the post-colonial 
Government had continued to impose marginalising policies in the region with 
a view to preventing alleged plans of secession of the region from Kenya to 
Somalia.357 The Commission found that the Kenyan Government was 
responsible for escalating issues in this region as security issues and enforcing 
‘numerous security operation(s)…..in this region (which had) often resulted in 
loss and confiscation of property, especially cattle, by state security agents’.358 
81 To prevent a repeat of these injustices, the Commission made the following 
recommendations, of relevance here, in its 2013 report: 359 
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- ‘That the Ministry of Lands/appropriate government…..survey, demarcate 
and register all remaining Government lands, including those that were 
formerly owned or managed by local authorities, all protected wildlife 
areas and river banks, among other public lands; 
- That the National Land Commission commences work with the Ministry of
Lands and settlement to undertake adjudication and registration exercises
at the Coast and all other areas where the same has not been conducted.
Measures shall be designed to revoke illegally obtained titles…..; 
- That the National Land Commission in furtherance of its mandate
expedites the process of addressing and/or recovering all
irregularly/illegally acquired land. Measures should be designed by the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement to encourage individuals and entities to
surrender illegally acquired land;
- That the Ministry of Land in conjunction with the National Land
Commission design and implement measures to revoke illegally obtained
titles and restore public easements;
- That the National Land Commission develops, maintains and regularly
updates a computerized inventory of all lands in Kenya, including private
land that should be accessible to all Kenyans as required by law. Land
registries country wide should be computerized and made easily accessible
as required by the law.’
82 Some of these recommendations echo some of those made by the Njonjo and 
Ndungu Commissions. To address economic marginalisation, the Commission 
recommended that the Government formulates, adopts and implements a 
socio-economic development policy to deal with this within 12 months of 
submission of its report.360  
83 Overall, the Commission considered that the constitution, the National Land 
Commission and attendant laws, ‘provide a sound basis to fully address land-
related injustices, including historical ones, but only if there is political will to 
use these laws and institutions’.361 The Commission proposed reparations as 
form of redress. It proposed that the Government allocate Ksh500 million as 
an initial figure for reparations,362 to include collective reparation for 
communities who had suffered economic marginalisation and violations of 
socio-economic rights; for historical land injustices; forced displacement; 
360 ibid, 53. 
361 ibid, para 254. 
362 ibid, foreword. 
83 
victims and survivors of massacres; extrajudicial killings; unlawful detention, 
torture and ill-treatment, all within 36 months; and that this be implemented 
through the Implementation Mechanism.363 
84 After conclusion of its report, the TJRC was required to recommend the 
prosecution of the perpetrators; ways to redress the victims of these abuses; 
and compile a report setting out its findings and recommendations.364 The 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act 2008 required the Commission to submit 
its report to the President at the conclusion of its work which: summarized its 
findings; made legal, political and administrative recommendations as 
necessary; set out recommendations for prosecution; recommended 
reparations for victims, specific actions to be taken, and legal and 
administrative measures to address specific concerns it identified; and which 
recommended a mechanism and framework to implement its 
recommendations and also recommended an institutional arrangement in 
that connection.365  
85 The Commission did all this including recommending an implementation 
mechanism. The report was published. The 2008 Act, s49(3) had required 
implementation of the report within 6 months of publication of the report, 
however, this Act was amended in 2013 to say that implementation would 
begin immediately after parliament had considered the report. Parliament has 
not considered the report. On 16 May 2019 the National Victims and Survivors 
Network submitted a petition in Parliament for the implementation of the 
report.366  
363 TJRC Task Force Report (n 282).  
364 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (Act No. 6 of 2008), s5. 
365 ibid, s48(2)(f). 
366 Senate Debates 16 May 2019, Senate Hansard Report (Hansard). 
84 
vi) The Mau Forest Task Force
86 The 2009 Mau Forest Task Force was established by Raila Odinga, the Prime 
Minister (at the time) on 21 July 2008 by Gazette Notice.367 It was mandated 
to ‘formulate appropriate recommendations’ for: a) ‘an effective management 
structure to stop any further degradation of the Mau Forests Complex; b) 
provide for the relocation of the people currently residing in the forests; c) the 
restoration of all degraded blocks of forests and critical water catchment areas 
with the Mau Forests Complex; d) Mobilizing local and international resources 
to implement the above mentioned objectives and to secure the sustainability 
of the entire ecosystem of the Mau Forest Complex’.368   
87 This mandate suggests that all those residing in the Mau Forest were going to 
be relocated no matter the finding made about them. Unlike other bodies, the 
mandate seemed less focused on obtaining views of the people. Notably 
however, the Task Force appointed committee(s) from within its own 
membership to deal with technical or other arising issues,369 namely: i) 
Committee on Enforcement and Outreach; ii) Committee on Boundaries; iii) 
Committee on Land Ownership and Resettlement Matters; and, iv) Committee 
on Restoration, Livelihoods and Resource Mobilization,370 which enabled it to 
hear from groups like the Ogiek lawfully residing in the forest. 
88 In terms of what had happened, the Task Force found that the Ogiek had been 
‘subjected to evictions severally’,371 from the Mau Forests Complex which was 
their home. It noted that historical records existed to show their residence in 
the Mau Forest for 150 years.372 The Task Force also found that in 2001 the 
Government had announced that 61, 587 hectares of the forest complex was 
to be excised for the purpose of settling Ogiek families and victims of the 1990s 
367 The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CX-No.62] Gazette Notice 7065 (1 August 2008). 
368 ibid. 
369 ibid. 




election-related land clashes, but rather than benefit these groups, the land 
had been allocated to ‘Government officials, political leaders and companies’ 
and others whilst the groups the land was meant for were left landless.373  
89 Notably, the initial proposal/recommendation to settle the Ogiek communities 
had in fact been made in the early 1990s by the Kenya Indigenous Forest 
Conservation Project (KIFCON), a project of the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources funded by the UK’s Overseas Development 
Administration,374 but not followed through by the government. KIFCON had 
established that that Ogiek peoples were present in and around the forest 
complex; that some were in the forest whist others were ‘alongside forest 
stations’ as they had been evicted from the forest itself by the Kenya Forest 
Department on grounds of conservation. KIFCON had therefore recommended 
a stay of the evictions and resettlement of the Ogiek community in the Tinet 
forest to protect their cultural rights.375 President Moi had rejected KIFCON’s 
recommendations on grounds that land-allocation was outside the scope of 
the project’s objectives,376 leading to the termination of the project.377 It is 
opined that KIFCON/ODA was naïve in: ‘failing to understand the complex 
politics around power and land in Kenya (and that rather than their 
recommendation assisting those it needed to) it had legitimize(d) settlement 
in the forest’.378  
90 The Mau Forest Task force noted that a 2001 Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
Forest Excisions Report had found that the original 3000 Ogiek families 
identified by KIFCON in 1992 to be resettled, had by 1996 become 9000 
373 ibid. 
374 ibid. 
375 Fransesca Di Matteo, ‘Community Land in Kenya: Policy Making, Social Mobilization and Struggle for Legal 
Entitlement’ (2017) Department of International Development Working Paper Series No.17-185. 
376 ibid. 
377 Peter Abelson, Project Appraisal and Valuation of the Environment: General Principles and Six Case-Studies in 
Developing Countries (Macmillan Press Limited 1996). 
378 Jacqueline M. Klopp and Job Kipkosgei Sang, ‘Maps, Power, and the Destruction of the Mau Forest in Kenya’ 
(Science and Technology 2011). 
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families.379 It observed that through the outward rejection of KIFCON’s 
recommendations to resettle the Ogiek, the Government ended up using the 
scheme as ‘a cover for massive and irregular appropriation’380 of public land; 
and the scheme ‘became a site of land accumulation and patronage politics by 
those in power, producing exclusion, conflict, and environmental 
destruction.’381 The Task force’s findings in this respect were no different to 
those of the Ndungu Commission, as observed earlier, which found that 
settlement schemes had not benefited those they were intended to benefit. 
 
91 The Committee also found that ecologically sensitive areas such as water 
catchments were also being unlawfully allocated. It recommended 
repossession of these areas.382 It also found that public land was being 
allocated for non-public use; and in this respect recommended that allocation 
of land only be permissible through the compulsory acquisition process.  It 
found that 28,500 hectares of forest land had been encroached and thus 
recommended immediate ejection of the encroachers from the forest. It is 
contended that the issues that existed when both the Njonjo and Ndungu 
Commissions had looked into illegal and irregular allocation of public land, had 
not been addressed in 2008/9 thereby, unsurprisingly, leading the Committee 
to make more or less the same findings as these bodies.  
 
92 To prevent continuation of the problems, the Task Force recommended the 
settlement of the Ogiek and other bona fide settlers outside ecologically 
sensitive areas; revocation of all title deeds not issued in accordance with the 
stated purposes; and that any ‘bona fide settlers’ who had received irregular 
title deeds should exchange the irregular ones for legitimate ones.383 Although 
it found that the Ogiek community was lawfully settled in the forest, the Task 
Force recommended that they be settled outside the claimed ecologically 
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sensitive areas. Arguably if the Ogiek were present there in the first place, 
those areas would have formed what the community considered to be their 
rightful lands. Restitution ‘should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the 
original situation before the gross violations ….occurred’.384 This should have 
meant the Ogiek being settled on their rightful land.  
 
93 An interim Coordinating Secretariat, based on a five phase plan, was 
established to coordinate implementation of the recommendations made 
which included repossession of unparceled and unoccupied forestland excised 
in 2001; and land encroached by illegal squatters  who the report defined as 
having ‘no documentation to support their occupation of the forest'.385 The 
Ogiek community were considered part of this category and as a result of the 
recommendations made by this Task Force, the Government served the 
community with an eviction notice to leave the forest in October 2009, leading 
to an urgent application to the African Commission which then sought a 
provisional order from the African Court.386 This notwithstanding the fact that 
the Task Force, similar to the Ndungu Commission, had found that the Mau 
forest is the Ogiek homeland. The Ogiek were not resettled on any other land 
either. What is apparent from this is that where it suits the Government to 
implement a recommendation to evict an indigenous community, it will do so 
but where it is required to implement a recommendation to their benefit, it 
will not do so. One of the persons said to have land in the Mau forest is ‘Baringo 
Senator Gideon Moi, President Moi’s son who owns 44.7 hectares’,387 which 
certainly shows that corruption and political influence take precedence in land 
matters in Kenya. 
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Other examples of Land Commissions  
94 As discussed earlier, the Tanzanian Shivji Commission, appointed by the 
Tanzanian President, was mandated to look into the land situation in Tanzania, 
it did and it made truly reflective proposals which the Government refused to 
implement.388 It is observed that this process allowed:  
 
‘the voices of the intended beneficiaries of land reform (to be) heard 
for a brief period….and (the Commission by) depositing their detailed 
findings ……capture(d) the subaltern voices of poor subsistence 
farmers…….itself an important contribution in contemporary land 
reform.’389  
 
95 The Commission was part of Tanzanian Government’s land reform plans, 
which it is said were initially ‘a response to pressure from rural constituents’  
but as the recommendations and therefore the extent of the problems 
surfaced, the ‘demands of rural constituents were lost in translation’. 390 This 
bears similarity with what has happened with the Kenyan Commissions. 
 
96 The Tanzanian Government has also recently established a Task force to 
investigate disputes ‘between livestock keepers and farmers, reserved areas, 
ranches owned by the National Ranching Corporation (NARCO), holding 
grounds for cattle and livestock multiplication units’.391 One of the differences 
between this and all the six bodies discussed above is that the Task Force will 
comprise: ‘Members of the ………. President's Office (Regional Administration 
and Local Government), the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, the Ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development and the Attorney 
                                                          
388Manji (n 32). 
389 ibid. 
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General Chambers,’392 which sounds similar to the Paraguayan Inter-Agency 
Commission discussed in Chapter 3. Although this may sound positive, in view 
of the way the Shivji Commission report was treated by the Government, this 
body may yet be another example of land-politicization exercises in the East 
African region, the basis of which is Tanzania seeking to align itself with the 
agenda of donor bodies.393 
 
97 Several West African States have also gone through constitutional review 
processes.394 Of the exercises, it is asked whether they indicate ‘a new era of 
recognition and acceptance of democratic processes….or merely reflect a 
trend of governments initiating these processes to surreptitiously attempt to 
subvert the democratic process through a “legitimate”, widely accepted 
means?’395 The answer is said to ‘lie somewhere in between.’396 What has 
happened and what is happening in Kenya’s case although at first glance may 
appear to be legitimate, seems also to be subversion of the democratic 
process. The NLP reinforces this view. 
 
Kenya’s National Land Policy (NLP) 
 
98 The NLP was adopted by the Kenyan Government in 2009. Its preliminary 
passages describe it as encompassing ‘the issues and policy recommendations 
that have been identified, analysed and agreed upon by the stakeholders, (as 
being) a hall mark of the rare sense of dialogue and collaboration between the 
Government and the Citizenry in tackling, arguably, the most emotive and 
culturally sensitive issue in Kenya’.397  
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90 
99 On the face of it, the NLP is a believable document. It acknowledges that there 
have been attempts to assimilate smaller communities into larger ones thus 
failing to acknowledge the smaller communities’ distinctive identities. This 
captures the experience of indigenous communities like the Ogiek whose 
assimilation was recommended by the 1932 Carter Land Commission. The NLP 
states that communities have lost their homes through gazettement of forests 
and national reserves and unlawful allocation of land with title being given to 
individuals and institutions, which is a restating of the findings of the various 
bodies considered here.  
100 The NLP is said to have benefited in particular from the Njonjo and 
Ndungu Commissions’ reports398 and one may therefore be tempted to 
conclude that the processes were not in vain. The NLP for instance recognises 
that policies and laws have deprived communities of access of land, disrupted 
their culture and disinherited them of their land;399 that the absence of 
governmental accountability in land has led to irregular allocation of public 
land;400 that the power of the State to compulsorily acquire land, the effect of 
which has been to extinguish other title to the land, has been abused resulting 
to irregular acquisition of land; that policies and laws have failed to provide 
protection on an equal basis to all land categories; and that colonial and post-
colonial regimes have ‘undermined’401 traditional land systems resulting in 
‘uncertainty in access, exploitation and control of land and land-based 
resources’.402 All these problems, according to the NLP, have created what it 
describes as ‘land issues requiring special intervention’403 namely: ‘historical 
injustices, rights of minority communities (such as hunter-gatherers, forest 
dwellers and pastoralists) and (those of) vulnerable groups’ which it considers 
to include inter alia pastoralists, hunters and gatherers.404 











101 The NLP proposes to resolve these issues by: redistribution, restitution 
and resettlement; and also by establishing a framework to investigation 
historical land injustices.  It also provides that the Government will lay out a 
clear framework and procedure for: a) recognising, protecting and registering 
of community land rights; and a framework to ‘resolve the problems created 
by illegally acquired trust land’.405 To prevent reoccurrence of these problems, 
and to secure community land, the NLP states that the Government will take 
the following action:406 i) repeal the Trust Land Act (Cap 288) – notably this Act 
has now been repealed; ii) document and map existing forms of communal 
tenure ‘in consultation with affected groups’407 – this has not been done; and 
iii) vest ownership of community land in the community- The 2010 constitution 
provides for this. 
 
102 Further the NLP provides that the Government, in order to recognise 
and protect these groups’ rights, will identify them and ‘ensur(e) their access 
to land and participation in decision-making over land and land based 
resources’.408 This has not been done. And where ‘pastoral communities’ are 
concerned, the NLP notes that their land has been disposed of without their 
consultation.409 It also provides that pastoralism will be recognised as a 
legitimate land use and production system and there will be a framework for 
‘defining and registering land rights in pastoral areas while allowing for 
pastoralists to maintain their unique land systems and livelihoods’.410 This has 
also not been done. 
 
103 It is said that drafters of policy are likely to draft what are in theory 
‘sound policies’411 but struggle to drive the change proposed by the policy or 
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sufficiently address how to ‘overcome’412 implementation challenges.413 
Although it may be suggested that the NLP was drafted with justice in mind 
and it has already led to the taking of certain legal steps - repealing of the trust 
land law; the inclusion of the community land category in the constitution, the 
enactment of the Community Land Act 2016 and the constitutional 
establishment of the National Land Commission to look into historical land 
injustices, evidence of implementation will always be in the operationalisation 
of a system. Patrick McAuslan observes that the NLP is ‘wide ranging and 
immensely ambitious’,414 that there is indeed some mismatch between the 
principles contained in it and the 2010 constitution,415 and more significantly 
it is unlikely to ‘sweep away’416 the political and administrative elitism that has 
existed, and cultivated impunity in Kenya for over 50 years.417 This thesis 
agrees with that view.  
 
104 Land in Kenya is a political chalice and the NLP and the six national 
exercises before it, need to be considered in that light. As to why those bodies 
were really established and why implementation of their recommendations 
have proved to be a challenge, this thesis notes Ambreena Manji’s 
observations. She says: 
 
‘The pressures on national governments from rural constituents to deal 
with long-standing problems of land conflicts have combined with the 
agenda of international financial institutions and bilateral donors to 
liberalize land tenure. It appears that once national governments 
began to address grievances over land, by appointing Commissions of 
Inquiry into land matters for example, matters begin to develop 
beyond their control, there is evidence that the land reform process 
developed a substantial momentum of its own, ultimately leading 
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national governments to approve new land laws over which they feel 
little sense of ownership or control. This explains the confusion with 
which new land laws are often received and the uncertainty that 
surrounds the questions of how they are to be interpreted.’418 
 
105 As discussed in the introductory chapter, and will be seen in chapter 5 
of this thesis, the World Bank has interfered with Kenya’s land reform policies 
initially emphasising reduced community land tenure and increased private 
tenure, to not being as emphatic about this in the early 2000s. This renewed 
thinking led to the Bank releasing a research report entitled ‘Land Policies for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction’ in 2003 in which it associated the definition of 
land rights with economic growth, poverty reduction, good governance and 
‘effective use of land as a resource’.419 Conjecturally the drafting process for 
Kenya’s NLP began a year later in 2004. The culmination of the Bank’s 
interference may be, as Ambreena Manji says, the creation of the NLP and 
constitution which the government feels little sense of ownership or control 





106 This thesis argues that notwithstanding the confusion created by the 
domestic exercises partaken by the 6 bodies, or the politics behind their 
establishment, the fact of the exercises creates a legitimate expectation that 
their recommendations will be implemented. The Commissions of Inquiry Act 
1962 Cap.102,420 is the statute that empowers the President to appoint 
Commissions of Inquiry to inquire and report back on any issue of a public 
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nature which s/he believes is in the public interest.421 It is this Act through 
which the Njonjo and Ndungu Commissions were established.  In the case 
Mureithi v Attorney General (2006) the applicant contended that the Court 
had jurisdiction to order the Government to enforce the recommendations of 
the Ndungu Commission under 1962 Act. The Court rejected this submission 
stating that there was no duty under law to do so.422 This is correct as the Act 
required that the Commission of Inquiry present its report only to the 
President, which was done. However, the Act was amended in 2010 to require 
a Commission of Inquiry to report back to the President and the National 
Assembly.423 The Memorandum of Objects and Reasons for the 
Amendment424 explains as follows: 
 
‘In the history of our country, numerous inquires (sic) have been 
commissioned by the President in exercise of the powers vested by 
section 3 of the Commissions Inquiry Act. The reports of such inquiries 
have, in terms of section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, been 
submitted to the President. In a good number of cases, the results of 
such inquiries have remained unknown to the public. This despite the 
fact that inquiries are constituted to interrogate matters that are of a 
public nature and which directly affect the public. The public are 
usually active participants in the proceedings and deliberations of such 
inquiries. Additionally, the inquiries are funded by the public. It is 
therefore an anomaly that the public would remain clueless as to the 
results of a large number of inquiries that have been commissioned.  
To address this anomaly, this Bill proposes an amendment to section 7 
of the Act. The proposed amendment would require a commissioner 
to report the findings of an inquiry to both the National Assembly and 
the President. Submission of a report of an inquiry to the National 
Assembly would afford the public, through their elected 
representatives, an opportunity to deliberate the results of the inquiry. 
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The amendment would also ensure transparency and accountability in 
the functioning of the inquiry system.’425 
 
107 Arguably this should enable judges in the future to find, where there 
has been a failure to table findings in Parliament, in respect of a Commission 
of Inquiry, that the Government has acted unlawfully and order it to do so.426 
 
108 Notably in the 2014 case of Joseph Letuya and others427  the 
Environment and Land Court listened to arguments made by the applicants, 
members of the Ogiek community who contended that their forcible eviction 
from the Mau Forest and settlement of other persons on their land, thus 
excluding them, was a breach of their means of livelihood and right not to be 
discriminated; and that the settlement scheme under which land was being 
allocated to these other persons was ultra vires. Amongst the evidence the 
community relied on was the 2009 Mau Task Force’s report findings and 
recommendations. Based on the report’s findings, the Court not only found it 
could not:  
 
‘uphold the legality of the said allocations. This Court also in this regard 
adopts the findings and recommendations made in the Report of the 
Government Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forest 
Complex, and particularly the recommendations that all titles that 
were issued irregularly and not in line with the stated purposes of the 
settlement scheme be revoked, and that members of the Ogiek 
community who were to be settled in the excised area and have not 
yet been given land should be settled outside the critical catchment 
areas and biodiversity hotspots.’ 
 
109 The Court therefore ordered the National Land Commission to register 
Ogiek land ‘in line with the recommendations in the Report of the Government 
Task Force ….’428 Notably, the Task Force was established not through statute, 
like the TJRC, but Gazette Notice but the community were daring enough to 
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rely on it and rightly so, as at the very least the Task Force’s findings was 
instructive here and assisted them despite the manner in which the 
Government sought to enforce them thereafter by evicting the community in 
October 2009. The finding that the Mau forest is the Ogiek home, which is 
fortunately corroborated by other reports, should continue to be relied on by 
the community in any event. 
 
110 In respect of the TJRC, the 2008 TJRC Act required that ‘all 
recommendations (of the TJRC) shall be implemented, and where the 
implementation of any recommendation has not been complied with, the 
National Assembly shall require the Minister to furnish it with reasons for non-
implementation’.429 To this end, the TJRC recommended an ‘independent 
body with its own offices and budget….to be supported by a Technical 
Secretariat’430 to implement its recommendations. The TJRC considered that 
it was ‘better to have fewer recommendations that are implemented, than 
many recommendations that gather dust on bureaucrat’s shelf’. 431 As such it 
‘strove to make meaningful and reasonable recommendations which, it is 
hoped, will have a higher chance of implementation’.432 
 
111 The TJRC observed that many commissions have made 
recommendations in the past that have not been implemented, ‘in a timely 
fashion (or) at all’.433 However, in 2013 following the publication of its report, 
the 2008 Act was amended by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
(Amendment) Act 2013.434 As observed earlier, the pertinent provision of this 
Act is s49 which provides that the Minister will ‘set in motion a mechanism to 
monitor the implementation of the report in accordance with 
recommendations of the National Assembly’ and that implementation of the 
report would commence ‘immediately after consideration of the report by the 
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National Assembly’.435 It is possible for indigenous communities to seek to 
trigger implementation or tabling of the report using court proceedings on 
grounds that failure to consider the report is inconsistent with the Act and the 
purpose for which it was enacted. Notably on 16 May 2019 the National 
Victims and Survivors Network submitted a petition to the Senate seeking 
implementation of the TJRC recommendations. The Senate committed the 
petition to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Justice, Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights to respond to the petition with 60 days.436 One of the authors 
of the petition, Wachira Waheire, states that he has not received 
communication from this Committee.437 
 
Conclusion 
112 Transitional justice has become more common than before and 
appears to be what is expected even by international organisations who see it 
as part and parcel of the rule of law and human rights through which disputes 
over property, economic development, accountability of governance and 
conflict resolution could be addressed.438 The UN has defined the process as: 
‘….society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation’.439 As a process it is centrally focused on victims and ensuring 
that they are heard and have the ‘right to truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-repetition’.440  
 
113 All the six bodies discussed in this chapter have had specific 
remits/mandates. However, when it comes to indigenous communities and 
their land rights, the evidence and contentions/complaints have not changed 
and therefore where the recommendations seem repetitive, it is because no 
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change has been felt by the communities which is tantamount to a failure to 
redress their grievances. Without appreciation of the impact the rule of law 
agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions may have had on development of 
the NLP, one could conclude that it is purely a product of the bodies discussed 
here, in particular the Njonjo and Ndungu Commission reports. However, it 
seems that that agenda did play a part in the NLP. Even if that were the case 
there is no reason to think that the Commissions’ reports were not used as 
basis for it nonetheless. It certainly appears to echo some of these reports’ 
findings and recommendations. However, as identified by Ambreena Manji a 
state may struggle with ownership of a policy, and therefore implementation, 
where it is created through external donor pressure. It may also be that the 
bodies themselves were a product of the same rule of law project which may 
explain, in part, the failure to implement the recommendations. This thesis 
suggests that the level of corruption and patronage identified by all the reports 
and the fact that the perpetrators are the political elite in Kenya, also explains 
why the reports have gone unimplemented. 
114 Be that as it may these exercises have played a pivotal role in ascribing 
what indigenous communities’ land rights are and what the government 
should do to realise those rights. Communities can, regardless of the reasons 
the government has had for the creation of these bodies and producing the 
NLP, take a stronger stance, through litigation and also as seen more recently 
by submitting petitions to parliamentary bodies. Furthermore there is certainly 
a role awaiting civil society organisations and the constitutionally established 
bodies such as the National Land Commission given the focus on public land 
and resolution of historical land injustices by the various bodies; and the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights, the country’s human rights monitor. 
Of these bodies, as well as the six dealt with here, Odenda Lumumba, CEO of 
Kenya Land Alliance opined in an interview in 2013:  
‘The constitutional ones, I think are still weak and still finding their 
bearing but establishing any commission as a way of probing issues has 
been a tactical way of postponing solutions- in the majority of cases 
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you do that and then the report is subject to parliament, parliament 
might as well refuse it, or water down the report and the nature of 
implementation could just come to nothing….…..we are yet to behave 
better.’441 
115 The constitutional bodies cannot afford to be weak where their 
mandates are in question and as indigenous communities await addressing of 
their claims. 
441 Interview with Odenda Lumumba, CEO, Kenya Land Alliance, Nairobi (Nairobi, Kenya, 20 September 2013). 
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Chapter 2: The 2010 Constitution and Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights 
Introduction 
1 The introduction and Chapter 1 have shown the challenging nature of 
indigenous communities’ land rights in Kenya. The source of the problem: the 
colonial administration, post-independence Governments and donor politics. 
As to whether the success of the Mau Mau litigation brought in the UK High 
Court,442 a challenge by members of the Mau Mau Kikuyu community against 
the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office for acts of torture perpetrated 
against them between 1951 and 1960, creates a precedence which indigenous 
communities could follow for land rights-related breaches, it has been said: 
‘many of them are saying they would want to take that as precedence 
but I think we are flogging a dead horse and raising the fallen dead 
woods of yesterday which are not helping the spark of the fire because 
(in as much as) we regret and we are informed by that past regrettable 
history…. we should concentrate on our own Government, sovereign 
as it always takes opportunity to say, to fulfil its mandate. It is within 
the mandate of the sovereign State to deal with its own Kenyan 
people.’443 
2 This is reasonable as any remedy derived from such a challenge would be 
monetary or temporary and devoid of structural resolution which is what is 
required. The Government’s mandate is set out in the NLP, now enshrined in 
the 2010 Constitution and its attendant laws including the Community Land 
Act 2016. These provide ways for indigenous communities to own, use and 
access land, which all things being equal should address problems they have 
hitherto experienced. The thrust of this chapter is to establish a number of 
things: the extent to which this is accurate including the means through which 
the law can make these land rights a reality; and whether there exists 
442 Matua & Others v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB). 
443 Lumumba (n 441). 
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inconsistency in the framework which may create challenges in the recognition 
of these rights. 
Land provisions in the Constitution444 
3 Article 61 provides that: (1) ‘land belongs to the people of Kenya collectively 
as a nation; as communities and as individuals’; and (2) ‘land in Kenya is 
classified as public, community or private’. Article 63 recognises the rights of 
hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and other communities to hold, manage and 
use land as community forests, grazing areas, shrines, ancestral lands and 
traditionally occupied lands. Article 40 protects the right to property and 
provides that people have the right to own or acquire property on their own 
or in association with others. This coupled with Articles 61 and Article 63 
potentially address the lack of community land protection of the past. 
4 Article 66 confirms that land is subject to the inherent power of the State: ‘The 
State may regulate the use of any land, or any interest in or right over land, in 
the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public 
health, or land use planning’. Article 67 mandates the National Land 
Commission to: ‘manage public land on behalf of the national and county 
governments (which is distinctly different from actually holding title to public 
land in trust for the people as had been envisaged by the 2002 CKRC Draft Bill, 
discussed in Chapter 1); recommend a national land policy; advise on a 
comprehensive programme for the registration of title in land; initiate 
investigations…into present, or historical land injustices, and recommend 
appropriate redress; to encourage the application of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms in land conflicts; monitor and have oversight 
responsibilities over land use planning throughout the country’ amongst other 
functions. And finally, Article 68 provides that Parliament shall have regard to 
these principles when revising land laws: ‘equitable access to land, security of 
444 Where Articles are mentioned without further qualification, this will be reference to 2010 constitutional 
provisions. 
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land rights and sustainable and productive management of land resources’,445 
amongst others. 
Bill of Rights 
5 Article 19(2) provides that the thrust of ‘recognising and protecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and 
communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential 
of all human beings’. The previous constitutions did not contain such a 
provision; and whether or not the reason for its inclusion is the exercises 
discussed in Chapter 1 or the financial donors’ rule of law projects, it 
constitutes a significant constitutional change. 
6 Similarly the Bill of Rights as set out in Articles 26 to 57 of the Constitution’s 
Chapter 4 is of critical importance in indigenous land rights discourse. Article 
27 provides that all are equal before the law, have the right to equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law which places indigenous communities on an equal 
standing with others and prohibits their disparate and disadvantageous 
treatment on the basis of their status. The provision expressly prohibits the 
State or any person from directly or indirectly discriminating against anyone 
(which would include indigenous groups) on grounds of ethnic or social origin, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture or language, which ordinarily form the 
basis of their discrimination. To reinforce this further Article 27 requires the 
state to take ‘legislative and other measures, including affirmative protection 
programmes and policies designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by 
individuals and groups because of past discrimination’. Although these clauses 
do not expressly mention indigenous communities- and there would be no 
reason for them to as then they would surely have to encompass all forms of 
445 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 60(1). Hereon this Constitution will be cited as Constitution 2010. 
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societal diversity- they meet the standard expected of States to ‘combat and 
eliminate such discrimination’446 as against indigenous communities.447  
7 Article 260 of the Constitution classes pastoralists; indigenous communities 
who hunt and gather; small communities unable to fully participate in socio-
economic spheres; and traditional communities seeking to preserve their 
cultures from assimilation, all as ‘marginalised’ and they stand to benefit from 
non-discrimination under Article 27 and to have their specific needs met under 
Article 56.  
8 Compared to other East African Community States, the Kenyan Constitution is 
not alone in its enshrining of the rights to equality and non-discrimination;448 
and affirmative action programmes449 but is the most extensive in its definition 
of marginalised communities.450 The use of indigenous communities here is 
new in constitutional terms. Article 260 rather than classifying all Kenyans as 
indigenous, suggests here that the indigenous people referred to here are 
distinct from the rest of Kenyan society. This seems to align with the African 
Commission’s understanding of these communities and also accords with the 
wider global understanding of the characteristics of indigenous communities, 
as discussed in the introductory chapter. Notwithstanding communities that 
identify as indigenous in Kenya would still squarely fit into the other 
descriptions of marginalisation as expressed in Article 260. Therefore 
compared to other African States, Kenya’s constitution here is progressive. The 
extent of marginalisation in other constitutions considered is restricted to 
marginalisation on ordinary discriminatory grounds of race, religion or status 
rather than resulting from historic oppressive policies and very few in 
446 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples 
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1997). 
447 See UNDRIP 2007, preamble, Articles 2 and 9. 
448 See Articles 9, 13 of the Tanzania Constitution; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 21; 
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003, Article 16; Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Article 22. 
449 See Uganda Constitution, Article 32. 
450 The Uganda Constitution refers to marginalisation on ‘the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason 
created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing imbalances which exist against them’: Article 
32. None of the other states’ constitutions proffers a definition. 
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indigenous terms.451 Indeed its inclusion in the Kenyan Constitution makes 
Kenya’s resistant stance on using the term, in its responses to international 
bodies,452 self-defeating but also supportive of the probability that these pro-
indigenous provisions are a product of external donor pressure. 
9 Furthermore this description of marginalisation, as including recognition of 
communities fearing forced assimilation, will make what happens at Kenya’s 
next census interesting. Will those indigenous communities who have been 
forcibly assimilated and not distinctly tallied in previous census exercises like 
the Endorois be distinctly enumerated? Surely the positive African Commission 
decision and the Constitution’s recognition of forced assimilation as a past 
cause of marginalisation will cause the Government to take steps to eradicate 
their marginalisation in this way particularly in light of obligations arising from 
Article 56.  
10 Article 56 provides that the State will ‘put in place affirmative protection 
programmes designed to ensure that minorities and marginalised groups are 
able to participate and are represented in governance and other spheres of 
life; and develop their cultural values, languages and practices.’ The onus of 
placement of these measures falls on the State, which is indeed part of its 
positive obligations under international law. However, design of any such 
programmes relating to indigenous communities should be in consultation 
with them;453 and in terms of how they wish to be identified, should have 
regard to their self-identification and expressions of distinctive collectively.  
451 Cameroon’s Constitution expressly lists some indigenous groups: See Solomon A. Dersso, ‘Perspectives on the 
Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ (Pretoria University Law Press 2010) 91. 
452 Albeit pre-2010 Constitution, it is notable that in June 2010 during its Universal Periodic Review Kenya refused 
to support recommendations made by other states that it strengthen its relations with ‘indigenous communities 
with a view to promoting and protecting their rights and assisting them in their development initiatives’ as it did 
not find the term indigenous peoples was applicable as ‘all Kenyans of African descent were indigenous to Kenya’. 
Para 103.7, Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review’, A/HRC/15/8, 17 June 2010. See also discussion of its resistance to use the term within the African 
Peer Review Mechanism: Dersso (n 449) 89-90. 
453 UNDRIP 2007, Article 14; Convention 169, Article 6. 
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11 Article 32 provides a right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief 
and opinion which includes the right of a community to ‘manifest any religion 
or belief through worship, practice, or observance.’ This would encapsulate 
effect of indigenous communities’ forced evictions on exercise of this right. 
Article 42 provides a right to ‘a clean and healthy environment’ which includes 
the right to ‘have the environment protected for the benefit of present and 
future generations’. Article 43 provides that everyone has the right to 
economic and social rights such as accessible and adequate housing. This 
thesis contends, and it has been found, that this right encapsulates indigenous 
communities’ right to their habitation; and the right to have adequate food 
which for indigenous communities can be interpreted as the right to their 
lands which are their source of sustenance. Finally, Article 44 provides a right 
to language and ‘to participate in the cultural life’ of choice; and provides that 
this right can be a communal right: i.e., ‘A person belonging to a cultural or 
linguistic community has the right, with other members of that community’.454  
The right to culture is reinforced by Article 11 which provides that ‘the 
Constitution recognises ‘culture as the foundation of nation’.  
12 Not only do these provisions create state obligations, their reach is greater 
than in previous constitutions and give indigenous communities, civil society 
organisations and even the KNCHR ammunition to challenge violations.  It 
cannot be business as usual. It is worth stating, in view of the discussions in 
the introductory chapter and chapter 1 about the politicisation of land in 
Kenya that these provisions no matter the agenda behind their codification 
constitute the law of the land and are justiciable. 
Categories of land under the Constitution 
13 The 2010 Constitution designates land in Kenya into three categories: private 
land, public land and community land.455 None of the other East African 
454 2010 Constitution, Article 44(2). 
455 ibid, Art 61(2). 
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Community States have all these categorisations enshrined in their 
Constitutions.  
Private land 
14 Private land consists of freehold and leasehold land held by individuals; and 
any land that the Government declares as such by statute.456 Such land may 
serve the purposes of individual members of indigenous communities who 
wish to hold land as individuals. In fact indigenous communities have argued 
that the right to property entitles them as individuals and as collectives to 
land.457 Moreover the African Commission has held that the ‘juridical 
personality’ of an indigenous community is not impacted by the fact that some 
individuals from that community have chosen to live separately and no longer 
practice the traditions and laws of the community.458 However, this category 
of land is not suitable for indigenous groups wishing to hold, occupy or use 
land communally. As a definition, it is less complex than community land or 
public land.  
Community Land 
15 This is a new category of land established under the 2010 Constitution. It is 
said that where there is reform or redesigning of land policy, land tenure 
systems, land use structures and rethinking around land administration, this 
offers occasion to ‘create adaptive thresholds’ and ‘mitigate interventions’ 
which allow the system to respond, adapt and moderate itself to various 
developments,459 which can of course be positive or negative. 
456 ibid, Article 64. 
457 Endorois case (n 114), para 92. 
458 ibid, para 62. 
459 H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Exploring the Role of Land Reforms in 
Africa’ in N. Chalifour and others (eds.), Land Use Law for Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy of 
Environmental Law Research Studies (Cambridge University Press 2006) 60. 
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16 Community land is described in Article 63(1) of the 2010 Constitution as land 
that is vested and held by an ethnic, cultural or other community of interest.460 
Article 63(2) of the Constitution provides that community land shall include:
‘(a) land lawfully registered in the name of group representatives under the 
provisions of any law; (b) land lawfully transferred to a specific community by 
any process of law; (c) any other land declared to be community land by an Act 
of Parliament; and (d) land that is—(i) lawfully held, managed or used by 
specific communities as community forests, grazing areas or shrines; (ii) 
ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer 
communities; or (iii) lawfully held as trust land by the county governments, but 
not including any public land held in trust by the county government under 
Article 62(2).’461 
17 Article 63(3) provides that: ‘any unregistered community land shall be held in 
trust by county governments on behalf of the communities for which it is held.’ 
Article 63(4) provides that: ‘Community land shall not be disposed of or 
otherwise used except in terms of legislation specifying the nature and extent 
of the rights of members of each community individually and collectively.’ And 
Article 63(5) provides that ‘Parliament shall enact legislation to give effect to 
this Article’. The Community Land Act 2016 is the mentioned legislation. This 
is discussed below. 
18 The Community Land Act 2016 (CLA), the legislation that enacts Article 63 of 
the 2010 Constitution, defines ‘community’ as those with a ‘common ancestry, 
similar culture or unique mode of livelihood, socio-economic or other similar 
common interest, geographical space, ecological space or ethnicity’.462 The 
classification of land in Kenya to include, for the first time, community land is 
without prejudice to land politicisation and corruption, undoubtedly 
progressive and constitutionally endorses self-identifying indigenous 
460 2010 Constitution, Article 63(1). 
461 ibid, Article 63(2). 
462 Community Land Act 2016 (No. 27 of 2016), s2. Hereon CLA 2016. 
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communities’ right to hold, manage and use community land for various 
reasons including occupation. So on the face of the Article 63 provisions, 
indigenous communities should be able to contend that they are entitled to 
community land.  
19 The CLA provides that to claim ‘an interest or right over community land’ 
indigenous communities will first have to, subject to invitation by a community 
land registrar, provide a register of all names of the ‘communal interest 
holders’ to a Community Land Registrar for registration.463  The registrar is 
simply the public official designated by a Chief Land Registrar with 
responsibility for registration of community land.464 The need for these 
communities to register implies that the rights to land as described in Article 
63 of the Constitution are not automatically accessible and are subject, first, 
to the registration of the communities. As this category of land is the only one 
that enables indigenous communities to access, hold, use land communally 
and thereby to maintain their distinctive collectivities, if indigenous 
communities do not register in the manner prescribed in the CLA they will not 
be able to benefit or prove their entitlement to community land. This, it is 
argued is the first issue that indigenous communities would have to contend 
with in accessing their land rights under domestic law. Since the enactment of 
the CLA in 2016, no indigenous community has yet been registered under it. 
In July 2019 it was reported the 11 communities sought to register but they 
have been told to wait for 4 months for processing of their application by the 
Ministry of Lands.465 It is actually reported that no community land registrars 
have been designated to carry out the registration and have not been posted 
to various areas for this purpose as there is currently no budget allocation for 
them.466 
463 CLA 2016, s 7. 
464 CLA, s2 & 9. 
465 Jaran Vogelsang, ‘Opinion: A Historic Step Towards Securing Community Land Rights in Kenya’ (30 
July 2019 Thomas Reuters Foundation News)< http://news.trust.org/item/20190730151357-
yl708/>accessed 1 October 2019. 
466 IWGIA, ‘New Community Land Act lacks resources for implementation’ (IWGIA 14 August 2019)< 
https://www.iwgia.org/en/kenya/3387-kenya-community-land-act>  accessed 1 October 2019. 
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20 The second issue seems to be that community land must first be registered as 
‘community land’ if it is to be held by the communities otherwise it must be 
held in ‘trust by county governments on behalf’ of the community according 
to the Constitution.467 This thesis will address the registration and trust land 
issues separately. 
21 Registration of community land effectively means that in order for land to be 
vested directly in communities rather than county councils on their behalf, the 
land in which they claim an interest in, or right to, must be land that is 
accepted, by the Government, as constituting community land. For land to be 
registered, it must first go through an adjudication process triggered by the 
Cabinet Secretary in consultation with County Governments.468 The 
adjudication process entails surveying, demarcating and registration of 
community land469 which is to commence with a public notice setting out an 
‘intention’ to commence the adjudication.470 Such notice is required to include 
inter alia, the community’s name; the land to be adjudicated; and an invitation 
to all with ‘overriding interests or any other claim on the land, to lodge their 
claims. It is therefore important that the identification and distinctive 
collectivity of indigenous communities is accepted by the state as otherwise 
they would fail at this initial hurdle. The notice must also specifically indicate 
which land is to form the community land registration unit.471  Registration 
units, whether relating to community or other types of land, are said to be 
units constituted as such by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the 
National Land Commission and the county governments.472 This means that 
even if indigenous communities were to say that the unit they were occupying 
467 2010 Constitution, Article 63(3). 
468 CLA 2016, s 8(1). 
469 ibid, s 8(4). 
470 ibid. 
471 ibid, s 8(5). 
472 CLA 2016, s 2; Land Registration Act 2012 (No.3 of 2012), s 10, as Amended by Land Registration Act (No. 28 of 
2016) s 6(1). 
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or using was capable of constituting a community land registration unit, unless 
the Cabinet Secretary agrees, it cannot be registered as such.   
22 The CLA confirms that it is for the County Governments to document, map out 
and develop an inventory of community land.473 Although there is a 
requirement for the registration process to be ‘transparent, cost effective and 
participatory’,474 other than confirming that communities may access the 
inventory of community land if they wish,475 there is no explicit requirement 
under the law to consult with the communities in the same way as there is an 
express requirement for the Cabinet Secretary to consult with the county 
governments over what constitutes community land capable of being 
registered as such. It is argued this is contrary to the NLP’s proposals and also 
contrary to international law on the issue. Notably, ‘although routinely flouted, 
the obligation to consult was explicit in the former Trust Land Act and the Land 
Group (Representatives) Act’,476 which is indicative of how the law, if existent, 
would be treated. This is fertile ground for contention as it is the Cabinet’s 
Secretary’s remit to determine what land could constitute community land, 
despite how it is defined in the constitution. Notably the CLA provides that 
land which is said to be ‘in use for public purposes’ and that which is 
adjudicated as private land will be excluded from surveys for the purposes of 
recognising and adjudicating community land.477 In isolation this seems 
uncontentious. However, given the history of irregularity and illegal allocation 
of land in Kenya, this top-down rather than bottom-up method of registering 
community land seems susceptible to abuse which can impact on realisation 
of indigenous communities’ land rights. 
23 Article 63(2)(d)(iii) of the current Constitution provides that land lawfully held 
as trust land by the county governments can constitute community land; and 
473 CLA 2016, s 8(2). 
474 CLA 2016, ss 8(2) and 8(3). 
475 ibid, s 8(2). 
476 Wily (n 1). 
477 CLA 2016, s 8(6). 
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Article 63(3) provides that where community land is unregistered it will be held 
in trust by county governments on behalf of communities. The CLA provides 
that ‘until any parcel of community land has been registered….such land shall 
remain unregistered community land and shall……be held in trust by County 
Governments on behalf of communities…’478 These provisions confirm that 
although the trust lands system created under the previous constitutions has 
been repealed, the regime continues to exist where unregistered community 
land is concerned. 
24  The difference of course is that unlike the previous position where trust lands 
were the only way in which communities could hold, manage or use land, the 
community land system created by the 2010 Constitution offers other ways. 
This does not necessarily make the situation better but it seems to be a way of 
managing those lands. Some have opined that at least it means 
‘customary/community property is recognised as existing, whether registered 
or not’.479 Having said that it appears that those unregistered community lands 
may be those where customary rights to land actually exist which may cause 
some challenges if the County Governments circumvent legal provisions on 
those lands as they have done in the past.  
25 In sum it is argued that the CLA does not make realisation of land rights for 
communities straightforward and to that end does not seem to import Article 
63 of the Constitution and the NLP proposals on addressing land rights 
problems faced by communities as was intended; or indigenous communities’ 
views as vocalised to the six bodies discussed in chapter 1.  
478 CLA 2016, s 10(3). 
479 Wily (n 1). 




Customary rights to land 
 
a) Subject to repugnancy laws 
 
26 Article 260 acknowledges that there are some communities in Kenya whose 
lives are governed by traditions and customs rather than written laws, but who 
have become marginalised because they wish to continue to be so governed. 
When it comes to land, customary rights to land are recognised in Article 
63(2)(d)(ii) of the Constitution which provides that community land shall 
include ‘ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer 
communities’.  The CLA defines the customary land rights as those that are 
‘conferred by or derived from African customary law, customs or practices 
provided that such rights are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any 
written law’.480 The CLA confirms that customary rights of occupancy shall be 
‘equal in status and effect’ to rights of occupancy existing in public or private 
land categories;481 and generally that customary land rights are ‘equal in force’ 
with freehold and leasehold rights acquired through ‘allocation, registration or 
transfer’.482And where such rights are not inconsistent they shall be 
‘recognised, adjudicated for and documented for purposes of registration’ and 
that such process shall be in accordance with the provisions of the CLA and 
any other written law.483  
 
27 George Mukundi Wachira suggested, pre-the 2010 Constitution, that one way 
in which indigenous communities’ land rights may be realised is by ‘equal 
application of African customary law.’484 He observed that there are groups 
who have founded their land claims on ‘their customary laws, traditions and 
pre-colonial occupation’ but that ‘Kenya’s legal framework subjugates African 
                                                          
480 CLA 2016, s 2. 
481 ibid, s 14(1). 
482 ibid, s 5. 
483 ibid, s 5(2). 
484 Wachira (n 161). 
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customary law to written laws’.485 This was the case under the Trust Land 
regime in the past where repugnancy laws were used to extinguish 
communities’ land rights. This makes customary land rights quite vulnerable. 
It appears that if under the CLA customary rights to land are to be of equal 
force to freehold and leasehold rights, they cannot be subject to unfair and 
unmonitored assertions of repugnancy thus making them inaccessible. 
28 Notably, the CLA confirms that customary rights shall be recognised, 
adjudicated for and documented for the purposes of registration if not legally 
repugnant.486 And also that rights of occupancy in community land that were 
in existence prior to the coming into effect of the CLA, shall continue to subsist 
as ‘recognisable right(s) of occupancy’ as long as they were acquired lawfully 
in the first place.487 The definition of public land creates difficulty for 
indigenous communities who continue to rely on customary land rights as they 
may not be considered to have acquired such land lawfully thus making their 
rights unrecognisable in law. 
b) Using customary law to settle land disputes
29 One of the principles of land policy under the Constitution is to encourage 
communities to settle land disputes using ‘recognised local community 
initiatives’ not discordant with the Constitution,488 which suggests that there 
is recognition that there are alternative dispute resolution mechanisms other 
than those prescribed by written law and that these should be promoted as 
long as they remain inoffensive to those written laws. The National Land 
Commission has as one of its responsibilities, the encouragement of traditional 
land dispute resolution mechanisms for land conflicts.489 The judiciary is also 
encouraged under the Constitution to promote traditional dispute resolution 
485 ibid. 
486 CLA 2016, s 5(2). 
487 CLA 2016, s 14(2). 
488 2010 Constitution, Article 60(1)(g). 
489 ibid, Article 67(2). 
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mechanisms; and to be guided by this as a principle as long as such 
mechanisms do not offend the Constitution including the Bill of Rights or 
justice or morality.490 It will be interesting to see how this is actually applied in 
practice. 
c) The test
30 In as much as the above shows that there is a move to lift the status of 
customary law, by recognising it in Article 63 and the CLA, the proof of its 
viability will be tested during the registration process and how repugnancy is 
interpreted.  
Public land 
31 Public land is said to include state held, used or occupied-land; land that is not 
capable of being owned by an individual or community through any legal 
process; land not classified as private or community land;  Government forests 
other than those lawfully held, managed or used by specific communities as 
community forests, grazing areas or shrines as defined by Article 63(2)(d)(i) of 
the 2010 Constitution;491 government game reserves, water catchment areas, 
national parks, government animal sanctuaries and specially protected areas; 
rivers, lakes, other water bodies defined by law; and all minerals and mineral 
oils.492  
32 These public land components create contention when it comes to indigenous 
communities whose ancestral lands are in those areas. As established in 
chapter 1, the Government has been liable for illegal and irregular allocation 
of public land in the past resulting in degradation of these areas which has 
been blamed on indigenous communities, purportedly then justifying their 
490 ibid, Article 159(2) and (3). 
491 This provides: ‘lawfully held, managed or used by specific communities as community forests, grazing areas or 
shrines’. 
492 2010 Constitution, Article 62(1). 
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eviction from those areas.493 In the following discussion this thesis will look at 
the discordance created by classification of forests, water catchment areas 
(and lakes etc.), wildlife and natural resources as public land on indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. 
Forests 
33 In Kenya the law distinguishes between Government forests which are public 
land and community forests which are community land. Article 62(1)(g) of the 
constitution states that Government forests are forests other than those 
which fall under the category of community forests under Article 63(2)(d)(i). 
That provision describes community land as including ‘land lawfully held, 
managed or used as community forests’. Unfortunately the Community Land 
Act 2016 does not offer much assistance in terms of determining or 
establishing what community forests are.  However, using the constitutional 
understanding one deduces that unless a community forest is lawfully held, 
managed or used by the community, it cannot constitute a community forest. 
34 The Forest Conservation and Management Act (No.34 of 2016) recognises 
community forests. It provides that these are forests made up of: ‘a) forests 
on land lawfully registered in the name of a group representative; b) forests 
on land lawfully transferred to a specific community; c) forests on any other 
land declared to be community land by an Act of Parliament; d) forests on land 
lawfully  held, managed, used by specific communities as community forests; 
e) forests on ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-
gatherers; and f) forests lawfully held as trust land by the county governments,
but not including any public land held in trust by the county governments
under Article 62 (2) of the Constitution.’494 The FCM 2016 Act provides that
forest owners can include communities,495 and that community forests are
493 Institute of Economic Affairs, ‘Reassessing Kenya’s Land Reform’ (2000) Issue No.40 The Point Bulletin of the 
Institute of Economic Affairs. 
494 s30 (2)(3). Act will be referred to as FCM Act hereafter. 
495 ibid, s2. 
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vested in the community,496 unlike its predecessor the Forests Act 2005 which 
confined forest owners to: ‘in the case of State forests, the Kenya Forest 
Service; (b) in the case of local authority forests, a local authority; (c) in the 
case of private forests, an individual, association, institution or body 
corporate’497 and did not recognise the concept of community forest 
ownership. 
35 But what happens where indigenous communities claim ownership of forests 
on their ancestral lands and lands occupied by them which also happen to be 
public lands? The Ogiek and the Sengwer for instance have been considered 
as falling foul of the law because they live in Mau and Embobut Forests, 
respectively, which they claim to be their ancestral homes, which are gazetted 
as Government forests (public land).  
‘They lied to us and said we were better off outside the forests. 
When we tried to come back home to the Mau, we were denied 
entry and they chased us away.’498 
36 The Ogiek’s Mau forest example in helpful in answering this question and for 
this purpose it is important to look at the African Court’s assessment of the 
issue.  
The Ogiek African Court case499 
37 The Ogiek have no title deeds to evidence their property rights over the Mau 
forest but it is their ancestral land.500 As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the 
blame for the excision and destruction of the Mau forest falls on the 
Government.501 In July 2008 the Government instituted an ‘aggressive 
496 ibid, s30(1). 
497 Forests Act 2005, s3. 
498 Chuma (n 93).  
499 Ogiek case (n 81). 
500 Minority Voices, ‘Reforestation, Corruption and Evictions: The Ogiek of the Mau Forest, Kenya’ (Minority Voices 
Newsroom 28 September 2010)<www.minorityvoices.org>accessed 24 November 2014. 
501 ibid. 
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campaign’502 to evict illegal occupants in the Mau Forest on grounds that it 
needed to begin conservation plans,503 thus the establishment of the Mau 
Forest Task Force. In July 2009, consequent on the findings of the Task Force 
it would seem, the Prime Minister at the time, Raila Odinga, announced that 
the Ogiek would be arrested if they did not leave the forest. This was followed 
a month later with the President ordering the arrest of those residing in the 
Mau Forest and in other water catchment areas stating that: ‘The Government 
shall take action against people who destroy forests. Such people should not 
be spared at all, they should be arrested and charged with immediate 
effect’.504  
38 On 25 August 2009 the Government announced by gazette notice that it was 
intent on commencing reforestation programmes and was ordering the 
removal of encroachers within 14 days of the notice.505 This was dubious in as 
far as the Ogiek were concerned and even more compelling when one 
considers the Ndungu Commission findings and the fact that the NLP had been 
approved by Parliament which should have distinguished the Ogiek’s lawful 
status. All without title deeds were deemed to be unlawfully encroaching on 
the forest; and on 26 October 2009 the Ogiek being deemed part of this group 
became victim to a forced eviction notice enforced by the Kenya Forest 
Service506 resulting in their application for urgent measures in the African 
Commission on 14 November 2009 to prevent the Government from enforcing 
the eviction notice. The Commission made a provisional measures order 
prohibiting its enforcement which the Government failed to comply with 
necessitating an application to the Court for a similar order on 15 March 
2013.507 The case was thereby transferred by the Commission to the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Court). The author attended the 
502 ibid. 
503 ibid. 
504 Chris Lang, ‘Ogiek threatened with eviction from Mau Forest, Kenya’ (REDD, 19 November 2009) <https://redd-
monitor.org/2009/11/19/ogiek-threatened-with-eviction-from-mau-forest-kenya/>accessed 18 April 2014. 
505 ibid. 
506 ibid.  
507African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of Kenya, Order of Provisional Measures, 
Application No.006/2012, 15 March 2013, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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hearing in Addis Ababa on 27 and 28 November 2014 and has obtained some 
of the parties’ submissions at the hearing. 
 
39 Essentially the Government argued that the Mau forest constituted invaluable 
public land as a water catchment area and it had responsibility for protecting 
it from harmful activities. It maintained that it could not lawfully delineate the 
land; and the most it was permitted to do was allow access to the forest by the 
Ogiek ‘for any special purpose’ and permit the community to take part in the 
management of the Forest under the provisions of the Act.508 The Minority 
Rights Group International (MRG) which intervened in the case submitted, 
amongst other things, that the Ogiek ‘were friendly to the environment on 
which they depend’; that their existence was ‘well-adapted’ to Mau Forest 
which had been their ancestral home ‘since time immemorial’; and the survival 
of the forest is ‘inextricably linked’ to their survival.509 
 
40 The expert in the case, Dr Liz Wily, called by the African Commission on behalf 
of the Ogiek community opined that there was inconsistency between the 
Land Act 2012510 which defined community land in the same manner as it 
appears in Article 63 of the 2010 Constitution i.e. ‘ancestral land and hunter-
gatherer lands are community lands’,511 and the Constitution’s definition of 
gazetted forests as public lands.512 Clearly what the Government was 
proposing- grant of access and some management rights- was insufficient and 
misconceived as the Ogiek were owners of the forest and full restitution is 
what was necessary.  
 
41 The Court found that the community had a right to property (to use, enjoy and 
dispose of) which in their case was their ancestral home, the Mau Forest.513 
                                                          
508 Muthoni Kimani, ‘Respondent’s Submissions in Application 006, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights v Republic of Kenya’ (The African Court on Human And Peoples’ Rights 27 to 28 November 2014). 
509 Lucy Claridge, ‘MRG Oral Intervention’ Ogiek case (n 81). 
510 Land Act 2012 (No. 6 of 2012), s2. 
511 Ogiek case (n 81), para 119. 
512 ibid. 
513 Ogiek case (n 81). 
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The Court accepted that the Government was entitled to restrict the right to 
property where public interest demanded and the restriction was necessary 
and proportionate. However, the Court concluded that the Government had 
failed to show that its actions in restricting the Ogiek’s right to property, on 
grounds of ‘preservation of the natural ecosystem’,514 were justified 
particularly as it could not show that the Ogiek were responsible for ‘depletion 
of the natural environment in the area’; 515 and that in fact evidence obtained 
by the Government itself showed that the ‘main causes of the environmental 
degradation are encroachments upon the land by other groups and 
government excisions for settlements and ill-advised logging concessions’.516 
The Court also noted that the Government had not disputed that the Ogiek 
community had resided in the Mau Forest ‘since time immemorial’.517 
 
42 As highlighted by the expert, Dr Liz Wily, where community land is said to 
comprise ancestral lands/traditional lands occupied by communities, where 
these lands are public land, there is incoherence in the law.  
 
43 The Mau forest is public land and not categorised as community forest. It 
therefore does not fall under the exception in Article 62(1)(g) which means 
that the Ogiek cannot be considered, under the law, as lawfully holding, 
managing or using the Mau forest, which explains, inter alia, why they are 
treated as illegal occupants of the land, and even with the African Court’s 
intervention, continue to be treated as such. But the Mau forest is their 
ancestral land and they have traditionally occupied it, and so it is community 
land.518 Effectively the law defeats the law, as the provisions relating to public 
land and legal holding, managing and using of community forests, in reality, 
trump those relating to ancestral lands/traditional occupation of lands. 
 
                                                          
514 ibid, para 130. 
515 ibid. 
516 ibid. 
517 ibid, para 128. 
518 2010 Constitution, Article 63(2)(d)(ii). 
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44 However, it seems that in the Ogiek case the African Court in finding that the 
Ogiek had a right to the Mau forest, their ancestral home as their property i.e. 
a right to use, enjoy and dispose it, concluded that sub-articles (i) and (ii) of 
Article 63(2)(d) were indistinguishable and that land that is ancestral lands and 
lands traditionally occupied by a forest community, is land that is also lawfully 
held, managed or used by them as a community forest. And this finds further 
efficacy in the description of community forest in the Forest Conservation and 
Management Act (Act No.34 of 2016) as including ‘forests on ancestral lands 
and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherers.’519 Effectively this means 
that in the case of such forests there must be considered as falling under the 
exception of public lands which are community forests. The Government will 
of course continue to contend that this is not the case and that where a forest 
is gazetted as public land unless that forest is lawfully transferred to a specific 
community- which notably is another description of community forest520- that 
forest remains public land. 
45 Furthermore it is apparent from the Government’s arguments that the 
furthest it is willing to go, is to permit communities like the Ogiek access to 
forests for specific purposes and management of the forests under forest 
legislation, but where these communities are the true owners of the land, this 
is not only perverse but delegitimises provisions of the constitution and the 
2016 forest legislation. Reflectively the limiting of land rights in this way is a 
curiously a regurgitation of colonial land policy towards black Africans. 
46 As established in chapter 1, the Government, and political elite, have been 
liable for illegal and irregular allocation of public land such as the Mau forest 
which explains any vested interest they continue to have in not allowing the 
law to have the effect it should. Further for communities like the Ogiek to 
benefit from such valuable land, and without any financial cost, may be touted 
519 FCM Act (n 494), s30 (2)(3)(e). 
520 ibid, s30 (2)(3)(b). 
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by politicians, and seen by other communities, as unfair, but the codification 
of community land and the 2016 forest legislation deposes such argument. 
Communities as owners and managers 
47 It is important to distinguish indigenous communities as owners of forests, as 
above, with them as managers of forests. The traditional mechanisms that 
indigenous communities use for forest conservation is ‘often superior to 
conventional state mechanisms’.521 The 2009 NLP suggests that gazettement 
of forests and protected areas has been focused mainly on the physical 
exclusion of human activities but that to sustainably manage forests there 
needs to be recognition that forests have ‘multiple values’ and need to be 
protected for their ‘ecosystem values’.522 As far as indigenous communities 
are concerned, their exclusion for activities they partake in has been 
misguided. Despite this being accepted on the global stage,523 Kenya has failed 
to adopt this thinking which means that forests continue to experience forest 
degradation. Kenya’s neighbour, Tanzania, is said to have one of the most 
advanced community forests ownership and management frameworks, which 
evolves from an acknowledgment of the poor state of Government-run forests 
and the need to salvage them. Under Tanzania’s Forest Act of 2002 village 
communities using their customary governance institutions have autonomy 
over the forest, with clearly delineated rights of ownership and managements 
and this works.524 This law says that community forest reserves can be 
established by a group, which is created for the purposes of management of 
the forest, comprising of village members or those living in proximity to the 
521 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
522 NLP (n 7), para 131. 
523 See United Nations ‘Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992’ (United Nations 1992) 
Chapter 11 on Combating Deforestation, which provides that indigenous communities should be amongst those 
involved in management-related forest activities, para 11.22; and also encourages Governments to ‘Integrate 
indigenous knowledge related to forests, forest lands, rangeland and natural vegetation into research activities on 
desertification and drought’, para 12.23<
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>accessed 29 December 2017. 
524 Tom Blomley and Said Iddi, ‘Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: 1993 – 2009 Lessons learned and 
experiences to date’ (Tz Online, September 2009) < 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/participatoryforestmanagement2009.pdf>accessed 12 December 2018.  
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forest or those interested in managing a forest ‘for any purpose connected 
with communal ownership, use and management of a community forest 
reserve’.525 In other parts of Africa, Central America and Asia, the rate of 
deforestation is reportedly higher in protected forest areas than in community 
owned forests.526 Interestingly there are examples of this in Kenya too. Loita 
Naimina is an example of a forest protected and managed by the Maasai 
community. The: 
‘forest is intact, there is livestock, water and they are feeding the 
community. It is managed by the community using traditional methods 
which are better than that used by the Government. It is better a forest 
managed by the community using their traditional knowledge than one 
managed by the Government as the Government destructs and always 
wants to chase people and blame them.’527 
48 A possible explanation for its success is that this forest has never been 
gazetted.528 It is trust land and would now probably fall under Article 
63(2)(d)(i) land as it constitutes land lawfully held, managed and used by the 
Maasai as a community forest.  There were plans in the 1990s to adjudicate it 
and gazette it for tourism purposes but the community litigated and settled 
the case with the Narok County Government conceding the plans.529 This 
community, and generally indigenous communities recognise the importance 
of conserving the forest because by doing so they preserve their ‘culture and 
society’.530 Their communal-approach to forests is an ‘ideal framework for 
community based operations’.531  
525 The Forest Act of 2002 (No.10 of 2002), s42(1). 
526 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81); See also L.Porter-Bolland and others, ‘Community Managed 
Forests and Forest Protected Areas: An Assessment of Their Conservation Effectiveness Across the Tropics’ (2012) 
Volume 268 Forest Ecology and Management< 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/articles/AGuariguata1101.pdf>accessed 10 December 2018. 
527 Interview with Eunice Sinoro Parsitau Nkopio, Programme Officer, Mainyoito Pastoralists Integrated 
Development Organization (MPIDO), Nairobi (Nairobi, Kenya, 12 September 2013).  
528 Cultural Survival, ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist IUCN plans for the Naimina Enkiyio Forest’ (Cultural Survival) 
<https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-
forest>accessed 9 January 2019. 
529 Angela Kronenburg García, ‘Contesting Control Land And Forest In The Struggle For Loita Maasai Self-
Government In Kenya’ (African Studies Centre 2015). 
530 Cultural Survival (n 528) and Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
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49 It is therefore important to empower indigenous communities to take up roles 
as forest-managers rather than ‘helpers’ because as managers they would 
have decision-making, permit-granting and other related powers currently 
retained by the state. The NLP in some fashion corroborates this as it provides 
that it is necessary to recognise ‘traditional management systems’ of forests 
by communities when setting up procedures for the co-management and 
rehabilitation of forest resources.532 However, experts say this needs to go 
further to allow communities to have tenure security in the form of a grant of 
title to own respective forests which can be made contingent on them not 
selling the forest but ‘rehabilitating and sustaining’ it, thereby resulting in a 
‘win-win situation’.533 This way the Government has another entity doing what 
it has failed to do and the community enjoying their land rights.534   
Water Catchment areas, rivers, lakes 
50 The Water Act 2016535 defines water catchment areas as ‘vulnerable water 
resources’ for which special protective measures are required.536 Water is 
State property, whether this be a water catchment area or ground water. The 
Act establishes a Water Resources Authority tasked with inter alia regulating 
the use and management of water resources.537 And within this remit it can 
‘impose such requirements or regulate or prohibit such conduct or 
activities’538 it considers is necessary for the protection of a water catchment 
area and its resources.539 Similarly in relation to ‘ground water’, which is 
defined as ‘water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins, 
reservoirs, lakes and other bodies of water in the ground, and includes water 
in interstices below the water table’,540 the Act provides that special measures 
532 NLP (n 7), para 135. 
533 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
534 ibid. 
535 Water Act 2016 (No.43 of 2016).  Hereon WA 2016. 
536 ibid, s 22. 
537 ibid, s12(b). 
538 ibid, s22(2). 
539 ibid. 
540 Ibid, s2. 
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can be adopted by the Water Resources Authority for its conservation where 
it is ‘necessary in the public interest for’: (a) the protection of public water or 
supplies used for industry, agriculture or other private purposes; (b) the 
conservation of the water resources of the aquifer of the ground water 
resources; or (c) ecological reasons…...’541 
51 From this it seems that any public purposes relating to water resources are 
likely to take precedence over other purposes including community purposes 
(projects) which in the case of indigenous communities could mean water 
resources they require for the sustenance of the community or for religious 
practice.  
52 Where land is required to carry out waterworks which are ‘of strategic or 
national importance’542 because the water resource is considered to be of a 
‘cross county in nature’ or to enable the National Government to exercise a 
public function such as creating ‘reservoirs for impounding surface run-off’ 
and ‘regulating stream flows to synchronise them with water demand 
patterns’, the Act provides that the Government will pay compensation on just 
terms ‘to the owner of the land on which such works are constructed’.543 
Effectively, in such cases the Act does not appear to allow for consultation of 
communities and for free, prior and informed consent to be obtained but 
simply for reasonable notice to be given to the communities, if they are 
accepted as legitimate landholders and for compensation to be paid to them 
on just terms.   
53 The Act also confirms that any powers or functions prescribed by it that affect 
land, shall in relation to community land, be ‘exercised and performed subject 
to any written laws’ relating to community land.544 Effectively this should 
mean that in respect of community land and thereof indigenous communities’ 
541 ibid, s 23. 
542 Ibid, s 8. 
543 ibid. 
544 ibid, s 138. 
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lands, any powers or functions, exercised or performed by public authorities 
in any public-related water-resource function, must be in accordance with CLA 
provisions. The CLA states that communities shall abide by relevant laws, 
policies and standards relating to water amongst other resources but that for 
the purposes of sustainable conservation, it shall be for the communities who 
have customary rights to water resources to ‘establish measures to facilitate 
the access, use and co-management’545 of those resources.546  
54 However the CLA qualifies this by saying that it is ultimately for the State to 
‘regulate the use of any land, or interest in or right over land, in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or land use 
planning’.547 This would mean, and is in fact confirmed in the CLA,548 that even 
if the community has the power to establish measures of access, use and 
management of water resources, and therefore any land that may be needed 
for such purposes, this power is subject to the power of the National and 
County Governments to regulate land use, on any of the stated grounds- 
defence, safety, land use etc.; and is also subject to their powers as laid out in 
‘laws and policies’ relating to ‘water protection, securing sufficient residual 
water’ and ‘environmental laws’ amongst others.549  
55 This thesis has discussed above how the African Court dealt with the water 
catchment area issues in the Ogiek case.550 The Court did not venture into a 
discussion as to the consistency of water-resources legislation and the CLA. 
Notably the latter was not in force at the time of the hearing in 2014. However, 
it is contended that although the law seems to offer safeguards in respect of 
how water resources are to be accessed, managed or used, and with the 2016 
Water Act seems to empower communities to make decisions relating to 
545 CLA 2016, s20. 
546 ibid. 
547 CLA 2016, s 38(1); 2010 Constitution, Article 66. 
548 CLA 2016, s 38(2). 
549 CLA 2016, s 38(2). 
550 Ogiek case (n 81), para 8, 130. 
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water resources, this Act confirms that the ultimate regulation of land use lies 
with the Government.  
56 As Akio Morishima551 has observed, States are entitled to enforce 
environmental laws that empower them to regulate land use in view of the 
fact that human activity does impact on the instant environment, and in the 
case of water catchment areas or groundwater areas, human activity in those 
areas could also have wider ramifications.552 However, Akio Morishima argues 
that sustainable development requires environmental laws to go beyond the 
conventional focus of preventing adverse effects on the environment by 
regulating land use to focusing also on ‘air, quality of water and 
ecosystems….and climate change’. 553 
57 Be that as it may, there is a need to balance these interests with the interests 
of the communities residing in community lands where there are water 
resources; and in Kenya’s case, the law does recognise that sustainable 
development calls for communities to be involved in the management and 
conservation of water resources. However, the state has tended to apply 
blanket laws, policies and decision-making which have failed to take into 
account the role of indigenous communities in such management or their land 
rights; and it has argued that the presence of indigenous communities on land 
where there are water resources is injurious to those resources thus justifying 
their eviction from those areas, without actually proving this.  
Wildlife conservation areas - Game reserves, national parks, specially 
protected areas and animal sanctuaries 
58 According to the NLP, to ensure sustainable management of land-based 
resources, identification, mapping and gazettement of wildlife migration, 
551 Akio Morishima, ‘Challenges Of Environmental Law – Environmental Issues And Their Implications To 
Jurisprudence’ in N. Chalifour and others (eds.), Land Use Law For Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy Of 




dispersal areas and corridors requires consultation with communities and 
individual land owners. Equally it acknowledges that for wildlife sanctuaries to 
be properly developed, communities bordering parks and protected areas 
need to participate in this and be involved in the co-management of the 
sanctuaries.554  
59 Section 2 of Kenya’s Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 2013555 
provides the following definitions which should assist in this discussion. 
‘Wildlife’ is defined as ‘any wild and indigenous animal, plant or microorganism 
or parts thereof within its constituent habitat or ecosystem on land or in water, 
as well as species that have been introduced into or established in Kenya’. A 
‘conservation area’ is said to be ‘a tract of land, lake or sea with notable 
environmental, natural features, biological diversity, cultural heritage, or 
historical importance that is protected by law against undesirable changes.  
60 A ‘wildlife conservation area’ is defined as ‘a tract of land, lake or sea that is 
protected by law for purposes of wildlife and biological diversity conservation 
and may include a national park, national reserve, game reserve or sanctuary’; 
a ‘national park’ ss ‘an area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the 
protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective 
means’; and a ‘protected area’ is a ‘clearly defined geographical space, 
recognized, dedicated and managed through legal or other effective means, 
to achieve long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem 
services and cultural values’. A ‘community’ is defined as a ‘a group of 
individuals or families who share a common heritage, interest, or stake in 
unidentifiable land, land based resources or benefits that may derived 
therefrom’.556 
554 NLP (n 7), para 131. 
555 Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 2013 (Act No. 47 of 2013) which came into force on 10 January 
2014. Hereon WCM Act. 
556 ibid, s 2. 
128 
61 Patricia Kameri-Mbote has argued that where wildlife is found on non-state 
property, for instance on an area where a ‘group has defined rights’,557 the 
wildlife should be classed as belonging to the group and that the responsibility 
for the wildlife should lie with the group, particularly to ensure where they use 
it as a resource, such usage does not lead to extinction of the wildlife. 
However, because wildlife is classed as state-property this means that 
wherever they are found – and if it is in a communal area- other than public 
land, the State has rights over the wildlife and the ‘areas they occupy’.558 In 
effect this means that indigenous groups cannot lay claim to them and the 
State essentially ‘appropriates’ the rights of the group(s) over the land where 
the wildlife is found. The State is also the sole beneficiary of proceeds returned 
from the wildlife in that area. This has been the experience of the Maasai, who 
are pastoralists and use certain lands as grazing sites and for their livelihood. 
Their way of life and interests in land have become subservient to the state’s 
property rights; and even in the case where ‘multiple land uses are 
permitted’,559 the State’s appropriation of rights to wildlife essentially creates 
a schism between the rights of the group(s) to land ‘they need and previously 
have had unlimited access to’560 and the State’s interest in managing 
wildlife.561 She accepts that it is challenging to balance the communities’ 
interests as well to ‘sustainably manage the wildlife’; 562 and that in fact ‘any 
grandiose plan for the conservation of wildlife without adequate provision for 
human interests is doomed to fail.’ 563  
62 In terms of declaring areas as protected areas, the Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Act 2013 provides that it is for the Cabinet Secretary, who may 
consult the competent authority, to declare, by notice, an area as a national 
557 Patricia Kameri-Mbote, ‘Land Tenure, Land Use, and Sustainability in Kenya: Toward Innovative Use of Property 
Rights in Wildlife Management’ in Chalifour N and others, Land Use Law for Sustainable Development (IUCN 








park.564 In the case of public land the competent authority is the National Land 
Commission and in terms of other categories of land, it is the owner of the land 
or person entitled to the ‘use, rents and profits thereof’.565 This should 
hopefully provide some safeguards for indigenous communities in these areas. 
63 It is also for the Cabinet Secretary ‘to publish areas zoned to have wildlife 
conservation and management as their land use priority’566 as long as public 
consultation has occurred, no challenge is pending and the declaration 
complies with the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 1999.567 
The 1999 Act confirms that it is the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary in 
so declaring to comply with ‘the constitution, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and other treaties’.568 As far as the constitution is concerned, the 
Cabinet Secretary needs to show that s/he has had regard to the protection it 
offers to cultural rights expressed through traditional celebrations and cultural 
heritage.569 The fact that it requires all State organs and public officers to 
address the needs of vulnerable communities including marginalised 
communities and members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural 
communities,570 which includes indigenous communities. Such needs would 
include protection of their land rights under the constitution’s community land 
provisions.571 Under the constitution, public land cannot be land in respect of 
which any community ownership can be established by any legal process.572  
64 To comply with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Cabinet 
Secretary would need to show that the decision to publish zoned wildlife 
conservation areas takes cognisance of the fact that the CBD accepts that 
indigenous communities have ‘close and traditional dependence…on 
564 WCM Act (n 555), s 31(1)(a). 
565 ibid, s 3. 
566 ibid, s 31(1)(e). 
567 ibid. 
568 Environment Management and Co-ordination Act 1999 (No. 8 of 1999), s 54(1), as Amended by Section 2, Act 
No.5 of 2015. 
569 2010 Constitution, Article 11. 
570 ibid, Article 21(3). 
571 ibid, Article 63. 
572 ibid, Article 62(1)(d). 
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biological resources’, 573 that their practices can contribute to conservation of 
biological diversity and where this is done, there is a need to promote 
equitable sharing of benefits with these communities.574 It also requires States 
in their role to establish a ‘system of protected areas or areas where special 
measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity (to) respect, 
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovation and practices of indigenous 
communities’ relevant for conservation of biological diversity.575 These are 
rights enshrined in the ILO Convention and UNDRIP. The Government cannot 
therefore continue with business as usual under these statutes. As a further 
safeguard the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act provides that for an 
area to be zoned as a wildlife conservation area, it must be with the approval 
of the National Assembly.576 This was not the position before the coming into 
force of the Act. Parliament as legislator of the 2013 Act and watchdog over 
the Constitution should not approve zoning where this defeats the 
aforementioned safeguards. 
65 Finally the CLA provides that management of community land is subject to 
National and County Government laws and policies relating to ‘protection of 
animals and wildlife’.577 These laws, as we have seen in the foregoing 
paragraphs, require consideration of indigenous communities’ land related 
rights and legality of the Government’s justification for degazettement of land 
for wildlife conservation. However, given the history of failures by the 
Government to lawfully justify their actions even where provisions were of a 
lower threshold, it is likely that indigenous communities will continue to be 
subjected to unlawful degazettement of their lands for public purposes and if 
so can resort to some of the above provisions to support their claims.  
573 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, preamble. 
574 ibid. 
575 ibid, Article 8. 
576 WCM Act (n 555), s31(1)(e). 
577 CLA 2016, s 38(2). 
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Natural resources 
Under the National Land Policy 
66 It is important to consider how natural resources are dealt with under the NLP 
and under legislation as they are integral to indigenous communities’ land 
rights claims. The NLP notes that although Kenya is abound with natural 
resources namely, wildlife, forests, water, minerals, marine and land itself,578 
there has been a lack of sustainable management of these resources. Amongst 
the solutions offered in the policy is a multi-sectoral approach to the 
exploitation of natural resources,579 involvement of communities in the 
governance and management of natural resources, which has been amiss in 
the past;580 and securing of access to land based natural resources. The third 
of these envisages aligning tenure of natural resources to all the categories of 
land including community land; vesting of land-based natural resources in 
communities; recognising and protecting of the rights of ‘forest, water-
dependent and other natural resources-dependent communities and 
facilitating their access, co-management and derivation of benefits from the 
resources’;581 formally recognising ‘traditional knowledge related to land-
based resources’;582 and establishing legal channels through which State 
obligations relating to natural resources and beneficiaries’ rights can be 
established.583 
67 The NLP also mandates the Government to establish legal mechanisms to 
recognise rights of communities to natural resources and to enable benefit-
sharing by the communities of the same; compensate where loss of these 
resources is experienced; and where management of these resources is vested 
578 NLP (n 7), 9. 
579 ibid, (ix). 
580 ibid, 7. 




in local authorities, to ensure communities still benefit from the resources; and 
ensure all stakeholders partake in the management and utilisation of the 
resources.584  
Under the Constitution 
68 The 2010 Constitution defines natural resources as including surface and 
groundwater; forests; biodiversity; and minerals amongst other ‘physical non-
human factors and components’,585 which would be public land. However, it 
speaks of ensuring that natural resources are sustainably exploited, utilised, 
managed and conserved and that there is equitable sharing of accruing 
benefits.586  
69 In terms of responsibilities for natural resources, the 2010 Constitution tasks 
the National Land Commission with conducting research into the use of 
natural resources and making recommendations to appropriate authorities.587  
The National Government is tasked with the protection of the natural 
resources for the purposes of ‘establishing a durable and sustainable system 
of development’.588 County Governments are tasked with implementing 
specific national government policies on natural resources.589 
70 Significantly however, the Constitution provides, in the Bill of Rights, the right 
to collectively acquire and own property of any description and in any part of 
Kenya; and where such property is compulsorily acquired for a public purpose, 
it provides for just compensation to be paid to those deprived.590 Natural 
resources would satisfy ‘property of any description’ and these safeguards 
584 ibid, 23. 
585 2010 Constitution, Article 260. 
586 ibid, Article 69(1)(a). 
587 ibid, Article 67(2). 
588 ibid, Fourth Schedule, para 22, Articles 185(2), 186(1), 187(2). 
589 ibid, para 10. 
590 ibid, Article 40. 
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should apply to them as they do to other property. This would therefore mean 
that if natural resources are compulsorily acquired by the Government from 
indigenous peoples, they should benefit from associated proceeds. 
Under the Natural Resources (Classes of Transactions Subject to Ratification) 
Act 2016 
71 This law makes provision for some natural-resources related transactions to 
be approved by Parliament before their enforcement. These include those 
relating to extraction of oil, gas and minerals in a wildlife conservation area or 
other wildlife protection areas. Similarly the following require parliamentary 
approval: transactions which may lead to excision or boundary changes of 
gazetted national parks or wildlife conservation areas; or where a ‘long term 
concession’ is sought in a gazetted forest resource; or where a transaction 
requires the excision or gazettement of a public forest or natural reserve.591 In 
this approval process, Parliament is required to consider the extent of 
‘stakeholder’ consultation’.592 Although the Act does not define the term 
stakeholder, this must surely be reference to the ‘grantor’ and ‘beneficiary’ as 
a grantor is defined as the person who has granted the concession or right to 
exploit natural resources593 and a ‘beneficiary’ is defined as the person who 
benefits from a ‘concession’. A concession is defined in the Act as the ‘right to 
exploit natural resources pursuant to an agreement between the grantor and 
the beneficiary or a permit issued under national or county legislation.’594  
72 The approval process appears to provide an extra layer of protection for 
indigenous communities involved in these transactions but will only be of real 
benefit to them if Parliament sees them as grantors because when natural 
resources are on these communities’ ancestral lands, indigenous communities 
automatically assume their rightful status as owners of natural resources and 
591 The Natural Resources (Classes of Transactions Subject to Ratification Act) 2016 (Act No.41 of 2016), 
Schedule. Hereon Ratification Act 2016. 
592 ibid, s 9. 
593 ibid, s 2. 
594 Ibid. 
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have the right thereof to dispose of those resources. This has not been 
accepted in the past but must be the prism through which they are seen. The 
beneficiaries too, whether they be the Government, corporations, donor 
agencies and development organisations need to respect indigenous 
communities’ grantor status.  
Under the Community Land Act (CLA) 2016 
73 Under the CLA, registered communities are required to adhere to the laws, 
policies and standards on natural resources;595 but are required themselves to 
establish measures to ‘facilitate the access, use and co-management of forest, 
water and other resources by communities who have customary rights to 
these resources’.596 Where natural resources are found on community land, 
the CLA confirms what the NLP and the Constitution say, that these shall be 
used and managed sustainably, for the benefit of the community, 
transparently and accountably, and on the basis of equitable benefit 
sharing.597 In respect of benefit-sharing the CLA provides that ‘free, prior and 
open’ consultations which take into account environmental impact 
assessments in respect of community land agreements, be between 
stakeholders and involve the community, monitor impact on the community 
and stipulate compensation and royalties to be paid out to the community 
amongst other things.598 This seems to suggest that communities will be 
treated as owners of these natural resources.  
74 However, under the Ratification Act599 Parliament may still have to approve 
such an investment agreement where the community itself has approved such 
an agreement. This would not be a problem if Parliament consents to the 
investment in line with the community.  However, in those cases where the 
595 CLA 2016, s 20(1). 
596 ibid, s 20(2). 
597 ibid, s35. 
598 CLA 2016, s36. 
599 Ratification Act 2016 (n 591). 
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community is said to have consented to an agreement the fact that the 
Ratification Act, as noted earlier, does provide another layer of scrutiny to 
ensure the transactions’ legitimacy, is another potential safeguard for 
indigenous communities. 
Conclusion 
75 There is no doubt that the issues discussed here are complex and to an extent, 
in reality, convoluted. Kenya’s land law framework is a product of 122 years of 
written law i.e. since 1895. The 2010 Constitution can be commended for 
being more progressive in its definition of marginalised communities 
particularly its reference to indigenous communities than other African 
Constitutions. This means that the Government can no longer maintain its 
resistance to that term now that it has enshrined it in its supreme law; and 
must address the land-related marginalisation. However, this can only be truly 
effective if it involves the communities themselves.  
76 The CLA constitutes a new land regime that is part of a Constitution that seeks 
to embrace diversity, has acknowledged that there are those within society 
who are vulnerable and marginalised and whose needs should be addressed 
and calls for affirmative action plans to be designed on behalf of these groups 
to secure their representation in places of governance and ensure that they 
are able to develop their cultural practices. This same Constitution has also 
created a Bill of Rights which shuns discrimination on various grounds that 
indigenous communities can relate to: ethnic or social origin, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture and language; and confirms that there is a right to 
property and that this can be acquired and owned individually or communally 
in association with others. This same Constitution then reinforces communal 
acquisition and ownership of communal land, setting out different ways that 
this can be vested in communities. The law enacted to give effect to the 
Constitution’s provisions on community land, has been long in the making. It 
came into force in the sixth year after promulgation of the Constitution, and 
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not within the five year requisite period. There was therefore some delay in its 
drafting and enacting which means it is quite recent. Only time will tell how 
effective it is in delivering the spirit of the Constitution but notably concerns 
have begun to be raised about the delay in operationalising the system of 
registering communities. 
77 The public land system has been susceptible to abuse as well. For indigenous 
communities the fact that areas they call their ancestral homes: forests, water 
catchment areas, lakes etc., are categorised as public land means that without 
recognition and acknowledgment of their right to land in those areas, 
designation of land for public purposes will always trump their land rights. The 
Community Land Act regime is new and but prone also to abuse particularly as 
the final decision as to whether a community can be registered lies with the 
Government as does the decision on whether land can be registered as 
community land.  Furthermore the fact that it retains trust land elements, in 
respect of unregistered community land, is recipe for abuse.  
78 The recognition for, and protection of, customary rights to land is positive. 
However, as in the past, where customary laws have been made subject to 
repugnancy laws on grounds that communities have engaged in activities 
injurious to society, which has been used to limit their rights, little appears to 
have changed. Customary land rights are despite being constitutionally 
recognised and entrenched by statute, made subject to the Government’s 
perception of what is acceptable or not. One may argue that this is the ultimate 
responsibility Citizens place on their Government, which may be correct in a 
system less corrupt, but where it is corrupt, it is likely that the problems of the 
past will resurface. 
79 In respect of forests, Kenya needs to go a bit further and move to a community-
controlled forest system. The 2016 Forests Act albeit better than its 
predecessor does not go far enough. There are examples from Tanzania, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Nepal and other States where Governments have restored to 
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forest communities their communal forests, completely, and this has led to 
effective conservation and the communities have been autonomous 
conservators.600  
80 In respect of natural resources, its pre-NLP position was somewhat scanty. The 
NLP and the CLA seem supportive of communities’ ownership and 
management these resources. The constitution does not fully reflect the 
aspirations of the NLP. The understanding given of natural resources in the 
constitution is that they constitute public land. This may mean that what is in 
the CLA may be restricted by how the constitution is applied.  Having said that, 
this thesis argues that Article 40 of the constitution which provides a right to 
own property of any description includes the right of indigenous communities 
to collectively own natural resources and that this cannot be disesteemed by 
inconsistencies in the law. 
600 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
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Chapter 3: Implementation of the Endorois and Ogiek decisions under the  
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights framework under 
domestic mechanisms 
Introduction 
1 When the domestic system fails, the African Commission and the African Court 
offer, subject to satisfaction of certain criteria,601 Kenya’s indigenous communities 
a further opportunity for consideration of their land rights’ claims. In as far as 
access to a regional litigious mechanism is concerned - this is it - the framework 
established under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter) 
that avails the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
Commission) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Court), is 
the place of last resort.602  
2 The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to establish what steps can be taken by 
domestic actors to engender implementation of the Endorois and the Ogiek 
regional judgments in the African regional jurisdiction i.e. the Endorois case: 
276/03: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya by the Commission and the 
Ogiek case: Application No 006/2012: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights v The Republic of Kenya by the Court. 
3 Both the Commission and the Court’s actions in reaching these judgments have 
been intra vires. Their determination of the two claims is in accordance with their 
mandate.603 This being the case, it is likely that future claims will benefit from the 
601 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, Article 56; and Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1998, Article 
5. 
602 Notably it is argued in Chapter 4 that the East African Court of Justice is an alternative forum for indigenous 
communities’ land rights claims but this is at the sub-regional rather than regional level. 
603 The Commission’s mandate includes making recommendations to Governments, Article 45(1) of the Charter; 
and the Court is able to consider cases submitted by the Commission, of which the Ogiek case was, see Rule 33, 
Interim Rules of Court. The Court was established primarily to complement and reinforce the functions of the 
Commission as the OAU felt that in order for the objectives of the ACHPR to be attained, there was need for such 
an institution. 
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precedence set by these judgments but as they seem not to have yielded much 
fruit yet, in terms of changing the position of the claimant groups, there needs to 
be a focus on implementation. Essentially if the judgments that these bodies make 
are not enforced, the remedies will not be a reality to the communities they 
concern and the system will be said to have failed, and the law not to have worked. 
The ‘litmus test’, or alternatively, efficacy, of bodies such as these is, ultimately, 
determined by enforcement of their judgments.604 
 
4 Unsurprisingly, there is a growing appreciation of the fact that decisions of quasi-
judicial and judicial regional bodies such as the Commission and the Court cannot 
be left as they are and that ‘strategies and mechanisms’,605 are needed to produce 
the desired outcome.606 Implementation is therefore seen as an evolving and 
ongoing process,607 which requires the input of various actors involved in the 
litigation process, who in Kenya-related cases would be:  
 
the claimants, their representatives, the Kenyan Government, the 
decision-making bodies: in this case the African Commission and the 
African Court, the African Union which is the regional umbrella body; and 
domestic actors like the Kenyan Parliament which as seen in Chapter 1, 
through parliamentary questions, can keep issues in the limelight and push 
for Government accountability; the domestic courts; the Kenyan National 
Commission on Human Rights which has a constitutional mandate to 
ensure Kenya complies with its international human rights obligations of 
which decisions of the Commission and the Court would constitute and as 
these cases relate to historical land injustices the National Land 
Commission; the media; domestic NGOs; and international actors such as 
UN bodies and international NGOs. 
 
5 There has been research conducted on the role of the African Commission, the 
African Court and other African Union bodies on implementation of their 
decisions;608 and the role of communities themselves and NGOs in 
                                                          
604 Lutz Oette, ‘Bridging The Enforcement Gap: Compliance Of States Parties With Decisions Of Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies’ (2010) Volume 16 Number 2 Interights Bulletin 51. 
605 ibid. 
606 ibid. 
607 Interview with Rachel Murray, Director, Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol, Bristol 
(Telephone, 18 July 2018). 
608 See Murray and Long (n 153); and Viljoen (n 166) 351. 
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implementation.609 Given the focus of this thesis on the law and its heavy focus on 
domestic law, this chapter will examine the domestic system’s ability to implement 
these two decisions. The rationale for this focus on the national mechanisms is 
that the domestic sphere is ultimately where these decisions will be implemented 
and no matter how vocal and active, the Commission and the Court are in respect 
of enforcement of their decisions, it is in Kenya that the issues will either be 
aligned or not and the efficacy of the two bodies and other extraterritorial bodies 
can be determined. 
 
The status quo 
 
6 The Endorois judgment was handed down on 25 November 2009 and adopted by 
the African Union on 2 February 2010. The recommendations made in this case, 
as noted in the introductory chapter, remain on the whole, unimplemented, the 
most significant being recognition of the community’s rights of ownership and 
restitution of their ancestral lands. If the position of the Endorois remains as it was 
prior to the claim, this then validly questions the essence of law, the judgment and 
in fact the whole regional process. If not to redress the community for violations 
under the Charter which have effectively estranged them from their land, their 
religion, their cultural practices and livelihoods, what was the point of it all?  
 
7 The Ogiek judgment was promulgated by the African Court on 26 May 2017.  
Despite this, the Ogiek have continued to face hostilities from the Government. In 
May 2018 they were classed as illegal settlers, accused of environmental 
degradation and served with an eviction notice by the Kenya Forest Service to 
leave the Mau forest on grounds of environmental conservation.610/611 This is 
against the backdrop of the Kenyan Government, in the regional case, conceding 
that the degradation of the Mau forest ‘could not entirely be…..associated with 
                                                          
609 See Odhiambo (n 165). 
610 George Sayagie, ‘Storm Brews over Mau as the Ogiek Resist Eviction’ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 6 June 2018) 
<https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/narok/Storm-brews-over-Mau-as-Ogiek-resist-eviction/1183318-4597524-
pq84c0z/index.html>accessed on 17 July 2018. 
611 Interview with Daniel Kobei, Director, Ogiek Peoples Development Programme, Kenya (Skype, 17 July 2018). 
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the Ogiek’;612 and the Court finding that the Ogiek had become, ensuing from 
evictions from their ancestral homes, victims of ‘continued subjugation and 
marginalisaton’613 and that their expulsion from the Mau forest violated their right 
to property.614 Unsurprisingly, the Ogiek community is now asking whether ‘the 
case has any value at all if they will be evicted again.’615 As the Court is yet to make 
appropriate orders to remedy the violations it has found in the case,616 and has 
invited and received submissions on reparations617 including an amicus brief,618 
on the one hand it may be deemed premature to criticise the Government for non-
implementation of the decision as no remedial orders have been issued as yet. 
However, on the other hand, such criticism may not be unwarranted given the 
Court has found inter alia a violation to the right of property, basing its reasoning 
on a number of factors including the Government’s own concession and yet the 
attacks experienced by the community, before the judgment, continue.619  
 
The obligation to implement 
 
8 This lies in Article 1 of the African Charter which provides: ‘The Member States of 
the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present Charter shall recognise 
the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to 
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.’  
 
9 The Endorois did not make any submissions in relation to Article 1. Nonetheless 
the Commission found a violation and although it was silent on its reasons, 
violation of the Charter is tantamount to a failure to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to the Charter contrary to Article 1. 
                                                          
612 Ogiek case (n 81), para 130. 
613 ibid, para 111. 
614 ibid, para 131. 
615 Kobei (n 611). 
616 Ogiek case (n 81), para 222. 
617 The Court has received submissions on reparations from the Commission (on behalf of the Ogiek) and the 
Kenyan Government, the parties in the case, confirmed by Kobei (n 611); and Interview with Lucy Claridge, Director 
of Strategic Litigation, Office of the Senior Director of International Law and Policy, Amnesty International (and 
previously Legal Director, Minority Rights Group International), London (London, 4 July 2018). 
618 From the Human Rights Implementation Centre (University of Bristol) and the Centre for Human Rights 
(University of Pretoria), confirmed by Murray (n 607). 
619  Ogiek case (n 81), para 130. 
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10 In the Ogiek case, the community argued that if the Court had found violations of 
other Charter provisions, such finding effectively meant that the State had violated 
Article 1. The Government did not make any submissions. The Court held that 
although the State had recently enacted a number of domestic laws since the 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, which could be said to constitute 
legislative measures to ensure enjoyment of Charter rights, namely: the 
Constitution itself, the Community Land Act 2016 and the Forest Conversation and 
Management Act 2016,620 the fact remained that there had been a failure to 
recognise the distinctive collectivity of the Ogiek i.e. ‘to recognise the Ogieks like 
other similar groups as a distinct tribe’,621 thus denying them access to the Mau 
Forest which had triggered a violation of other rights, in violation therefore of 
Article 1. 
11 As has been found in the Ogoni peoples’ case, a case determined by the African 
Commission in 1996,622 giving effect to duties set out in human rights instruments, 
which is the implication of Article 1, means abiding by a four-fold duty:  
i. respect of the rights which at a basic level means that States are
prohibited from interfering in the enjoyment of fundamental rights. In
the case of a collective group it also means respect for the resources it
uses to satisfy its needs;
ii. protection of these rights by means of legislation and provision of
effective remedies. This also requires States to take measures to
protect beneficiaries of the protected rights against political, economic
and social interferences;
iii. promotion of enjoyment of human rights which requires States to
ensure that individuals are able to exercise their rights and freedoms
by promoting tolerance, raising awareness, and even building
infrastructures; and
iv. fulfilment of the rights and freedoms which requires States to take
measures to actually realise the rights which in some cases might
‘consist in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or resources
that can be used for food (direct food aid or social security).’623
620 ibid, para 216. 
621 ibid, para 216. 
622 Communication no: 155/96 (n 143). 
623 ibid, paras 45-47. 
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12 The recommendations of the Commission in respect of the Endorois were that 
the State: recognise the community’s rights of ownership and restitute their 
ancestral land; permit their access to Lake Bogoria, surrounding sites for 
religious and cultural rites and for grazing their cattle; recompense them for 
all losses suffered; pay them royalties from existing economic activities and 
ensure they benefit from employment opportunities in the reserve; grant 
registration to their representative body, the Endorois Welfare Council624 
(EWC); engage with them to bring about the implementation of the 
recommendations; and provide a report on implementation to the 
Commission within 3 months of the decision.625 The EWC has been granted 
registration but the main recommendations with include recognition of 
ownership and restitution of land, have not yet been complied with. In respect 
of the Ogiek, the Court ordered that the Kenyan Government ‘take appropriate 
steps within a reasonable time frame to remedy all the violations established 
and to inform the Court of the measures taken within 6 months from the date 
of the judgment’, that is, six months from 6 May 2017. The Court reserved its 
position on reparations.626 It is understood that the Government has filed a 
document with the Court, which has also received submissions from the 
Commission on behalf of the Ogiek community and an amicus curiae, as 




13 Implementation has been defined as the legal process through which findings 
are incorporated into domestic law through legislation, judicial decisions, 
executive decree or other process; and compliance with decisions is seen more 
broadly as the ‘factual matching of state behaviour and international 
norms’. 627 Compliance is sometimes and inconsistently considered or equated 
with ‘the adoption of legislation or judgements by a domestic court or an 
                                                          
624 The judgment actually refers to this as the Endorois Welfare Committee which is incorrect. 
625 Endorois case (n 114). 
626 Ogiek case (n 81), para 227. 
627 Murray and Long (n 153). 
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amendment to policy’628 following a regional body finding but not as ‘ensuring 
that the victim has reparation or that the African Charter’s obligations have 
been respected in practice.’629 Implementation and/or compliance of the kind 
needed to enforce the Endorois and Ogiek decisions is therefore a colossal 
task. This is made even more colossal, one might add, by the multifarious and 
complex factors discussed in the introductory chapter: the politicisation of 
land, market liberalization; corruption in land management; and in Chapter 2, 
the friction between public and community land.  
 
14 The African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines provide useful guidance 
on the issue of implementation and what measures States are required to take 
to implement these rights. The Principles and Guidelines place implementation 
at the heart of the obligation to protect. They provide that this obligation not 
only requires States to take positive measures to ensure that non-state actors 
do not violate the economic, social and cultural rights under the Charter but 
requires States to ensure ‘effective implementation of relevant legislation and 
programmes and to provide remedies’,630 for violations. They provide that 
there are certain obligations which are immediate upon the ratification of the 
Charter and include, but are not limited to, ‘the obligation to take steps, the 
prohibition of retrogressive steps, minimum core obligations and the 
obligation to prevent discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights’.631 At the very minimum the Principles and Guidelines provide 
that a State has an obligation to ensure that ‘no significant number’632 of 
nationals are denied ‘the essential elements of a particular right’.633 This 
means that even where the State claims not to have resources, it is expected 
to ‘ensure the minimum essential levels of each right to members of 
                                                          
628 ibid. 
629 ibid. 
630 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 2011), para 7. 
631 ibid, para 16. 
632 ibid. 
633 ibid, para 17. 
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vulnerable and disadvantaged groups’.634 Essentially this requires at the very 
least, prioritisation by the State of the realisation of the rights of its poorest 
and the most vulnerable groups.635  
 
 
The Government  
 
15 So in the case of the Endorois and the Ogiek communities, not only are there 
two decisions which have found their various rights under the Charter to have 
been violated and are to be remedied, Kenya is expected even if it argues that 
resources have made it difficult to implement the decisions in their totality, to 
nonetheless prioritise the realisation of these communities’ needs in 
recognition of the fact that they form part of the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups within Kenyan society. One only has to look at the amount of money 
the Government has spent on the bodies discussed in Chapter 1 to conclude 
that there is money available, from somewhere. As noted it spent Kshs 
79,399,768 on the Ndungu Commission alone.636 
 
16 And from a very basic level, if Kenya is to be said to have complied with its 
obligation to take adequate measures to give effect to the rights of the 
indigenous communities, it needs at the very least to identify the members of 
the community, engage them in dialogue and make arrangements to register 
their land rights which means at a very basic level ensuring that there is a 
community land registrar to register communities as required under the CLA.  
It would also mean refraining from inconsistent and indefensible comments 
made by the Government officials contesting the legality of the decisions. At 
the one year’s public celebration of the Ogiek decision, the County 
Commissioner of Narok, declared publicly that the Ogiek case should be taken 
back to the African Court as the Ogiek are causing trouble.637 This is a clear 
                                                          
634 ibid. 
635 ibid. 
636 Parliamentary Debates (n 342). 
637 Kobei (n 611). 
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misunderstanding of the Ogiek community’s status in respect of the Mau 
forest. 
 
17 The Kenyan Government has a duty to respect rights of its citizens which at a 
basic level means it is prohibited from interfering in the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights. In the case of a collective group it also means respect for 
the resources it uses to satisfy its needs. The Kenyan Government in its duty 
to remedy the rights which the Commission and the Court have found to have 
been violated in the two cases, has to begin by respecting those rights which 
at its basic level means prohibiting anything that is interfering in the enjoyment 
of the two communities of their rights. In the case of the Endorois it means 
opening up access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and 
cultural sites and grazing cattle. This would not only be in line with the decision 
itself but in line with Article 63 of the Constitution and its recognition of the 
fact that community land encompasses grazing areas lawfully held, managed 
or used by communities. The fact that the Commission has found that the 
community was unlawfully restricted from accessing the Lake Bogoria area 
means that it has found that the community to be the lawful owners of that 
land under customary law. This then requires that the corresponding process 
in the CLA as discussed in Chapter 2 has to be followed to ensure that the land 
is recognised, adjudicated and documented for the purposes of registration 
under section 5(2) of the 2016 Act, in consultation with the community.  
 
18 This process would not therefore just address the granting of unrestricted 
access, it would also address the recognition of rights of ownership to the 
Endorois community and restitute their ancestral land to them. Although it is 
noted that the manner in which the CLA is drafted may cause challenges in 
respect of recognition of communities where those communities’ distinctive 
collectivity is not recognised or accepted by the State, reversal of 
marginalisation in the form of forced assimilation638 and reversal of effects of 
                                                          
638 As defined in Article 260 of the 2010 Constitution. 
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discrimination,639 coupled with the fact that the Commission has made a 
finding of fact that the Endorois are a distinctive collectivity, necessitates 
acceptance of that distinction. If that distinctive identity is recognised, as the 
CLA is now in force (it was not previously), there is no reason why the process 
of recognition, adjudication and documentation of their land should not take 
effect. 
 
19 In respect of the Ogiek, the same applies. They have been recognised by the 
African Court as constituting a distinctive collectivity and it has been accepted 
that the Mau Forest is their ancestral home. These findings of fact coupled 
with Article 63 of the Kenyan Constitution which defines community land as 
ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer 
communities, should mean that the Mau Forest areas which the community 
claims as their ancestral land should be recognised, adjudicated and 
documented for the purposes of registration under the Community Land Act 
2016.   
 
20 Respect would also require the Kenya Forest Services (KFS) to respect the 
rights of the Ogiek community to own, use and manage forest-resources. This 
would require them, in the first instance, to distinguish this community from 
others and stop treating them as squatters and encroachers. The Ogiek 
Peoples Development Programme (OPDP) has a register of the Ogiek 
community and where they reside.640 The KFS should collaborate with the 
OPDP and based on this list refrain from forcibly removing them from their 
land. Working from this list is likely to prevent reports such as:  
 
‘mushrooming of the Ogiek – people pretending to be Ogiek but we 
know that these people are not as they were not there when we were 
struggling- they are providing documents claiming to be Ogiek but we 
have a list of Ogiek and these people are not on the list’ 641 
 
                                                          
639 As required by Article 27 of the 2010 Constitution. 
640 Kobei (n 611). 
641 ibid. 
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as it is found to have happened in the Mau Forest in respect of settlement 
schemes for the Ogiek community.642 In any event identification and 
protection of communities like the Ogiek is a policy directive under the NLP to 
facilitate the meeting of their land needs.643 
 
21 The Kenyan Government also has a duty to protect these communities’ rights 
by means of legislation and provision of effective remedies. This also means 
that it is required to take measures to protect beneficiaries of the protected 
rights against political, economic and social interferences. The most pertinent 
pieces of legislation pertaining to these two communities are the Community 
Land Act 2016, the Kenya’s Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 
2013,644 the Forest Conservation and Management Act 2016, the Natural 
Resources (Classes of Transactions Subject to Ratification) Act 2016 and the 
Water Act 2016, as discussed in Chapter 2. There the friction existing between 
indigenous communities’ land rights and public land as set out in these 
legislative measures is discussed. Giving effect to the two decisions would 
require analysis of these frictions and taking action to remedy the 
inconsistencies. One of the difficulties in recognising indigenous communities’ 
rights, other than political unwillingness is the existence of inconsistent laws 
or laws that seek to restrict rather than protect human rights and provide 
effective remedies.645 
 
22 The Kenyan Government also has a duty to promote the enjoyment of the 
communities’ human rights which means promoting tolerance, raising 
awareness and building infrastructures to ensure that the communities are 
able to exercise their rights and freedoms. It is said that the majority of States 
which are signatories of international treaties have an under-developed 
national implementation infrastructure to give effect to treaty decisions.646 
                                                          
642 See Chapter 1, para 58. 
643 NLP (n 7), executive summary. 
644 Which as noted earlier came into force on 10 January 2014, WCM (n 550). 
645 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
646 Open Society Foundations, 'From Rights to Remedies, Structures and Strategies for Implementing International 
Human Rights Decisions’ (Open Society Foundations 26 May 2013), executive summary. 
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The consequence of this is that implementation is not prioritised.647 This thesis 
considers that this is one of the problems Kenya has: it has an under-developed 
infrastructure which is aggravated by politics and corruption. 
 
23 In the few nations where implementation is effective, they have ‘high-level 
inter-ministerial committees and working groups, standing parliamentary 
committees, enabling legislation and direct enforcement through national 
courts’.648 However, this is the exception rather than the rule.649 Of these 
Kenya has had/has the following mechanisms: two task forces tasked with 
implementing the two decisions; three Constitutionally-established bodies: 
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the 
Administration of Justice and the National Land Commission; a national 
Parliament; and national courts which by virtue of Article 2(6) of the 2010 
Constitution must treat the Charter as part of the domestic law framework. 
These will be considered next. Suffice to say that individually these bodies have 
specific mandates but even where these are fulfilled, the actual realisation of 
the rights is reliant on Government conduct. 
 
i) The Task Forces 
 
24 There have been two of these: i) the Task Force on the Implementation of the 
2010 judgment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Endorois community; and ii) The 2017 Task Force on the implementation 
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i) The Endorois decision Task Force 
 
25 This was set up by the President on 19 September 2014 by Gazette Notice,650 
to implement the 2010 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
decision on the Endorois community. The Task Force was mandated to: 
 
• ‘study the Decision of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights contained in Communication No. 276/2003 and 
provide guidance on the political, security and economic 
implications of the Decision; 
• examine the potential environmental impacts on Lake Bogoria 
and the surrounding area because of the implementation of the 
Decision; 
• examine the practicability of restitution of Lake Bogoria and the 
surrounding area to the Endorois Community taking into 
account that Lake Bogoria is classified as a World Heritage Site 
by the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO); 
• assess the amount of compensation payable to the Endorois 
Community for losses suffered and for settlement of royalties 
owed from existing economic activities on and around Lake 
Bogoria; and 
• any other matter that is relevant and pertinent.’651 
 
26 The Task Force’s tenure was to be for a year or longer if deemed necessary by 
the President. In terms of reporting on its progress and recommendations, the 
notice required the Task Force to report: ‘(a) every three months, prepare and 
submit to the President reports of its progress; (b)   propose interim 
recommendations to the President within six months of its appointment; and 
(c)   submit a final report and make final recommendations to the President 
within one year of its appointment.’652  
 
27 Other than the assessment of compensation, there is nothing in the mandate 
that suggests that the Task Force was established to implement the decision. 
The remit appears to have been based on scrutiny of the decision rather than 
                                                          
650 The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CXVI-No.115], Gazette Notice 6708 (26 September 2014). 
651 ibid. 
652 ibid. 
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giving effect to it. For instance, it is not clear what steps would have been taken 
if the Task Force had made negative findings on all the issues it was tasked 
with investigating. However, in the initial month there was some hope of 
implementation as the Task Force met with various organisations including the 
Endorois Welfare Council (EWC), Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) and Minority Rights Group International (MRG) 
to discuss the decision,653 leading the Endorois to believe that the Government 
was intent on implementing the decision.654   
 
28 In 2015 the EWC gave a statement at the African Commission’s 56th Ordinary 
Session.  They expressed concern about the Task Force’s terms of reference 
and noted that these: 
 
‘appear to give room for further study and analysis on the decision by 
this Honourable Commission, instead of implementation. For example 
the Task Force has been empowered to study the decision and provide 
guidance on its political, security and economic implications – yet the 
Government has had 5 years to evaluated (sic) the decision and all of 
its implications.  We are also concerned that, whilst the Task Force is 
permitted to seek the views of the public in relation to implementation, 
there is no requirement to consult with any Endorois 
representative.’655  
 
29 The Task Force’s mandate did not actually require it to consult with the 
Endorois community which confirms EWC’s concerns. The mandate of the Task 
force has now expired and it is defunct. Its work was not completed.656 
Implementation of recommendations aside, at least the bodies discussed in 
Chapter 1 completed their work which blights the Government’s intentions (if 
genuine) with this task force. 
                                                          
653 ESCR-Net, ‘First meeting of the Kenyan Task Force for the Implementation of the Endorois decision’ (ESCR-Net, 
24 November 2014)<http://www.escr-net.org/node/365690>accessed 17 October 2017. 
654 Minority Rights Group International, ‘Kenya Task Force formed to implement the 2010 Endorois ruling’ (MRG, 
29 September 2014)<‘https://minorityrights.org/2014/09/29/kenyan-task-force-formed-to-implement-the-2010-
endorois-ruling/>accessed 7 October 2018. 
655 Wilson Kipkazi,  ‘Statement by Endorois Welfare Council-Kenya at the 56th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 21st April to 7th May 2015 in Banjul, the Gambia’ (Endorois Welfare 
Council 2015)<‘http://www.achpr.org/files/endorois_welfare_council_kenya.pdf>accessed 12 November 2018. 
656 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘KNCHR’s Engagement with Indigenous People’ (Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights) <http://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1046/KNCHR’s-
Engagement-with-Indigenous-People>accessed 7 October 2018. 




i) The Ogiek decision Task Force 
 
30 This was appointed on 10 November 2017 by the Cabinet Secretary for 
Environment and Natural Resources by Gazette Notice.657 Similar to the 
Endorois task force, the terms of reference for it have expired before 
conclusion of its work. Its functions included:  
 
‘a) study the decision of the African Court and decisions by domestic 
courts on the Ogiek’s occupation of the Mau Forest; b) study all land 
related laws to see how they address the plight of the Ogieks of the 
Mau; c) establish both the registration and the ground status of the 
claimed land; d) recommend measures to provide redress to the Ogiek 
claim. These may include restitution to their original land or 
compensation with cash or alternative land; e) prepare interim and 
final report to be submitted to the Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in Arusha; f) examine the effect of the judgment on similar cases in 
other areas of the country; (and) g) conduct studies and public 
awareness on the rights of indigenous peoples’.658  
 
31 In and of themselves these functions are not dismissible and could be seen as 
the recognition of the gravity of work required to bring actual realisation of 
the judgments to pass, however, the fact that the task force was being asked 
to recommend measures which it was informed may include restitution of the 
land to the community is telling of the intentions of the Government. Given 
that the Court had heard arguments, balanced the evidence and concluded 
that the Mau forest constituted Ogiek land, it was not for the Government to 
deliberate further on whether restitution should be effected although it is 
acknowledged the Court is yet to rule on reparations;659 and may find that 
restitution is not actually possible. It is highly doubtful that this will be its view 
as the Ndungu Commission in particular sets out the pragmatic steps needed 
to reallocate land in the Mau forest.  
 
                                                          
657 The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CXIX-No.167] Gazette Notice 6708 (10 November 2017). 
658 ibid. 
659Ogiek case (n 81), paras 222-223. 
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32 The task force was probably a mere attempt by the Government to window 
dress and make it appear, to the African Court and other bodies, as if it were 
taking measures to implement the decision. Notably, the Task Force was 
funded by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS). This is the same agency that has 
been accused of forcibly evicting the Ogiek and Sengwer communities from 
their ancestral homes which arguably makes it conflicted. Furthermore, its 
mandate did not explicitly require it to consult with the Ogiek which one might 
have thought necessary for the purposes of recommending measures for 
redressing the community.  
 
Examples of implementation bodies elsewhere 
 
33 This thesis will now examine two examples of implementation bodies, in 




34 Paraguay, is a nation with 19 groups that self-identify as indigenous. It has a 
legal framework that recognises indigenous communities including its 
Constitution660 and domestic law no. 234/93 that transposes the ILO 
Convention No.169.661 Maugre this legal framework, there have been 3 
indigenous communities’ cases brought against the State in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, namely: i) Yakye Axa Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, Judgment of June 17, 2005; ii) Case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of August 24, 2010; and iii) Case of Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of August 24, 2010. All 
these cases have been determined positively by the Inter-American Court. 
Essentially the Court has found that the communities’ property and affiliated 
rights as enshrined in the American Convention have been violated; and that 
provisions of the Paraguayan constitution which recognise indigenous 
                                                          
660 IWGIA, ‘IWGIA-Indigenous World-2019’, IWGIA, https://www.iwgia.org/images/documents/indigenous-
world/IndigenousWorld2019_UK.pdf (Accessed 28 September 2019); See also para  
661 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of June 17, 2005, para 130. 
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communities and their land rights had also been violated. The Court further 
found that the process provided for in domestic law for land rights claims 
determination hampered the realisation of the communities’ right to their 
ancestral land.  
 
35 In the first case the Court ordered the state to: 
 
‘identify said traditional territory and give it to the Yakye Axa 
Community free of cost, within a maximum period of three years from 
the date of notification of the instant Judgment.  If the traditional 
territory is in private hands, the State must assess the legality, 
necessity and proportionality of expropriation or non-expropriation of 
said lands to attain a legitimate objective in a democratic society’.662  
 
36 But as of June 2008, the Government had not taken this action and as of the 
end of 2017, the community was still awaiting resettlement.663 
 
37 In the second case, the Court ordered, inter alia, restitution of the 
community’s ancestral lands in line with the ‘restitutio in integrum principle’ 
as reparation;664 and noted, that albeit such restitution may be ‘barred’ due to 
the lands being ‘currently privately owned’,665 the court had to nonetheless 
make the right to property a reality by either purchasing those lands or 
condemning them for the purpose of returning them to the community. 
However, if this was not possible, the State needed to ‘make over alternative 
lands’ in agreement with the community in a manner that respected their way 
of life,666 i.e. ‘formally and physically grant tenure of the lands to the victims’ 
within 3 years of the judgment.667 As of March 2009, three years after the 
                                                          
662 ibid, para 217. 
663 Human Rights Committee, ‘Fourth Periodic Report Submitted by Paraguay under Article 40 of the Covenant 
Pursuant to the Optional Reporting Procedure, Due in 2017 CCPR/C/PRY/4’ (Human Rights Committee, 7 November 
2018). 
664 ibid, para 210.  
665 ibid, para 211. 
666 ibid, para 212. 
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judgment, the State was yet to grant tenure to the community. It was not until 
2014 that the State passed expropriation laws in respect of the community’s 
lands. The lands are said to have been awarded to the ‘National Institute of 
Indigenous Affairs, for subsequent award to the Sawhoyamaxa indigenous 
community’.668 
 
38 In the third case, the Court found that the 10,700 hectares of land claimed by 
the community did belong to the community,669 and ordered the State to take 
necessary measures to ensure that the community’s right to ownership, use 
and enjoyment of the land was realised,670  within 3 years of the judgment.671 
The Court recognised that to do this would require ‘specific identification’ of 
the territory in participation with the Community, which it ordered should take 
place within a year of the judgment; 672 and once that had been done, that it 
was the necessary for the State to decide within the guidance provided within 
the Court’s judgment, whether those lands, if privately owned, could be 
expropriated for the community and if not, the State was ordered to find 
alternative lands. The Court thereby being willing to grant a 1 year extension 
to the 3 years, to enable this,673 but with a US$10,000 charge for each month 
of delay after the 3 year mark.674 Compliance should therefore have been by 
August 2014 at the latest but it was not until December 2017 that land 
belonging to the Xákmok Kásek community had been acquired from private 
owners and was registered in the community’s name.675 
 
Paraguay’s implementation system 
 
39 In February 2009 Paraguay established the Inter-Agency Commission on the 
Enforcement of International Judgements (CICSI) made up of governmental 
                                                          
668 HRC (n 672). 
669 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, para 107. 
670 ibid, para 281. 
671 ibid, para 285. 
672 ibid, para 283. 
673 ibid, para 287. 
674 ibid, para 289. 
675 HRC (n 672).  
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agencies ‘to monitor and coordinate the efforts of the executive branch to 
comply with the judgements and recommendations of the inter-American 
system’676 and as of 2013, recommendations of international supervisory 
bodies.677 The Commission’s current President is the Paraguayan Vice 
President who is one of other senior Government officials with requisite 
decision-making powers within it. The Commission’s main objective is to 
develop criteria and action plans to see to it that there are no impediments to 
effecting decisions made by the Court and international bodies.678  
 
40 Also in 2013, Paraguay ratified a National Human Rights Plan and set up 
SIMORE, an inter-governmental online system of following up on 
recommendations made by international treaty bodies’ created with the 
assistance of OCHRC.679 It allows state agencies to monitor their actions, 
prepare national reports, design public policies and conduct research.680  
 
41 Arguably Paraguay has had a head start on recognition of indigenous 
communities’ land rights, if only in law and judgments of an international 
magnitude. The Inter-American Court has found that its land claims system is 
ineffective and effectively prevents indigenous communities from realising 
their ancestral land rights. In Kenya, the law in its recognition of indigenous 
communities’ land rights is fairly young and its system of land claims is yet to 
be tested fully. There are potential problems as discussed in Chapter 2 but 
even more apparent is the absence of a system akin to Paraguay’s CICSI in 
particular as an inter-governmental body comprising of decision-makers 
                                                          
676 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-
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focused on implementation of judgments and importantly having longevity 
rather than having a fleeting existence.  
 
42 That is not to say that CICSI is fool proof. It was created in 2009 but notably 
the Paraguayan State is still ten years after the Commission’s creation and 
thirteen years after the Yakye Axa community judgment, yet to resettle the 
community.681 In its 2015 periodic report to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Paraguay stated that the CICSI had made great 
strides in implementing the three judgments which may be true but 3 years 
previously, Amnesty International’s interviews with the communities revealed 
that: 
 
‘the CICSI has been ineffective in securing the traditional lands to the 
communities affected. Indigenous communities have expressed 
concerns that for many years the Commission prioritized pursuing 
alternative land proposals without first exhausting with due diligence 
other options such as conducting serious negotiations with the current 
owners of the ancestral lands.’682 
 
43 Similarly IWGIA in a 2018 report considered that Paraguay lacked a proper 
legal framework for regulating and effecting implementation.683 To its credit, 
in November 2018 the UN’s Human Rights Committee reported that Paraguay 
had facilitated a visit of the Committee to the indigenous communities to 
‘verify the status of compliance with the three judgments’, that ‘follow-up’ to 
the judgments remained on CICSI’s agenda and the CICSI had held meetings 
with the leaders of the groups and their legal representatives.684 In its August 
2019 Concluding Observations on Paraguay, the Human Rights Committee 
reported that the CICSI’s membership had now been extended in law to 
                                                          
681 As this is awaiting determination of an ancillary right of way easement litigation being pursued by the State 
against a corporation linked to the land, see HRC (n 676). 
682 Amnesty International (n 677).  
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include representatives of civil society which it described as a positive aspect. 
In its observations on indigenous communities, it noted that in respect of the 
three judgements, there had been minimal progress but that in the last 3 years 





44 On 22 April 2015 the Caribbean Court of Justice, determined the case of Maya 
Leaders Alliance et al. v. The Attorney General of Belize.686 The Maya 
community has been fighting for recognition of its customary land tenure as 
property for several years. In 2004 the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in a case brought by the Maya Indigenous Community against the 
State687 found that the State had ‘violated the right to property enshrined in 
Article XXIII of the American Declaration by failing to take effective measures 
to recognize, demarcate and title Maya communal property, and by granting 
logging and oil concessions to third parties in relation to Maya lands without 
effective consultations and the informed consent of the Maya people.’688  
 
45 The Commission’s recommendations included the adoption of measures 
necessary for the delimiting, demarcating and titling of the Maya territory in 
consultation with the community; carrying out of the said measures and 
refraining from actions that would impact on the ‘existence, value, use or 
enjoyment located in the geographic area occupied and used by the Maya 
people;’ and repairing any damage caused by environmental degradation 
caused by logging concessions granted by the State, on the Maya community’s 
land.689 Other cases had been pursued domestically by other Maya 
communities with similar judgments and orders including refraining from 
                                                          
685 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Paraguay 
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transacting on Maya community territories.690 But with no proper 
implementation of the decisions, the community pursued the proceedings in 
the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 
 
46 However, on 22 April 2015 the same day as the CCJ judgment, the community 
and the Belizean Government agreed a consent order in which the 
Government consented to the following: that community land tenure existed 
in the Maya villages and gave rise to collective and individual rights of property; 
that it would adopt measures to identify and protect the rights consequent on 
the customary tenure in consultation with the community and respectful of 
their cultural practices; that it would refrain from any land transactions in 
respect of the said lands pending the identification and protection of the 
community’s tenure rights, unless with the authority of the community and in 
respect of their rights; that the Court would determine the issue of damages; 
and the parties would report back  by 30 April 2016 on compliance.691 The CCJ 
considered that the order did not preclude assessment of the community’s 
constitutional rights and treatment of same by the State and proceeded to do 
so in the judgment. It found that the Belizean State had ‘contravened the 
constitutional guarantee of the Appellants to the protection of the law’ and 
endorsed the consent order agreed between the State and the community. It 
ordered the State to ‘establish a fund of BZ$300,000.00 as a first step 
towards…..protect(ing) Maya customary land tenure’ and 75% payment of the 
legal costs incurred by the community.692  
 
47 Other than stating that the parties needed to report back to the Court on 30 
April 2016 on compliance, there were no specific dates by which the measures 
of identification and protection of the community’s customary tenure rights 
had to be complied with.  
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Belize’s implementation system 
 
48 In 2016 the Belizean State ‘established the Toledo Maya Land Rights 
Commission (“TMLR Commission”) under the authority of the Belize Attorney 
General as the government’s mechanism to implement the CCJ consent order. 
The TMLR Commission, chaired by former Minister of Forestry, Lisel Alamilla, 
was tasked with developing a draft implementation plan by 30 June 2016.’693 
As of September 2018 the plan had not been completed.694 The Commission 
has reportedly met with the community’s representatives but the meetings 
have been ‘severely handicapped as the TMLR Commission has taken the view 
that it is for the government alone to determine the scope of the work to be 
done and the timeline to implement the Consent Order and, in accordance 
with that view, with whom they are obligated to consult.’695 The State had also 
used the BZ$300,000.00 ordered by the CCJ not to compensate the 
community in pursuance of the CCJ order but as funds for establishing the 
TMLR Commission.696 Further the Commission has stated in open court that ‘it 
does not see the demarcation and documentation process as being within its 
mandate of work, and it does not expect the development of such a process 
to occur for several more years.’697 Essentially no proper steps have been 
taken by the Commission to implement the CCJ’s judgment. 
 
49 In September 2018 the Commission is reported to have met with consultants 
to prepare a draft of the Maya Customary Land Tenure Policy. The Chair of the 
Commission was quoted as saying:  
 
‘When you talk about a customary land tenure, they are governed by 
different conventions within the global framework of what the 
indigenous people have been advocating for. So basically what we are 
                                                          
693 Maya Leaders Alliance, ‘Update Report to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR for the 124th Session 
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doing is looking at the consent order and bringing it down to how we 
are going to apply that in Belize. What does it look like, what should it 
include; what are some definitions that we have to include.’ 
 
as well as suggesting that any drafted policy would have to be approved by 
Attorney General and then the Cabinet before being proposed as 
legislation.698 In January 2019, it was reported that the Commission’s Chair had 
held further consultations with various participants on the legislative 
measures to be taken.699 The Chair was further reported as saying: 
 
‘“This is our second day that we’re having a meeting with indigenous 
people’s and human rights experts and we’re discussing legislative 
principles and headings on Maya lands and their associated rights.  It’s 
really a preliminary discussion with the experts to see what are some 
of the principles that would be included in legislation that we will be 
drafting in the near future.  We’re being very ambitious and we hope 
that the legislation will be completed this year, but as a starting point 
for us, it’s to bring key officials from the government to participate in 
this workshop or meeting to make sure that we’re all on the same page 
and understanding these principles as we move forward.  The idea is 
to just really build their capacity as we move this forward because it’s 
important that all of government officials are understanding the basis 
of the consent order and how you actually make it happen on the 
ground.  How do you bring it into fruition on the ground, how do you 
protect Maya customary land rights?”’700 (sic) 
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50 Given that the consent order was an agreement between the state and the 
Maya community and has been endorsed by the CCJ, the Commission appears 
to be unduly prolonging the process and above statements by the Chair seem 
rhetorical. The above statements by the Chair seem rhetorical rather than a 
genuine attempt at enforcing the judgment. What was in the consent order 
was effectively what the Inter-American Commission had said in its 
recommendations in 2004 and the State had had since then to engage with 
the issues and seek the assistance of experts etc., Effectively, the Belizean 
state through this Commission seems to be acting as if these are novel issues, 
behaviour one would argue is replicate of the government of Kenya. That is 
not to say that implementation is not complex, it is and from the example of 
the Paraguayan Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community which had to wait from 
March 2006 when judgment was made in their favour to 2014 for 
expropriation laws to be passed in respect of their lands, one sees this. The 
protracted nature of implementation including the challenges the Commission 
seems to be having in understanding what the consent order means in the 
Maya community’s case are not unique, but attempts have to be genuine.  
 
51 Of the two, the Paraguayan inter-agency commission seems to be far more 
advanced than the Belizean Commission. This is likely to be attributable in part 
to the fact that it has been in existence for longer and the fact that it is 
constituted by decision-makers. 
 
52 Similarly other jurisdictions with indigenous communities have had task forces 
which have comprised of accountable stakeholders. In September 2013 the 
Malaysian Government set up a Task force to review a 2012 report of an 
inquiry by the country’s national human rights institution, the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), into the land rights of indigenous 
communities. This task force comprised of Government Ministries, state 
agencies and civil society experts and produced its report in August 2014,701 
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which suggests that it had sufficient time to conclude its review. It endorsed 
the majority of the Commission’s recommendations albeit rejecting some.702 
There is a follow-up plan to implement the task force’s report which Suhakam 
continues to monitor.703  
 
53 If the Kenyan Government was genuinely minded to repeat the task force 
exercise, having an inter-agency task force with a long standing mandate 
constituted by various stakeholders: senior representatives with decision-
making powers from the Ministry of Lands, the Treasury, the Attorney 
General’s office, the Department of Justice, the National Land Commission, the 
KNCHR given its mandate on the monitoring of Kenya’s compliance with its 
international obligation, the Kenya Forestry Service as well as representatives 
of civil society including representatives of indigenous communities, will be 
strides in the right direction and may bring about implementation within a 
reasonable period. 
 
ii) Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 
 
54 This Commission was established under the 2010 Constitution. It has a number 
of functions but most pertinent to this discussion is its function ‘to act as the 
principal organ of the State in ensuring compliance with obligations under 
treaties and conventions relating to human rights’704 that is most crucial. 
National human rights institutions are observed as being ‘in a unique position 
to facilitate the implementation of international human rights judgements.’705 
It is opined that for national human rights institutions such as the KNCHR to 
promote implementation of international body judgments, they should have a 
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formal mandate to ‘monitor the implementation’706 of such decisions and to 
‘audit executive agencies for compliance’.707 The KNCHR has such as mandate. 
This mandate is more than simply ‘monitoring’ of the implementation of the 
decisions but speaks of ‘ensuring’, which means it has the responsibility of 
guaranteeing/making certain/securing Kenya’s compliance with its obligations 
under international treaties which include obligations under the African 
Charter. This being the case, the KNCHR ought therefore to be the body that 
is leading or co-ordinating various national organs and various activities to 
bring about fulfilment of the decisions.  
 
55 The 2010 Constitution provided for legislation to give effect to the KNCHR. 
Therefore in 2011 Parliament passed the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights Act, which established the KNCHR to give effect to the 
Constitution.  Notably, the Commission’s functions as set out in the Act seem 
more restricted than those contained in the Constitution. As noted above, the 
Constitution empowers the Commission to act ‘as the principal organ of the 
State in ensuring compliance with obligations under treaties and conventions 
relating to human rights’.708 However, Section 8(f) of the 2011 Act restricts this 
power and provides that the KNCHR will: ‘act as the principal organ of the State 
in ensuring compliance with obligations under international and regional 
treaties and conventions relating to human rights except those that relate to 
the rights of special interest groups protected under the law relating to 
equality and non-discrimination.’709 (emphasis added) 
 
56 The Act itself does not define who special interest groups are and neither does 
the Constitution. The KNCHR’s website describes these as: ‘migrants, 
indigenous groups, children and intersex persons’.710 Is Section 8(f) of the Act 
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therefore to be read as if the KNCHR cannot act as the principal organ in 
relation to international obligations relating to the rights of indigenous groups 
as protected under equality and non-discrimination laws? If so this seems 
counterproductive particularly as ‘human rights’ are defined under the Act as 
‘fundamental rights and freedoms protected under the Constitution, and the 
laws of Kenya’711 which Chapter 4 of the Constitution defines as including the 
right to ‘equality and freedom from discrimination’.712 By virtue of Article 2(6) 
of the Constitution, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is a 
domesticated international treaty that is applicable to all Kenyan citizens 
including indigenous groups whose rights, including equality and non-
discrimination-related rights, that the State may have failed to protect, are 
enshrined. It could not have been Parliament’s intention to fail to protect 
these communities from such violations.  It is more likely that Parliament was 
seeking, by the introduction in the Act of such a restriction, to prevent claims 
being made by LGBT communities and other groups whose claimed rights may 
be considered contrary to Kenyan custom.713 Be that as it may the functions 
of the KNCHR must be read as those envisioned by the Constitution rather than 
those set out in the Act. 
 
57 In any event the KNCHR has taken the position that work on indigenous groups 
will form part of its work. It states that: ‘The KNCHR has, in discharge of its 
mandate, continued to engage with indigenous people and different duty 
bearers and advocated for a human rights based approach to conservation. 
The KNCHR continues to receive and investigate complaints by Indigenous 
People on violation of their fundamental human rights and freedom.’714 
Notably, it has been part of both the Endorois and the Ogiek decisions task 
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forces.715 The following is a closer look at its work from an implementation 
purview. 
 
 Decisions-related work 
 
58 In 2010/11 it assisted the Endorois community to prepare a document that 
they could use to engage with the Government in negotiating the 
implementation of the judgement.716 It facilitated a workshop of experts to 
prepare a guideline for implementation of the ruling; and ‘continued to engage 
both the Government and the Endorois community in order to realize 
implementation of the ruling.’717 The KNCHR’s attempts to engender 
discussion and interest by the Government on the decision, including attempts 
to enlist the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attend a 
working group on indigenous issues and also engage the Minister for Lands on 
the issue of implementation, failed in 2010/11. The KNCHR noted that 
‘bringing the government to the negotiation table on the Endorois case has 
been a challenge since there seems to be no clear path of progression due to 
an apparent lack of political will on its implementation’.718 It reported its failed 
attempts to the African Commission. 719 The fact that the KHCHR could not get 
the Government to engage in the various processes and the fact that as a last 
resort it reported back to the African Commission shows that it does not have 
the power or alternatively will not be permitted by the Government to exercise 
its power of ensuring compliance.  
 
59 In its 2012/2013 reports the KNCHR reported no Endorois/Ogiek-related 
activities.720 Similarly in 2013/2014 no such work was reported.721 In 2015/16 
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KNCHR confirmed that the Government had set up the Task Force to examine 
implementation of the Endorois decision; and that:  
 
‘KNCHR is the principal constitutional organ entrusted with the 
protection and promotion of human rights of all people in Kenya and is 
also the chief advisor to the government on its international 
obligations. In fulfilment of this mandate, KNCHR has engaged the 
government continuously and given the necessary advisories to 
facilitate implementation of the decision. In realization of this 
mandate, the President included the KNCHR in the task force on the 
implementation of the ruling. The task force’s work has been delayed 
by lack of funds.’722 
 
60 The extent of the KNCHR’s actions other than what is noted above, was a      
recommendation to the Government that it extend the Task Force’s term,723 
which it has not. Notably the KNCHR attended the Ogiek victory celebration on 
26 May 2018, marking a year since the decision of the Court. Although the 
Chairperson, Kagwiria Mbogori stated that the KNCHR would continue working 
with the Ogiek community, it was ‘felt that she said that for the sake of the 
public but did not actually mean it. She did not know much about the Ogiek 
plight and was reportedly mesmerised as to where the community was 
located.724 In her speech on the day, Ms Mbogori, noted that despite the 
positive-nature of the decision, forced evictions were continuing and the Task 
Force’s terms of reference had lapsed. She called on the renewal of the Task 
Force’s mandate to undertake:  
 
‘comprehensive literature review on the various relevant laws and 
publications; field visits for public participation whereby it shall meet 
the Ogiek Community; hold public hearings in all the affected regions 
with similar use and occupation of forest covered areas of the country; 
engage and interact with experts and consultants on marginalized 
communities, land issues with a view to come up with best practice 
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applicable and; compile a report to be submitted to the African Court 
on Human and Peoples Rights in Arusha.’725 
 
61 Given its mandate, there is no reason why this work cannot be undertaken by 
the KNCHR itself. Notably in Malaysia, it is the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia (SUHAKAM), the national human rights institution, as noted ealier, 
that undertook a National Inquiry into the Land Rights for Indigenous Peoples 
in 2013, that resulted in the establishment of a Task force by the Government 
to review the findings. The KNCHR can start the ball rolling in Kenya by carrying 
out a similar exercise with a particular focus on implementation. 
 
62 In 2018 in a report,726 the KNCHR referred to the findings of the African Court 
in the  Ogiek case to show the Court’s position on protecting the rights of forest 
communities in forest conservation and management; and also referred to the 
Endorois decision as evidence of positive findings on indigenous communities’ 
land rights claims.727 
 
63 There is no doubt the KNCHR has taken part in a number of activities to raise 
awareness of various indigenous communities’ plights; and in addition to the 
above, in 2010/11 investigated claims of threatened eviction of the Ogiek 
community from the Chepkitale forest, gazetted as a game reserve since the 
mid-2000s. The KNCHR established that there had been violations of the 
community’s land rights in that they had not been consulted prior to the 
gazetting and despite being advised that they would be resettled, had not 
been. The KNCHR asked the Government to resettle the community to enable 
them to enjoy their land rights.728 In 2014 it undertook a fact-finding mission 
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to investigate reported forceful evictions against the Sengwer by the KFS in the 
Embobut forest area. Its investigations confirmed that in spite of prohibiting 
court orders refraining KFS from evicting the indigenous communities 
involved, these evictions continued.729 Similarly in 2016 it investigated 
continuing further forceful evictions of the Sengwer from the same forest. It 
found that there were ‘several human rights violations among them 
destruction of property, arbitrary arrests and forceful eviction of the Sengwer 
community members.’730 Based on these investigations which corroborate the 
accounts given by indigenous communities, it is fair to say that the KNCHR is 
monitoring the HR situation of indigenous groups, it acts a machinery that 
keeps their contestations alive and gives the communities voice, if not much 
more. 
 
64 At the end of 2016 together with the National Land Commission, the KNCHR 
took part in a ‘Ground-Truthing Mission to Resolve the Ancestral Land Right 
Claims of Forest Dwellers’731 in the Embobut forest where they engaged with 
communities affected by land rights violations. The KNCHR heard grievances 
from the communities relating to ‘negligence, failure and reluctance by the 
Kenya Government and the Kenya Forest Service as well as other authorities 
to abide by national, regional and international human rights principles and 
treaties and standard procedures with respect to forceful evictions of 
populations.’732 The KNCHR noted that the Chairperson of the National Land 
Commission informed the affected communities at this mission that ‘it was 
important for the community to come to terms with the fact that the 
Government was not going to allow them to settle back into the forest but that 
they would be granted user rights only.’733 The KNCHR observed that ‘Dr. 
Swazuri’s statement was not taken kindly by the affected community members 
present and many of them saw it (the statement) as (being) contrary to the 
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recommendations’734 made at a different forum. However nothing is reported 
on how the KNCHR dealt with the affected communities’ concerns or the 
comment made by Dr Swazuri. Its mandate called for a more robust response 
to this. If anything one would expect the KNCHR to be able to refer to 
international agreements,735 which Kenya was part of, which acknowledge the 
importance of granting indigenous communities management rights to forests 
in recognition first that these forests constitute their homes and second, of 
their expertise in sustainable forest conservation. 
 
65 When it comes to enforcement of the Endorois and Ogiek decisions, this thesis 
considers that the KNCHR has not done enough. The Ogiek Peoples’ 
Development Program (OPDP) believes that it has taken insufficient interest in 
fulfilling its mandate in relation to the Ogiek decision.736 And that in view of 
the fact that the funding for the KNCHR comes from the Government itself, 
there is concern about whether the Commission can fulfil its mandate or be 
allowed to do so, on indigenous land rights issues given what is at stake. Its 
exasperation with the Government in respect of the Endorois decision as early 
as 2011/12, and observation that the Government lacked political will to 
implement the decision shows that the extent of the KNCHR is to observe, 
investigate, monitor but not actually to ensure compliance or even take steps 
to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated because 
its capability, in these respects, is subject to Government will. Notably 
however, the KNCHR reports to Parliament annually and where it makes 
recommendations which remain unimplemented, this information is relayed 
too.737 The remit of the KNCHR permits it to take a more bullish role in pushing 
for the implementation of the two decisions. It is reported that when Kenyan 
MPs asked for an increase in their salaries in 2013, the Kenya's Salaries and 
Remuneration Commission (SRC), also a constitutionally created body, had 
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considered this unreasonable and rejected the proposal. The MPs responded 
with threats. The media reported: 
 
‘….when it attempted to reduce the salaries of MPs, the legislators 
threatened to disband the Commission. The Commission, itself earning 
super salaries, knew which side of its bread was buttered. It backed down. 
It was only a few months to the end of its term that the Commission found 
the guts to propose a modest cut to MPs’ salaries, a proposal that has little 
chance of being implemented.’738 
So it could be that the KNCHR makes proposals that are not implemented, even 
so, it should make them. 
 
66 The KNCHR is mandated to have the gusto to address and redress violations of 
human rights of which the failure to implement these decisions amounts to. In 
addition to ensuring compliance with international obligations it is required: 
 
- ‘to promote the protection, and observance of human rights in public and 
private institutions;  
- to receive and investigate complaints about alleged abuses of human 
rights and take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights 
have been violated; 
- on its own initiative or on the basis of complaints, to investigate or research 
a matter in respect of human rights, and make recommendations to 
improve the functioning of State organs;  
- to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or any act or omission in public 
administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected 
to be prejudicial or improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice;  
- to investigate complaints of abuse of power, unfair treatment, manifest 
injustice or unlawful, oppressive, unfair or unresponsive official 
conduct’.739  
 
67 Any threats to its sustenance that may prevent it from doing its work should 
be challenged. Some opine that: ‘If a commission is not granted the budget it 
is supposed to get then it has the right to sue and go to court and say this is 
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what we were allocated.’740 In other words possible threats of this kind should 
not prevent KNCHR from doing its work. 
 
iii) The Commission on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) 
 
68 This Commission was established under the Commission on Administrative 
Justice Act 2011 essentially to act as the Office of the Ombudsman in Kenya. 
This fact is confirmed in its functions which are as follows:  
 
‘(a) investigate any conduct in state affairs, or any act or omission in 
public administration by any State organ, State or public officer in 
National and County Governments that is alleged or suspected to be 
prejudicial or improper or is likely to result in any impropriety or 
prejudice; (b) investigate complaints of abuse of power, unfair 
treatment, manifest injustice or unlawful, oppressive, unfair or 
unresponsive official conduct within the public sector; (c) report to the 
National Assembly bi-annually on the complaints investigated under 
paragraphs (a) and (b), and the remedial action taken thereon; inquire 
into allegations of maladministration, delay, administrative injustice, 
discourtesy, incompetence, misbehaviour, inefficiency or ineptitude 
within the public service; (d)(…..) (e) (….); (f) (….); (g) recommend 
compensation or other appropriate remedies against persons or 
bodies to which this Act applies; (h) provide advisory opinions or 
proposals on improvement of public administration, including review 
of legislation, codes of conduct, processes and procedures; (k) take 
appropriate steps in conjunction with other State organs and 
Commissions responsible for the protection and promotion of human 
rights to facilitate promotion and protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual in public administration; (l) work with 
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights to ensure efficiency, 
effectiveness and complementarity in their activities and to establish 
mechanisms for referrals and collaboration; and (m)(…..).’741 
 
69 The failure to implement the Endorois and the Ogiek decisions falls within the 
remit of the CAJ at least for the purposes of investigation. It is conduct 
stipulated in (a) and (b) of its functions as it is prejudicial to both communities 
to be left in the state they were in before the claims were initiated; and it is 
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progressively prejudicial as these decisions are in their favour but the 
violations continue. It is reported that ‘some of the Ogiek community 
members have had to leave the forest- because they are feeling frustrated, 
they had a lot of hopes.’742 These hopes have been dashed. The delay 
therefore also amounts to unfair treatment, manifest injustice and 
unlawfulness, as it is contrary to Article 1 of the African Charter for Kenya not 
to recognise the rights of both communities particularly where the State has 
been ordered to recognise those rights. It is unfair to the communities to leave 
them as they are without any resolution. The failure to implement is also 
tantamount to unresponsive official conduct. 
 
70 The investigations can be pursued by the Commission following a complaint or 
on the Commission’s own initiative.743 In the two instant cases of the Endorois 
and the Ogiek, only the Endorois can make a complaint as their case is no 
longer pending before the Commission. 744 If after the Court has given its final 
judgment on the Ogiek and the State does not implement the decision, the 
Ogiek can complain to the CAJ then. Such a complaint can be made on the 
basis that the State’s conduct warrants investigation as it is prejudicial, 
unresponsive, amounts to delay and is systemically inefficient, which all fall 
under CAJ’s investigatory remit. 
 
71 Following investigation, the Commission’s actions might include to: 
‘recommend to the complaint a course of other judicial redress (….); 
recommend (….) other appropriate methods of settling the complaint or to 
obtain relief.’745 It can recommend compensation or other appropriate 
remedies.746 And where it has found in favour of the complaint the 
Commission will set out to the relevant State organ, public office or 
organisation concerned its findings and recommendations; actions to be taken 
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and its reasoning.747 It will also inform the complainant of its decision.748 
Generally, if an Ombudsman, finds in favour of a complainant, they should 
really place them back in the position they would have been, had the conduct 
complained of not occurred.749 In fact the CAJ’s website states:  ‘When you 
complain, a wrong is righted and administrative justice is delivered. 
Complaining ensures that service delivery in public offices is timely, efficient 
and effective.’750 As the CAJ’s decisions are recommendatory in nature, they 
can be ignored by the Government. However, as it is financed by Parliament,751 
and is required to submit annual reports to the National Assembly, similar to 
the KNCHR, where such reports contain recommendations that remain 
unimplemented, the CAJ is required to set these out to Parliament.752 
 
72 Their work is supposed to be less formal than that of a court and in some cases 
Ombudsmen are seen as better able to engage with systemic issues and 
provide input to public bodies which can make them more able to ‘improve 
their working practices and policies’.753 In Kenya, this could be the kind of input 
that is needed to trigger movement on implementation of the two decisions. 
The CAJ has the power to provide advisory opinions or proposals on 
improvement of public administration, including review of legislation, codes of 
conduct, processes and procedures which means it can provide advice on an 
implementation infrastructure.  Notably on 21 November 2012 the CAJ wrote 
to the Prime Minister about the delay in appointing members of the National 
Land Commission. Of particular note in its opinion was this statement:  
 
‘The Commission is particularly concerned by the delay in making 
appointments to the National Land Commission even after the matters 
that were in High Court were determined and concluded on 12th 
                                                          
747 ibid, s 42. 
748 ibid, s 43. 
749 The Law Commission, ‘Remedies against Public Bodies: A Scoping Report’ (The Law Commission, UK 10 October 
2006). 
750 Commission on Administrative Justice, ‘What Results From A Complaint?’ (Commission on Administrative 
Justice)<Http://Www.Ombudsman.Go.Ke/Index.Php/Complain-Here/What-Results-From-A-Complaint>accessed 
13 December 2018. 
751 CAJ Act (n 741), s45. 
752 ibid, s54. 
753 The Law Commission (n 749). 
   
175 
 
October 2012 by Justice David Majanja. The cases filed in High Court 
were HCCC Nos. 266 of 2012, 373 of 2012 and 426 of 2012 all of which 
are no longer pending before the court…… is clear that the period after 
the final determination of the Court cases has now gone beyond the 
seven days provided by the Act…further delay in making appointments 
to the Commission might not only constitute a breach of the 
Constitution, but may also constitute an obstacle to speedy realisation 
of justice in land related claims.’754 
 
73 In 2013 the National Land Commission members were sworn in.755 This may 
or may not have been be attributable to the CAJ but the CAJ’s views on the 
delay may have been taken into account. Unfortunately very little is known 
about the CAJ and its functions.756 Notwithstanding, its functions albeit not 
expressly focused on implementation per se can assist in establishing what and 
who should be taking responsibility for implementing the decision of the 
Endorois presently and following the African Court’s reparation judgment, on 
the Ogiek case; and it can certainly provide an advisory opinion on the 
implementation of the decisions. In view of the above statement which shows 
that it is clearly concerned about the realisation of land-related claims, 
indigenous communities should make requests for it to intervene in pursuance 
of its mandate. 
 
iv) The National Land Commission (NLC) 
 
74 As discussed in Chapter 2, the NLC can investigate complaints into 
historical land injustices and recommend appropriate redress.757 The 
land rights claims of the Endorois and the Ogiek, as discussed in that 
chapter, constitute historical land injustices. The NLC should be working 
within its remit to manage public land, where such land is part of land 
that the Ndungu Commission established was irregularly and illegally 
                                                          
754 Otiende Amollo, ‘Delay in Making Appointments to the National Land Commission’ (Advisory Opinion, The 
Commission on Administrative Justice 21 November 2012)<http://www.ombudsman.go.ke/index.php/resource-
center/advisory-opinions/category/30-advisory2012> accessed 21 October 2018.  
755 CapitalNews, ‘Land Commissioners Finally Sworn in’ CapitalNews (Nairobi, 27 February 2013) 
<https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/02/land-commissioners-finally-sworn-in/>accessed 8 October 2018. 
756 Kobei (n 611). When the author asked whether the Ogiek has ever considered engaging the CAJ, he said ‘nothing 
is known of the CAJ in Kenya’.  
757 National Land Commission Act 2012, s 5(1)(e). 
   
176 
 
allocated and belongs to either community, to ensure that that 
happens. It can also work, in a more conducive manner, with the KNCHR 
towards implementation strategies; and also with the CAJ if it is of the 
view that other State organs should be responsible for implementing all 
or some aspect(s) of the decisions. Notably the NLC has faced challenges 
in enforcing its mandate, initially with the delay in the appointment of 
its members, and also in respect of the existing friction between its 
functions and those of the Ministry of Lands.758 Even so as the land-
related issues these cases raise fall squarely within its mandate it should 
work towards bringing their realisation rather than adopt a cynical 
approach as evidenced by the comments made by its Chairman, Dr 
Swazuri, earlier.759 However, it may be that those comments need to be 
viewed in the prism of the politicising nature of land in Kenya which can 
easily beget disillusionment. 
 
v) The National Parliament 
 
75 The impact that domestic parliaments can have on the implementation 
process has not escaped international bodies. The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe for instance has taken it upon itself to encourage 
national parliaments to ‘adopt a proactive approach’ to the implementation of 
judgments.760 The Assembly has noted that domestic parliaments are ‘often 
overlooked’ in the implementation process but can be instrumental to 
implementation and compliance with human rights obligations, as their role 
includes legislating, proposing and revising law in accordance with 
international judgments and ratifying of international human rights treaties; 
making Governments answerable for their actions by establishing domestic 
mechanisms like parliamentary human rights committees or ‘analogous 
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structures,761 whose remit includes monitoring compliance with international 
judgments; ensuring  compliance of legislation with human rights treaty 
obligations; calling witnesses and requesting evidence relating to 
implementation; requiring governments to submit periodic reports on 
international judgments; and provision of independent advice on human rights 
issues.762 It observes that successful parliaments are those which have 
established these domestic structures.763  
 
76 Further the Assembly considers that Parliaments are in a position to 
collaborate with national human rights institutions, civil society organisations 
and international human rights monitoring bodies with adequate expertise on 
human rights issues.764 This viewpoint is echoed by others,765 including those 
commenting specifically about Kenya’s situation.766 Notably CEMIRIDE and 
other organisations formed a cluster group of NGOs following the Endorois 
decision whose function included lobbying parliamentarians.767 
 
77 It is argued that the findings of the African Commission and the African Court 
particularly the latter's finding that Kenya has violated Article 1 of the Charter, 
should be an issue of concern, one that should be deliberated on and resolved 
by the National Assembly. The primary onus should therefore be on the 
National Assembly as the domestic body tasked, by the people, with bringing 
into force laws to ensure that Article 1 is complied with. It may be argued that 
Parliament has already done that by the bringing into force of the Community 
Land Act 2016 which recognises the rights of indigenous communities to own, 
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use and access community land. The African Court observed that Kenya had 
taken the legislative step of: ‘enacting its Constitution in 2010, the Forest 
Conservation and Management Act No.34 of 2016 and the Community Land 
Act, Act No.27 of 2016 (……………) to ensure the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms protected under the Charter’768 but had not actually taken the step 
or measures necessary to enforce or ‘give effect to the rights.’769 This criticism 
should be of concern to the Kenyan Parliament, particularly as it goes towards 
the legitimacy of its work. What the Court said was as good as holding that 
Parliament’s work or value of its work in enacting law is delegitimised by the 
failure to enforce the law.  
 
78 Parliament’s role allows not only for deliberation over the failure to give effect 
to laws in the manner found by the Court but also to question those whose 
jurisdiction it is to give effect to the laws. The Constitution provides that the 
implementation of rights and fundamental freedoms lies with the State and 
the State organs;770 that the onus is on the State to ‘achieve the progressive 
realisation’771 of socioeconomic rights which include the right to access 
adequate housing, freedom from hunger and clean and safe water.772 This 
encompasses the bulk of the rights the Court found had been violated by the 
State in Ogiek case and similarly the Commission in the Endorois case.773  
 
79 Its parliamentary committee system can facilitate the: ‘(i) summoning persons 
to present oral evidence and written memoranda or documents; (ii) (…); (iii) 
availing an environment that can facilitate presentation of details, sifting 
through evidence and formulating reasoned conclusions, consistent with both 
the statute and procedure; (iv) carrying out inspection tours, inquiry on 
                                                          
768 Ogiek case (n 81), para 216. 
769 ibid. 
770 Article 21(1) provides: ‘It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights.’ 
771 2010 Constitution, Article 21(2). 
772 These rights are enshrined in Article 43 of the 2010 Constitution. 
773 In the Endorois case the Commission found that the right to property under Article 14 encompasses the right 
to adequate housing ‘which although not explicitly expressed in the African Charter, is also guaranteed under 
Article 14’: Endorois case (n 114), para 191. 
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matters out of which reports with recommendations are submitted to the 
House; and (v) forming sub-Committees for the effective and efficient 
discharge of varied issues within the mandate of the Committees.’774  
 
80 Parliament acknowledges that these committees are crucial its workings 
‘without which the proceedings of a legislature could grind to a halt’775 due to 
its overwhelming workload. Parliament further recognises that these 
committees’ specific ‘mandates and membership’ makes them effective in 
‘focus(ing) their attention on a subject matter’,776 study it in detail and deepen 
their understanding of the issue(s); that they enable senators to engage in the 
intricacies of Parliamentary work by taking ‘ownership of (…) outcome’.777 
They further encourage cross-party discussions outside party-line constraints 
which means that ‘members (of committees) can consider legislative 
proposals and conduct inquiry with less control from the executive branch of 
Government’.778 They can also ‘hold hearings and meetings that provide the 
democratic opportunities for various interest groups (academics, 
professionals and individual citizens) with varied expertise, to participate in 
presenting their views on a range of issues’,779 thereby constituting a 
mechanism through which to ‘legitimize the operations of parliament’.780 
Parliament further recognises that members of parliamentary committees 
have the opportunity to ‘develop expertise’ and ‘become resourceful on 
specific issues’ and are capable of recognition as reference sources by their 
peers, the public and the media’.781   
 
81 To date there has been no select committee established to investigate Kenya’s 
compliance with its international obligations and specifically to deal with the 
                                                          
774 Parliament of Kenya, ‘The Place and Functions of the Committee System’ (Parliament of 
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Endorois or the Ogiek decisions; or even to deal with indigenous groups’ land 
rights issues. South Africa, for instance, has a Select Committee on Land and 
Mineral Resources and a Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land 
Reform which are very active in terms of committee meetings, producing 
reports and inviting submissions on various issues amongst other activities .782  
And returning to Kenya’s Parliament, it actually has a Standing Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights ‘to consider all matters related to 
constitutional affairs, the organization and administration of law and justice, 
elections, promotion of principles of leadership, ethics and integrity; and 
implementation of the provisions of the Constitution on human rights’.783 
Notably it is this select committee that has been asked to consider the petition 
by the National Victims and Survivors Network to the National Assembly for 
implementation of the TJRC’s recommendations, discussed in chapter 1. 
 
82 It seems then to be an ideal committee to raise non-implementation of the 
decisions with and also to bottom out who should be responsible for 
implementation. One way in which to bring about these issues before 
Parliament is for the KNCHR and the CAJ to report on the delay 
comprehensively in their annual reports which are brought before Parliament 
and hopefully trigger a discussion on the issue that way; or a specific detailed 
report on the issue not necessarily forming part of the annual report.  For 
example, in 2018 Parliament established a select committee to investigate a 
national tragedy, the Solai Dam tragedy,784 following a joint report by the 
Kenya Human Rights Commission (not the KNCHR), Freedom of Information 
and Mid Rift Human Rights Network.  
 
                                                          
782 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, ‘Committees in Full’ (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa)< 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/committees?perPage=100> accessed 29 January 2019. 
783 The Senate of the Republic of Kenya ‘Standing Committees’ (The Senate of the Republic of Kenya)< 
http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-senate/committees/standing-committees>accessed 17 December 2018. 
784 Republic of Kenya Twelfth Parliament Second Session, ‘The Senate, Votes and Proceedings, Tuesday June 05, 
2018 at 2.30p.m.’ (Twelfth Parliament (No.032) Second Session 326, 5 June 2018)< 
http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/Senate_Votes_5.6.18.pdf> accessed 14 November 
2018. 
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83 Through the avenue of parliamentary select committees, parliamentarians can 
assume the responsibility over an issue on behalf of Parliament by considering: 
who the victims are and the public bodies involved including determining their 
framework, their public obligations and establish compliance of that body with 
its obligations in the particular issue; and can consider the  views/expertise of 
human rights bodies which in the instant case could be the KNCHR and also 
possibly the African Commission’s special rapporteur on indigenous 
communities/someone from the African Commission’s Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities. Parliament could also collate evidence 
from community members and leaders; get to the crux of the matter properly; 
propose a compensation scheme and other measures to avoid repetition of 
the issue. The reports of bodies discussed in Chapter 1 would be beneficial; 
undoubtedly stand such discussions in good stead; and prevent the re-
invention of wheels.  
 
84 Further, it is within Parliament’s power to determine the budgets of 
Government bodies and State organs. If these organs are not adequately 
funded, it is unlikely that they will perform their duties including the giving 
effect to rights. This means that parliamentarians should not only be 
concerned with their own salaries but enable other organs to perform their 
functions effectively, like the community land registrars discussed in chapter 2 
for example. 
 
85 Finally, people have the power to petition Parliament to ‘consider any matter 
within its authority, including to enact, amend or repeal any legislation’.785 The 
Endorois and the Ogiek communities should be encouraged to make petitions 
about their land rights. It is notable that the Ogiek community are hoping to 
use the office of the recently voted in Senator Victor Prengei who is a member 
of the Ogiek community to bring awareness to their plight.786 The senator 
could raise parliamentary questions about the lack of implementation and 
                                                          
785 2010 Constitution, Article 119(1). 
786 Kobei (n 611). 
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raise the profile of the communities and continuing land injustices. Notably 
Ekwe Ethuro, a former MP used the avenue of parliamentary questions to ask 
the Minister for Lands about the plans his Ministry had to realise the land rights 
of the Endorois, the Ogieks and other communities.787  
 
86 The foregoing suggests that the parliamentary infrastructure to generate 
action towards implementation exists. 
 
vi) Domestic courts 
 
87 In terms of the domestic courts, there are two ways in which they can facilitate 
implementation. Firstly, there seems to be scope for bringing a judicial review 
challenge in the Kenyan High Court to challenge the continuing failure of the 
State to implement the decision. It should be possible to argue that the 
inaction by the State is unlawful as it is incompatible with Article 1 of the 
African Charter; and also unconstitutional as it goes against Article 21 of the 
Constitution which requires the Government to implement rights and 
fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, to take legislative, 
policy and other measures to realise rights socio-economic rights enshrined in 
Article 43 of the Constitution, and further requires that steps be taken to 
address the needs of vulnerable groups such as ethnic, religious or cultural 
communities, of which the communities are.788 
 
88 Hitherto it may have been argued that the African Charter rights are distinct 
from the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights under the Constitution and failure 
to comply with them is not unconstitutional. Such an argument would now be 
difficult to sustain in light of Article 2(6) of the Constitution. Where the 
Government is seeking to realise those rights it cannot limit its purview to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights but must also realise the rights enshrined in the 
                                                          
787 Minority Rights Group International, ‘State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011: Events of 
2010’ (MRG 2011). 
788 2010 Constitution, Article 21(3). 
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international treaties that are now part of Kenyan law. The fact that Article 
21(4) of the Constitution which provides that: ‘the State shall enact and 
implement legislation to fulfil its international obligations in respect of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’ seeks to suggest that such is not the case 
until subsequent legislation is enforced, is neither here nor there.  
 
89 Domestic courts can through referring to the two judgments in their own 
judgments or even permitting arguments to be made about the applicability 
and/or impact of those decisions, stimulate implementation. The fact that 
Kenya is now a monist State should hopefully mean that the courts are less 
resistant to arguments based on international law. In chapter 1, it was 
observed that in the case of Joseph Letuya and others the claimants raised the 
findings of the Mau Forest Task Force in their pleadings which resulted in the 
Court adopting the report and ordering the National Land Commission to 
address the issues raised in the case.  Similarly in the present case, the 
Commission could through bringing more awareness of the decisions, change 
the narrative from one of oblivion, for example the like that exists in African 
Francophone nations where there is no reported case that refers to the 
Charter,789 to one where the courts know not only about the Charter but the 
decisions. 
 
90 Since the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, there have been domestic 
cases which have relied on the provisions of the Charter, of which there are a 
few examples.790 For the purposes of this discussion, this thesis will look at two 
decisions. The first is the case of James Kaptipin & 43 Others v The Director of 
                                                          
789 Murray and Long (n 153). 
790 Case of Satrose Ayuma & 11 others v Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme 
& 3 others Petition No.65 of 2010 Petition No.65 of 2010 (High Court of Kenya) where the Court was asked to 
consider Articles 5,14 and 16 of the Charter in circumstances of a forced eviction; Case of Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 
others v Attorney General [2013] Petition 19 & 115 (High Court of Kenya) where the Court was asked to consider 
Articles 27, 28, 39 and 47 in a case of refoulement of refugees to Somalia; Case of C K (A Child) through Ripples 
International as her guardian & next friend) & 11 others v Commissioner of Police / Inspector General of the National 
Police Service & 3 others [2013] Petition 8 of 2012 (High Court at Meru),790 where the Court considered police 
conduct in complaints relating to defilement, other forms of sexual violence and child abuse. The Court found inter 
alia that the police had violated provisions of the Charter. 
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Forests & 2 others [2014],791 an indigenous communities’ land rights case 
which enables, albeit frustratingly, insight into judicial understanding of 
indigenous groups’ land rights.  
 
91 In the case the complainants, the Sengwer community, argued amongst other 
things that Articles 1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 19 & 20 of the African Charter had been 
violated as they had been discriminated against, harassed and evicted from 
their original habitat at Kapolet forest. They also argued that contrary to an 
agreement to settle them in accordance with the Kapolet Settlement Scheme 
on a 3000 acre parcel to be hived off Kapolet forest, the Government had only 
settled some members on only 1846.57 acres of land.792  The High Court in this 
case acknowledged that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya formed 
part of the law of Kenya and referred specifically to the African Charter as one 
of these. However, that was the extent of its discussion on the Charter, an 
omission which exposed the High Court judge’s limited insight into indigenous 
land rights issues.793  
 
92 For example in paragraph 23 of the judgment, the Court having noted that 
community land encompasses land traditionally occupied by hunter-
gatherers, concluded that absent enactment of the Community Land 
legislation to give effect to the Constitution, it has ‘a duty to determine any 
claim based on the law available’, thereby appearing to conclude that the 
Constitution was not applicable law.794 Not only did the failure to apply the 
Constitution mean that the court did not engage with Article 63(2)(d)(ii) 
notwithstanding non-enacted legislation to give effect to it as stipulated under 
Article 63(5), which this thesis contends should have required it to nonetheless 
purposively apply the provision or at least make a finding that the community’s 
                                                          
791  James Kaptipin & 43 Others v The Director of Forests & 2 others [2014] Constitutional Petition no 6 of 2012 
(High Court of Kenya). 
792 ibid, para 5. 
793 Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Strategic Litigation Impacts: Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights’ (Open Society 
Foundations 2017). 
794 Compare this position to that of the High Court in the case of Republic v Speaker of the Senate & another Ex 
parte Afrison Export Import Limited & another [2018] eKLR (n 801) discussed below. 
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land satisfied that definition of community land, it also failed to engage with 
Article 40 which as discussed elsewhere provides a right to property.  
 
93 Given its acknowledgment that Kenya had become a monist State, the Court 
did not appear to appreciate the effect then of the African Charter and within 
that wider human rights framework, the decisions of the African Commission 
on the Endorois community in 2009 and the African Court Ogiek injunction in 
2013. Doing so would have widened its’ otherwise misinformed view of 
indigenous communities, which is further evident in its remark about the 
hunter-gatherer nature of the community. By saying: ‘The community was 
traditionally known to be a hunter-gatherer community’, the Court seemed to 
treat this characteristic of the community as extrinsic and past. Clearly by 
saying that and also calling the community indigenous, the Court seems to 
have concluded that a hunter-gatherer community cannot also be indigenous. 
Furthermore, it would have been less dismissive of the community’s claim to 
the forest as their ancestral land, as the regional decisions would have alerted 
it to the fact that ancestral land is not simply a phenomenon, it exists and can 
be recognised and protected.  
 
94 The Court also concluded that the Sengwer community’s access to the forest 
be subject to permission by the Kenya Forestry Service. Awareness of the 
Charter and the regional decisions would have made it aware that to relegate 
the Sengwer community’s ancestral land rights to limited access to the forest 
as and when it is authorised by the Kenya Forestry Service, is not only perverse 
given their true status as owners of the forest, but also unlawful.  
 
95 The Court’s poor reasoning can also be seen in this statement, in paragraph 
25: 
  
‘Efforts should be made to settle the Sengwer people in accordance 
with international pleas to the government to do so particularly from 
the World Bank which is at the forefront of agitating for recognition of 
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the Sengwer people's rights and their settlement. All is not lost for the 
Sengwer People.  New legislations are coming which will address their 
historical problems.  Some of these laws are in place and more will 
come.’ 
 
96 This needs to be compared to its conclusion in the same paragraph that it is 
‘not tenable that we can go back to the old day of hunter-gatherer lifestyles’ 
and its refusal to carve out the forest for the community.795 One wonders how 
the Court could conclude that the World Bank was capable of achieving what 
the law and society, purportedly, did not permit. And it seems curious that it 
did not apply the laws it claimed existed. The Court clearly lost an opportunity 
here to amalgamate the gifts the 2010 Constitution provides in Articles 2(5) 
and 2(6) in appreciation of the binding nature of the African Charter as a body 
of international law and apply that properly to an indigenous land rights case. 
 
97 By virtue of Articles 2(5) and 2(6) of the 2010 Constitution, international treaty 
obligations and therefore decisions made under the Charter, have direct 
effect. Applicants/claimants when bringing indigenous group land claims 
domestically should rely on the Endorois and Ogiek decisions and by doing so 
bring them to attention of the domestic courts which can in turn develop case 
law and impact on legal discourse that way.  
 
98 In the second decision of discussion, Simion Swakey Ole Kaapei & 89 others v 
Commissioner of Lands & 7 others [2014], a case concerning a Maasai 
community’s land rights, the High Court although cognisant of the definition 
and understanding of indigenous communities under the Endorois decision, 
African Charter, the UNDRIP, the World Bank’s policy on indigenous peoples 
4.20 and constitutional provisions including Articles 40 and 63 concluded: 
 
‘Whether under the UN, the World Bank definition or the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, all the forty-two (42) sub-
nations of Kenya would qualify as either “indigenous peoples”, 
                                                          
795 ibid, para 23. 
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“indigenous ethnic minorities,” or “tribal groups” because each of 
those sub-nations of Kenya including the Endorois are to varying 
degree subject to World Bank characterisation in development 
terms.   For instance they all speak distinct languages, none of which is 
the national or language of commerce.’ (para 29.07) 
 
99 And further: 
 
‘………….It seems to be quite fallacious for the Petitioners or for that 
matter, any other person or group of persons in Kenya, to claim on the 
basis of the Declaration, that it has more or exclusive right to resources 
or in this case, land, than other people of Kenya, whether as 
communities indigenous to particular areas of Kenya such as the Luo 
and Suba around Lake Victoria or individuals of other communities.   In 
my view that argument runs contrary to the clear provisions of Articles 
40, and 60 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, and are consequently not 
tenable. In my view further the more positive approach to issues of 
marginalisation is to seek redress by moving more resources to those 
economically depressed areas, but not seek a remedy in exclusivity or 
exclusion.’ (para 34.01) 
 
100 It is observed that this case ‘was actually unusual in that it referenced 
Endorois at all’ but that it is clear that the Court ‘misinterpreted it (in) spite of 
established interpretations’ of the decision such that it ruled that ‘the term 
‘indigenous peoples’ could apply to nearly anyone in the country, making the 
decision and that understanding ineffectual to the Maasai case.796 
 
101 The foregoing decision of the High Court is regrettable and concerning. 
Hopefully the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court; or 
the Constitutional and Judicial Review Division may be more amenable to cases 
of this nature. In the Satrose Ayuma case797 that Kituo cha Sheria acted on in 
the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court, relating to 
socioeconomic rights, they noted that the national court was robust in making 
orders mandating the parties including the Government to take action to 
remedy breaches within certain timescales which they found was proving 
                                                          
796 Open Society Justice Initiative (n 793). 
797 Satrose Ayuma (n 790). 
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helpful for implementation.798 The author of the thesis agrees with this as in 
her own practice in public law, she has found that mandatory orders with set 
timescales seem to elicit action from Government agencies than would 
otherwise be the case.  
 
102 In the Satrose Ayuma case,799 para 110, the judge cited a statement 
made in the Mitu-Bell case in the Constitutional and Judicial Review division,800 
which is apt for the present discussion. The statement provides: 
 
 
‘The argument that social economic rights cannot be claimed at this 
point, two years after the promulgation of the Constitution, also 
ignores the fact that no provision of the Constitution is intended to wait 
until the State feels it is ready to meet its constitutional obligations.  
Article 21 and 43 require that there should be 'progressive realization' 
of social economic rights, implying that the State must begin to take   
steps, and I might add be, seen to take steps, towards realization of 
these rights.’ 
 
103 Such judicial interpretation of the law is encouraging and shows that 
maybe these two branches of the court system are effectual in their mandates 
as constitutional and human rights courts. Further the above statement is 
doubly helpful for use in implementation-type cases as it is disproving of the 
James Kaptipin-type reluctance by the Court to give effect to constitutional 
rights simply because the Government has not done what it is supposed to do 
and second, because it is emphatic in the notion that rights are meant to be 
realised.  
 
104 In another case, Republic v Speaker of the Senate & another Ex parte 
Afrison Export Import Limited & another [2018] eKLR801 the High Court  
                                                          
798 Rotich (n 86). 
799 Satrose Ayuma (n 790). 
800 Mitu-Bell Welfare Society vs. Attorney General and 2 Others [2013] Petition No.164 of 2011 (High Court of 
Kenya). 
801 Republic v Speaker of the Senate & another Ex parte Afrison Export Import Limited & another [2018] eKLR 
Miscellaneous Civil Application 82 of 2018 (High Court of Kenya). 
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surprisingly (in view of James Kaptikin and Simion Swakey cases) upheld the 
power of judicial review as a constitutional remedy as follows:  
 
‘25. Judicial Review in now entrenched in the Constitution…. 26. The 
entrenchment of the power of Judicial Review, as a constitutional 
principle should of necessity expand the scope of the remedy ……. 27. 
Court decisions should boldly recognize the Constitution as the basis 
for Judicial Review ..…. Time has come for our Courts to fully explore 
and develop the concept of Judicial Review in Kenya as a constitutional 
supervision of power and develop the law on this front ……. 28. Judicial 
Review is …………… now a constitutional principle to safeguard the 
constitutional principles, values and purposes.’  
 
105 This understanding of judicial review, constitutionality and the court’s 
role is germane to indigenous communities’ land rights claims in that the 
Endorois and the Ogiek communities can seek judicial review of the 
Government’s continuing failure to implement the two judgments. Other 
communities that are experiencing violations of the constitution, and where 
there is no other remedy, should seek to use judicial review as a means of 
asserting their rights and asking the courts to safeguard the same. It is 
important to also note that in the above case the court found that a mere 
letter by a state body was capable of violating constitutional rights and was 
susceptible to judicial review proceedings under the Fair Administrative Act 
2015.802 How much more so a failure to implement the two judgments or even 
violation of indigenous communities’ land rights? The Fair Administrative Act 
2015 enforces Article 47 of the Constitution which provides in subsection 1 
that everyone has the right to a fair administrative action that is ‘expeditious, 
efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’. The decision not to 
implement the judgments of the African Commission and the African Court 
amounts to administrative action which is ‘an act, omission or decision’ 
capable of affecting the legal rights or interests of any person to whom such 
action relates;803 and would therefore be susceptible to judicial review 
                                                          
802 ibid, para 29. 
803 Section 2, Fair Administrative Act 2015 (No.4 of 2015) (Kenya). 
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challenge as it violates the right to expeditious, efficient, lawful and 
procedurally fair action. 
 
So what can the Government do? 
 
106 In its 2018 Activity report, the African Court considered the 
implementation status of 21 of its judgments from 2013 to 2018. In respect of 
implementation with interim orders the findings are telling. State parties in 18 
out of 21 reported provisional measures cases informed the Court that they 
would not comply with the Court’s orders. In relation to full judgments, many 
states had not reported back to the court so from the data collected, it was 
not possible to assess if this also meant that they had not complied. Possibly 
so as reporting back in itself constitutes one of the orders the Court can make. 
There were a few cases where judgments were partly complied with; and in 
another case the State seems to have complied but with some delay. Kenya is 
on the list but against its name is the note that the Ogiek case is still ongoing 
as the reparations determination is outstanding. 804 
  
107 It is observed that in March 2018 the Council of Europe reported that 
the majority of judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights in its 
60 year existence had not been enforced i.e. 7500 judgments which represents 
‘more than half’; that ‘non-compliance with the Court’s judgments remains a 
major problem for the Council of Europe’; and that failure to enforce these 
judgments had the effect of generating repeat cases.805 In terms of what could 
be done to the states that do not comply, it is suggested that three 
mechanisms could be imposed depending on the state and issues concerned, 
namely: ‘material inducement’ which is where financial benefit or sanctions 
are applied to bring about results; secondly, ‘persuasion’ which is where states 
are ‘persuaded’ to see ‘the validity or the appropriateness of a specific norm, 
                                                          
804 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Activity Report of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
1January -31 December 2018’ (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2018). 
805 Veronika Fikfak, ‘Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human Rights’ (The 
European Journal of International Law Vol.29 no.4 2019). 
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belief or practice’ and get them to a position where they have ‘internalised’ 
the same; and thirdly ‘acculturation’ which is where ‘actors adopt the beliefs 
and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture’ and this is contingent on 
‘the cognitive and social pressures that create a compliance pull’ including 
‘publicly condemning and shaming states’. 806 Out of these it is said that, in the 
European model, material inducement in the form of orders for basic, 
aggravated and punitive damages for claimants, seems to work best because 
this forces states to consider whether ‘a certain behaviour is economically 
sound’.807 And although it is recognised that high and unpredictable punitive 
damages ‘are unlikely to be paid out, they may nevertheless encourage states 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and conclude that it is best to get rid of 
structural/systemic problems that continue the violation’.808 
 
108 The above is helpful where what is at stake is a violation that can be 
remedied monetarily but in indigenous communities’ land rights cases, money 
is not the remedy these communities seek and in the two cases, it was not 
what they wanted. The communities want their land back and that is the main 
order that both the Commission and the Court have made in the two cases. 
Even if it the remedy sought was financial, the Kenyan Government is unlikely 
to pay, thus continuing the non-compliance. Such sanctioning may not work 
but material inducement in the form of donor support may work, as will be 
discussed in chapter 5. Acculturation is unlikely as other African states are 
likely to treat their indigenous communities in a similar way. Additionally every 
state is unique and one state will undoubtedly give reasons for taking disparate 
action from another state. This thesis considers that persuasion by an entity 
that those in leadership can defer to may work, bearing in mind that it is those 
in leadership that have pursued a policies of privatisation of land, corruption 
and permitted market liberalisation. 
 









109 Implementation of an indigenous land rights decision is undoubtedly 
challenging as seen not only in the Kenyan examples but also the Paraguayan 
and Belizean examples. However, it is a matter of settled law that the African 
Charter entitles indigenous communities like the Endorois and the Ogiek a 
right to: non-discrimination, equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law, religion, right to property (land), enjoyment of culture; the right to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources and to benefit from 
proceeds from the same; and to determine their own development. It is also a 
matter of settled law that Kenya is bound by Article 1 of the Charter and should 
act in accordance with it. It is difficult to dispute that if these decisions are 
implemented the situation of the Endorois and Ogiek communities, and other 
indigenous communities- as they also would be able to rely on the 
implementation of the decisions as grounds for asking for resolution of their 
land rights- would vastly improve. 
 
110 As far as the law and the determination of the Commission’s and 
Court’s decisions are concerned, what needed to be done has been done. 
However, perceived effectiveness of a treaty body, and in the present case the 
Commission and the Court, is likely to be ‘measured by the extent to which 
(their) findings are implemented and ultimately complied with’.809 Ultimately, 
it comes down to the will of the State. The political context of a State can 
influence whether or not a decision is implemented and complied with.810 
There are undoubtedly implications for implementing the decisions such as 
how much compensation would cost and what impact restitution would have 
on other communities etc., and fundamentally the fact that those who 
currently possess the land to be restituted to the communities are those in 
power. However, as recognised by the Court, the State has taken legislative 
measures since the coming into force of the constitution. The resources and 
                                                          
809 Murray and Long (n 153). 
810 Murray (n 607). 
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efforts to legislate should have corresponding action; and in any event 
resources cannot be basis for taking no action at all. Arguably if all the various 
entities mentioned here: the KNHCR, CAJ, National Land Commission, 
parliament and the courts were to make implementation of the judgments a 
key issue then together this may cause the Government to change tack. There 
is certainly a lot in their various mandates and powers that they have not been 
doing that they could be doing to stimulate implementation. 
111 However, if the KNCHR, CAJ and NLC are not deemed suitable organs 
to take charge of the decisions, and the state was minded to enforce the 
judgments, the State needs to create a properly funded and longer-term organ 
to co-ordinate implementation of the decisions. The decisions will require the 
involvement of the state organs with legislative authority under the laws that 
these decisions hinge on, namely the Community Land Act 2016, the Kenya’s 
Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 2013,811 the Forest Conservation 
and Management Act (Act No.34 of 2016)812 the Natural Resources (Classes of 
Transactions Subject to Ratification) Act 2016 and the Water Act 2016.  
112 In addition, Kenya’s indigenous communities may benefit from looking 
at the examples in other states like the Paraguayan cases discussed earlier. The 
communities there persisted in their fight for realisation of rights using 
regional bodies, time and time again. They had to wait several years before 
implementation with some still waiting. They may also be encouraged (or 
discouraged) by looking at the Mabo and Others,813 which challenged the legal 
position as it had been for centuries and led to the enactment of the Native 
Title Act 1993. Indeed Kenya has the Community Land Act 2016 and also these 
two regional judgments, however, it may be necessary for Endorois and Ogiek 
communities, and others, to continue to play the long game in view of the 
complexities that embroil Kenyan land politics, but whilst doing so engage the 
various bodies discussed in this chapter. It is correct that the obligation to 
811 WCM (n 555). 
812 Assented on 31 August 2017 and commenced on 31 March 2017. 
813 Mabo (n 127). 
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implement is the Government’s but the communities should as much as 
possible be proactively robust in maintaining pressure on the Government by 
using the actors discussed here; and equally reminding them of their 
obligations towards them.  
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Chapter 4: The East African Community - An Alternative mechanism for recognition, 
promotion and protection of indigenous communities land rights? 
Introduction 
1 In chapters 1, 2 and 3 this thesis has identified the problems that exist in the 
domestic and regional frameworks. The domestic is of course the jurisdiction 
where indigenous peoples’ land rights claims will be initiated. If that system fails 
to deliver because: the adjudicators have got the law wrong and remedies have 
been exhausted; or the decisions are made in a community’s favour but they are 
not implemented; or there is significant delay in the litigation process where 
notwithstanding non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies, creates a sense that 
remedies have been exhausted; or there are human rights violations of a grave 
nature that need the intervention of a non-domestic court; or if the system is the 
kind described in Chapter 1 where quasi-legal processes are established to seek to 
address land rights grievances but these fail, then the obvious alternative forum 
has been, and is, commonly the system created under the African Charter i.e. 
under the African Commission and the African Court. The fact that the Endorois 
and Ogiek claims have been positively determined in those forums and the African 
Commission has a Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, which has led on the 
indigenous discourse in the region, adds to the appeal of the regional system. 
2 However, the fact that the Endorois claim took six years to be determined (2003-
2009), that in 2018 the recommendations made by the Commission remain in 
large part unenforced, which effectively means 16 years on, justice for the 
Endorois is still withheld; that the adjudication on reparations for the Ogiek has 
taken so long to be made, whilst land rights violations against the Ogiek persist, 
may open up the East African Community, as a potential forum for more 
indigenous land rights claims.  
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3 No research on human rights in the sub-regional context814 which specifically 
considers the indigenous peoples’ land rights question has been encountered. This 
chapter will examine the sub-regional system under the East African Community. 
The purpose of this is to see whether it could offer an alternative to the domestic 
and regional systems in respect of determining indigenous peoples’ rights cases 
and promoting their land rights issues. In particular this thesis will be looking at 
the impact of the East African Community Treaty (EAC Treaty) including the 
jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice established under it, the East 
African Community Bill of Rights, the East African Community Human and Peoples’ 
Human Rights Bill, the Common Market Protocol, the Protocol on Good 
Governance and the Plan of Action on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
4 As noted in the introductory chapter,815 the reason why other issues have caught 
the attention of the sub-regional bodies is that they do not concern one ‘single 
state in isolation’ and are more amenable to sub-regional responses. However, 
there has been recognition that the EAC member states: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Burundi and Rwanda, all have indigenous communities in their territories like the 
Ogiek in Kenya, Hadzabe in Tanzania, the Batwa in Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda; 
and the Pokot in Kenya and Uganda816 amongst others.  These communities, 
according to the African Commission are reportedly amongst those in Africa: ‘living 
under very difficult circumstances’, ‘suffering from human rights abuses’ and 
experiencing ‘dispossession of land and natural resources ….. (which has led to 
them being) pushed out of their traditional areas to give way for the economic 
interests of other more dominant groups and large-scale development initiatives 
that tend to destroy their lives and cultures rather than improve their situation’.817 
It is argued that the issue of indigenous communities’ land rights is one that 
concerns not one EAC state in isolation but all of them and should therefore lend 
itself to a sub-regional response. It is also argued that the current EAC Treaty 
814 Kufuor (n 166); Ebobrah (n 166); Viljoen (n 166); Murungi and Gallinetti (n 166), 119; and Murray and Long (n 
153).  
815 See para 73, introductory chapter. 
816 ACHPR and IWGIA 2005 (n 50) 15-17. 
817 ibid, 15-20. 
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contains provisions that could be utilised by indigenous communities in advancing 
their land rights claims; that the present jurisdiction of the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ) does not preclude it from determining indigenous land rights cases; 
that both the East African Human and Peoples Rights Bill and East African Bill of 
Rights, contain provisions which indigenous peoples could utilise in land rights 
cases once enforced; and that these instruments together with other human rights 
efforts including the EAC policy on disability rights, for instance, suggest a changing 
culture at the sub-regional level in respect of protection and promotion of human 
rights and concomitantly, indigenous land rights.  
Historical background of the East African Community 
5 The harbinger to the current EAC Treaty, The Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community 1999818 was the Treaty for East African Co-operation of 
1967819 which established the East African Community comprising of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Its aim was realist survival to try to counter the impact that 
colonialism had had on these nations and to place them in a position to be able to 
stand against stronger Western economies.820 The three partner states therefore 
committed themselves to ‘strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and 
other relations’,821 ensure an ‘accelerated, harmonious and balanced 
development and sustained expansion of (their) economic activities’822 and 
equitable sharing of the benefits.823  
6 There was certainly no mention of indigenous communities’ land rights in this 
original EAC Treaty which is no surprise given that the indigenous project as a 
movement did not begin in the continent until 20 or so years later. The Treaty was 
equally silent on human rights but this was not extraordinary as the ‘earliest 
818 Hereon 1999 Treaty. 
819 Hereon 1967 Treaty. 
820 Ebobrah (n 166). 




founding legal texts of RECs….(did not contain) reference to human rights as such 
as part of the institutions’ foundational values’824 due to the ‘focus on economic 
integration’.825 
7 The main function thereof of the Co-operation was to foster ‘the establishment, 
functioning and development of the Common Market’826 and it created various 
institutions to enable this.827 The partner states were required to align their 
national policies with the Co-operation’s such as to ensure ‘development of the 
Common Market and the achievement of the aims of the Community’ and to 
refrain from ‘any measure likely to jeopardize the achievement’ of this aim.828 
8 The Court of Appeal for East Africa which had been established under the East 
African Common Services Organization (EACSO) Agreements 1961 was mandated 
under the 1967 EAC Treaty to continue to ‘hear and determine such appeals from 
the courts of each partner state as may be provided for by any law in force in that 
partner state and shall have such powers in connexion with appeals as may be so 
provided’.829 There has been discussion as to whether in fact this court was a 
judicial body with judicial officers or a judicial agreement.830 Additionally the East 
African Industrial Court was established under the Treaty to settle trade 
disputes.831  
9 Each of the partner states was required under the Treaty to enact legislation to 
give effect to the Treaty.832 Kenya on its part adopted, on 29 November 1967, the 
‘Treaty for East African Co-operation Act 1967, No. 31 of 1967 giving effect to 
824 Viljoen (n 166) 482. 
825 ibid, 490. 
826 1967 Treaty (n 819), Article 43(1). 
827 ibid, Articles 30, 32, 48, 51, 54, 55 and 56. 
828 ibid, Article 4. 
829 ibid, Articles 80 and 81. 
830 Solomon T. Ebobrah considers the views of T.O.Ojienda that under the 1967 Treaty there was no provision for 
a ‘judicial body made up of judicial officers’ and F. Viljoen’s view that the court was ‘a form of judicial cooperation’ 
under the Treaty in his text Ebobrah (n 166). The author considers both views to be correct as unlike Article 32 
which expressly states that the Common Market Tribunal is a judicial body, there is no such express statement in 
Articles 80 and 81 in reference to the Court of Appeal but the mere fact that it is a court with the function of 
determining cases is cognizant of some judicial functionality. 
831 1967 Treaty (n 819), Articles 84 and 85. 
832 ibid, Article 95. 
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certain provisions of the Treaty. The Act came into force on 1 December 1967. Like 
the 1967 EAC Treaty which did not make mention of human rights or indigenous 
communities or their land rights or how any of the institutions or judicial bodies 
regarded such matters, the 1967 Kenyan Act did not either. In fact it is observed 
that there is not much recorded activity of any courts or tribunals in the Co-
operation other than the Common Market Tribunal hearing any cases during that 
time and no ‘evidence to indicate that it had jurisdiction over human rights issues 
and, even if it did, (that) any were submitted to it at all.’833 The remit of the 
Common Market Tribunal was very much the Common Market as elucidated by 
Article 32 of the EAC Treaty. This was not far removed from the founding remit of 
the other sub-regional bodies namely the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) or SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), although 
founded later, whose main aim was ‘the pursuit of economic development of 
member states’ and not human rights.834 Kofi Kufuor observes that although this 
is now changing, initially not much attention was paid to sub-regional courts in 
these ‘embryonic stages’.835 The subject of human rights was considered to be too 
political, at the time; and one that might interfere with state sovereignty, thus best 
suited for the ‘international fora’.836 
10 The East African Co-operation was dissolved in 1977 because of a ‘lack of strong 
political will, lack of strong participation of the private sector and civil society in 
the co-operation activities, the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of 
the Community among the partner states due to the differences in their levels of 
development and lack of adequate policies to address this situation’.837 Socialism 
in Tanzania was at odds with capitalist development in Kenya and Uganda; and 
Tanzania felt unable to submit cases to a court it considered ‘dominated by 
lawyers with a liberal and capitalist world view’.838 The mistrust caused by the 
833 Kufuor (n 166). 
834 Murungi and Gallinetti (n 166). 
835 Kufuor (n 166). 
836 Ebobrah (n 166). 
837 1999 Treaty (n 818), preamble. 
838 Viljoen (n 166) 476. 
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military coup in Uganda by Idi Amin followed by Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda also 
played a significant role in dismantling the Co-operation.839 
11 On 30 November 1993 there was an agreement between Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda to form a permanent ‘Tripartite Commission’ for co-operation and 
‘coordination of economic, social, security and political issues’. In 1997 after 
appraising the strides made in this respect, these three partner states proposed 
to ‘upgrade’ this agreement into a Treaty.840 It was envisaged that the Treaty 
would ‘attract investments and allow the private sector and civil society to play a 
leading role in the socio-economic development activities’ 841 and enable the 
three partner states to ‘foster and promote greater awareness of the shared 
interests of their people’,842 matters that might have helped it overcome the 
problems leading to the 1977 dissolution. The focus remained very much 
economic betterment of the partner states but there was some desire to widen 
its ambit to include strengthening of social and cultural ties amongst other ties843 
in the proposed Treaty. These ties it was hoped would ‘raise the standards of living 
of African peoples, maintain and enhance the economic stability, foster close and 
peaceful relations among African states’ which would hopefully bring to 
‘realisation…the African Economic Community and Political Union’.844  
Other sub-regional bodies 
12 In the Western sub-region of Africa, the Treaty of Economic Community of West 
African States845 was concluded on 28 May 1975.846 This aimed to ‘promote 
cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity…..and in social and 
cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of 
increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among 
839 ibid. 
840 1999 Treaty (n 818), preamble. 
841 ibid. 
842 ibid. 
843 The other ties were ‘economic, (………) political, technological and other ties for their fast balanced and 
sustainable development by the establishment of an East African Community’, See ibid, preamble. 
844 Preamble, 1999 Treaty (n 818). 
845 Hereon ECOWAS Treaty. 
846 ibid, preamble. 
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its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African 
continent’.847 Notably it was more advanced than the EAC with its focus on 
improving people’s lives. The ECOWAS Treaty established several institutions 
including the Tribunal of the Community848 tasked with ‘observance of law and 
justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty’.849 On 24 July 1993 this 
Treaty was revised. It became known as the Revised Treaty of the Economic 
Community of West African States 1993.850 Its notable revisions included 
reference to the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its 
preamble.851  
13 The Community’s main aim remained economic - to promote co-operation and 
integration, leading to an establishment of an economic Union852 - but 
fundamental principles were augmented. These included: …..(g) recognition, 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; and (h) 
accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in 
development.853  
14 The revised Treaty included Article 63 entitled ‘women and development’ which 
required member states ‘to formulate, co-ordinate and establish appropriate 
policies and mechanisms for the enhancement of the social and cultural conditions 
of women’ and take measures to identify constraints inhibiting women from 
maximising their contribution to regional development efforts, provide a 
framework to address women’s concerns and needs, stimulate dialogue on the 
847 ibid, Article 2(1). 
848 ibid, Article 4(1)(d). 
849 ibid, Article 11(1). 
850 Hereon Revised ECOWAS Treaty. 
851 This change was triggered by the 1992 review of the Treaty by a Committee of Eminent Persons, a group 
established by the OAU to look into reparation claims by African States for human rights abuses perpetrated by 
colonising States: See Solomon Ebobrah, ‘A Rights-Protection Goldmine or a Waiting Volcanic Eruption? 
Competence of, and Access to, the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Community Court Of Justice’ (2007) 
Volume 7 No 2 AHRLJ 307; and Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, ‘Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent 
Persons’ (Cahiers d’Études Africaines 2004)<https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/4543>accessed 12 
November 2018. 
852 Revised ECOWAS Treaty (n 850), Article 3(1). 
853 ibid, Article 4. 
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types of projects that would integrate women in the development process and so 
on.854 The Tribunal became the Community Court of Justice (CCJ)855 with its remit 
remaining the same.856 The Treaty established the Social and Cultural Commission 
which was tasked with examining and developing ways to increase social and 
cultural ties among member states, provide a forum for consultation of such 
matters and make recommendations to the Council.857 Finally, the revised Treaty 
also included provisions on sanctions to be imposed on member states for failing 
to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty which had not been provided for in the 
original treaty.858  
15 The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992 in the 
Southern African sub-region,859 through The Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community 1992.860 Its principles under the treaty included 
sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and 
peaceful settlement of disputes.861 Amongst its objectives was to ‘achieve 
development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and 
the quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration’.862 The states parties undertook not 
to discriminate against any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, 
race, religion, ethnic original, culture or disability’.863 Article 9(1)(f) establishes the 
Tribunal as one of the Institutions of SADC. Its main functions are to ensure the 
adherence to and proper interpretation of the Treaty provisions and any 
subsidiary instruments; and adjudicate upon disputes referred to it, decisions of 
854 ibid, Article 63. 
855 ibid, Article 6(1)(e). 
856 ibid, Article 76. 
857 ibid, Article 49. 
858 ibid, Article 77. The sanctions include: (i) suspension of new community loans or assistance; (ii) suspension of 
disbursement on ongoing community projects or assistance programmes; (iii) exclusion from presenting 
candidates for statutory and professional posts; (iv) suspension of voting rights; (v) suspension from participating 
in the activities of the Community. 
859 Between Angola, Botswana, Kingdom of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, (interestingly) 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe- Preamble, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 1992. 
860 Hereon SADC Treaty. 
861 ibid, Article 4. 
862 ibid, Article 5(1)(a). 
863 ibid, Article 6(1). 
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which are to be final and binding; and to give advisory opinions as referred to it by 
the Council and Summit.864 
16 Under the Treaty, the partner states also agreed to co-operate in the areas of: 
food security, land and agriculture; natural resources and the environment; social 
welfare, information and culture and others.865 The States Parties also sought to 
foster a relationship with, co-operate and support NGOs in order to ‘foster closer 
relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the Region’ in 
pursuance of its objectives. 866 On 17 August 2008 there was an agreement to 
amend the SADC Treaty to replace some of the original bodies with new ones to 
oversee inter alia social and human development and special programmes which 
include: health and HIV and AIDS; education; labour; employment and gender.867 
The supposition here is that these had not been issues of as great concern as of 
the date of the original text in 1992 but were at this point. In October 2015 the 
‘Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community’ 
was adopted.  
17 The principles under Article 4 have remained the same as have the non-
discriminatory undertaking in Article 6 and the Tribunal’s powers under Article 16. 
Article 33 is a newly introduced provision that provides that sanctions may be 
imposed against a member state that: a) persistently fails, without good reason, 
to fulfil obligations assumed by the Treaty; and b) implements policies which 
undermine the principles and objectives of SADC amongst other reasons. SADC 
has also adopted a ‘Protocol on Forestry’ which is discussed later in this chapter. 
864 ibid, Article 16.  The Tribunal did not actually become operational until 2005: Ebobrah (n 166). 
865 Ibid, Article 21(3).  
866 ibid, Article 23. 
867 Article 5, Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 2008. 
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The Current EAC framework and indigenous communities’ land rights 
The East African Community Treaty 
18 The current East African Community (EAC) was established under the East African 
Community Treaty (1999 Treaty), a treaty signed on 30 November 1999 and 
entered into force on 7 July 2000.868 Its founding partner states are Uganda, Kenya 
and Tanzania.869 On 1 July 2007, Burundi and Rwanda were granted 
membership.870 Tanzania is also a state party to the SADC Treaty.871 
19 The raison d’etre of the EAC is set out in Article 2 and this is to ‘establish an East 
African Customs Union and a Common Market’.872 In this respect the EAC has 
made considerable efforts which notably include the ratification of the Protocol 
on the Establishment of the EAC Common Market in 2010.873 Frans Viljoen has 
observed that generally there are 5 stages of  regional economic integration 
namely: i) preferential trading agreement - where members have tariffs which 
they may lower for non-members allowing them to trade with them under certain 
rules; ii) customs union - where there is a ‘common external tariff’ applied by 
members to non-members’ imports; iii) common market - where there is free 
movement of goods and services and production between members; iv) economic 
union - where there is harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies between 
members; and v) political union- which is described as the ‘pinnacle of regional 
integration’ and the stage where member states ‘cede their sovereignty over 
economic and social policies to a supranational rather than intergovernmental 
authority’ and where ‘common legislative and judicial institutions are 
established’.874 The current EAC Treaty and even the Protocol on EAC Common 
868 The Treaty has been amended twice on 14 December 2006 and on 20 August 2007. The amendments pertain 
to Chapters 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 21 <http://www.eac.int/sites/default/files/docs/treaty_eac_amended-
2006_1999.pdf> accessed 15 June 2016. 
869 1999 Treaty (n 818), Article 3. 
870 The Treaty allows for ‘any other country (to be) granted membership to the Community’, ibid, Article 3. 
871 As the SADC Treaty came into force in 1992, Tanzania presumably joined SADC at a time when there was no 
existing treaty in the East African region. 
872 1999 Treaty (n 818), Article 2. 
873 Viljoen (n 166) 477. 
874 ibid, 472. 
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Market suggest an inclination towards a political union which ties in, in fact, with 
what the 3 original partner states had envisaged the new treaty providing.875   
20 Article 3 of the EAC Treaty provides that the ‘matters to be taken into account’ by 
the state parties when considering an application for membership from any other 
country are whether the prospective member 
‘accepts the Community as set out in the Treaty; it adheres to 
universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the 
rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice; its potential 
contribution to the strengthening of integration within the East African 
region; its geographical proximity to and inter-dependence between it 
and the partner states; its establishment and maintenance of a market 
driven economy; and whether its social and economic policies (are) 
compatible with those of the Community’.  
21 Article 7(2) expects current partner states to be adherents of the same. This 
provides that ‘the Partner states undertake to abide by the principles of good 
governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human 
rights’. Notably these aspirations are very much in line with the features of a 
political union. 
22 The objectives of the Community are set out in Article 5 of the EAC Treaty and 
include a commitment to raise the standard of living and improve the quality of 
life of their populations. Frans Viljoen observes that despite the longstanding focus 
on the common market and economic development by the regional economic 
communities (RECs), the ultimate purpose of regional integration is eradication of 
poverty.876 He contends that poverty is the ‘greatest threat to and source of 
875 See para 11 above. 
876 Viljoen (n 166) 481. 
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human rights violations in Africa’877 and that the ‘heart of sub-regional integration 
would beat in vain if it did not provide a lifeline to those living in poverty’.878  
23 Indigenous communities are amongst the poorest in Africa and such poverty is 
related to their land situation. The African Commission has found that the Turkana 
from Kenya for example live in ‘poor and remote areas of Northern Kenya’,879 that 
the Batwa in Uganda have ‘little land’ with no existing ‘forest-based economy’,880 
that they suffer discrimination and are ‘the poorest of the poor, marginalised from 
society’.881 It is further reported that the majority of ‘the areas still occupied by 
indigenous peoples and communities (in Africa) are under-developed with poor, if 
any infrastructure’.882  
24 The association between poverty and land access for indigenous peoples can also 
be seen from the arguments made by Endorois community in their land claim in 
the African Commission. They argued that ‘their health, livelihood, religion and 
culture are all intimately connected with their traditional land,883 (and that) ….. the 
process of evicting them from their land not only violate(d) Endorois community 
property rights, but (that their) spiritual, cultural and economic ties to the land 
(had been) severed’.884 In looking at these issues, the Commission found that 
‘dispossession of land and its resources is a major human rights problem for 
indigenous peoples …….. (and that it) threatens the economic, social and cultural 
survival of indigenous pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities’.885 
Indigenous communities can therefore rely on Article 5 to argue that the EAC has 
a responsibility to raise their standard of living and improve their quality of life and 
877 ibid. 
878 ibid. 
879 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50) 54. 
880 ibid, 22. 
881 The quote refers to the Batwa in the DRC who are described as suffering the ‘same discrimination as the Batwa 
in Rwanda and Burundi’, ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50) 36. 
882 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50) 109. 
883 Endorois case (n 114), para 16. 
884  ibid, para 19. 
885 ibid, para 244. The Commission here was referring to the Report of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (2003). 
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that this comes hand in hand with resolution of their land rights problems of which 
poverty is a by-product. 
25 A similar argument could also be made under Article 120 of the Treaty. This 
provides that: 
‘the Partner states undertake to closely co-operate amongst themselves in 
the field of social welfare with respect to: a) employment, poverty 
alleviation programmes and working conditions; b) (….); and c) the 
development and adoption of a common approach toward the 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups, including children, the youth, the 
elderly and persons with disabilities through rehabilitation and provision 
of, among others, foster homes, health care education and training’.  
As there is a link between the poverty indigenous communities experience and 
dispossession of their lands, it is arguable that any poverty alleviation programmes 
adopted under Article 120(a) of the Treaty should be committed to raising the 
standard of living of indigenous communities and improving the quality of their 
life. 
26 In respect of Article 120(c) it is arguable that this requires partner states including 
Kenya to develop an approach that addresses their land related needs as 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups. It is not in dispute that indigenous 
communities are disadvantaged and marginalised886 and as such ‘need recognition 
and protection of their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms’.887 In 
addition the 2010 Kenyan constitution recognises marginalised communities and 
groups in Article 260 as including those unable to fully participate in the economic 
and social life of the state, those who are assimilated into larger communities and 
those disadvantaged by discrimination on grounds including ethnic or social origin, 
886 Endorois case (n 114), para 149. 
887 ibid, para 148. 
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religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.888 If it is correct, as Frans Viljoen 
has noted, that the RECs have acted on issues such as HIV and AIDS, Refugees, 
Human Trafficking, Women’s Equality and Gender Issues; and Children’s Rights 
because they do not affect only one REC in isolation, as Article 120(c) actually 
encourages a common approach to be adopted for disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups, to which we have established indigenous communities 
belong, then it is certainly arguable that the EAC states should work towards an 
indigenous communities’ land rights policy as has been done by SADC with its 
Protocol on forestry, as it has itself done with the EAC Gender and Equality Bill; 
and the EAC policy on disability rights, discussed later in this chapter. 
The East African Community Forests Management and Protection Bill 2015 and 
SADC’s Protocol on Forestry 2010 - a possible comparator? 
27 This Bill was passed before the East African Legislative Assembly on 15 May 2015. 
It provides for the management and protection of forests and makes provision for 
regional forests management, coordination, monitoring and reporting’.889 It is 
based on the Articles 111, 112 and 114 of EAC Treaty on the management of the 
environment including forest and natural resources, sustainable development and 
sharing of benefits between partner states. Article 111(2) for example provides 
that the community will have the following objectives:  
‘a) to preserve, protect and enhance the quality of the environment; b) 
to contribute towards the sustainability of the environment; c) to 
ensure sustainable utilisation of natural resources like lakes, wetlands, 
forests and other aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems; and d) to jointly 
develop and adopt water resources conservation and management 
policies that ensure sustenance and preservation of ecosystems.’ 
888 2010 Constitution, Articles 260 and 27(4). 
889 The East African Community Forests Management and Protection Bill 2015, preamble. (Hereon EACFMP Bill.) 
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28 And to enable this, the partner states are required in Article 112(1) to prevent, 
arrest and reverse the effects of environmental degradation, which unfortunately 
has been the Kenya Government’s mantra and justification for forcibly evicting 
indigenous communities from forests. Article 112(2)(b) requires that the partner 
states: ‘develop capabilities and measures to undertake environmental impact 
assessment of all development project activities and programmes’. This is 
particularly key for areas where indigenous communities reside; and as will be 
seen in chapter 5 is not always done properly.  
29 The intent of these provisions is unambiguous. Adopting a Protocol or policy on 
indigenous peoples’ land rights would be in consonance with these provisions and 
the spirit of the EAC Treaty although Articles 111, 112 and 114 appear focused on 
the partner states themselves. However, as the raising of the standard of living 
and improving the quality of life of EAC populations, who include indigenous 
communities, is one of the objectives of the EAC integration, and partner states 
are required to adhere to good governance principles which notably include 
adherence to human rights, in giving effect to these provisions partner states are 
required to ensure that they embody the rights of indigenous peoples who include 
forest communities.  
30 Notably however, the 2015 Bill does not include forest communities in its 
definition of terms in the text of the Bill. On one hand it could be argued that this 
is immaterial as the Bill is focused on the EAC partner states rather than the 
communities within their territories. However, when its aspirations are explored, 
the omission of forest communities from the equation appears short-sighted, and 
particularly so when compared to the scope and intentions of SADC’s forestry 
Protocol- discussed below- which acknowledges the role played by forest 
communities in sustainability of forests. For example the Bill defines Forest 
Conservation as: ‘modalities for protection, maintenance, rehabilitation and 
developing of forests in a sustainable manner’.890 Further, its memorandum which 
890 ibid. 
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is set out at the beginning of the Bill, refers to the 1992 Rio Summit. That Summit 
recognised the crucial role played by indigenous communities in forest 
management and development and encouraged states to recognise them to 
facilitate their participation in sustainable development,891 as does the ensuing 
Convention on Biological Diversity;892 the ILO Convention No. 169 which 
recognises the right of communities to use, manage and conserve natural 
recourses pertaining to their lands;893 and the UNDRIP which affiliates respect for 
indigenous cultures and knowledge with sustainable, equitable and proper 
management of the environment.894 For instance, the African Court in the Ogiek 
case found that the Mau forest was the community’s ancestral home, that they 
had the right to occupy it, use and enjoy it. The Court also held that it had not been 
shown that they were responsible for degradation of the forest.895 The fact is for 
indigenous forest communities, damaging of forests would be counterintuitive if 
not deleterious to their existence. Any other finding by the Court would have been 
inconsistent with this fact as well as the wider consensus that ‘indigenous 
communities’ aspirations are for sustainable management’ of natural 
resources.896  
31 The South African Development Community (SADC)’s ‘Protocol on Forestry’,897 
signed by SADC members on 3 October 2002 in comparison is certainly supportive 
of forest communities’ involvement in management and protection of forests and 
forest resources. The Protocol recognises that forest communities are ‘a coherent, 
social group of persons with interests or rights related to forests or forest 
resources (which are held or exercised) communally in terms of an agreement, 
891 Principle 22 provides: ‘Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role 
in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.  States 
should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in 
the achievement of sustainable development.’ 
892 See Article 8(j) which encourages respect for, preservation and maintenance of indigenous groups’ lifestyles 
which are ‘relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’. 
893 ILO Convention No.169, Article 15(1). 
894 ibid, preamble. 
895 Ogiek case (n 81), paras 128, 130.  
896 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘Report 
of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities: Extract Industries, Land 
Rights and Indigenous Populations’/Communities’ Rights’, 2017, 37. 
897 Hereon SADC Forestry Protocol. 
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custom or law’ and that they depend on forests for their livelihood.898 It recognises 
the vital role such communities play in the conservation899 and sustainable 
management of forests by virtue of their traditional knowledge and practices,900 
and thus seeks to protect and promote their right to manage or receive benefits 
from forests.901  
32 The Protocol provides that forest communities are entitled to ‘public participation 
in decision-making regarding the sustainable management of forests and use of 
forest resources,902 and should be effectively involved in the sustainable 
management of forests and forest resources on which they depend. It further 
provides that such communities should be consulted and should participate in 
decision-making regarding natural forests and forests on public or state land, 
biological diversity and land-use planning.903 Further it provides that forest 
communities are entitled to an equitable share in the benefits arising from the use 
of these resources.904 It requires partner states to ‘ensure that the laws and 
agreements that regulate the use, management of, access to and tenure in state-
owned forests gives sufficient security of tenure to parties managing or using 
forest resources to create incentives for sustainable forest management; and 
delineate ownership and occupancy rights.905 These provisions accord with the ILO 
Convention No. 169 and the UNDRIP; and are far-more advanced than those in the 
domestic framework discussed in Chapter 2. 
33 The EAC Bill instead seems focused on economic gains and productivity. Forest 
Management is defined in Bill as ‘acts aimed at setting up technical, economic, 
industrial, legal and administrative measures towards maintaining forests for 
898 Definition of local community provided in the SADC Forestry Protocol, ibid. 
899 SADC Forestry Protocol (n 886), Article 1 defines conservation as ‘the protection, maintenance, rehabilitation, 
restoration and enhancement of forests and efforts to ensure that the use thereof is sustainable’. 
900 SADC Forestry Protocol (n 886), preamble. 
901 ibid, Article 1 defines ‘community based forest management’ as: ‘the management of forest resources by one 
or more local communities on the basis of a right to manage or to receive benefits from those forests’. 
902 This is one of the guiding principles of the Protocol in SADC Forestry Protocol (n 886) Article 4(9). 
903 SADC Forestry Protocol (n 886), Article 8. 
904 ibid, Article 4(10). 
905 ibid, Article 5. 
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increased productivity’. 906  Public hearings were held by the EAC’s Committee on 
Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources in September 2015 in the partner 
states to discuss the Bill. The hearings did not involve forest communities. The 
Committee members met ‘stakeholders from National museums of Kenya, those 
from the State Department of Agriculture, from the Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs and from the Kenya Forest Service Authority’.907 The focus of 
the stakeholders was, unsurprisingly, on State powers rather than protection of 
human rights. The stakeholders are said to have asked for the Bill to ‘strengthen 
the mandate of institutions and forest agencies in partner states in the following 
areas: afforestation; curbing illegal trading; logging activities; and trading in forest 
products’.908 The stakeholders also informed the Committee that Kenya was in the 
process of enacting legislation on forest management and conservation ‘which 
captures 80% of the content of the regional bill and is going to be comprehensive 
enough to address the issues of environment, cross border trade in forest 
products, trans-boundary forest reserves like in Mt. Elgon forest areas.’909 
34 Notably, the Mt. Elgon area is the home to some of the Sengwer indigenous 
community who have complained repeatedly about the Kenya Forest Services’ 
attack on their land rights. This Government agency’s complicity in acts of land 
rights violations, and general non-inclusion of indigenous communities in forest 
management and protection in Kenya, makes their inclusion in discussions over 
the EAC Bill not only unrepresentative but highly problematic. Further the fact that 
Kenya’s Forest Conservation and Management Act 2016 refers to forest 
communities, recognises the concept of community forests, the concept of joint 
management agreements where forest agencies ‘enter into partnership with 
other persons for the joint management of forests’ and the concept of benefit 
sharing,910 as discussed in Chapter 2, should have triggered discussion with forest 
906 EACFMP Bill (n 889), preamble. 
907 Committee of Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, ‘Report of the Committee of Agriculture, Tourism 
and Natural Resources on the EAC Forests Management and Protection Bill 2015: EAC Partner States Capitals, 9th 
to 15th September, 2015’ (Committee of Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources 2015). 
908 ibid. 
909 ibid. 
910 FCM Act (n 494). 
213 
communities during these hearings or at the very least should have been 
highlighted by the stakeholders involved. The hearings’ note of meetings is silent 
on this which implies it was not discussed. 
35 The EAC could learn from SADC’s Protocol on Forestry particularly as SADC, as has 
been highlighted before, is also a sub-regional body whose main aim is the pursuit 
of economic development of member states.911 The SADC Protocol has not been 
without its challenges. Despite being signed in 2002, it only came into force in 
2009 following ratification by a sufficient quota of SADC members. As of 2017 
there were seven members yet to give their assent to it.912 For the majority of 
these members, their domestic legal frameworks on forestry management are: 
inadequate; outdated and still contain elements of their colonial legacies and 
approaches to forest management; are distilled from a plethora of laws with 
various approaches to forest management thus creating incongruity; and are 
under-funded thus making forest management challenging.913  
36 Indeed there are a number of members who have updated their domestic 
frameworks on forestry management which are, inter alia, supportive of 
communities’ forest management i.e., creation, ownership and governance of 
forests:914 Amongst these are Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, Namibia and 
Mozambique. In doing so they address some of the challenges. However, the 
majority of the members are yet to update their laws and continue to experience 
similar challenges.915 As SADC members have shared and varied experiences of 
deforestation, illegal timber trading and practices that adversely impact on forest 
conservation, the Protocol creates a space for shared thinking on these issues 
including sharing of good practices, which has the potential to impact not only on 
how individual states manage and govern their territorial forests and resources 
911 Murungi and Gallinetti (n 166). 
912 Southern African News Features, ‘SADC reviews forestry protocol implementation’ (SARDC, May 2017) 
<https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-reviews-forestry-protocol-
implementation>accessed 28 September 2018. 
913 Phosiso Sola, ‘Forest Law Enforcement and Governance and Trade in the Southern African Development 
Community’ (2011) Working Paper Series Vol 1 Issue 9 African Forest Forum 51. 
914 Expert evidence Liz Alden Wily, Ogiek case (n 81). 
915 Sola (n 913). 
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which includes their communities’ participation in forest management, but also 
on regional approaches to these issues.916 If the EAC has something similar, Kenya 
would no doubt benefit from it given the reluctance to give forest communities 
full ownership and management rights. 
37 Notably SADC has also adopted a SADC Forestry Strategy 2010-2020 to promote 
the implementation of the Forestry Protocol and engender sustainable and 
cooperative management amongst members.917 This Strategy entails a number of 
forest-management programmes, which it is hoped will support implementation 
of the Protocol’s objectives,918 as well as enable involvement of a wider group of 
forestry services stakeholders in domestic, regional and international discussions, 
which has been lacking.919 In 2017, SADC began a process to review regional 
implementation of the Protocol, including an assessment of the degree to which 
its objectives are being met.920 The assessment is ongoing.921 In any event 2020 
will probably be the true gauge of implementation as this will mark the end of the 
ten year Forestry Strategy. The continued suspension of the SADC Tribunal does 
not permit assessment of application of the Protocol in land claims. 
38 The argument remains that indigenous communities land rights are a cross-over 
issue affecting more than one state, and should rightly and properly be addressed 
at the sub-regional arena and this Bill, with some revisions, is an opportunity for 
that. 
916 Southern African News Features (n 911). 
917 Stergomena Lawrence Tax, ‘Statement’ (Launch of the JICA-SADC Project on Conservation and Sustainable 




919 C. Dlamini, M. Larwanou and P.W. Chirwa, ‘A Review of Capacities of Public Forest Administrations for 
Interventions in Climate Change Activities in the Dry Forest and Woodland Countries of Sub-Sahara Africa’ (2015) 
Vol.17 (S3) International Forestry Review.  
920 Southern African News Features (n 911). 
921 See call for a consultants to tender expressions of interest SADC, ‘Request for Expressions of Interest, Selection 
of Individual Consultant, Reference Number: SADC/FANR/FORESTRYPROTOCOL/2017, Request for Services Title: 
Individual Consultancy to Undertake Regional Assessment Of Implementation Of The SADC Protocol on Forestry’ 
(SADC March 2017) <Https://Www.Sadc.Int/Opportunities/Procurement/Procurement-Archive/Consultancy-
Undertake-Regional-Assessment-Implementation-Sadc-Protocol-Forestry1> accessed 2 November 2018. As the 
request is presently the latest information on the implementation process, one can deduce that the review is still 
open/ongoing. 
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The East African Community Gender and Equality Bill 
39 The East African Community Gender and Equality Bill 2016 is founded on the 
fundamental principle of recognition, promotion and protection of human rights. 
It ‘avers that women and men’s contribution in the integration process’922 is just 
as fundamental to the EAC as partner states’ obligations under various 
instruments; and that in light of ‘emerging threats (resulting) from HIV and AIDS, 
globalisation and human trafficking of women, men and children as well as 
feminization of poverty and gender based violence’923 and the impact this will 
invariably have on EAC nationals, there is a need to marry up efforts in the partner 
states to effectively address the reality.924 The Bill was passed on 8 March 2017 
but awaits assent by the Heads of State.925 The Bill acknowledges that although 
the partner states have individually taken measures to address gender imbalances 
in their territories, the measures have not been uniform. The Bill therefore serves 
as a tool for ensuring consistency, consolidation and harmonisation of approach 
to the issue which should ultimately ensure full enjoyment and protection of 
human rights by women in equal measure to men.926 Essentially the Bill seeks to 
address the marginalisation of women.  
40 The gender inequality and women’s empowerment project has undoubtedly been 
more centre stage globally. The UN’s Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979, 40 years ago. 
The ILO Convention No. 169 entered into force in 1991 and the UNDRIP was 
adopted in 2007.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination entered into force in 1969. The point here is that at various stages, 
issues of discrimination have reached a head necessitating the intervention of law 
922 East African Community Gender Equality and Development Bill 2016, preamble. 
923 ibid. 
924 Elisha Mayallah, ‘East Africa: EAC Gender Bill Eases Through’ (AllAfrica.com, 7 February 2016) 
<http://sjdspace.sagepub.com/?p=1264> accessed 7 April 2016. 
925 East African Legislative Assembly, ‘EALA Passes Key Gender Bill on International Women’s Day’ (EALA 8 March 
2017) <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/146-gender,-community-development-civil-society/729-eala-passes-
key-gender-bill-on-international-women-s-day>accessed 28 September 2018. 
926 Gender Bill (n 922), preamble. 
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to set standards of behaviour. The significance and importance of these issues is 
relative. It is inevitable that some will see race as a bigger issue than gender and 
others will see indigenous peoples’ discrimination as a bigger issue. Crucially 
however, as issues of discrimination, they all need resolution. 
41 A further compelling fact is the adoption of regional treaties on issues already 
legislated on at the international stage. This suggests a move to take regional 
ownership of these issues. The adoption of the ‘Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ for example, whilst 
CEDAW still continues to have effect, must result from a desire to adopt principles 
suited to the region and its issues. This African Protocol on women observes in its 
preamble that despite the ratification of international treaties protecting rights of 
women by African Union members, ‘women in Africa still continue to be victims of 
discrimination and harmful practices’.927 The fact that the East African Community 
Gender and Equality Bill 2016 has now been passed reinforces the point 
concerning ownership, this time sub-regional ownership notwithstanding the 
existence of a regional instrument on the rights of women. 
42 Similarly, in 1981, whilst the 1945 UN Charter on Human Rights continued to have 
effect in African States which had signed up to the UN, those same African states 
adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights at a time when a 
majority of them had gained independence from colonial domination including 
imposition of laws foreign to them. The adoption of the Charter was seen as 
necessary to address those shared past experiences, for the states to protect 
themselves from future domination and to ensure the Charter’s alignment with 
African aspirations and principles. The fact that the Charter enshrines the rights of 
peoples has made it more accessible to indigenous peoples in Africa like the 
Endorois and Ogiek from Kenya, the Ogoni from Nigeria and other communities 
and made it possible for them to bring claims as peoples rather than as individuals. 
927 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 2003, preamble. 
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43 The existence of Article 120 of the EAC Treaty which calls for the ‘adoption of a 
common approach towards disadvantaged and marginalised groups’,928 as 
discussed earlier creates an expectation that instruments already on the global 
stage that address issues of marginalisation need to be domesticated for sub-
regional purposes to address those communities’  unique sub-regional features. It 
is argued that if such action can be taken to address discrimination against East 
African women, then surely the same can be done and should be done to address 
the situation of indigenous communities in the same sub-region in light of their 
human rights sufferings, and to ensure that the ‘heart of sub-regional integration 
does not beat in vain’.929  
EAC Policy on Persons with Disabilities 
44 In view of the steps taken in respect of protection for persons with disabilities in 
the EAC, it is argued that there can be some similar engagement with indigenous 
peoples’ land rights issues. It is acknowledged that the discourse on disability 
rights far surpasses that of indigenous peoples’ rights, certainly in Africa, but 
nonetheless it is important to see what steps the EAC is taking to promote the 
rights of vulnerable groups; and to see whether a fraction of this could be 
imported to address indigenous peoples’ concerns and in particular their land 
rights. 
45 The ‘EAC Policy on Persons with Disabilities’ was adopted in March 2012. The 
Executive Summary of the policy highlights Article 120(c) and notes that Article 39 
of the Common Market Protocol of November 2009 requires amongst other 
things, the promotion and protection of the rights of marginalized and vulnerable 
groups.930 The policy notes that following a resolution passed by the East African 
Legislative Assembly urging partner states to implement the UN Convention on 
928 1999 Treaty (n 818), Article 120(c). 
929 In reference to Frans Viljoen’s view that ‘the heart of sub-regional integration would beat in vain if it did not 
provide a lifeline to those living in poverty’, (n 167) 481. 
930 The EAC Policy on Persons with Disabilities 2012, 6. 
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the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, experts on persons with disabilities met in 
December 2009 to review domestic laws and policies on disability. Their review 
found gaps in the law, ‘challenges in including disability in the Millennium 
Development Goals and the current social protection initiatives in the EAC Partner 
states’931 and other issues to be deliberated at a disability conference, and 
recommended implementation of the Convention.932  
46 The formulated policy therefore seeks to: ‘promote and protect disability rights as 
human rights, promote research on issues of persons with disabilities and promote 
the self-representation of people with disabilities in all public decision-making 
structures’.933 The policy is said to be consistent with various international human 
rights instruments including the African Charter, the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and so 
on.934 It is believed that the ‘policy will promote and contribute to ensuring 
equality and equity……(and) be used as a yardstick to inform other policies, 
programmes and sectoral plans among the EAC Partner states’.935 There is no 
reason why similar strides should not be taken to promote and protect indigenous 
communities’ land rights. In the same way that experts on disability issues were 
invited to review the respective partner states’ laws on disability rights and make 
recommendations which included the implementation of the UN Convention on 
the rights of persons with disabilities, the same can be done in respect of 
investigating indigenous communities’ land rights in the sub-region.  
47 Notably, the African Commission’s work on indigenous communities began with a 
resolution which recommended establishment of a working group of experts to 
examine the indigenous communities and the progress made under the African 
regional system on that front. Kofi Kufuor notes that sub-regional bodies are 
finding their own way in respect of human rights notwithstanding the 
931 ibid. 
932 ibid. 
933 ibid, 28-9. 
934 ibid, rationale. 
935 ibid, executive summary. 
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developments in the regional system.936 It is contended that although the African 
Commission’s 2005 report on indigenous communities provides the EAC with a 
starting point and may even mean that it does not have to reinvent the wheel, the 
EAC could and should as part of its Article 120 obligations, set up a working group 
or instruct experts as it did with the examination on disability, to examine the issue 
as it impacts the sub-region.  
48 With specific reference to Kenya and the role it has played in pushing for 
promotion of disability rights, Corina Hoffman notes that as a nation it has invested 
quite heavily over the years in disability rights issues and has also largely focused 
on ensuring legal protection as seen in its 2010 Constitution and ratification of the 
UN Convention; and that the other EAC members could learn from its example.937 
It could therefore be argued that in the case of indigenous communities, Kenya 
could do more as a Partner state in protecting their land rights particularly as its 
constitution is more progressive than the others in terms of recognition of 
pastoralists and hunter-gatherers and the need to address their land rights 
concerns. However, for the purposes of the present examination it is averred that 
Article 120 requires the EAC to take a stronger stance. The Common Market 
Protocol also projects this expectation quite clearly. 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market 
49 The ‘Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market’,938 seeks to give effect to Article 5 and other EAC Treaty provisions. It 
defines ‘vulnerable groups’ as including ‘groups of persons who are marginalised 
on grounds of stigmatised illness, gender, ethnicity, disability or age’.939 This 
Protocol requires partner states to ‘coordinate and harmonise their social policies 
936 Kufuor (n 166).  
937 Corina Hoffmann, ‘Disability Rights Movement In East Africa, The Role and Impact of Self-Representation Of 
Persons With Disabilities On National, Transnational And Regional Level (Max Planck Institute For Social Law And 
Social Policy 2014) <Https://Ecpr.Eu/Filestore/Paperproposal/60b58c73-A93a-44ab-92db-0fb846577fd8.Pdf> 
accessed 14 April 2016. 
938 Entered into force on 20 November 2009. 
939 The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market 2010, Article 1. 
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to promote decent work and improve the living conditions of the citizens of the 
partner states for the development of the Common Market’.940 The social policies 
to be coordinated and harmonised under the Protocol include those related to: a) 
good governance, the rule of law and social justice; b) promotion and protection 
of human and peoples’ rights; …. d) promotion and protection of the rights of 
marginalised and vulnerable groups…’.941 Amongst the programmes partner 
states are required to implement are programmes to: ‘(h) expand and improve 
social protection; …... (and) (p) eliminate ignorance, diseases and poverty’.942 In 
implementing these programmes, partner states are required to ‘adopt measures 
and programmes aimed at promoting the welfare of vulnerable groups’.943   
50 Indigenous communities from Kenya should be able to argue that the Protocol 
applies to them as vulnerable groups for reason of their ethnicity, that the 
measures/programmes/policies to be adopted to promote their welfare must 
recognise, promote and protect their land rights, that the coordination and 
harmonisation of policies under the Protocol, in matters related to: a) good 
governance, the rule of law and social justice; b) promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights; ….. d) promotion and protection of the rights of 
marginalised and vulnerable groups, as seen above, should not be an abrasive 
process particularly as the Kenyan Constitution recognises these principles.944 In 
the Endorois case, the African Commission found that Kenya: 
‘has a higher duty in terms of taking positive steps to protect groups 
and communities like the Endorois but also to promote cultural rights 
including the creation of opportunities, policies, institutions, or other 
mechanisms that allow for different cultures and ways of life to exist, 
develop in view of the challenges facing indigenous communities. 
These challenges include exclusion, exploitation, discrimination and 
extreme poverty; displacement from their traditional territories and 
940 ibid, Article 39. 
941 ibid, Article 39(2). 
942 ibid, Article 39(3). 
943 ibid, Article 39(4)(b). 
944 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 preamble provides: ‘Recognising the aspirations of all Kenyans for a 
government based on the essential values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the 
rule of law’. 
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deprivation of their means of subsistence; lack of participation in 
decisions affecting the lives of the communities; forced assimilation 
and negative social statistics among other issues and, at times, 
indigenous communities suffer from direct violence and persecution, 
while some even face the danger of extinction’.945  
The same argument could be made by indigenous communities under Article 5, 
Article 120 and under the Protocol.  
51 Article 6 of the EAC Treaty set outs the fundamental principles of the EAC which 
are meant to ‘govern the achievement of the objectives of the Community by the 
Partner states’. One of these is ‘good governance including adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social 
justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion 
and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’. It is argued that the EAC has a 
responsibility to ensure that Kenya meets this objective in relation to indigenous 
peoples and their land rights. Although similar arguments have been made above 
in respect of Articles 5 and 120 and the Common Market Protocol, it is worthwhile 
considering the Draft Protocol on Good Governance when examining Article 6 as 
the Protocol seeks to give effect to it.  
52 Although yet to be implemented, the Protocol is in its final draft. Underpinning it 
are the following principles: constitutionalism, rule of law, access to justice, 
protection of human rights and promotion of equal opportunities, democracy and 
the democratisation process amongst others.946 In 2009 the first draft of this 
Protocol incorporated ‘comments from stakeholders including Chief Justices, 
national parliamentary committees, civil society organisations and national 
institutions of governance such as human rights commissions, electoral 
945 Endorois case (n 114), para 248. 
946 The East African Community Protocol on Good Governance (Draft), Article 4. 
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commissions, anti-corruption agencies’.947 Frans Viljoen has observed that 
although RECs were not established with human rights in mind, there is an 
‘obvious link between improving the welfare of the people’, regional integration, 
and ‘realisation of socio-economic rights’.948 He notes that increasingly ‘calls are 
being made to bridge the schism between the ‘trade’ and ‘human rights regimes’ 
and to emphasize the ‘ethics’ of economic integration.949  
53 One can say that this is what the Good Governance Protocol seeks to do. It may 
also explain the level of consultation undertaken in respect of the Protocol which 
Solomon Ebobrah describes as unprecedented in ‘human rights treaty making 
(history) in Africa’950 which he hopes will make for an instrument for which there 
is ‘popular ownership’951 and thus ‘internalisation of norms and standards’.952 In 
2011 a regional conference on good governance was held. This sought to ‘link 
respect for rule of law and constitutionalism to regional integration’ and was 
before ‘200 participants from governments, ministries, parliaments, judiciaries, 
regional and global governance institutions, academia and civil society’953which 
bolsters Frans Viljoen’s views. 
54 Indigenous peoples could argue that any acts which violate their land rights are 
inconsistent with the pillars of: constitutionalism, rule of law, access to justice, 
protection of human rights to name some and therefore violate Article 6 of the 
Treaty. “Constitutionalism” is defined in the Protocol as ‘a complex of ideas, 
attitudes, and patterns of behaviour elaborating the principle that the authority of 
Government derives from and is limited by a body of fundamental law’.954 For the 
purposes of this discussion, it is averred that constitutionalism actually embodies 
947 East African Community Secretariat, ‘EAC Protocol on Good Governance in Final Stages’ (East African 
Community Secretariat 11 May 2011)
<http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=156:eac-Protocol-on-good-
governance-in-final-stages-&catid=40:news&Itemid=147> accessed 4 April 2016. 
948 Viljoen (n 166) 481. 
949 ibid. 




954 Draft Protocol (n 946), Article 1. 
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the rule of law, access to justice and protection of human rights. This, looking at 
the Kenyan Constitution, would look like this. 
55 The preamble of Kenya’s 2010 constitution ‘recognis(es) the aspirations of all 
Kenyans for a Government based on the essential values of human rights, equality, 
freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law.’ Constitutionalism and thus 
respect for indigenous peoples’ land rights would require compliance with Article 
27(4) of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination on various grounds 
including ethnic or social origin, religion, conscience, belief, culture and language. 
Although their case was prior to promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the 
Endorois, as they did before the Commission could similarly rely on Article 6 of the 
EAC Treaty to argue that ‘violations resulting from the displacement …… from their 
ancestral lands, the failure to adequately compensate them for the loss of their 
property, the disruption of the community’s pastoral enterprise and violations of 
the right to practice their religion and culture, as well as the overall process of 
development of the Endorois people’955 is tantamount to discrimination under 
Article 27(4) of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional.  
56 Article 56 of the constitution requires affirmative action programmes designed to 
‘ensure participation and representation in governance and other spheres of life; 
development of cultural values, languages and practices; and reasonable access 
to water, health services and infrastructure’. Using the example of the Endorois 
again, constitutionalism in this respect would be complying with the positive 
obligations to protect their land-related matters.956  
57 It could also be argued that constitutionalism and thus respect for indigenous 
peoples’ land rights requires purposive interpretation and application of the 
Community Land Act (CLA) 2016 in accordance with the spirit of the constitution. 
The Protocol actually requires states to enact laws that promote and protect the 
rights of women, children, persons with disabilities and other marginalised and 
955 Endorois case (n 114), para 1. 
956 ibid, para 248. 
224 
vulnerable groups.957 Failure to properly apply the CLA in a way that promotes and 
protects indigenous land rights is tantamount to violation of the pillars of good 
governance and Article 6 of the EAC Treaty.  
58 Article 48 of the constitution requires the state to ‘ensure access to justice for all 
persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede 
access to justice’. The Protocol requires states to ensure access to justice by 
establishing legal aid schemes and pro bono services. In respect of indigenous 
communities access to justice when litigating land rights claims, availability of legal 
aid and pro bono services is crucial to access to justice as dispossession of their 
land and other problems associated with their land is likely to have affected their 
economic position such that they are unable to afford legal representation. 
Fortunately the cases litigated by the Kenyan indigenous communities in the 
regional African bodies have been funded by civil society and not the communities 
themselves. Albeit a historical case, the colonial Maasai case,958 is an example of 
how lack of funds can impact on pursuing land claims. The East African Court of 
Appeal had made an order for costs against the Maasai in their challenge against 
land agreements entered into with the British colonial administration. They were 
therefore unable to proceed to the Privy Council which it is believed might have 
overturned the previous decision(s).959  
59 It will be interesting to see how Kenya actually applies Article 48 of its constitution 
in cases raising indigenous land rights issues given that these cases will 
predominantly be against the State. In any event, any acts considered inconsistent 
with Article 6 would be challengeable under the EAC Treaty. The Protocol also 
requires the establishing of mechanisms to enhance expeditious disposal of 
claims.960 It is noted that the Endorois’ land rights claim, although relating to 
actions as far back as 1973, did not come to court until 2000 and was not 
957 Draft Protocol (n 946), Article 5(4)(h). 
958 Ole Njogo and 7 Others v The Honorable Attorney General and 20 Others, Civil case No. 91 of 1912 (5 E.A.L.R. 
70). 
959 Albert Kwame Barume, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa with Special Focus on Central, Eastern and 
Southern Africa (IWGIA 2010) 87. 
960 Draft Protocol (n 946), Article 5(5). 
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determined until 2002.961 Proceedings in the African Commission began in 2003 
and ended in 2009. Establishment of such mechanisms in or through the conduit 
of the EAC should improve disposal of claims.  
Human Rights in the Sub-Regional Body 
The Draft East African Community Protocol on Good Governance 
60 In respect of promotion of human rights this Draft Protocol interprets good 
governance in human rights terms. It says that such governance shall include 
encouragement of partner states to take affirmative action in favour of 
marginalised groups on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason 
created by history, tradition or custom for the purpose of redressing existing 
imbalances;962and further encourages them to review existing laws and policies, 
abolish retrogressive cultures, customs and traditions that are against the dignity, 
welfare or interest of women, persons with disabilities, marginalised and other 
vulnerable groups.963 These requirements, and the Protocol as a whole, would 
undoubtedly bolster indigenous communities land rights claims in the forum. 
EAC Treaty 
61 Similarly indigenous communities may be able to rely on Article 7(2) of the EAC 
Treaty. As stated earlier this provides that partner states have an obligation to 
‘undertake to abide by the principles of good governance, including adherence to 
the principles of democracy, the rule of law, social justice and the maintenance of 
universally accepted standards of human rights’.  
961 Endorois case (n 114), paras 5-13. 
962 Draft Protocol (n 946), Article 6(3)(d). 
963 ibid, Article 6(3)(e). 
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The EAC Plan of Action on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in East 
Africa 
62 This Plan was given effect in 2008.964 It provides a framework of policies, strategies 
and activities that address promotion and protection of human rights and is 
informed by EAC’s ‘commitment to international, regional and national human 
rights including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter, the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the EAC 
Treaty among others’.965 The plan is founded on ‘the need at the regional level, to 
build on the gains already made at the national level, in promoting and protecting 
human rights’.966 It lists 8 ‘strategic interventions’ namely:  
‘compliance with Paris Principles on national human rights institutions; 
capacity building for national institutions; establishment of an East African 
Community Bill of Rights with mechanisms of enforcement; establishing of an 
EAC Human Rights Policy Forum to establish linkages with the African Union 
on implementation of the African Charter; building capacity of partner states 
to comply with their human rights obligations in compliance with regional and 
international human rights instruments; ratification and domestication of all 
relevant international and human rights instruments; and increasing levels of 
awareness and understanding of human rights among key actors and agencies 
in partner states through education and training’.967  
The Plan was initially designed for a year from July 2008 - June 2009 but appears to be 
ongoing as some of the interventions like the establishment of the Bill of Rights, are 
yet to be concluded.968 
964 East African Community, ‘List of all Council Decisions, EAC/CM15/DC36’ (East African Community 2008), 
<http://www.eac.int/council_decisions/decision.php?pageNum_qry=65&totalRows_qry=1051>accessed 12 April 
2016. 
965 EAC Plan of Action on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in East Africa 2008, introduction. 
966 ibid. 
967 ibid, Objective of the Regional Plan of Action. 
968 At the EAC Forum of NHRIs in April 2014 it was noted that an outstanding issue with the Bill of Rights was its 
monitoring function and that resolution on this had been deferred until the EACHPR had received assent. 
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63 The formulation of this Plan concerning human rights promotion and protection is 
in line with the EAC’s human rights obligations under the Treaty; and expands on 
those human rights obligations. Based on this Plan, indigenous communities can 
contend that in addition to the Treaty’s expectations that the EAC’s Partner states 
observe human rights and the rule of law, they are bound too to respect 
obligations set out in international, regional and national human rights treaty 
obligations.  Indigenous communities’ land rights have been affirmed under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by both the African Commission 
and the African Court.  
64 It is therefore arguable that the interpretation of those bodies of indigenous 
communities’ land rights claims should be persuasive in the sub-regional sphere. 
In this respect reliance by indigenous communities can be placed on the Plan’s 
strategic intervention to establish links with the African Union on implementation 
of the Charter. Implementation of the Charter, as discussed in Chapter 3, includes 
compliance with decisions and guidance set out by bodies created under the 
Charter. On indigenous communities’ land rights, it remains good law, until these 
bodies reach alternative decisions on the issues, that these communities have 
been found to be entitled to land rights under Articles 1, 8, 14, 21 and 22. 
Indigenous communities can therefore argue that as the Plan exists, and it is a plan 
of action, the action of the Partner states should be to align themselves with 
human rights developments such as those existing on the African Union platform. 
65 In addition to the potential of indigenous communities making these contentions, 
the Plan should be the basis for which the EAC acts. This would mean that even if 
indigenous communities do not make those contentions, the EAC has an 
obligation to ensure that it is taking note not only of decisions and guidance being 
made under the African Charter but to ensure that its actions are in accordance 
with such developments. This reinforces the points made about Article 120 of the 
EAC Treaty and the steps that could be taken to give effect to that in respect of 
indigenous communities. This would also apply, based on the Plan, to other 
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obligations arising at the UN level including the UNDRIP, ICERD, ICCPR and ICESCR; 
and the Declaration on the Right to Development amongst others, as they relate 
to human rights expectations towards indigenous communities.  As it is proposed 
within the Plan to build the capacity of the Partner states to comply with their 
human rights obligations in compliance with regional and international human 
rights instruments, this would be part of that. 
66 Further given the commitment under the Plan to international human rights, it 
would be within the remit of the Plan to look at Kenya’s own commitment to 
human rights, in particular what is set out in the Bill of Rights under Articles 27, 40 
and 56 of the constitution as well as Articles 2(5) and 2(6), in terms of Kenya’s 
integration of international human rights treaty obligations in its domestic 
framework. And further, this would require looking at domestic exercises like the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission findings, to name just one, and 
therein the human rights breaches reported against indigenous communities, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, and the recommendations of the Commission which 
include ratification of international human rights treaties, particularly those 'with 
provisions that have direct relevance to communities that may be subjected to 
racial discrimination such as the ILO Convention, 1989 (No.169)’.969 All the EAC 
partner states are members of the ILO. Therefore to enquire under the Plan, at 
the very least, the extent to which Kenya’s, as well as the other partner states’ 
national assemblies have taken to ratify the Convention, would not be 
unsanctioned. 
The Draft East African Community Bill of Rights (EACBR) & The East African 
Community Human and Peoples Rights Bill (EACHPR)970 
67 The EACBR process was initiated in 2007 as part of the EAC Plan of Action on 
Human Rights by the Kituo cha Katiba (Centre for Constitutional Development), a 
969 TJRC Report (n 352). 
970 The EACHPR remains a Bill. It is not included in the List of the Acts on the East African Legislative Assembly, 
http://www.eala.org/documents/category/acts-of-the-community/P16 (Accessed 4 October 2019). The EACBR 
has not been adopted by the EAC. 
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regional organisation in Kenya that has observer status with the EAC.971 This 
organisation collaborated with Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan National Human 
Rights Institutions to form a Task Force on the Draft Bill of Rights for the East 
African Community.972 The Draft Bill was reviewed by the East African Community 
National Human Rights Commission on 1 June 2010. At this review the EAC Deputy 
Secretary General observed:  
‘We cannot afford to continue applying different benchmarks to issues of 
governance if we hope to move this integration to a Political Federation. We 
also need to be brave enough and bring to the fore what disrespect for Human 
Rights has caused us in the past so that collectively we correct the past 
mistakes and put in place mechanisms to deal with Human Rights protection 
in future’973  
and emphasised the importance of ‘according equal treatment across the 5 partner 
states’974 particularly in the light of the ‘stage at which the EAC integration has 
reached’.975 The EACBR has never been adopted by the EAC, and remains a document 
proposed by the Kituo cha Katiba, but is worth discussing. 
68 In 2012 the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA/Assembly) adopted and 
passed the East African Community Human and Peoples Rights Bill (EACHPR).976 
The Bill aims: 
‘to establish an East African Community human rights regime; to give effect 
to the EAC Treaty’s human rights provisions; to establish a mechanism for 
the recognition, promotion and protection of human rights in accordance 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; and to foster the 
971 East African Community, ‘East Africa: EAC Receives Proposed Regional Bill of Rights 4 months After Approving 
Appellate Wing of the EACJ’ (East African Community 23 October 2007). 
972 Morris Odhiambo and Rudy Chituga, The Civil Society Guide to Regional Economic Communities, The East African 
Community (African Minds Publishers 2016) 25. 
973 African Press Organization, ‘Heads of Human Rights Commissions Review EAC Draft Bill of Rights’ (African Press 
Organization, 2 June 2010)<https://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/06/02/heads-of-human-rights’-commissions-
review-eac-draft-bill-of-rights/>accessed 22 December 2018. 
974 ibid. 
975 ibid. 
976 The passing of the Bill was published in the East African Community Gazette [Vol. AT 1 – No. 11] (12 August 
2011).  
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process of deepening and widening integration by guaranteeing human 
rights in the social, economic and political sphere’.977  
69 This Bill has not yet received the assent of the Heads of State. The Heads of State 
have the power to withhold assent to a Bill of the Assembly.978 Those Bills which 
have not received assent within 3 months from the date they are passed by the 
EALA and submitted to the Heads of State, will be referred back to the Assembly, 
with reasons as to why the Bill or a provision of it should be reconsidered by the 
Assembly. If the Assembly discusses and approves the Bill, it will be resubmitted 
to the Heads of State for assent. However, if a Head of State withholds assent to a 
re-submitted Bill, the Bill shall relapse. The current position with this Bill is that it 
has not relapsed notwithstanding the passage of time but is still awaiting assent.979 
70 It is noteworthy that neither ECOWAS nor SADC has a specific instrument that 
seeks to recognise, promote and protect human rights in accordance with the 
African Charter. In respect of ECOWAS, Frans Viljoen has observed that although 
its original Treaty did not mention human rights, the ‘shift in emphasis’ results 
from the ratification by several of the member states of the African Charter and a 
‘regional movement towards greater democratization …….. between 1973 and 
1993’.980 He questions whether this movement is ‘cosmetic, occasioned by the 
rhetorical demands of international relations’981 or whether it is genuinely meant 
to be mainstreamed into ECOWAS’ activities.982 He goes with the latter using the 
example of the 1999 ECOWAS ‘declaration on the decade of a culture of the rights 
of the child in West Africa and a ‘declaration on child soldiers’;983 and the 2001 
‘Declaration on the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons’ which encourages states 
to ‘criminalise human trafficking, set up anti-trafficking law and enforcement 
units, sensitise and train government officials dealing with trafficking’ focused on 
977 East African Legislative Assembly, ‘The East African Community Human and Peoples Rights Bill 2011 
Memorandum’ (East African Legislative Assembly 12 August 2011)<http://www.eala.org/documents/view/the-
eac-human-and-peoples-rights-bill2011 >accessed 17 June 2016. 
978 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999, Article 63. 
979 This still appears under the list of East African Legislative Assembly Bills on the Assembly’s Bills webpage 
<http://www.eala.org/documents/category/bills/P16>ccessed 29 September 2018. 
980 Viljoen (n 166) 483. 
981 ibid. 
982 ibid. 
983 ibid, 487. 
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child trafficking and child prostitution as part of its Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance.984 Also as part of enforcing this Protocol, he notes that 
ECOWAS has established a ‘Gender Division’ within its Secretariat and has adopted 
a ‘gender policy’.985 Although these instruments are non-binding and their ‘legal 
value (could thus be said to be) limited’, he views them as setting a platform for 
‘relevant binding standards.’986 
71 In respect of SADC, inclusion of human rights was considered in the ‘initial treaty 
drafting process’ but it was rejected.987 Experts mandated to ‘draft a proposal for 
a SADC Tribunal’ argued that individuals should actually be allowed to make 
human rights references or complaints to the Tribunal by virtue of the non-
discriminatory clauses in the Treaty and that the SADC Tribunal should be given a 
‘more general jurisdiction in relation to human rights’ but this was not followed 
through.988 However, more recently there has been in SADC generally, as seen in 
ECOWAS, a ‘similar shift towards greater recognition of human rights’.989 One of 
SADC’s main principles is that it will act in a manner compliant with ‘human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law’,990 reference, Frans Viljoen believes, stems from 
the ‘fact that (SADC states) have suffered a denial of human rights for a longer 
period than other African countries’.991 Prospective applicant states are required 
to show observance of principles of ‘democracy, human rights, good governance 
and the rule of law in accordance with the African Charter’.992 He further notes 
that in 1999 SADC adopted a Protocol on Health which set out how it would 
combat HIV/AIDS amongst ‘other deadly and communicable diseases’.993 In 2003 
it adopted a ‘declaration on HIV/AIDS’ and a ‘declaration on gender and 
development’ both of which are non-binding but offer a ‘comprehensive 
984 ibid, 486. 
985 ibid. 
986 ibid, 487. 
987 ibid, 492. 
988 Ibid.  




993 ibid, 485. 
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framework for action’.994 In 2008 it adopted a ‘model law on HIV in Southern Africa 
(to) guide legislative review and adoption of new laws on HIV in SADC States’.995 
72 It is contended that taken together both the Draft EAC Bill of Rights (EACBR) and 
the East African Community Human and Peoples’ Rights Bill (EACHPR), albeit 
unenforced at this juncture, certainly show a concerted effort in bringing human 
rights to the fore of the EAC. Both have provisions which could be relied on in 
indigenous communities’ land rights cases. They both provide a right to property. 
Article 22 of the EACBR protects the right to property and states that no person 
may be deprived of property or any interest in or right over property except where 
certain conditions are fulfilled. Article 30 of the EACHPR enshrines the right to 
acquire and own property in any part of the EAC either individually or collectively. 
It prohibits partner states’ national assemblies from enacting laws that would 
result in arbitrary deprivation of this right. The right is however qualified and can 
be violated in certain circumstances.996  
73 They are similar in this respect to Article 14 of the African Charter. The EAC 
instruments could be utilised to make similar arguments. Both instruments protect 
the right to housing. Article 35 EACBR provides that everyone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing and requires partner states to take reasonable 
legislative or other measures within their available resources to achieve this. It also 
prohibits the eviction of persons from their homes or demolition of their homes 
without an order from a court or arbitrary evictions, amongst others.  
74 The EACHPR provides a right to accessible and adequate housing and reasonable 
standards of sanitation but does not give the additional protection against eviction 
and demolition of homes. It is therefore similar to Article 43 of Kenyan constitution 
which provides that ‘every person has the right (b) to accessible and adequate 
housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation’ which stops there and does 
994 ibid. 
995 ibid. 
996 The East African Community Human and Peoples’ Rights Bill 2011, Article 30(3). 
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not provide protection against eviction or demolition and so the ECBR offers wider 
protection. The Charter does not provide a specific right to housing but this has 
not prevented the African Commission from finding in the Ogoni case that ‘the 
right to adequate housing which although not explicitly expressed in the African 
Charter, is also guaranteed by Article 14.’997 Indigenous communities, in the EAC, 
will be able to make similar arguments under the EAC instruments once enforced. 
75 They both define ‘marginalisation’ as the ‘means by which disempowered groups 
are denied the means to improve their position’.998 This interpretation is similar 
to the interpretation given of ‘marginalised communities’ under Article 260 of the 
Kenyan constitution. It is also is in tandem with the definition given of vulnerable 
groups in the Common Market Protocol and also under the Kenya National Land 
Policy.999 
76 The EACBR defines ‘minorities’ as a ‘group which is smaller in number than that of 
the rest of the population in the East African Community or one that has been 
disempowered, whose members have different ethnic, religious and linguistic 
features from the rest of the population’. It has been observed that the terms 
‘minorities, marginalised or vulnerable communities’ are used interchangeably by 
the Kenyan Government.1000 Equally the African Commission Working Group has 
noted that the terms can overlap and that although there is some debate as to 
whether indigenous groups should be referred to as minorities due to the 
contentious nature of the term indigenous in the African context, a ‘clear-cut 
distinction between minorities and indigenous peoples’1001 would not be as useful 
as focusing on ‘the human rights issues at stake’.1002 Although similar debates 
could be had in respect of the use of ‘minorities’ or ‘vulnerable’ rather than 
‘indigenous’ in the EAC context, a focus on the human rights enshrined by the 
instruments is arguably more important particularly given the original nature and 
997 Endorois case (n 114), para 191. 
998 The EACHPR uses the term ‘disadvantaged’ but provides the same definition. 
999 NLP (n 7) 45. 
1000 Stavenhagen (n 166) 6. 
1001 Indigenous World 2013 and Indigenous Peoples: A Forgotten Peoples? (n 74) 13. 
1002 ibid. 
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history of RECs. Be that as it may, the recognition of minorities in the manner 
described by the EACBR is welcome. 
77 Article 18 of the EACBR provides protection for minorities and states that they 
have a right to participate in decision-making processes and their views and 
interests shall be taken into account in the making of both national and regional 
plans and programmes. Article 15 of the EACHPR provides that minorities and 
marginalised groups are entitled to enjoy all the rights and fundamental freedoms 
provided for in the Act, on a basis of equality, taking account of their identity, way 
of life, special circumstances and needs. It requires partner states to take 
legislative or other measures to put in place affirmative action programmes 
designed to benefit minorities and marginalised groups including measures to 
allow them to participate and be fully represented in governance and in all spheres 
of national life; assist them to develop their cultural values, languages and 
practices; have a reasonable opportunity to meet their basic needs and live a life 
free from discrimination, exploitation and abuse.  
78 As seen earlier Article 27(6), Article 56 and Article 203(1)(h) of the Kenyan 
constitution all advocate for affirmative action to be taken in respect of 
marginalised and/or disadvantaged communities. Article 18 of the African Charter 
refers to elimination of discrimination against women and children, the aged and 
the disabled and in respect of the latter two groups, provides that they ‘shall also 
have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or 
moral needs’.1003 To therefore have a similar level of protection advocated for by 
both instruments is further ground for proposing the EAC as an alternative forum 
for indigenous land rights cases. 
79 Article 25 of the EACBR concerns rights of women and requires the state to protect 
women and their rights, take account of their unique status and make available 
affirmative action to redress the imbalance created by history, tradition or custom. 
1003 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, Article 18(4). 
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This could certainly apply to indigenous women who reportedly ‘face more 
obstacles than other dominant groups of women both in terms of access and 
enjoyment of their fundamental rights’ 1004 due to the ‘persistence of customs that 
(result in) discrimination against (them) in land tenure (and …) an entrenched cycle 
of poverty as a result of land loss and discrimination’.1005  
80 The EACHPR does not provide a specific provision on women and therefore does 
not call for additional consideration of their circumstances but it does provide a 
general non-discriminatory clause, Article 8, which prohibits discrimination by a 
partner state or an authority in a partner state including on grounds of sex. More 
widely, the EACBR in Article 28 requires the partner states to guarantee and 
provide affirmative action in favour of groups marginalised on the basis of their 
gender, age, disability or other reason created by history, tradition or custom. The 
EACHPR’s Article 8 as noted above addresses discrimination and similar to the 
EACBR requires states to take measures in affirmative action to redress any 
disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups as a result of past discrimination. 
Indigenous peoples are likely to have suffered such disadvantage.1006 Article 3 of 
the EACBR provides a right of equality before the law and advocates for non-
discrimination. The EACHPR’s Article 7 provides the same. 
81 Article 37 of the EACBR provides every person with a right to belong to, enjoy, 
practice, progress, maintain and promote any culture, cultural institution, 
language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others as long as the 
exercise of these rights is not inconsistent with other provisions. The Endorois 
relied on similar provisions under the African Charter in their African Commission 
claim to show that the Government had violated their right to development. 
Similar arguments could be made under Article 37. 
1004 Soyata Maiga, ‘Gender And Indigenous Peoples Rights’ in Laher R and Sing’Oei  K (eds), Indigenous People in 
Africa, Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights (Africa Institute of South Africa 2012)65. 
1005 ibid, 73. 
1006 Notably Article 27(6) of the Kenyan Constitution also highlights disadvantages caused by past discrimination 
and offers similar protection for individuals or groups. Article 2 of the Charter provides a right to freedom from 
discrimination on several grounds although it does not refer to disadvantage or past discrimination. 
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82 The EAC partner states, as the upholders of human rights in the Community, are 
required in the introduction of the EACBR to: 
1. ‘Respect the rights set out therein by ensuring that the laws, policies,
programmes and practices they put in place do not violate human rights;
2. Protect and promote human rights in a manner that ensures that violations
by others are prevented, and affordable and accessible redress is provided
in instances where violations occur; and
3. Fulfil human rights whereby positive actions to realise human rights are
taken.’1007
83 A similar provision can be found under Article 47 of the EACHPR. Although Article 
47 may not provide justiciable rights it may be relied on in indigenous land rights 
claims to highlight any state failures to adhere to human rights standards. It 
requires partner states to recognise and facilitate the role of civil society in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.1008 It also provides that ‘all state 
organs and all public officers have a responsibility to understand, equip 
themselves to deal with the needs of special groups within society including 
members of marginalised communities and of particular ethnic, religious and 
cultural communities’.1009 This is particularly useful in indigenous land rights cases 
where the state has failed to adopt policies and programmes that recognise the 
unique relationship indigenous communities have with their land. Article 47 also 
requires the partner states to implement legislation to fulfil their international 
obligations in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.1010 This mirrors 
to some degree Article 21(4) of the Kenyan constitution which requires the state 
to legislate to enforce internal human rights treaties.  
84 Article 47 of the EACHPR further requires the partner states to report on time to 
international human rights bodies on the implementation of human rights treaties 
and other instruments.1011 It also requires them to publish reports on their human 
rights obligations and allow sufficient time to facilitate public discussion and 
1007 Human Rights Principles & Standards, Draft EAC Bill of Rights, Principles, 4-5. 
1008 EACHPR, Article 47(3). 
1009 ibid, Article 47(4). 
1010 ibid, Article 47(5). 
1011 ibid, Article 47(5)(a). 
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participation of civil society before the reports are revised and submitted; and that 
they disseminate to the public the general comments and recommendations of 
international human rights bodies relating to the implementation of their 
international obligations. Article 47 further requires national governments to 
make a statement to parliament on whether and how it intends to implement 
human rights recommendations; and finally every partner state to establish the 
necessary machinery to give full effect to the provisions of the Act. 1012 All these 
provisions go further than the Kenyan constitution and could address the 
Government’s seeming inertia to implement regional decisions, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
85 Article 41 of the EACBR provides that any person or organisation claiming a 
violation of their, another person’s or group’s human rights can apply to a 
competent national court for redress which may include compensation and on 
appeal to the EACJ. This would therefore allow for individual as well as collective 
claims to be made by members of indigenous communities. Article 48 of the 
EACHPR is slightly wider in its remit in this respect. It provides that a person acting 
in their own interest, a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act 
in his or her name, a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or 
class of persons, a person acting in the public interest or an association acting in 
the interest of one or more of its members, has the right to complain and institute 
proceedings alleging a violation, infringement or threat to a right or fundamental 
freedom. This would allow public interest challenges to be brought which is more 
than is offered under the African Charter or the Kenyan constitution.  
86 The EACBR does not stipulate whether a fee is required but Article 48(3) of the 
EACHPR provides that no fee is required for instigating proceedings which mirrors 
Article 22(3)(c) of the Kenyan constitution. No fee is required for 
communications/complaints under the African Charter either. In terms of the 
remedies the court(s) could offer under the EACBR, Article 41 provides that 
1012 ibid, Articles 47(7) and (8). 
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redress may include compensation. Article 49 (3) of the EACHPR provides that the 
court may order a declaration of rights, an injunction, conservatory orders, a 
declaration of invalidity, an order of compensation and order for judicial review 
which is wider in scope than the African Charter in respect of the bulk of these 
powers and also wider, in its offer of judicial review, than what the African Court 
can offer. Potentially the EACHPR could be used to seek a review of the 
Government’s conduct/failure to act in respect of the Endorois and Ogiek 
judgments.  
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and litigation of human rights in RECs 
87 The original remit of REC courts, like other international courts and tribunals was 
to ‘resolve disputes’ between states.1013 However, they now permit individuals to 
issue human rights claims which means that the human rights potential of these 
bodies, which would otherwise ‘have been left largely unexplored’ can be 
tested.1014 There is a coherent flow from concern over ‘disputes arising from the 
process of economic and legal integration’1015 and consideration of ‘human rights 
implications of economic policies and programmes’ which REC courts and 
tribunals ‘may be called’ to consider.1016 
88 The EACJ is the judicial organ of the EAC tasked with ensuring adherence to law in 
the interpretation and application of and compliance with the Treaty.1017 It has a 
First Instance Division and an Appellate Division. The First Instance Division has 
jurisdiction to hear and determine, at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to 
the Appellate Division under Article 35A, any matter before the Court in 
accordance with the Treaty. The EACJ’s jurisdiction to determine cases is set out 
in Article 23(1) as above i.e. it is ‘a judicial body which shall ensure the adherence 
to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with this Treaty.’ 
1013 Viljoen (n 166) 488. 
1014 ibid. 
1015 ibid, 490. 
1016 ibid. 
1017 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999, Article 23(1). 
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89 Article 27(1) of the EAC Treaty. This provides that: 
‘The EACJ shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty, provided that the Court’s jurisdiction to 
interpret under this paragraph shall not include the application of any 
such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of 
Partner states’.  
90 Article 27(2) provides that: 
‘the Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and 
other  jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable 
subsequent date. To this end, the Partner states shall conclude a 
Protocol to operationalise the extended jurisdiction’.  
91 Article 30 provides that: 
‘referrals to the EACJ can only be made by legal and natural persons: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of this Treaty, any person who
is resident in a Partner state may refer for determination by the Court,
the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a
Partner state or an institution of the Community on the grounds that
such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an
infringement of the provisions of this Treaty; (2)The proceedings
provided in this Article shall be instituted within two months of the
enactment, publication, directive, decision or action complained of, or
in the absence thereof, of the day in which it came to the knowledge
of the complainant, as the case may be; (3) The Court shall have no
jurisdiction under this Article where an Act, regulation, directive,
decision or action has been reserved under this Treaty to an institution
of a Partner state’.
92 Before looking at the human rights jurisdiction of the EACJ, it is important to note 
that the process as described by Article 30, is distinct from that available at the 
regional level under the African Charter in the following ways: i) the limitation 
period for issuing cases is 2 months from the decisions, unlike 6 months at the 
regional level which requires speedy action from claimants to ensure they lodge 
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their claims in time; ii) any person can make a claim - Article 30 refers to any legal 
and natural person, unlike the restrictions in the regional system; and iii) there is 
no requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies. Lawyers interviewed about 
this commented on the fact that applications can be made to it prior to the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, an attribute those who have litigated in the 
African Commission and African Court,1018 and other regional human rights 
forums,1019 as well as those litigating in the EACJ itself,1020 consider to be a 
significant and distinctive feature of the EACJ particularly in view of the gravity of 
issues at play in indigenous communities’ land rights claims. They also consider 
that the long delays experienced under the African Charter system make this 
forum an attractive alternative.1021 
93 In respect of human rights, Article 27(2) does not prohibit individual human rights 
claims.1022 
94 It also does not preclude collective claims being made by indigenous communities 
on the basis of their human rights. The following cases highlight these issues well. 
It is the case that the EACJ has in the past not received too many cases relating to 
human rights.1023 A reason for this may be the unsure nature of the EACJ’s 
jurisdiction.1024 Partner states have argued in the past that the EACJ cannot 
determine cases raising human rights issues.  
95 In a case relating to Kenya, Independent Medical Unit v Attorney-General of Kenya 
and Others [2011],1025 the complainant, an NGO on behalf of 3000 Kenyans in the 
Mt. Elgon district who had been tortured and inhumanely treated, brought a claim 
1018 Claridge (n 617). 
1019 Interview with Tom Lomax, Lawyer & Coordinator, Legal and Human Rights Programme, Forest Peoples 
Programme, UK (Telephone, 31 July 2018). 
1020 Interview with Nelson Sidney Ndeki, Associate Litigation Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), Tanzania 
(Skype, 21 July 2018). 
1021 ibid. 
1022 Ebobrah (n 166) 82 citing Viljoen (n 166). 
1023 Solomon T Ebobrah, ‘Human Rights Developments in African sub-regional economic communities during 2011’ 
(2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 223. 
1024ibid. 
1025 Reference No.3 of 2010 (East African Court of Justice). 
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under Article 30 of the EAC Treaty arguing that Kenya, the Respondent state had 
violated: ‘a) rule of law under Articles 6 and 7(2); (b) promotion and protection of 
human rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights under Article 7(2); (c) good governance under Article 6 and 7(2)’.1026 The 
Kenyan Government in response raised a preliminary point that the EACJ had no 
jurisdiction to receive human rights related cases. The EACJ summarised the 
Government’s argument on this point as follows: 
‘It was contended by Counsel for the Respondents that the Court is 
being asked to exercise jurisdiction and address issues of human rights 
raised in the Reference, but that the Court has no jurisdiction to do so 
since the Court’s jurisdiction is at the moment restricted to the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty under Article 27(1). He 
argued further that Article 27(2) expressly excludes the jurisdiction to 
deal with human rights issues until the Court is granted extended 
jurisdiction through a subsequent protocol which has not yet been 
concluded.’1027 
96 In response to Kenya’s argument, the complainant relied on international law as 
arising from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the expectation 
thereof that treaties are to be ‘read, interpreted and performed in good faith’,1028 
and that as Article 27 confirmed the EACJ’s jurisdiction over matters related to the 
interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty, and the arguments constituted 
such matters, the EACJ’s remit permitted it to determine the issue. The 
complainant further relied on an earlier decision of EACJ, Katabazi and Others1029 
where the EACJ ‘held that although it does not have jurisdiction to deal with 
human rights issues yet, it has jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty even if the 
matters complained of include Human Rights violations.’1030 The EACJ therefore 
accepted that it was permitted to consider issues of a human rights nature where 




1029 Katabazi and Others v Secretary-General of the East African Community and Another (Reference No.1 of 
2007) [2007] EACJ 3. 
1030 ibid. 
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97 The EACJ further observed that in the Katabazi case it had also considered, 
although this was not one of the arguments made by the complainant, that Article 
8(1) of the EAC Treaty prohibited partner states from ‘measures that are likely to 
jeopardise the achievement of those objectives or implementing of the provisions 
of this Treaty’ and that it had found that: “While the Court will not assume 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from 
exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the 
reference includes allegations of human rights violations.” Therefore the EACJ’s 
concluding remark on this issue in Independent Medical Unit v Attorney-General 
of Kenya and 4 Others (Reference No.3 of 2010) is significant. It held: ‘Similarly, in 
this Reference, the Court shall not abdicate its duty to interpret the Treaty merely 
because Human Rights violations are mentioned in the Reference. In the result, 
we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Reference.’1031 
98 Some have observed that although the Court has ‘creatively engaged in judicial 
practice to adjudicate’1032 on human rights issues despite the fact that such a 
jurisdiction is ‘yet to be conferred on it’,1033 it could reinforce its position by 
referring to its jurisdiction under Article 30 of the Treaty1034 as human rights issues 
can ‘be accommodated under Article 30’.1035 Article 30 is a helpful provision but 
one that highlights the incongruity of the limitation of the EACJ’s human rights 
jurisdiction in Article 27(2). A claimant who relies only on Article 30 to bring a case 
that hinges mainly on human rights may fall foul of it on the basis that it is subject 
to Article 27. This is despite the fact that Article 30 empowers the EACJ to 
determine whether decisions made by partner states are in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty, and this would include determining whether the decision 
complies with the fundamental principles of human rights under Articles 6, 7 and 
8, allowing the EACJ, as it has done in some cases, to circumvent the human rights 
1031 ibid. 
1032 Ebobrah (n 1023). 
1033 ibid. 
1034 See Articles 27 and 30 of the EAC Treaty, paras 89-91 above. 
1035 Ebobrah (n 1023). 
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concerns and find that the decision or act is unlawful or contravenes the provisions 
of the Treaty.  
99 The EACJ has confirmed its position in a recent matter, Case of: 1.Ololosokwan 
Village Council 2. Oloirien Village Council 3. Kirtalo Village Council 4. Arash Village 
Council v The Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania Application 
No.15 of 2017 (Arising from Reference No.10 of 2017.1036 This claim was brought 
by a Maasai indigenous community from Tanzania in 2017. The community 
complained that they were ‘directed to vacate’1037 and consequently forcibly 
evicted from their lands. This had triggered the substantive application (Reference 
No.10 of 2017) in which they sought the following remedies: ‘permanent halt to 
their (…) eviction, arrest and prosecution as well as the destruction of their 
property (….) restitution, reinstatement of (their) properties, as well as 
reparations.’1038 Although the substantive application is yet to be determined, the 
decision of EACJ of 25 September 2018 was made to determine the injunctive 
application lodged alongside the substantive application. In the interim relief 
application the community had sought ‘a temporary halt to (their) eviction and the 
destruction of their property.1039 The community placed reliance on various EAC 
Treaty provisions namely: Article 6(d) which notably includes the binding principle 
of the partner states to adhere to ‘promotion and protection of human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’;1040 Article 7(2), Article 27(1), Article 30 and finally Article 39 
which empowers the EACJ to make injunctive relief orders.1041  
1036 Application No.15 of 2017 (Arising from Reference No.10 of 2017), 25 September 2018 East African Court of 
Justice First Instance Division. 
1037 ibid, para 1. 
1038 ibid, para 2. 
1039 ibid, para 3. 
1040 Article 6(d) in full reads: ‘(d) good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.’ 
1041 Article 39 provides: ‘The Court may, in a case referred to it, make any interim orders or issue any directions 
which it considers necessary or desirable. Interim orders and other directions issued by the Court shall have the 
same effect ad interim as decisions of the Court.’ 
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100 The Tanzanian Government has defended its position but has not alleged that 
a human rights related claim cannot be brought in the EACJ. In a decision on the 
injunctive relief application, the EACJ confirmed that it is within its jurisdictional 
ambit to deal with issues of legality raised under Article 30(1), namely: ‘the legality 
of the evictions is, in our view, a formidable legal question that falls squarely within 
the ambit of Article 30(1) of the Treaty as an issue that this Court may 
interrogate.’1042 Article 30(1) as seen earlier permits claims to be raised as to the 
legality and compliance by the partner states with the EAC Treaty. This would 
therefore include compliance with Articles 6(d) and 7 which relate to, inter alia, 
adherence to human rights. 
101 In relation to the EAC Treaty provisions that the Maasai community relied on 
in the claim, other than Article 30(1) and Articles 6(d) and 7(2), it is possible to 
base an indigenous community’s land rights claim on grounds that a decision to 
violate those rights is inconsistent with the general undertaking given by a partner 
state as to implementation under Article 8(1) (a) to ‘plan and direct (its) policies 
and resources with a view to creating conditions favourable for the development 
and the achievement of the objectives of the Community and the implementation 
of the provisions of this Treaty’.1043 Taking the example of adherence to the 
principle of democracy, the partner states’ obligation to create conditions 
favourable for the development and achievement of this objective, would in the 
case of indigenous peoples need to ‘reflect the ideal of unfettered inclusion and 
special recognition of circumstances that have precluded (them) from being 
participative citizens in the post-colonial’ era in those states and addressing those 
circumstances .1044 
102 In the case of Kenya, as previously noted its 2009 National Land Policy 
acknowledges that land injustices in the colonial period have continued in the 
post-colonial era and have affected indigenous communities like those ‘in the 
1042 Ololosokwan Village Council (n 1036), para 41. 
1043 1999 Treaty (n 818), Article 8(1)(a). 
1044 Laher and Sing’Oei (n 166). 
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pastoralist areas (and have) led to the(ir) deprivation of land management rights 
from the traditional institutions thereby creating uncertainty in the(ir) access, 
control and exploitation of land based resources including grazing lands, water and 
salt licks among others’.1045 Therefore for Kenya to be said to have complied with 
Article 8(1)(a) it would need to show that the recommendations set out in the 
National Land Policy to address those circumstances namely:  
‘recognising pastoralism as a legitimate land use and production 
system; providing for pastoralism in the Land Act; establishing suitable 
methods for defining and registering land rights in pastoral areas whilst 
allowing  pastoralists to maintain their unique land systems and 
livelihoods; ensuring the rights of women in pastoral areas are 
recognised and protected; providing for flexible and negotiated cross 
boundary access to protected areas, water, pastures and salt licks 
among different stakeholders for mutual benefit; and ensuring that all 
land uses and practices under pastoral tenure conform to the 
principles of sustainable resource management’1046  
have been given effect. They have not been given effect in the case of the 
Endorois, the Ogiek nor the Sengwer communities, to name  a few, as discussed 
in preceding chapters; and in cases such as those it would be possible to rely on 
Article 8 to argue that Kenya has contravened the EAC Treaty.  
103 Equally it could also be argued that the failure to enforce the above national 
land policy recommendations or the Endorois and Ogiek regional judgments is a 
violation of Kenya’s obligations under Article 1 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, and thus a violation of Article 6(d) of the Treaty to recognise, 
promote and protect human and peoples’ rights under the African Charter and 
ultimately a violation of Article 8(1)(c) which requires partner states to: ‘abstain 
1045 NLP (n 7), para 181. 
1046 ibid, para 183. 
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from any measures likely to jeopardise the achievement of those objectives or the 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty’.1047  
104 It is of further note that although the community did not claim, and have not 
sought, a finding that they constitute an indigenous community, the EACJ 
observed that they were ‘at the risk of eviction from parcels of land which they 
have historically occupied and from which they derive their security of tenure and 
livelihood’.1048 The EACJ also considered the need to prevent the ‘social disruption 
and human suffering that would inevitably flow from the(ir) continued 
eviction’1049 and that this trumped, at least for the purposes of the injunctive relief 
application, ‘the important duty to avert environmental and other ecological 
concerns,’1050 an argument the Government made, as is common with the Kenyan 
Government too, in justification of its repeated eviction of indigenous 
communities from their ancestral homes. The EACJ’s order thereby included a 
restraining order prohibiting the Tanzanian Government from ‘evicting the 
Applicants’ residents from the disputed land, being the land comprised in the 1500 
sq km of land in the Wildlife Conservation Area bordering Serengeti National Park; 
destroying their homesteads or confiscating their livestock on that land’,1051 until 
the substantive claim is determined. 
105 It is notable that the EACJ’s reasoning tied in with features of the concept of 
indigenousness as accepted by the African Commission and the African Court. 
There is reference to historical occupation of land, land from which the community 
derives secure tenure and livelihood;1052 and reference to social disruption and 
human suffering. It is accepted that the latter two can apply to any group of 
applicants but the former two have been accepted by the Commission and Court 
as a central feature of indigenous communities’ identity. The community may 
choose not to argue their case within the confines of indigenous protection which 
1047 1999 Treaty (n 818), Article 8(1((c). 
1048 Ololosokwan Village Council (n 1036), para 53. 
1049 ibid, para 54. 
1050 ibid. 
1051 Ololosokwan Village Council (n 1036), para 58. 
1052 ibid, para 53. 
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would be their entitled prerogative. However, such identification, given what the 
EACJ has found so far, aligns with the accepted definition and may result in further 
protection for them not only under their laws, but under the EAC’s laws which 
include the African Charter and international human rights obligations binding 
Tanzania. 
106 It will be interesting to see how the EACJ ultimately deals with this case, see 
whether the Applicants will argue the case in terms of their rights as indigenous 
communities and also seek a finding to that effect. There would be support for 
such an argument if the Applicants considered making it. It is possible to argue 
that the obligations under Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty, that partner states 
adhere to ‘the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’,1053 permits consideration by the EACJ of claims relating to 
indigenous communities’ land rights, as the African Charter recognises individual 
as well as collective rights and is distinct from other human rights instruments in 
that respect.1054 The term ‘peoples’ although not defined by the Charter has been 
accepted by the African Commission in various cases to mean: and to mean 
indigenous communities,1055 an entire nation,1056 a group in a nation which sees 
itself as distinct from other groups and enjoys a ‘common ancestry, ethnic origin, 
language or cultural habits’, and can therefore ‘include distinct ethnic groups’.1057 
1053 Article 6(d) provides: ‘(d) good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.’  
1054 ACHPR and IWGIA (n 50) 72. 
1055 The African Commission found that the Endorois community constitute an indigenous community and were a 
“people”, ‘a status that entitles them to benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protect collective rights’ 
and that their alleged violations of the African Charter- namely Articles 8, 14, 17(2), 17(3), 21, 22: ‘were those that 
go to the heart of indigenous rights- the right to preserve one’s identity through identification with ancestral lands’, 
Endorois case (n 114), para 162. 
1056 Clive Baldwin and Cynthia Morel, ‘Group Rights’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006 (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 
referring to the African Commission’s finding in Communications 147/95 and 149/96, Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The 
Gambia, Thirteenth Activity Report 1999-2000, Annex V, para 72. 
1057 Communication 211/98, Legal Resources Foundation v Rwanda [2001] (African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) para 73. 
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107 Compliance with the African Charter thus also means compliance with the 
decisions made by the African Charter bodies. The EACJ therefore has to consider 
and follow decisions made by the African Commission and the African Court, as 
bodies established under the Charter, which would include the Endorois and Ogiek 
decisions. Be that as it may, it is down to the Applicants to assess how much 
making such arguments, in effect seeking a finding they are indigenous 
communities, would assist their claim and cause. In the case of the injunctive 
orders at least, it did not necessitate such express identification.  
108 As the above case shows although the EACJ has found a way of dealing with 
cases concerning human rights issues, it has grown increasingly weary of its limited 
jurisdiction Article 27(2). In the case of Emmanuel Mwakisha Mjawasi & 748 
Others v the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya [2011]1058 argued under 
Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the EAC Treaty the EACJ held that: 
‘It is not in dispute that the steps in Article 27(2) have not yet been 
taken. It follows therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on 
disputes concerning violation of human rights per se. The Court has no 
appellate jurisdiction as well.  However, in this Reference, this Court is 
neither being asked to adjudicate on a dispute concerning violation of 
human rights per se nor to exercise an appellate jurisdiction over the 
decision by the Kenya High Court. The Court is being asked to 
determine whether the alleged failure by the Kenya Government to 
pay the Claimants their terminal benefits constitutes a violation of 
Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty. The fact that the Reference also 
contains allegations of violations of human rights under the 
conventions listed therein cannot prevent this Court from exercising its 
mandate under Article 27(1) of the Treaty. We have considered this 
objection and come to the same conclusion in a number of references 
including James Katabazi & 21 Others -vs. - The Secretary General of 
the EAC and the AG of the Republic of Uganda (supra). We still hold the 
same view.’ 
109 Hopefully when the East African Community Human and Peoples’ Rights Bill is 
assented, it will reinforce the EACJ’s jurisdiction to determine human rights cases. 
Albeit at the risk of continuing challenge by states, its jurisdiction to interpret and 
1058 Reference No. 2 of 2010 (East African Court of Justice). 
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apply the EAC Treaty, does allow it to. This view is shared by those litigating1059 or 
looking into the EACJ as a forum for bringing indigenous communities’ land rights 
cases.1060 As to whether the EACJ is a suitable alternative to the regional forum, in 
terms of how it fares in comparison to the bodies under the African Charter 
system, the EACJ, notwithstanding Article 27(2), one can say it certainly has 
features which may attract indigenous communities to it.  
Other sub-regional courts 
110 The ECOWAS CCJ is the only court with an explicit human rights mandate which 
makes determination of human rights issues, in the Western region, less 
controversial.1061 The ECOWAS CCJ has determined issues concerning slavery, 
education, unlawful arrest and detention.1062 It does not require exhaustion of 
domestic remedies and has in fact held that to do so would ‘impose on individuals 
more onerous conditions …… than those provided for by the Community texts 
(thus) violating the rights of such individuals’,1063 a view shared by litigators in the 
regional sphere, as noted earlier. 
111 In the Southern region, the SADC Treaty touches on human rights issues and 
SADC itself has acted on various human rights issues and adopted policies in this 
respect. This may suggest that the SADC Tribunal is ‘well positioned to produce 
sub-regional human rights jurisprudence’,1064 however, the Tribunal has faced 
great resistance and opposition particularly from Zimbabwe following three 
judgments against it, and is now suspended.1065 
1059 Ndeki (n 1020). 
1060 Lomax (n 1019). 
1061 Viljoen (n 166) 490. 
1062 ibid. 
1063 Karaou v Niger [2008] ECW/CCJ/JJD/06/08 (ECOWAS Court of Justice), as referred to in Viljoen (n 166) 488. 
1064 Viljoen (n 166) 483. 
1065 ibid. 
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112 In the first of these cases, Campbell v Zimbabwe1066 a case concerning the 
acquisition of land by the Government and obtaining judicial redress SADC found 
that Zimbabwe had breached the right of access to justice enshrined in the African 
Charter and the South African Constitution; and that this is a right that goes to the 
core of the rule of law which member states are required to adhere to. It therefore 
amounted to a violation of the SADC Treaty. The Tribunal also found that the 
introduction of an amendment to the law which allowed for the expropriation of 
land from a certain race group amounted to indirect racial discrimination, also 
breaching the Treaty.  The Tribunal therefore ordered Zimbabwe to ‘take all 
reasonable measures to protect the occupation and ownership of the applicants, 
refrain from evicting them and pay fair compensation for expropriated lands’.1067 
Zimbabwe argued that SADC had sought to become a ‘human rights court’ and by 
so doing had acted ultra vires.1068  
 
113 In Tembani v Zimbabwe,1069 another case concerning land and specifically the 
sale of land belonging to an individual following a default on a loan, the SADC 
Tribunal found that the applicant had been entitled to ‘contest the amount and 
value of his land before a court, before the sale by the Agricultural Bank of 
Zimbabwe’;1070 and that denial of this was inconsistent with ‘access to and a fair 
hearing by an independent and impartial court’1071 which were tenets of human 
rights and the rule of law.1072 In the third case, Gondo & Others v Zimbabwe,1073 
the Tribunal found that the failure by Zimbabwe to comply with domestic court 
findings was contrary to ‘various fundamental principles’ including the right to an 
effective remedy, the right to an independent and impartial court and the right to 
a fair hearing.1074  
 
                                                          
1066 Campbell v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 2/07 (SADC, Dec. 13, 2007). 
1067 Viljoen (n 166) 483. 
1068 ibid. 
1069 Tembani v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 07/2008 (SADC, Aug. 14, 2009). 
1070 Viljoen (n 166) 493. 
1071 ibid. 
1072 ibid. 
1073 Gongo v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 05/2008 (SADC, Dec. 9, 2010). 
1074 Viljoen (n 166). 
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114 Zimbabwe’s disagreement with these three findings led to it seeking an 
amendment of the Tribunal’s mandate and to have it ‘disbanded’.1075 Following a 
review which found that the Tribunal was ‘validly constituted’,1076 another review 
was requested during which time the Tribunal’s work remained suspended.1077 
These three cases show how political land related cases can be and what effect 
political interference can have on justice. SADC is a body made up of several states. 
The deference of these states to Zimbabwe in this instance, possibly in itself a 
reflection of self-preservation of states in not wanting to hold others to account 
lest they be held to account themselves, risks making extra-territorial human 
rights systems impotent. 
 
115 So far there has been no such application by the Kenyan Government in 
respect of the EACJ other than of course the challenges noted above to the human 
rights jurisdiction of the Court. The Tanzanian Maasai litigation,1078 if this turns out 
to be positive and damages are awarded to the community, is likely to set the tone 
for how Tanzania and other partner states, including Kenya, react to the EACJ. The 
advances in the human rights project in the EAC, albeit slow, may not permit 
disbanding of the Court in the way triggered by Zimbabwe with the SADC Tribunal, 
although having said that, there is purportedly more recognition of human rights 





                                                          
1075 ibid, 501. 
1076 ibid. 
1077 ibid. 
1078 Ololosokwan Village Council (n 1036). As of October 2019, the substantive application is yet to be heard by 
the Court. See the Pan African Lawyers Union’s website which refers only to the interim relief application: Pan 
African Lawyers Union, ‘Ololosokwan village Council and 3 Others vs. The Attorney General of United Republic of 
Tanzania: Ref no. 10 of 2017: The Loliondo Case (Pan African Lawyers Union 5 February 2019) 
<https://lawyersofafrica.org/ololosokwan-village-council-and-3-others-vs-the-attorney-general-of-united-
republic-of-tanzania-ref-no-10-of-2017-the-loliondo-case/>accessed 4 October 2019 and the Court’s list of 
decided cases which does not include this case: East African Court of Justice, ‘Recent-Decisions’ (East African 
Court of Justice) <http://eacj.eac.int/?page_id=2298>accessed 4 October 2019. 
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4.1 Forums for enforcement of regional decisions? 
116 Another valid question is whether sub-regional bodies like the EAC could be a 
forum for enforcement of regional decisions, like the Endorois and Ogiek regional 
judgments. There is much more to the EAC than meets the eye and in this regard 
this thesis agrees with Lucyline Murungi and Jacqui Gallinetti that the increasing 
litigation in these bodies, and in particular at the EACJ level notwithstanding the 
jurisdictional issue, serves as a pressure point for states to accord with their 
human rights obligations, and coordinate laws and deliberations which ‘enrich the 
human rights discourse ….… and empower citizens’.1079 There is a risk, they 
caution, that the absence of ‘human rights catalogues in any of the RECs, (….…) 
disparate approaches to the incorporation of human rights into the mandate of 
RECs courts (may result in) varying degrees of protection (sub-regionally as 
opposed to a) common African human rights standard’1080 thus calling into 
question the effectiveness of RECs as human rights mechanisms. The 
developments made in the EAC, in terms of setting human right standards, 
strongly suggest that progress is being made in the right direction. Although there 
is no enforced human rights catalogue, there is a treaty which is founded on 
human rights principles and there is a Court that appears to be continually 
circumventing obstacles in order to meet its mandate. This on one hand shows 
human rights protection is available in the EACJ, but on the other hand indicates a 
reluctance by the partner states to operationalise the Court’s human rights 
jurisdiction, possibly to avoid it becoming an exclusive human rights court. 
Conclusion 
117 The conclusion reached is that the EAC offers indigenous communities an 
alternative to the regional and domestic mechanisms to present their indigenous 
communities’ land rights claims. The conclusion would have been different if the 
Treaty had remained as it was under the East African Co-operation as that was 
1079 Murungi and Gallinetti (n 166), 129. 
1080 ibid. 
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silent on human rights. However, the current Treaty is not. The provisions under 
Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 111, 112, 114 and 120 could be relied upon in indigenous land 
rights claims. Equally, the East African Community Human and Peoples’ Human 
Rights Bill, the Common Market Protocol, the Protocol on Good Governance and 
the Plan of Action on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in East Africa are 
all strong indicators that the EAC has awareness of human rights issues and is 
willing to be people-focused. The East African Community Bill of Rights, an 
instrument proposed by East African NGOs further shows the sub-regional zeal for 
human rights protection. For indigenous communities, raising of their standards 
of living and improving the quality of their lives, would mean addressing their land 
rights claims i.e. protecting, respecting and promoting them. The provisions in the 
Charter and these draft instruments or Protocols certainly make that possible. 
118 The fact that the EAC has adopted a policy on persons with disabilities and a 
Gender and Equality Bill, both with the aim of meeting its obligations under Article 
120 to develop and adopt a common approach towards disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups, not only creates a hope and expectation in indigenous 
communities, but is reason to push for similar advances to be made in respect of 
their land rights. Similarly, SADC’s Protocol on Forestry shows that such issues 
affect more than the one REC and thus call for a sub-regional response; and expose 
the inadequacies of the 2015 East African Community Forests Management and 
Protection Bill in its failure to capture forest communities. 
119 In respect of bringing land rights claims to the EACJ, it is accepted that the 
current restriction to the EACJ’s jurisdiction under Article 27(2) may be 
problematic. Plain reading of this provision suggests that until the said Protocol is 
concluded the EACJ does not have jurisdiction to solely determine indigenous 
communities’ land rights issues framed in human rights terms. Some favour 
clarification on this issue in the law or alternatively by way of a Protocol in 
pursuance of Article 27(2).1081 However, the fact that the court has proceeded to 
1081 Murungi and Gallinetti (n 166). 
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determine various human rights related cases suggests that it has not allowed the 
delayed operationalisation of the Protocol to perturb its functions and has 
focused, instead, and rightly so, on its mandate as arising from Articles 23(1) and 
27(1) of the Treaty. The fact that the Maasai community from Tanzania has 
pursued an application to the EACJ relating to their land rights will test whether 
the EACJ is a suitable alternative forum to the African Charter forum for such cases. 
Those who litigate on indigenous communities’ land rights in the regional forum 
consider that it has features which make it so and this thesis agrees. 
120 Whether in fact cases of this nature are likely to be complied with by Kenya 
and other partner states is a different matter altogether and is likely to need a 
similar approach to implementation as proposed in Chapter 3. This chapter sought 
to examine whether the EAC presents indigenous communities with an alternative 
mechanism for recognition, promotion and protection of their land rights. It seems 
to. 
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Chapter 5: Impact of International development funding on indigenous 
communities’ land rights: Case Studying the IDA funded Natural Resource 
Management Project1082 
Introduction1083 
1 It is said that many development projects, not just those of the World Bank (the 
Bank), lead to ‘dispossession of land, loss of resources, diminished livelihoods and 
environment degradation’.1084 In 2001 the World Bank funded the Bujagali 
Hydroelectric power project. It was alleged that during this project the Bank had 
violated its own policies on indigenous communities, involuntary resettlement and 
environmental impact assessments. There were also corruption allegations in 
respect of the project. The project was temporarily stayed but restarted whilst 
investigations into the corruption were ongoing. During this time the Bank also 
increased the original loan.1085   
2 And from what its staff say, the Bank seems to expect non-compliance from 
governments but will rarely take any enforcement action.1086 Analysis of a 
plethora of development projects funded by the Bank between 2009 to 2013 
revealed that the Bank injected US $50 billion in financing for projects said to pose 
‘the highest risk for irreversible or unprecedented social or environmental 
impacts’1087 which had inevitably caused ‘displacement of millions of people, 
evictions from homes, dispossession of lands and … damage to their property’.1088 
1082 Project P095050. 
1083 The majority of the project-related documents referred to in this Chapter will be cited by the titles given by 
the World Bank in the project documentation and not necessarily in OSCOLA referencing style otherwise used in 
the rest of the thesis. All the documents referred to can be found here: The World Bank, ‘Kenya - Natural Resource 
Management Project’ (The World Bank)<http://projects.worldbank.org/P095050/kenya-natural-resource-
management-project?lang=en> accessed 24 January 2019. 
1084 C  Daniel and others, ‘Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development Finance’ (SOMO, January 
2016) < https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IAM_DEF_WEB.pdf> (accessed 4 January 2019). 
1085 Weaver (n 160). 
1086 Sasha Chavkin and others, ‘Investigation: Evicted and Abandoned: How The World Bank Broke Its Promise To 
Protect The Poor’ Premium Times (Nigeria, 19 April 2015) 
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/181677-investigation-evicted-and-abandoned-how-the-
world-bank-broke-its-promise-to-protect-the-poor.html> accessed 11 January 2019; See also Sasha Chavkin and 
Mark Anderson, ‘The World Bank Breaks its own Rules as Millions Lose Land and Livelihoods’ The Guardian (London, 
16 April 2015)<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/16/world-bank-breaks-own-rules-




The analysis further showed that the Bank fails to properly assess projects in 
advance to ensure that ‘communities are protected…continues to do business 
with governments that have abused their citizens, sending a signal that borrowers 
have little to fear if they violate the Bank’s rules’.1089  
3 In this chapter this thesis wishes to examine the International Development 
Association (IDA) funded Natural Resource Management Project (P095050). This 
was a project financed under the auspices of the World Bank Group’s Investment 
Project Financing (IPF). An analysis of this project is important as the project is an 
example of the numerous factors at play during development projects affecting 
indigenous communities including the Bank’s and, in this case, the Kenyan 
government’s hypocrisy. 
4 The underlying question is whether by providing development financing for land, 
environmental and natural resources management-related projects, international 
development organisations like the Bank whose function includes, offering 
development assistance to developing nations through the avenue of funding 
agreements, safeguard policies or frameworks, can, in doing so, assist indigenous 
communities in Kenya to realise their land rights. As the focus of this research is 
on legal avenues, this chapter considers that as development aid frameworks are 
part of a wider body of international law; and the funding agreements are 
essentially contracts between states and multilateral development organisations, 
based on conditional terms which if violated can lead to termination of the 
agreement, the development project mechanism has quasi-legal strands which 
make it suitable for examination in this research.  
5 As the safeguard policies are there to ensure that the projects do not have- or to 
minimize or mitigate against- adverse impacts on the environment and the people 
concerned, a process which requires an understanding, in the case of indigenous 
communities of their land rights, this potentially creates an avenue for recognition 
of those rights.  Furthermore these policies provide an avenue through which 
1089 ibid. 
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grievances can be raised where adverse impact is complained of, which bears 
some semblance with bringing of grievances using courts, minus of course the 
remedial orders that courts can make. This potentially offers an avenue for land 
rights grievances to be aired and vindicated. 
 
6 In addition, Kenya is a sovereign state with its own laws. The fact that it has been 
and continues to be a beneficiary of development funding from the Bank and other 
agencies, does not mean it has no say on development. It does, but as history and 
hypocrisy would have it, this is not as straightforward as it seems. Ideally however, 
where the Bank and other agencies fail to protect the land rights of indigenous 
communities, Kenya’s first priority and loyalty should lie with its people. 
 
7 It suffices to say at the outset that the project was not successful and resulted in 
grievances being raised by two indigenous communities for violation of their land 
rights which the Bank ultimately upheld. To understand what happened, this 
chapter will take the following form. First, there will be a discussion about the 
evolution of the Bank’s development agenda which will lead to a discussion on 
hypocrisy i.e. the gap between the Bank’s rhetoric and reality followed then by an 
analysis of the project. This will take the form of an examination of the project’s 
components; a synopsis of the bank policies that were said to apply and what they 
entailed; the agreements entered into between the Bank, the Government of 
Kenya and its two agencies; the grievances raised by indigenous communities; a 
discussion on the project’s frameworks and what actually happened, during the 
project, that led to the failure of the project; and finally the crux of the matter-
indigenous communities’ unmet needs will be discussed.  
 
8 This chapter argues that development projects that impact on indigenous 
communities are inevitably going to require contending with their land rights 
question; and where that is done, it is too complex an issue to be undertaken 
superficially or naively and that in fact there are other factors which may be in play 
that overshadow the opportunities such projects present. 
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Concept of development 
 
9 The marginalisation of indigenous communities, caused by their need to preserve, 
from assimilation, their unique culture and identity as indigenous peoples, which 
is centrally based on their relationship with land, has meant that they have 
become economically unfree or so poor that they are unable to participate in 
economic interchange relating to their land rights, which in turn results in violation 
of other freedoms. For real development to occur it needs to respect human rights 
and be ‘shaped by the people it is designed to benefit.’1090 The African Commission 
and arguments made by the Endorois and Ogiek communities in their regional 
cases are instructive on what development for indigenous communities in the 
context of their land rights constitutes.  
 
10 Article 20 of the African Charter: the right to self-determination of political status 
and development, has been interpreted by these regional bodies to encompass 
for indigenous communities the following. Firstly, their freedom from 
discrimination in all spheres of economic, social and cultural life;1091 secondly, that 
states obtain their informed consent prior to any exploitation of the resources on 
their ancestral lands; thirdly, that they benefit from any such exploitation;1092 
fourthly, that their environmental rights are respected by both the government 
and non-state parties;1093 fifthly, that their cultural identity is safeguarded;1094 and 
lastly, that they benefit from increased participation in governance.1095 Article 21: 
the right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources, was delineated by the 
Endorois in their case as: ‘liberty of action’;1096 access to increased capabilities;1097 
unfettered access and right to dispose of natural resources;1098 increase in 
                                                          
1090 C  Daniel and others (n 1084).  
1091 Principles and Guidelines (n 630) part III, para 42.  
1092 ibid, para 44. 
1093 ibid. 
1094 ibid, para 45. 
1095 ibid, para 46. 
1096 Endorois case (n 114), para 128. 
1097 ibid, para 127. 
1098 ibid, paras 129. 
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wellbeing;1099 effective consultation;1100 not being subjected to ‘coercive and 
intimidating activity;1101 meaningful participation and freely given consent;1102 
and sharing in benefits.1103 Article 22: the right to economic, social and cultural 
development, was delineated by the Ogiek as encompassing the community’s 
right to determine and develop their own priorities and strategies; the right to be 
involved in projects impacting on their existence; and the right to take charge of 
the administration of such projects themselves through their own 
infrastructures.1104  
 
What is the Bank’s agenda? 
 
11 The Bank has several agendas it would seem: market liberalization, rule of law, 
protection of indigenous communities and respect for human rights, which will be 
discussed here.  
 
12 Its original remit as set out in the Articles of Agreement of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement bodies (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), is capital investment, 
promotion of private foreign investment and supplementing of this on suitable 
conditions, financing for productive purposes, promotion of international trade; 
and arranging of or guaranteeing of loans.1105 However, IDA was established with 
a libertarian remit. Its purpose at the outset was to assist less developed nations 
who were unable to obtain funding or meet loan requirements set by the IBRD or 
the IMF by offering them loans on concessional terms or ‘soft-loans’.1106 
 
                                                          
1099 ibid. 
1100 ibid, para 130. 
1101 ibid, para 134. 
1102 ibid. 
1103 ibid, para 135. 
1104 ibid, para 202. 
1105 See the original remit, Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1945 (UK), Article 1, Text of Articles of Agreement of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Schedule, Part II. 
1106 International Development Association, ‘History’ (International Development Association) 
<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/history> accessed 20 May 2016.  
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13 The International Development Association (IDA) presently has 52 contributor 
countries1107 and 77 countries eligible for funding. Kenya is eligible for funding.1108 
It is classed as a lower middle income country.1109 Eligibility is dependent on a 
country’s relative poverty based on gross national income per capita;1110 how the 
country has managed its economy and other IDA projects.1111 The Bank, and IDA 
for that matter, is therefore not seeking simply to give money away, it wants a 
return on its investment. The NRMP was a project funded under the Bank’s 
Investment Project Financing which takes the form of ‘provision of loans, credits 
or grants financed by the Bank (including IBRD and IDA) from its resources or from 
trust funds by other donors and administered by  the Bank, or a combination of 
these’.1112 For the NRMP, IDA agreed to provide credit, amounting to 46 million 
Special Drawing Rights,1113 which is US $68.5 million.1114 IDA credits do not accrue 
interest, only annual service and commitment charges.1115 However, they are 
meant to be paid back.  
 
14 Therefore it could be argued that the Bank’s agenda is a neoliberal one. For 
neoliberalism to exist: ‘the conditions allowing for a free market must be won 
politically, and the state must be reengineered to support the free market on an 
                                                          
1107 International Development Association, ‘Contributor Countries’ (International Development Association)   
<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/contributor-countries> accessed 6 April 2016.   
1108 International Development Association, ‘IDA Graduates’ (International Development Association)   
<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/ida-graduates >accessed 12 May 2016. 
1109 Amy Copley, ‘Kenya Rebases GDP and Becomes Ninth-Largest African Economy’ (Brookings 3 October 2014)< 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/03/africa-in-the-news-kenya-becomes-a-middle-
income-country-mo-ibrahim-index-released-south-sudan-peace-talks-yield-promise/> accessed 23 January 2019. 
1110 International Development Association ‘Borrowing Countries’ (International Development Association) 
<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries> accessed 12 May 2016.  
1111 International Development Association, ‘The World Bank’s Fund for the poorest’ (International Development 
Association, February 2016)<http://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/images/fund-for-the-poorest.pdf> 
accessed 15 May 2016. 
1112 The World Bank, ‘Investment Lending Reform: Modernizing and Consolidating Operational Policies and 
Procedures’ (Operations Policy and Country Services, 1 October 2012)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/777241468331877549/pdf/730380BR0R20120C0disclosed010030
120.pdf> accessed 25 January 2019. 
1113 Financing Agreement (Natural Resource Management Project) between Republic of Kenya and International 
Development Association, 7 May 2017, para 2.01. 
1114 The World Bank IBRD-IDA, 'Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project’ (The World Bank IBRD-IDA, 27 
March 2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/loans-credits/2006/03/27/kenya-natural-resource-
management-project>accessed 12 January 2019. 
1115 The World Bank, ‘OP 3.10 - Financial Terms and Conditions of IBRD Loans, IBRD Hedging Products, and IDA 
Credits’ (The World Bank, June 2003). 
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ongoing basis’, thereby making ‘the only social end …. the maintenance of the 
market itself’.1116 It is said that upon independence, Kenya: 
 
‘received the enthusiastic support of the World Bank (which) ….50-odd 
years ago …...was an imprimatur that was eagerly sought after, greatly 
valued when received and taken to mean that one was on the right track. 
There was little, if any dissent, from the Bank’s approval which also meant 
the Bank’s financial support and financial support from bilateral 
donors’.1117 
 
15 As discussed in the introductory chapter, the World Bank’s policy in respect of 
Kenya, from the outset, was promotion of market liberalisation. Law did not 
feature anywhere in the Bank’s thinking from the ‘60s to ‘90s and even in the 90s 
when the Bank published its policies on urban planning, law was omitted. 1118 
However, because of two coinciding global developments: the end of the Cold War 
and African countries’ agitation for more democracy, which in Kenya’s case was 
marked by it having its first multiparty elections in 1992, the Bank’s position 
changed.1119  Notably also, in respect of land matters, up until that point the Bank 
had been promoting ‘land titling and registration’ at the expense of customary 
tenure,1120 which it had considered to be the most efficient way to maintain 
market liberalization.1121  
 
16 However, these global changes led to its position changing in the early ‘90s and a 
changed agenda, to one of rule of law reforms. The Bank ‘came to the view that in 
some circumstances customary tenure did not inhibit agricultural 
productivity’.1122 It therefore took a relaxed position in respect of the African 
states, acknowledging that it would take some time for them to replicate the 
                                                          
1116 Metcalf (n 41). 
1117 McAuslan (n 15). 
1118 ibid. 
1119 ibid. 
1120 Manji (n 32). 
1121 ibid. 
1122 ibid. 
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‘western concept of (land) ownership’.1123 To deal with, or even control the 
ongoing democratisation in Africa, the World Bank and the IMF were compelled 
to introduce ‘structural adjustment to African economies’ which brought with 
them rule of law reforms.1124 As noted in chapter 1 in respect of land, the Bank’s 
rule of law land reforms saw the Bank and other international donors invest 
millions towards the ‘drafting of national policies, the appointment of 
commissions of inquiry and the enactment of new land laws’.1125 
 
17 The Bank also has a human rights agenda focused on indigenous communities. In 
or around 1992, that the Bank revised its policy on indigenous peoples, thereby 
extending the understanding of those communities from ‘isolated and 
unacculturated tribal groups affected by development projects’ as set out in its 
1982 policy to communities seeking to maintain distinct social and cultural 
identities with close relationships to their ancestral lands; and as being 
‘susceptible to being disadvantaged in the development process.’1126 In July 2005 
the Bank published OP 4.10 its policy on indigenous peoples. The Bank’s position 
in that policy was clear. It supported their existence and protection of their 
ancestral lands. However, also in 2005, the Forest Peoples Programme produced 
a report detailing indigenous peoples’ experience of participation with the 
Bank.1127 Indigenous communities said that the Bank routinely failed to involve 
them in processes, projects and programmes concerning them; that the Bank 
commonly disregarded their land rights and failed to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent over land issues; that ‘meaningful indigenous participation 
remains absent or superficial in the Bank’s adjustment and programmatic 
loans…..that participation is always low grade and ……projects are still experienced 
as top-down interventions’.1128  
 
                                                          
1123 ibid. 
1124 McAuslan (n 15). 
1125 Manji (n 32). 
1126 The World Bank ‘The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples Policy and Program Initiatives’ (The World 
Bank)<http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00524/WEB/PDF/IPPOLICY.PDF>accessed 10 October 2019. 
1127 Tony Griffiths, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: experiences with participation’ (Forest Peoples 
Programme 2005). 
1128 ibid, 1. 
263 
18 The Bank now has a human rights agenda as well. In 2017 the Bank replaced a 
number of its policies including its policy on indigenous communities with the 
Environmental and Social Framework (ESF).1129 This comprises the Bank’s vision 
for sustainable development, its policy for investment project financing; and the 
environmental and social standards which apply to both the borrowing nation and 
the project.1130  The Bank acknowledges in this framework that it cannot operate 
in a human rights-lite vacuum. Its Vision for Sustainable Development set out in 
the ESF states that the Bank’s activities will ‘support the realization of human 
rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and) through 
projects it finances….(it) seeks to avoid adverse impacts and will continue to 
support its member countries as they strive to progressively achieve their human 
rights commitments.’1131  
19 In 2015 the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private-arm of the Bank 
was sued by a group of Indian fishermen and farmers on grounds that the Tata 
Mundra power plant project it funded ‘ha(d) severely damaged the local 
environment and (their) traditional ways of life’.1132 They claim that the Bank 
provided a US $450million loan for the project knowing it posed a high risk of harm 
to the community if things went wrong but it failed to put safeguards in place to 
mitigate against those risks.1133 IFC claimed it had absolute immunity against such 
claims. Although the lower US courts rejected the claim on immunity grounds, in 
February 2019 the US Supreme Court found that it did not have absolute 
immunity.1134 In 2017 another claim1135 was brought by a peasant community 
from Honduras against the IFC for funding projects which have resulted in 
1129 The World Bank, ‘The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework’ (International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/The World Bank 2017). 
1130 ibid. 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 Claire Provost and Mark Kennard, ‘World Bank lending arm sees off lawsuit by Indian fishermen’ The Guardian 
(London 30 March 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/30/world-bank-lending-
arm-ifc-sees-off-lawsuit-by-indian-fishermen-power-plant> accessed 12 January 2019. 
1133 Earth Rights International, ‘Budha Ismail Jam, et al v. IFC’ (Earth Rights 
International)<https://earthrights.org/case/budha-ismail-jam-et-al-v-ifc/>accessed 12 January 2019. 
1134 Budha Ismail Jam et al v International Finance Corporation, No 17-1011 (Supreme Court of the United 
States). 
1135 Juana Doe et al v IFC Asset Management Company, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1494-VAC-SRF (District Court for the District 
of Delaware). 
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‘murders, torture, assault, battery, trespass, unjust enrichment and other acts of 
aggression’.1136 The community accused the IFC of ‘profit-making from land 
allegedly acquired by ‘fraud, coercion, threat of violence, or actual violence’.1137 
Amongst IFC’s arguments was that it had absolute immunity and if not, this was 
not the kind of case where it could waive immunity.1138 Although the Court found 
that it was immune from suit, relying on the lower Courts’ decision in Jam at el, in 
view of the US Supreme Court’s decision in that case, that decision may be 
overturned. 
 
20 So why the incoherence? The answer seems to lie in hypocrisy. Catherine Weaver 
states that ‘hypocrisy is in essence the persistent failure of the Bank, as a collective 
entity, to act in accordance with its own ideals.’1139 This, in her view, is what 
explains ‘the mainstreaming gaps between what the Bank says are its priorities in 
alleviation of poverty and in socioeconomic development and what is actually does 
to pursue these goals’.1140 That is what explains the Bujagali project failings which: 
 
‘to the most of its unforgiving critics…….exemplifies the Jekyll and Hyde 
character of the Bank, which preaches sustainable, participatory, and 
accountable development while, in practice, doing whatever is 
necessary to get big loans approved and out the door as quickly as 
possible.’1141 
 
21 And as to why the hypocrisy arises, she opines that the ‘sociological theories share 
the assumption that’: 
 
                                                          
1136 Claire Provost, ‘Farmers Sue World Bank Lending Arm Over Alleged Violence In Honduras’ The Guardian 
(London, 8 March 2017)<Https://Www.Theguardian.Com/Global-Development/2017/Mar/08/Farmers-Sue-
World-Bank-Lending-Arm-Ifc-Over-Alleged-Violence-In-Honduras>accessed 12 January 2019. 
1137 ibid. 
1138 Earth Rights International, ‘Juana Doe et al. v. IFC’ (Earth Rights 
International)<https://earthrights.org/case/juana-doe-et-al-v-ifc/#documentsff69-1a905f26-f4b6>accessed 12 
January 2019. 
1139 Weaver (n 160). 
1140 ibid. 
1141 ibid. 
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‘Organizations depend upon their external environments for critical 
resources, including both material (financial) support and conferred 
legitimacy. An organisation must appear responsive to environmental 
demands in order to survive. Hypocrisy arises when these demands 
clash and the organization is compelled to separate talk from action so 
as to reconcile conflicting societal norms to placate multiple political 
masters with heterogeneous preferences’.1142 
 
22 This, then must be the story behind the NRMP. 
 
The Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) 
 
23 The project was approved on 27 March 2007.1143 It officially commenced on 7 May 
20071144 which was marked by the signing of a financing agreement between the 
Government of Kenya (GoK) and the IDA, as well as two project agreements 
between the IDA and the project’s two implementing agencies: the National 
Irrigation Board (NIB) and the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) 




24 The NMRP project had 4 components: 
 
- Component 1, water resource management. This was to encapsulate: a) 
legal and institutional strengthening and identification of priority 
investments in the South-east Aberdares and West Mt Kenya catchment 
areas; b) Catchment investments, or alternatively, management of 
investments in the South-east Aberdares and West Mt Kenya catchment 
areas, strengthening the information base on them, decision-making, 
enforcement of allocations and investment in storage infrastructure and 
rehabilitation of existing structures; and c) irrigation reform- reforming the 
                                                          
1142 ibid. 
1143 The World Bank, ‘Project Profile: Natural Resource Management Project’ (92518, The World Bank 2 April 
2007)<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534961468044080553/pdf/9251802007Apr20t0Box038536
7B0PUBLIC.pdf> 12 July 2016. 
1144 The date the financing and project agreements came into effect. 
1145 Project Profile (n 1143). 
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policy and legal framework around irrigation and increasing the capacity to 
manage irrigation schemes.  
 
- Component 2: Management of forest resources – this was to take the form 
of assisting the Ministry of Environment and National Resource 
Management in creating the regulatory and institutional framework 
proposed under the Forest Bill; to undertake investments in forests to 
coincide with management of water resources; and to delimit  land rights 
‘by requirements for management of forests’.1146 Three activities were 
proposed under this component: a) forest sector institutional reform - 
including supporting the Kenya Forestry Service, which was to be 
established under the Forest Act; engaging private companies and 
communities in forest management; establishment of a certification 
scheme for forest products; and complete a forest inventory; b) indigenous 
forest protection- to find and develop approaches to protect forests 
including ‘identifying and evaluating promising community based 
activities’; 1147  and c) revitalising forest industries - through encouraging 
community and private sector management of plantations and farm 
forestry.’ 
 
- Component 3: Assistance to communities for co-management- this was to 
be fulfilled through a ‘community-driven development’ approach, allowing 
community participation and control over planning decisions and 
investment resources. 
 
- Component 4: Monitoring, management and evaluation-   success of the 
NRMP was to be assessed by ‘capturing both the changing status of the 
natural resources (water, forests and biodiversity) and welfare of 
participating communities’.1148  
 
25 The NRMP’s development goal or objective was to enhance ‘institutional capacity 
to manage water and forest resources, reduce the incidence and severity of water 
shocks such as drought, floods and water shortage in river catchments and 
improve the livelihoods of communities participating in the co-management of 
water and forest-based resources’.1149 
 
                                                          
1146 The World Bank, ‘Project Information Document (PID) Concept Stage’ (Report No.: AB1588, The World Bank 
20 October 2005) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/696841468271848001/pdf/NRM0PID010concept0stage.pdf>acce
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26 It is important to underscore that these components were not devised in isolation. 
In 2004, the Government of Kenya and the World Bank Group agreed a Country 
Assistance Strategy 2004-2007 which included a strategy to reduce vulnerability 
and strengthen communities, the main objective being to implement community-
driven approaches to development.1150 There was also in place a National 
Development Plan 2002-2008 which focused on environment and national 
resources management for which it was hoped the government could obtain 
assistance from development partners to ‘guide them into supporting affected 
and threatened communities’.1151 In addition in 2006, Kenya had also promulgated 
its own development blueprint- Vision 2030,1152 constituting Kenya’s development 
plan for the years 2008 to 2030. It came into force a few months after the project 
began. It seeks to make Kenya a 'middle-income country providing a high quality 
life to all its citizens by the year 2030’1153 and is founded on three pillars: 
economic, social and political.1154 These promote poverty reduction, creation of a 
public service that is ‘more citizen focused and results-oriented’1155 by instilling 
‘transparency and accountability’;1156 and seek to promote land reform and in this 
respect, recognise the key role that land plays in giving effect to socio-economic 
and political rights.1157  
 
Bank policies applied 
 
27 The NRMP was classified as a Category B project1158 i.e. a project whose potential 
adverse environmental impact was considered to be site-specific, and on human 
                                                          
1150 The World Bank Group, ‘Kenya Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report 2004-2008’ (The World Bank 
Group 2004)<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KENYAEXTN/Resources/Kenya_CASPR.pdf > accessed 6 
September 2016. 
1151 Republic of Kenya Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, ‘Second Implementation Report on the 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification’ (National Environment Secretariat 
April 2002). 
1152 Government of Kenya, ‘Vision 2030’ (Government of Kenya 2007) 2. 
1153 ibid, 1. 
1154 ibid. 
1155 ibid, 8. 
1156 ibid. 
1157 ibid, 9. 
1158 The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Management Framework for the Western Kenya Community-
driven Development and Flood Mitigation Project, and the Natural Resources Management Project Final Report’ 
November 2006 (E1520, Environmental Resources Management, November 2016)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/765061468272355570/pdf/E1520.pdf> accessed 8 August 2017. 
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populations or environmentally important areas. This being the case it was 
envisaged that the NRMP would trigger the following safeguard policies: i) OP 4.10 
on Indigenous Peoples; ii) OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement; iii) OP 4.36 on 
Forests; and iv) OP 4.04 on Natural Habitats.1159  
 
28 Projects likely to affect indigenous communities triggered Operation Policy on 
Indigenous Peoples OP4.10. The Policy defined indigenous peoples as peoples 
who: self-identify as members of distinct indigenous cultural groups and this 
distinct identity is recognised by others; communities with attachment to distinct 
geographical areas, ancestral lands in the project area and attachment to natural 
resources in those areas; communities that have maintained traditional, cultural, 
economic, social and political institutions,1160 and with ‘an indigenous language, 
often different from the official language of the country or region’.1161 This 
understanding of indigenous communities is similar to that of ILO Convention, 
UNDRIP and also in some respects to the definition of marginalised communities 
in Article 260 of the Kenyan constitution. Although the NRMP pre-dated the 
constitution, and IDA’s understanding of the term was not reflected in any 
domestic legislation, the understanding the GoK would have been required to 
adopt is that under OP4.10.  
 
29 Projects likely to lead to the resettlement of affected persons, at the relevant time, 
triggered Operation Policy on Involuntary Resettlement, OP4.12. Projects likely to 
affect the health and quality of forests, the livelihoods of forest-dependent 
communities; and which had potential to impact on forest management, 
protection and utilisation triggered Operation Policy on Forests, OP4.36.1162 And 
those which necessitated support for the protection, maintenance and 
rehabilitation of natural habitats triggered Operational Policy on Natural Habitats, 
OP4.04.1163 The NRMP triggered all these policies. 
                                                          
1159 The World Bank, ‘Operation Manual OP 10.00- Investment Project Financing’ (The World Bank April 2013), para 
8. 
1160 The World Bank ‘Operational Manual OP 4.10- Indigenous Peoples’ (The World Bank July 2015), para 4. 
1161 ibid. 
1162 The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.36 - Forests’ (The World Bank November 2002), para 3. 
1163 The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.04 - Natural Habitats’ (The World Bank June 2001). 




30 The Bank also had a policy on environmental assessment OP/BP4.01. An 
environmental assessment was required to assess whether the project was 
environmentally sound and sustainable.1164 An environmental assessment 
entailed evaluation of environmental risks and impacts of the project; examination 
of project alternatives;  identification of ‘ways of improving project selection, 
siting, planning, design, and implementation by preventing, minimizing, 
mitigating, or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and enhancing 
positive impacts’;1165 and facilitated ‘mitigating and managing (of) adverse 
environmental impacts throughout project implementation.’1166 The onus for 
carrying out an environmental assessment of the project lay with the GoK.1167  
 
31 In most cases where a policy is triggered, this necessitates the preparation of a 
corresponding framework. For the NRMP, the following frameworks were 
required: an Indigenous Peoples’ Policy Framework (IPPF), an Environmental and 
Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Policy Framework 
(RPF). 
 
32 The GoK and the two implementing agencies, the NIB and the WRMA were 
therefore bound in their respective agreements with IDA not only to the 
applicable/triggered policies but corresponding frameworks as well. This is 
confirmed in the respective financing agreements of 7 May 2007. 
 
The Agreements  
i) With the Government of Kenya 
 
33 In the Financing Agreement between the GoK and IDA, IDA agreed to provide 
funding for the project. The agreement confirmed the GoK’s commitment to the 
                                                          
1164 The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.01 - Environmental Assessment’ (The World Bank January 1999), 
para 1. 
1165 ibid, para 2. 
1166 ibid. 
1167 ibid, para 3. 
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objectives of the project.1168 The Agreement provided that 4 conditions of 
effectiveness applied, failing which the agreement could be terminated: i) that the 
GoK and its project implementing entities execute subsidiary agreements 
satisfactory to the Association; ii) that the Gok adopt a project implementation 
plan in form and substance satisfactory to the IDA; iii) that the GoK adopt an 
institutional risk based management framework satisfactory to the IDA; and iv) 
that the GoK appoint two project coordinators, one for forest resources and the 
other for water resources and a procurement specialist for both the forest and 
water related Ministries, with qualifications satisfactory to the IDA.1169  
 
34 Schedule 1 to this Agreement set out the project objectives and its four 
components. Commitment 4, in the Agreement, contained two sub-components 
specific to indigenous peoples, which require highlighting, namely: ‘a) developing 
a national resettlement policy including a communications strategy on 
resettlement and the rights of indigenous peoples; and b) supporting the effective 
implementation of the Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework.’1170 Schedule 2 
to the Agreement provided more guidance on this. It provided that the GoK, to 
ensure the safeguarding of the rights of indigenous peoples’, displaced persons 
and protection of the environment, would implement the Environment 
Management and Social Framework, Resettlement Policy Framework, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Policy Framework and all relevant national legal and policy 
requirements.1171 The Agreement also contained an Appendix which defined 
certain terms. Of note are: “Indigenous Peoples” defined as ‘distinct, vulnerable, 
social and cultural groups that may be identified pursuant to the studies outlined 
in the IPPF’; 1172 and “IPPF” was defined as the ‘instrument outlining the basis for 
identifying indigenous peoples and their rights’.1173  
 
                                                          
1168 Financing Agreement (n 1113), para 3.01. 
1169 ibid, para 5.01. 
1170 ibid, Part 4, Schedule 1, Project Description. 
1171 ibid, Para 4, Schedule 2, Project Execution. 
1172 ibid. 
1173 ibid, Appendix. 
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35 The effect of the Agreement was that if there was a breach of the Indigenous 
Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF), the Environmental and Social Management 
Framework (ESMF) or Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and a failure to carry 
out what was being proposed in Schedules 1 and 2, the agreement would be 
terminated. 
 
36 As the Agreement was not terminated, and the project run its full course, it is 
either the case that the Bank remained satisfied that the GoK’s fulfilment of the 
stipulated conditions was satisfactory or if it was not so satisfied, the Bank chose 
not to discharge the Agreement. An examination of the project’s various stages, 
and the upholding of the grievances made by affected communities, and the fact 
that in 2009 the Bank found the project to be moderately unsatisfactory,1174 as 
will be seen later, suggests that the Bank made the latter choice. 
 
 
ii) With the two implementing agencies 
 
37 The Bank’s project agreement with the NIB confirmed that the NIB was an 
implementing agency and would carry out the following activities: ‘Supporting the 
policy, legal and institutional reforms of the irrigation and drainage sector 
including a review of the roles and functions of the Ministry of Water and the 
National Irrigation Board (and) constructing and rehabilitating agreed irrigation 
schemes.’1175 The Agreement required the NIB to, in implementation of its role, 
comply with the ESMF, IPPF and RPF.1176 
 
                                                          
1174 The World Bank, ‘Kenya- Natural Resource Management Project Restructuring Paper’ (Report No. 62490-KE, 
The World Bank 10 June 2011) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/509351468272106448/pdf/624900PJPR0P090e0only0900BOX361
487B.pdf> accessed 5 May 2016. 
1175 ibid, Part 1, Project Description. 
1176 The World Bank ‘Project Agreement (Natural Resource Management Project) International Development 
Agency and the National Irrigation Board’ (The World Bank 7 May 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/544091468048829112/pdf/PA1NIB01conformed1.pdf> accessed 
15 July 2016, Schedule, Execution of the Project Implementing Entity’s Respective Part of the Project. 
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38 The project agreement with the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) 
similarly confirmed that the Authority was an implementing agency with 
responsibility for the following: ‘Strengthening the capacity of the Water 
Resources Management Authority (WRMA); (b) Promoting an integrated approach 
in the management of the Upper Tana River catchment area; and supporting the 
preparation and implementation of community driven development sub-projects 
in the Thika, Sagana and Thiba River Basins which focus on livelihoods enhancing 
interventions and conservation of the natural resource base.’ 1177 Similarly the 
Authority was required to carry out its part of the agreement in accordance with 




39 There were two grievances brought under the NRMP. 
 
i) 1st Grievance – Sengwer community 
 
40 On 14 January 2013 representatives of the Sengwer community in the Kapolet 
Forest (in Trans-Nzoia District), Talau and Kaipos (in West Pokot District) and 
Embobut Forest (in Marakwet District) submitted a request to the Bank’s 
Inspection Panel for investigation into the NRMP. They complained that: i) their 
houses had been burnt and their property destructed in Embobut forest; ii) that 
members of their community had been arrested from the Kapolet forest, detained 
and arraigned following charges of illegal cultivation of forests without permission- 
this they noted was their ancestral land; iii) that a female member of the 
community had been shot by forest guards during an attempt to arrest members 
of the community and had been left for dead; iv) that the project had been 
restructured and amongst the changes was reference to them as Vulnerable and 
Marginalised Groups rather than indigenous peoples, which had been done 
without their free, prior and informed consent thus violating their rights under 
                                                          
1177 ibid, Schedule, para 2.01. 
1178 ibid, Schedule, para 5. 
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international law and the Bank’s policies and frameworks; v) they had been 
subjected to threats and intimidation by the District Commissioner of the Trans 
Nzoia County for objecting to planting of trees; and vi) the GoK had made plans to 
resettle them without free, prior and informed consultations contrary to OP4.12 
on Involuntary Resettlement.1179 
 
41 The community asked for the following redress: i) recognition, respect and 
protection of their rights as indigenous forest communities to live in the forests 
and carry out livelihood activities that promote sustainable conservation and 
protection of natural resources; ii) a review of frameworks that discriminated 
against their right to live within their ancestral homes in the forests; iii) 
compensation for houses and property burnt in Embobut Forest since the 
adoption of the NRMP in 2007; iv) compensation for community members 
arrested in Kapolet Forest and those subject to court proceedings; v) 
compensation for the shooting of the female community member by forest 
guards; vi) that the GoK revert to using the term indigenous peoples as it had done 
in the formulation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Planning Framework (IPPF); vii) 
transfer of the zonal manager who they believed had been responsible for the 
arrest of community members and shooting of the woman in Kapolet forest; and 
viii) suspension of further REDD funding until the alleged ‘violations, injustices, 
concerns and fears are addressed’.1180 
 
ii) 2nd grievance- Brought by the Cherangany indigenous peoples’ community 
 
42 On 1 August 2013, the Inspection Panel received a request for inspection from the 
Cherangany indigenous peoples’ community living in the Cherangany Hills. The 
community contended that as they had not been recognised as indigenous 
peoples, they had not been recognised as the rightful owners of the Cherangany 
                                                          
1179 The World Bank ‘The Inspection Panel, Report and Recommendation Kenya: Natural Resource Management 
Project (P095050)’ (Report No. 77959-KE The Inspection Panel, 29 May 2013)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/305841468276357879/pdf/779590IPR0P09500lPN0REQUEST0RQ0
1302.pdf> accessed 12 September 2016. 
1180 ibid. 
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Hills, as a result of which they had lost their identity, territory, social and cultural 
status.1181 They claimed that this had exposed them to ‘unfair competition and 
conflicts which might lead to internal friction and tribal war’1182 from other 
tribes.1183 Similar to the Sengwer they contended that use of the term Vulnerable 
and Marginalised Groups rather than indigenous peoples was damaging and that 
they had been evicted without free, prior and informed consultation.1184 
 
Disjointedness between the framework, expectations and the reality 
 
43 The failure to adhere to agreements is likely to lead to grievances, as was the case 
with the NRMP. This thesis argues that where a proposed development project is 
likely to impact on indigenous communities’ land rights, the Government, as the 
borrower should properly communicate the anticipated impact to the 
communities concerned before the application is submitted; should make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the communities’ free, prior and informed 
consent to the project is obtained; and should set these issues out clearly in the 
project proposal. However, even where it fails to do so the development 
organisation should have a framework that operates as a backstop, such that the 
Government’s failure to impute these rights is mitigated.  
 
44 This means that the organisation needs to discharge its own duty to screen the 
proposed project area(s) to determine the presence of indigenous peoples; to 
assess the social impact of a project on the communities there including ensuring 
that the Government has fully engaged the community in discussions about the 
project and that the communities’ views are heard and respected; and that 
throughout the preparatory, implementation and even at the post-
implementation stage their rights continue to be respected.  Looking at the 
                                                          
1181 The World Bank, ‘Memorandum to the Executive Directors and Alternates of the International Development 
Association, Request for Inspection Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project (P095050)’ (The Inspectional 
Panel, 1 August 2013> 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/744481468272734843/pdf/801490INSP0R200m00OUO0900Box37
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agreement, it is fair to say that there was a plan at that early stage between parties 
to make the NRMP a plan to overhaul the law and policy impacting on indigenous 
communities. This being so, communities concerned or at least their 
representative organisations should have been aware of the agreement’s 
proposals and been consulted. Moreover the policies said to be triggered, should 




45 As at 2007, no domestic legal framework existed that recognised indigenous 
communities’ rights to land and natural resources. The Forests Act 2005 was 
enforced in November 2005 but this did not recognise the concept of indigenous 
community-owned forests. A forest owner under the Act could either be the Kenya 
Forest Service (KFS) in the case of public forests; the local authority in the case of 
local authority forests; and an individual, association, institution or body corporate 
in the case of private forests. The Act recognised the concept of forest 
communities.1185 It provided that these communities had a right to use, subject to 
prescribed conditions, forest produce that they had customarily used.1186  
 
46 It recognised that there were forest sacred groves with religious or cultural 
significance to forest communities. It also recognised that forest communities 
could form approved forest community associations,1187 enabling them to 
participate in various forest management activities.1188 In return the Act provided 
that the community would benefit from various user rights.1189 Any person found 
                                                          
1185 The Act defined such as a community as; ‘a group of persons who (a) have a traditional association with a forest 
for purposes of livelihood, culture or religion; (b) are registered as an association or other organisation engaged in 
forest conservation.’ 
1186 The Forests Act 2005 (Chapter 385), s 22. 
1187 ibid, s 46(1). 
1188 ibid, s 47(1) provided these would be: ‘forest management activities including protecting, conserving and 
managing forests; and formulating and implementing forest programmes assisting the Kenya Forest Service in 
carrying out its functions; and entering into partnerships with other persons for the purposes of ensuring the 
efficient and sustainable conservation and management of forests.’ 
1189 ibid, s 47(2) provided for the following user rights: ‘collection of medicinal herbs, honey-harvesting, timber or 
fuel wood harvesting, grass harvesting and grazing, collection of forest produce for community based industries, 
ecotourism and recreational activities’, scientific and education services, plantation establishment through non-
resident cultivation, contracts to assist in carrying out specified silvicultural operations, development of community 
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to have contravened any of its provisions was liable for criminal prosecution.1190 It 
follows that as it saw communities as users only and not owners, communities 
living in forests on the basis of ownership were already in contravention of the Act 
and liable to prosecution. 
 
47 The World Bank’s policies, at the material time, OP4.10 in particular showed that 
the primary focus when development projects were likely to impact on indigenous 
communities, was the communities themselves. The thrust of the policies was that 
if the communities did not consent, the likelihood was that the project would not 
commence or progress unless there were public interest reasons that aligned with 
the law which trumped their views. This therefore placed indigenous communities 
in a powerful position, the basis of which was that the communities were to be 
treated as the owners of the land and resources, and in the same way that a 
private individual owner would be asked to give consent for the use of their land 
and resources and if they refused, unless it could be shown the development was 
necessary for the public good, that project would not go ahead.  
 
48 The IDA and the GoK solely on these two points alone, were already in 
dichotomous positions. 
 
49 In respect of land and related natural resources, the Bank’s policy recognised that 
indigenous communities have a close link to these resources and provided for 
application of ‘special considerations’ if there was a risk that a project would affect 
that link. In such circumstances the borrowing nation was required to give 
particular heed to:  
 
‘i) the communities’ individual and collective customary rights to land 
or territories they traditionally own, use, occupy and access for natural 
resources essential for their existence, cultural and otherwise; ii) the 
                                                          
wood and non-wood forest based industries; and other benefits which may from time to time be agreed upon an 
association and the Service.’ 
1190 ibid, s 54(1). 
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need to protect such lands and resources against illegal intrusion and 
encroachment; iii) the cultural and spiritual values these communities 
associate with the lands and resources; and  iv) their  natural resources 
management practices and long-term sustainability of such 
practices’.1191  
 
50 If the GoK’s position was already that forest communities did not have any such 
rights, and this must have been its position given the Forests Act 2005, then it 
would not have given heed to these issues as the policy required. 
 
51 In respect of development of natural resources such as water and forests, as 
proposed by the NRMP, OP4.10 called for a similar process of assessment; free, 
prior and informed consultations including advising indigenous communities 
about their ‘rights to such resources under statutory and customary law’; being 
transparent with the communities about potential adverse impact on ‘their 
livelihoods, environments and use of such resources’; and inclusion in the 
indigenous peoples’ plan, arrangements for equitable benefits sharing of the 
proceeds of the development. The Bank’s position was that indigenous 
communities would benefit from such development, at the very least, at the same 
level as a ‘landowner with full legal title to the land’.1192 This would also have been 
ineffectual in Kenya’s case given the law in force. 
 
52 The policy further provided that where project activities are dependent on 
‘establishing legally recognised rights to land and territories that indigenous 
peoples have traditionally owned or customarily used or occupied’, or involves 
‘acquisition of such lands’, this would necessitate the formulation of an action plan 
for ‘the legal recognition of such ownership, occupation, or usage’.1193 Such a plan, 
according to the policy, where suitable, was to be implemented as a primary 
measure ‘before project implementation’ or enforced contemporaneously ‘with 
                                                          
1191 OP 4.10 (n 1160), para 16. 
1192 ibid, para 18. 
1193 ibid, para 17. 
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the project itself’.1194 Based on the reading of the Forests Act 2005, the GoK could 
not have considered this being necessary as the Act did not recognise community 
ownership or occupation, only usage rights, which nonetheless would have 
required an action plan before project implementation or contemporaneously. 
 
53 The policy envisaged the possibility that domestic law may not allow for ‘full legal 
recognition of existing customary land tenure systems of indigenous peoples’ or 
‘conversion of customary usage rights to communal and/or individual ownership 
rights’. Where this was the case, it provided that the indigenous peoples plan 
‘includes measures for legal recognition or long-term renewable custodial or use 
rights’.1195 Kenya’s law, as seen above, did not recognise community tenure as 
described here. The plan would therefore have needed measures for this. 
However, the continuing failure of the GoK to implement the recommendations 
of the Njonjo and Ndungu Commissions which included measures of this kind, 
should have alerted IDA to the GoK’s depth of resistance to granting such 
recognition; and that any indigenous peoples’ plan prepared was probably going 
to be difficult to implement. 
 
54 And where the project was likely to lead to the resettlement of indigenous 
peoples, the policy required ‘the borrower to explore alternative project designs 
to avoid physical relocation of indigenous peoples’.1196 Where this was 
unavoidable, however, resettlement options were to be discussed with the 
affected communities, and only where ‘broad support for it’ had been obtained 
from them, and a resettlement policy prepared in accordance with the Bank’s 
Operation Policy on Resettlement OP 4.12, would resettlement be pursued. 1197  
 
55 From the above it is clear that the OP 4.10 covered a series of eventualities which 
would have made it possible not only to consider indigenous peoples’ rights but 
address them; and if not, not to progress with the project unless public interest 
                                                          
1194 ibid. 
1195 Ibid. 
1196 ibid, para 20. 
1197 Ibid. 
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demanded it. Kenyan law was the problem. As alluded to above, the Forests Act 
2005 was deficient in not recognising the rights of forest based communities to 
own and occupy forests; and was restrictive in its provisions on use of forest-based 
resources. The Bank was aware of the Act even before the agreements were 
signed.1198 The Bank was also aware of what aspirations indigenous communities 
had vocalised about the NRMP:  
 
‘i) to live in peace with their neighbours; ii) to have access to sufficient 
land to practice agriculture and graze their livestock; iii) to have access 
to forests to gather honey for consumption and sale; iv) to practice 
their culture; v) to have equitable access to social infrastructure and 
technical services; and vi) to be fairly represented in the institutions 
which make decisions affecting their lives at local, regional and national 
levels.’1199  
 
Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF)1200 - creation of an 
expectation 
 
56 This framework was produced in November 2006. The ESMF was supposed to set 
out ‘the principles, rules, guidelines and procedures to assess the environmental 
and social impacts’1201 as well as the ‘plans to reduce, mitigate and/or offset 
adverse impacts and enhance positive impacts’.1202 As OP 4.10 was set to be 
triggered, the ESMF provided as follows:1203 
 
‘There are a number of tribal groups in both project areas that, 
consistent with the revised indigenous peoples’ safeguards, would be 
characterised as indigenous peoples. Therefore as both projects have 
the potential to impact both positively and negatively on these groups, 
this safeguard is triggered in both instances. While there are varying 
degrees to which the different groups in the project area satisfy the 
                                                          
1198 The Bank’s PID of October 2005 noted that the Forests Bill had been approved in July 2005, Project Information 
Document (PID) Concept Stage (n 1130). 
1199 ibid, executive summary. 
1200 ESMF (n 1158). 
1201 OP 4.01 (n 1148), Annex A- Definitions. 
1202 ibid. 
1203 ESMF (n 1158), 31-33, Table 3.1. 
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characteristics as outlined in the safeguard policy, there are 
nevertheless distinct cultures and traditions that need to be carefully 
considered prior to implementing an initiative. The types of measures 
that could trigger this safeguard include changes in rights of access to 
forestry areas on which indigenous peoples rely both for subsistence 
and cultural purposes; changes in use of culturally sensitive areas (e.g. 
burial sites); or resettlement of indigenous peoples residing in 
environmentally sensitive areas to another location. Given the 
community driven nature of both projects, it is not clear now which 
projects will impact which groups, therefore the Indigenous People’s 
Planning Framework should be referred to enable screening and 
review of initiatives in a manner consistent with the policy’.1204 
 
57 In respect of the Forests Act 2005, the ESMF provided: 
 
‘Subcomponent 2.2………While the new Forests Act is innovative with 
respect to the promotion of stakeholder participation, it does not 
clearly articulate rights and responsibilities of concerned parties, 
processes for developing and approving management plans, or benefit 
sharing arrangements. Subsidiary legislation of the Forests Act will be 
critical guiding decision-making, management responsibilities and 
benefit sharing……..The project will also support increasing awareness 
on the benefits of sustainable land management practices and the 
conservation of forests. Encroachment of certain forest areas and the 
process for reclaiming these areas has aggravated the already tense 
relationship between encroachers and the GOK, and made 
enforcement challenging. To address this situation, financing will be 
provided to formulate and implement a coherent and transparent 
framework to mitigate current and future conflicts over land, 
customary rights and rights of indigenous people. It is expected that 
evictions of persons who have customary or traditional rights to forests 
will not be carried out till the aforementioned framework is in 
place.’1205  
 
58 The development of the recommended framework would have been welcome and 
would undoubtedly have enhanced the rights of indigenous forest communities. 
Nevertheless, seeking to address these issues in the context of the NRMP, was 
bound to be a challenge given as noted earlier the already existing resistance to 
implement the recommendations made by bodies established by the GoK itself- 
the Njonjo and Ndungu Commissions. 
 
                                                          
1204 ibid, 32. 
1205 ESMF (n 1158)16. 
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59 This thesis argues that whether or not a project’s primary development objective 
is to address indigenous peoples’ land rights issues or this issue arises in the midst 
of a project with a different objective, as it did here, the nature of indigenous 
peoples’ land rights issues is such that they cannot be resolved superficially. They 
require an understanding of the following: i) historical land issues in Kenya, that is 
the effect of the transfer from a customary/traditional system of ownership that 
not only indigenous communities but other communities operated under, to the 
individual system of ownership introduced by the colonial administration and the 
adverse effect this had on land rights; ii) the perpetuation of that colonially 
introduced land system into, and so far throughout, independence that has left 
unaddressed these issues and dashed indigenous communities’ expectations of 
restoration of their rights; iii) the entrenchment of these issues by the 
politicisation, mismanagement and corruption of the land system in Kenya; iv) the 
relationship between indigenous communities and land and expression of this 
relationship; and v) the existence of laws that sanction, and sometimes even 
criminalise, that expression; and an awareness of the incoherence in the law.  
 
60 The fact that the ESMF was seeking to delve into these issues was action it needed 
to undertake properly with understanding of these issues or not at all. However, 
as observed in preceding chapters of this thesis, it is the case that the Bank was 
aware of Kenya’s land history and legacy and would have been aware of the 
politics, mismanagement and corruption associated with it. 
 
Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF)1206 – emboldening of the 
expectation 
 
61 This framework shows that the Bank and the GoK appear to have considered the 
NRMP and subcomponent 2.2 in particular, to be contingent on creation of the 
                                                          
1206 Republic of Kenya Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation & Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources, ‘Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework for the Western Kenya Community Driven 
Development and Flood Mitigation Project and the Natural Resource Management Project Final Report December 
2006’ (IPP198, Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation & Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources, 1 December 2006)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/147881468283550135/pdf/IPP198.pdf > accessed 12 July 2016. 
   
282 
 
framework proposed in the ESMF. To justify this the GoK accepted the difficulties 
that indigenous communities had been subjected to, namely: assimilation policies, 
denial of recognition of separate and distinct identities, limited understanding of 
their way of life thus leading to denial of land rights including dispossession of their 
land, on grounds that this was terra nullius by the colonial administration. The IPPF 
noted that these issues had failed to be addressed by the post-independence 
administrations,1207 and noted that these communities had continued to be 
subjected to further land rights violations- bans on hunting, absence of strategies 
addressing their needs and interests and unfulfilled compensation schemes.1208 
Specifically, the IPPF observed that the Ogiek and the Sengwer communities were 
within the territory of the proposed projects and sub-projects.1209 Of the Ogiek, it 
noted their land rights contestations as starting in the 1920s and continuing into 
the independent state; and similarly it set out the Sengwer community’s history, 
livelihoods and social organisation.  
 
62 Significantly it observed that although indigenous communities are legally equal 
to other citizens in Kenya, their land rights were uncertain. It found that both the 
Ogiek and Sengwer, whose association was forest-based, were being forced into 
agro-based existence outside the forests; that their ‘sedentarisation, 
marginalisation, social discrimination, and impoverishment’1210 had been 
increased by their ‘continual expropriation of land and steadily intensifying 
restrictions on access to natural resources- especially forests’.1211 It noted that 
these communities were more dependent on forest and forest based resources 
than other communities and were being ‘forced out of forests with little or no 
compensation, and with little or no land to go to or resources to live on’.1212  
 
63 The IPPF further pointed to the Forests Act 2005 and its preceding Forests Policy 
as seeking to address some of the problems created in the past by a failure to 
                                                          
1207 ibid, 16. 
1208 ibid, 15-16 
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address these issues. However, it noted that both the Act and the Policy failed to 
embody the Convention on Biological Diversity which calls for respect of amongst 
other things, traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity and equitable sharing of benefits arising from use of that 
lifestyle.1213 Notably the Forests Act 2005 had claimed to have been compliant 
with international conventions.1214 The IPPF confirmed that the NRMP would seek 
to fill those gaps by creating a framework that implemented the Forests Act and 
Forests Policy; and addressed the inconsistencies between the national law and 
the international standards by formulating a technical framework to narrow the 
gap. The IPPF further observed that the Ministry of Lands and Housing was seeking 
to formulate a land policy which addressed equitable and sustainable land use, 
distribution etc., and confirmed that it would use the understanding used in that 
draft policy for its own use, whether or not the policy translated into law.1215 
 
64 In light of the discussion in Chapter 1 and the GoK’s failure to operationalise 
mechanisms proposed by those bodies to address these impacts on indigenous 
communities- and taking into account the rehashed finding that the GoK was 
responsible for these communities’ land rights abuses- the manner in which the 
GoK set out the framework here was duplicitous and should have made the Bank 
question whether the GoK meant what it said.  
 
The plan under the IPPF 
 
65 The action plan under the IPPF was: the training of key actors including the KFS on 
indigenous peoples’ organisations;1216 carrying out an inventory of indigenous 
communities including carrying out social assessments for communities evicted 
from the forests as far back as 2002 including a detailed land-use mapping and 
assessment of lost properties and livelihoods; ensuring participation of the 
                                                          
1213 ibid, 16. 
1214 Section 61 claimed that all provisions of the Act were to be carried out in accordance with any treaty, 
convention or international agreement concerning forests or forest resources which Kenya is a party. 
1215 IPPF (n 1206), 17. 
1216 ibid, 45. 
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communities in all decision-making bodies and of community representatives in 
all forest and resettlement related committees, working groups and other decision 
making bodies; and provision of funds to the elected community representatives 
to carry out consultations with the communities and participate in meetings.1217 
For any evicted indigenous communities, the IPPF proposed to rehabilitate their 
livelihoods, provide assistance to enable them to return to their homes and 
formulate a resettlement strategy having regard to their cultural preferences;1218 
and ensure they benefitted from natural resources.1219  
 
66 The IPPF noted that by carrying out the above plan, the NRMP would ensure that:  
 
‘present and past settlements, land use areas and cultural sites of 
indigenous peoples are comprehensively documented; (b) that the 
indigenous peoples are well represented in all forest and resettlement 
related decision-making bodies and processes; (c) that a comprehensive 
strategy  to rehabilitate the livelihoods of evicted indigenous peoples is 
elaborated in an open-minded and fully participatory option assessment; 
(d) that this strategy is implemented in a comprehensive and timely 
manner; (e) that the indigenous peoples are enabled to benefit from 
participatory forest management and reforestation.’1220  
 
67 The IPPF noted that option (c), above, was for the purpose of establishing whether 
it was possible for indigenous communities affected to re-establish access to land 
and resources crucial to their livelihood1221 and if not that the NRMP would 
‘commission for each forest a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) in accordance with 
international standards (World Bank OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement)’ which 
would ‘include a land-based resettlement strategy, compatible with the 
indigenous peoples’ cultural preferences’. None of this was done.  
 
                                                          
1217 ibid. 
1218 ibid. 
1219 ibid, 46. 
1220 ibid, executive summary. 
1221 ibid. 
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Failure to fulfil- the reality 
 
68 The plan did not go as planned, which would suggest that the IPPF was either 
flawed, disingenuous or simply unrealistic. Was the GoK simply stating what it 
believed needed to be said to obtain funding but had no intention whatsoever of 
protecting the communities in the manner proposed? As noted earlier, it is 
reasonable to think that the Bank would have been aware of the findings and 
unimplemented recommendations of the bodies considered in Chapter 1. It 
therefore would have known of the Government’s attitude towards indigenous 
communities and the failure to act in their best interests. In 1991 the Bank had 
also co-ordinated the National Forestry Development Project through which the 
Overseas Development Administration had funded KIFCON, discussed in Chapter 
1 in relation to the Mau Forest Task Force. As discussed there, KIFCON had 
established the presence of the Ogiek during the project, had recommended their 
resettling but the Government had refused to resettle and rejected the 
recommendations made.1222 Themfailure to heed the recommendations of the 
bodies discussed in chapter 1 was material to the NRMP’s objectives in that some 
of the problems the project was seeking to deal with had their roots in those 
findings. 
 
69 The IPPF was an elaborate and particularly transformative exercise that in light of 
GoK’s performance and attitude towards indigenous communities in the past, 
made it incongruous.  Looking at it in isolation, it was based purely on indigenous 
peoples and protection of their land rights. Given the magnitude of what it 
proposed, it made the NRMP more an indigenous peoples’ project than what had 
been originally planned. Notably this was permissible under OP4.10. The policy 
position, as noted earlier, was where project activities are dependent on 
‘establishing legally recognised rights to land and territories that indigenous 
peoples have traditionally owned or customarily used or occupied’, an action plan 
                                                          
1222 Mau Task Force Report (n 82). 
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would be needed to legally recognise those rights, and to do so as a primary 
measure prior to the project implementation or contemporaneously.1223 
 
70 To take up the task(s) being proposed in the IPPF and its action plans, required the 
GoK, and the Bank in its supervisory role, to ensure that there was: i) a thorough 
evaluation of what the project objectives were i.e. what is it that the project seeks 
to do; ii) a review of the legal framework i.e. establish what laws will govern the 
operation of the project and how that framework will impact on the objectives; iii) 
a proper assessment of the likely impact on indigenous communities i.e. how will 
the project’s activities, in seeking to meet the objectives, impact on the 
communities’ land rights;  iv) where the impact is said to be adverse, assess 
whether in fact the project can realistically address those issues, with full 
comprehension of the five issues mentioned earlier.1224 If the answer to this is not 
in the affirmative, as in most cases the answer will be given the depth of 
complexities, to v) then consider the possibility of alternative activities to bring to 
fruition the objectives that will circumvent any potential adverse impact on 
indigenous communities thus leaving them as they are. If that is not possible, and 
the project has to be pursued, to vi) resettle and compensate indigenous 
communities for the adverse impact on their rights which in itself would require 
an acceptance of their status as de jure landholders or de facto landholders. 
However, that creates a problem where the domestic framework on resettlement 
and compensation does not recognise community ownership of land or forests 
and criminalises community habitation of areas they consider their ancestral 
homes.  
 
71 It is therefore no surprise that the Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group, 
when reviewing the NRMP in 2016 set out amongst the lessons learnt, the 
following:1225  
                                                          
1223 OP 4.10 (n 1160), para 17. 
1224 See para 59 above. 
1225 The World Bank IEG, ‘ICR Review’ (Report No.: ICRR 14893, IEG 23 February 2016)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/207631468194954362/pdf/ICRR14893-P095050-Box394872B-
PUBLIC.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016, section 3. 




’(1). A simple and limited project design that considers institutional 
capacity and promotes active stakeholder participation is especially 
appropriate for complex natural resource situations where there is 
potential for land rights conflict. Sufficient time, budgetary needs and staff 
capacity are critical factors during preparation to ensure that all the project 
elements are coordinated. In this case the Project design was too broad 
and ambitious to be implemented within the planned duration partly 
because it addressed multiple reforms across several implementing 
agencies that had insufficient capacity and staff retention. (2). In-depth 
understanding of the political context and other historical evidence is 
critical in designing community-based natural resource management 
initiatives. In this case, there was insufficient appreciation at the design 
stage of the political and historical context of the land issue.’1226  
 
72 It is difficult to understand how this happened, if not for the hypocrisy spoken of 
at the outset. 
 
Resettlement Policy Framework- the unimpeded failure 
 
73 The GoK produced this in January 2007 for project affected persons, namely 
indigenous communities. The policy anticipated difficulties with resettling them as 
their ancestral land rights were not legally ascertainable. It therefore proposed the 
taking of alternative measures if these were feasible, failing which it provided that 
experts would be commissioned to record indigenous peoples’ land use following 
which indigenous peoples would receive advice on their land rights under the 
domestic legal framework and be offered compensation at the very least. For 
those with full rights of ownership the policy provided that they would be entitled 
to due process of the law, appropriate development opportunities, land-based 
                                                          
1226 ibid.  
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compensation or compensation in kind in place of cash compensation if feasible; 
and participation in negotiations.1227  
 
74 The policy provided that in case of any proposed resettlement, displacement or 
relocation of indigenous peoples from their ‘communally held traditional or 
customary lands’,1228 the ultimate decision would be the Bank’s in accordance 
with the IPPF and ultimately the OP4.10.1229 The criteria for resettlement was: 
those with formal rights to land which was interpreted as including customary and 
communal land rights recognised under law; those without formal rights to land 
but had made claims to such land which were recognised under law; and those 
recognised under the Bank’s resettlement policy but otherwise with no legally 
recognisable rights.1230  
 
75 Significantly the policy observed that Kenya had a myriad of laws that applied to 
resettlement and that the Kenyan domestic framework allowed for compensation, 
for lawfully owned land, but not for those found to be encroaching. This it 
observed was inconsistent with its own resettlement policy, OP 4.12 which 
allowed for compensation for both legal owners and those found to be 
encroaching. The policy noted that OP 4.12 took precedence where there was a 
conflict between it and domestic law.1231 This was consistent with the approach of 
the ESMF of November 2006 which had stated that OP 4.12 was to be complied 
with where involuntary resettlement was likely to take place as a result of the 
project.1232 The resettlement policy allowed for a collective award of 
compensation for group claimants who had lost their land, access to their land and 
resources.1233 
 
                                                          
1227 Republic of Kenya, ‘Resettlement Policy Framework Natural Resource Management Framework’ (RP500, 
Republic of Kenya, January 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/124651468278041263/pdf/RP500.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016, 
section 3.2. 
1228 ibid, section 4.2. 
1229ibid. 
1230 Resettlement Policy Framework (n 1227) section 7.1. 
1231 ibid, section 8.4. 
1232 ESMF (n 1158) 32. 
1233 Resettlement Policy Framework (n 1227) section 7.2.1. 
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76 The problem with the resettlement policy was that the criteria was based on land 
rights recognisable under law. The IPPF had observed that the Sengwer and the 
Ogiek communities’ rights to land were not secure and were not recognisable in 
law as lawful hence their forcible evictions over the years. The resettlement policy 
was therefore inconsistent with the IPPF. Even if it was the case that those 
recognised otherwise by operation of the Bank’s policy i.e. those with no legally 
recognisable rights, had to go through the Bank’s policy procedure and were 
deemed under that policy to be eligible for settlement, that resettlement would 
have had to take place, in reality, within the confines of the domestic law. 
Nonetheless the Bank was satisfied with this as shown in the Appraisal and 
Approval Stage documentation.  
 
77 An Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (ISDS) produced in January 2007 by the Bank 
for the purposes of appraising the project,1234 observed that the IPPF was to 
‘ensure that the development process fully respects the dignity, human rights, 
economies and cultures of indigenous peoples’.1235 The Bank’s approval of the 
project on 27 March 2007,1236 must have meant that it was satisfied with what the 
GoK had proposed despite what history showed of its treatment of indigenous 
communities. This aligns further with the hypocrisy talked about by Catherine 
Weaver that weighs down the Bank and international organisations like it:  
 
‘As multilateral governmental agencies, IOs are particularly dependent 
upon externally conferred legitimacy, public funding, and demand for 
services’.1237 
 
78 Therefore notwithstanding what the GoK’s omissions were, it seems that the 
Bank’s legitimacy meant the project needed to plough on regardless. 
 
                                                          
1234 The World Bank, ‘Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet Appraisal Stage’ (Report No.: AC2608, The World Bank, 10 
January 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/222201468273009863/pdf/Integrated0Saf1et010Appraisal0Stage.
pdf> accessed 17 Jul 2016. 
1235 ibid.  
1236 Project Profile (n 1143). 
1237 Weaver (n 160). 
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Evictions and Breaches of the Financing Agreement and Bank Policies- continuing 
reality 
79 The project was a challenge and led to violation of the communities’ land rights. 
The Sengwer were evicted from their ancestral lands in 2009 during the course of 
the NRMP, but the project did not stop. The Bank’s Inspection Panel’s 2013 Report 
and Recommendations said this of these evictions:  
‘When the Bank learned of the eviction of 450 families in April/May 2009 it 
requested information from KFS and received a letter from the community. 
Management notes that these evictions were not part of the NRMP activities 
and were the result of Government action in response to an ongoing dispute 
over water resources between communities living downstream from Embobut 
and those living in the forest.’1238  
80 This was unsatisfactory. Whether or not the evictions were part of the NRMP was 
irrelevant. Firstly, the fact that the evictions occurred during the Bank’s 
incumbency should have resulted in the Bank taking a stand, particularly as the 
perpetrating force was the GoK, its partner in the NRMP. Secondly, the forest law 
in force at the time was still the Forests Act 2005. The Bank had found this to be 
inadequate and had been told by the GoK, that it too was aware of the statute’s 
shortcomings. This awareness of a lack of legal protection for forest-dependent 
indigenous communities should have alerted the Bank to the possibility that some 
of those being evicted were indigenous peoples, given that the Forests Act 
considered all those residing in the forest to be squatters.1239 Further, it is noted 
that after receiving report of the evictions, the Bank sought the view of the KFS, 
which was unlikely to be impartial given its role in the evictions and its function 
under the Forests Act to prosecute squatters.1240 Lastly, given what was happening 
globally at the time with the approval by the Human Rights Council of a UN 
1238 Report and Recommendation (n 1179). 
1239 Amnesty International (n 109). 
1240 Forests Act 2005, s 5. 
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framework on Business & Human Rights- the Ruggie principles, it certainly seems 
hypocritical that as a body that claims to put people first, it would have responded 
by sustaining the stance that the evictions were not part of the project’s activities.  
 
81 The failure to take a more robust stand by the Bank enabled the GoK’s impunity 
to continue. On 7 April 2011 the Bank wrote to the GoK to report that indigenous 
communities had been forcibly evicted from their homes, had their properties 
burnt and had been made subject to inhibitive forest-access measures, by the 
KFS.1241 On this occasion, the Bank asked the GoK to stay any further evictions until 
requisite safeguards relating to vulnerable groups and their resettlement were in 
place.1242 What the Bank should have done is terminate the project. The eviction 
of indigenous communities from their homes was contrary to the Financing 
Agreement of 7 May 2007 as it violated the IPPF. In a response dated 27 April 
2011, the GoK confirmed that no further evictions would be enforced until 
safeguards were in place.1243 As the IPPF was prepared by the GoK itself, the 
staying of the evictions pending the enforcement of its associated safeguards was 
surely in itself a violation of the Agreement since the Government had undertaken 
in the Financing Agreement, to remain seized of those safeguards. 
 
Restructuring Process  
 
82 Astoundingly after having reported barely a few months earlier in December 2009 
that the project was moderately unsatisfactory, the NRMP was assessed as being 
‘moderately satisfactory’ in March 2010.1244 It is therefore a surprise that a year 
later on 10 June 2011 the GoK submitted a Restructuring Paper to the Bank. If all 
had been satisfactory, there would have been no need for restructuring. The 
Restructuring Paper observed that there had been issues related to the 
implementation of the IPPF which had been formulated to prevent the Ogiek and 
Sengwer communities from being adversely affected by the NRMP and to mitigate 
                                                          
1241 Project Restructuring Paper (n 1174) 4. 
1242 ibid. 
1243 ibid. 
1244 ibid, 2. 
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against potential negative impacts.1245  In particular the GoK noted that it had not 
been possible to survey, demarcate, register and document land and speed up the 
issuing of titles to allotment to indigenous communities; to rehabilitate the 
livelihoods of indigenous communities; or to facilitate the restitution of land 
indigenous communities had lost between 1895 and December 30, 2002, as had 
been planned.1246 The Paper observed that whilst the commitments were 
‘desirable on their own account (they) were not related to the mitigation of 
anticipated project impacts’.1247  It admitted that those tasks required significant 
policy interventions and multi-agency actions regarding ancestral land rights; and 
could not be achieved within the project’s timeline.1248  
 
83 The 2016 Independent Evaluation Group report of the NRMP,1249 found that the 
attempts to address ‘long-standing historical land claims of indigenous peoples 
were ambitious and commendable’,1250 but the risk assessments at the appraisal 
stage were far from adequate; and there were insufficient financial and human 
resources to ‘plan, appraise and implement such a complex undertaking, which 
were made even more complicated by an environment that required the 
engagement of actors beyond the forestry sector and intentions were not fully 
backed by actions’.1251 This seems a fair assessment of what happened. The fact 
that the NRMP morphed into indigenous communities’ land rights reform was not 
inevitable given what was contained in the main agreement’s sub-
components.1252 As noted earlier, any attempt to resolve indigenous 
communities’ land rights issues cannot be pursued without an understanding of 
the history belying those issues. To attempt to resolve, or to allow the GoK to 
resolve these issues within the NRMP, was a recipe for disaster, as the NRMP’s 
original objectives were totally different.1253 
                                                          
1245ibid.  
1246 ibid, 3. 
1247 ibid. 
1248 Project Restructuring Paper (n 1174) 3. 
1249 ICR Review (n 1225). 
1250 ibid, para 25. 
1251 ibid.  
1252 See para 26 above. 
1253 ICR Review (n 1225), para 25. 




84 For the restructured phase, the GoK informed the Bank that it would be using term 
Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups rather than indigenous peoples. It asked the 
Bank that any ‘project instruments related to the implementation of OP 4.10 use 
(this) constitutionally-sanctioned terminology’,1254 as OP 4.10 allowed the use of 
different terminology as long as this did not affect the application or substance of 
the policy.1255 It proposed to focus the restructured activities on a livelihood and 
rural development programme and a strategy for improving forest management 
for these communities.1256 It proposed to implement a Vulnerable and 
Marginalized Group Plan (VMGP) in place of the IPPF.  
 
85 It noted that there continued to be a risk of involuntary resettlement, risks of 
evictions and continued encroachments in forest areas owing to the size of the 
forests and insufficient number of forest guards to discourage encroachment.1257 
To address these concerns, the GoK proposed to: ‘i) continue and strengthen the 
ongoing free, prior and informed consultations; ii) develop and implement the 
VMGP through the existing decentralized CFAs and user groups; iii) improve 
capacities of KFS, especially its forest guards, for carrying out community-driven 
development programs.’1258 The paper proposed seeking to obtain community 
support for the VMGP, failing which the GoK would discuss the possibility of 
abandoning the related component.  
 
86 It is argued that there were serious issues with this proposal that the Bank should 
have picked up on: firstly, the lack of indication in the GoK’s plan that the 
communities concerned had been consulted about the use of the term, VMG 
particularly as the GoK had stated that the VMGP would be based on free, prior 
and informed consultations. Secondly, no other reasoning for the change of the 
                                                          
1254 The World Bank ‘Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet Restructuring Stage’ (Report No.: AC6311, The World Bank, 
13 June 2011)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/916871468090305426/pdf/Integrated0Saf00Restructuring0Stage.p
df> accessed 21 July 2016. 
1255 ibid. 
1256 Project Restructuring Paper (n 1174) 4. 
1257 ibid.  
1258 ibid, 14. 
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term was given other than that the term VMG was based on the constitution. 
Article 260 of the constitution actually refers to indigenous communities as 
marginalised communities so rejecting the term indigenous peoples was actually 
incompatible with the constitution. It is probably the case that the GoK considered 
using a different term would avert it from responsibilities associated with referring 
to the communities as indigenous. Notably, both communities’ grievances 
challenged the use of the term VMGs rather than indigenous peoples as they self-
identify as indigenous peoples and this had been done without their free, prior 
and informed consent.1259 This was in every aspect inconsistent with the Bank’s 
policies. 
 
The Bank’s response to the Grievance 
 
87 Paragraphs 39 to 42 above set out the communities’ grievances. In its May 2013 
report, the Panel, in dealing with the complaint(s), found that the communities 
had raised important questions as to whether OP 4.10 had been complied with.1260 
Based on this the panel recommended an investigation into the concerns raised 
by the communities as to the conduct of both the Bank and the GoK and the extent 
to which the safeguard policies were applied. 1261 In respect of the evictions and 
resettlement allegations, the Panel found that despite the efforts made by the 
Bank’s Management to address these issues, there were ‘plausible linkages 
between activities under the Project and the concerns of the people relating to 
eviction and resettlement’,1262 suggesting the possibility that the Bank’s 
safeguarding policies had not been complied with.1263 
 
88 The findings of the Inspection Panel’s 22 May 2014 ‘Investigation Report’1264 are 
worth underscoring as they show the extent of what went wrong: 
                                                          
1259 Memorandum to the Executive Directors (n 1181).  
1260 Report and Recommendation (n 1179), 21. 
1261 ibid, 22. 
1262 ibid, 16-17. 
1263 ibid. 
1264 The World Bank, ‘Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project, Investigation Report’ (Report No. 88065-KE, 
The World Bank, 22 May 2014) 




a. Notwithstanding the fact that the Bank responded quite quickly upon 
awareness of the evictions, they ought to have had foresight of the risk of 
evictions ‘given that the eviction of encroachers’1265 was common to the 
Cherangany Hills.1266 Additionally this thesis argues that the fact that the 
Bank was aware of the inconsistencies between OP4.10 and the Forests Act 
2005, and the GoK’s understanding therefore about forest communities, 
should have made the Bank even more alert to the likelihood of evictions. 
 
b. The function of the KFS in evicting those it deemed encroachers from forests 
was incompatible with NRMP’s objective of facilitating co-management of 
forests with communities. This being so there had been a need for ‘a major 
paradigm shift in the culture and functioning of the KFS, a shift that would 
call for significant and longer-term support to capacity building’.1267 This 
thesis argues that a paradigm shift was needed by both parties. For the GoK 
a paradigm shift could only begin with the changing of the law to make it 
consistent with the objectives of the project, effectively revising the Forests 
Act 2005 to recognise ownership, occupation and management rights of 
communities. And for the Bank, a paradigm shift would be as basic as 
complying with its own policies and at its highest, having the confidence to 
take enforcement action when it initially received reports of forced evictions. 
 
c. In-depth assessment of the KFS would have detected that far more robust 
training was needed to assist with that culture shift.1268 This thesis argues 
that enforcing a culture shift within the constraints of the Forests Act 2005 
was unlikely to have been achievable as the provisions of the Act required 
the KFS to treat anything other than user rights as unlawful. Robust training 
could not have changed that. 
 
d. Similar to earlier expressed views about the complexities of addressing 
indigenous communities’ land rights issues and that this cannot be done 
superficially, the Panel observed that it was not possible to ‘find a permanent 
solution to the plight of indigenous peoples living in gazetted forests….on the 
sidelines…or as an add-on to a NRMP which had a different focus, and whose 
main implementing agency did not have the mandate to address the 
issue’.1269 The Panel recommended that the Bank engage in dialogue and at 
a policy level and provide backing to agencies with responsibility for this 
issue. This thesis argues that the Bank should not act as if in a vacuum, that 
seeking involvement in any land-related policy work necessitates the Bank’s 
thorough understanding of the degree of politicisation and mismanagement 
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1265 ibid, para 26. 
1266 ibid. 
1267 ibid, para 27. 
1268 ibid, para 28. 
1269 ibid, para 29.  
   
296 
 
of land affairs in Kenya; and should involve the communities themselves as 
well, not just agencies. 
 
e. The Panel also considered that understanding of ‘the complexities of long-
standing historical conflicts, particularly when they relate to land issues and 
indigenous peoples’ claims’, was paramount. They found that the NRMP’s 
documents created a legitimate expectation that ‘long-awaited solution to 
what the Cherangany-Sengwer considered their long-term legitimate 
claims’1270 would result but was unable to fulfil this; and therefore the NRMP 
‘was not successful in incorporating indigenous people in the management 
of these forest resources, an approach that would have contributed towards 
the Project’s goals’.1271 This supports this thesis’ view that unfortunately in 
projects of this kind there is incongruity between the framework, the 
expectations and the reality. The fact that the Agreement’s sub-components 
effectively planned to revise the legal structure suggests the Bank was aware 
of this from its early stages and therefore its approach from that point should 
have been different. 
 
f. The climate within which the NRMP took place was a ‘very difficult political 
reality stemming from post-election violence’1272 resulting in displacement 
of communities, ethnic conflict and ‘land ownership conflicts that have deep 
historical roots’ which complicated project implementation even further.1273 
This is correct and the Bank should have been less naïve (or hyprocritical) and 
more alert to the possible impact of these issues.  The fact that the country 
had gone through by this time, all the domestic processes discussed in 
Chapter 1 would not have been lost on the Bank. But is it not also the case 
that the Bank is functioned to lend to nations, and despite IDA being the 
more human rights focused institution of the World Bank Group, it is still part 
of the Bank which lends knowing it will get its return in any event? It has a 
two-fold motive, first to lend with a view of a return; and then to assist in the 
delivery of development. Unfortunately the first seems to always trump the 
second. 
 
89 In light of those findings the Panel recommended that: 
 
`Going forward, Bank engagement, through the high level policy 
dialogue currently ongoing in pursuit of a longer term resolution to the 
issues of land rights of Indigenous Peoples, and others living in gazetted 
forests, is critical. It is the Panel’s firm view that, despite the 
complexities of the issues it reviewed in this case and the challenges 
involved, the World Bank continues to be best equipped in terms of 
expertise, mandate and resources to support the GoK in resolving 
these issues, and to follow through with the transformation process 
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that was launched, in the interest of sustainable development, the 
natural environment, and the protection of vulnerable communities, 
including Indigenous Peoples.’ 1274 
 
90 This thesis agrees with the criticality of resolving indigenous communities’ land 
rights issues. However, it is because of the complexities that arose in this case and 
the manner in which the Bank acted, that this thesis questions whether it is best 
equipped to assist the GoK in resolving them. The NRMP was undoubtedly made 
complex by the presence of indigenous communities in the project areas. 
However, it must be acknowledged that a natural resource management project 
is unlikely not to touch on indigenous peoples’ lives. This project's failure, in view 
of the discussion on the Bank’s agenda in the earlier segment of this chapter, is 
regrettably unsurprising. Without that prism it seems irreconcilable that Bank 
which in development terms has been the force behind land law reforms could be 
a perpetrator of land rights violations.  
 
The crux of the matter- unmet needs 
 
91 This thesis returns now to one of the declarations made by the GoK in the IPPF. 
This will be referred to as the ‘declaration’ in this segment. It said the NRMP would 
by way of provision of opportunities and mechanisms, ensure that indigenous 
communities were no longer displaced from land and forests they have 
traditionally relied on for their livelihood, and for their cultural and social 
existence; ensure that they no longer lost legal access to natural resources which 
the IPPF noted were vital for their livelihood and cultural and social institutions; 
did not face continued harassment by cattle rustlers; were no longer marginalised 
from society or alienated from national life; no longer received less governmental 
support and less capabilities to defend their legal rights; that they were no longer 
dependent on other ethnic groups; and no longer at risk of losing their cultural 
and social identity.1275 
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92 The extent of the failures of this project raises one major question about the GoK: 
was it really intent on resolving indigenous groups’ land rights issues in the manner 
set out above?  It appears not. The government was aware that the proposed 
project areas had a presence of indigenous communities and it knew that that 
Bank would establish this sooner or later. Therefore to ensure that funding was 
obtained, it said the right things, but had no intention whatsoever of resolving the 
issues as set out in the declaration.  
 
93 However, for the communities concerned, the effect of the declaration is likely to 
have been the creation of a legitimate expectation that their land rights’ 
grievances would be resolved once and for all particularly where Njonjo, Ndungu, 
TJRC-type exercises, had not been successful in conjuring such declarations. But 
as the Government did not deliver as promised, this thesis questions whether the 
failure to give effect to it (or other ones in the future) have wider ramifications or 
amount solely to a failure within the project? In other words, could litigation be 
pursued on the basis of the declaration? It is arguable that based on the finding of 
the Kenyan court in the Afrison Export case1276 discussed in Chapter 3, if this 
declaration had been made outside the scope of the NRMP, one could potentially 
argue that the failure to give effect to it was injurious to the constitutional rights 
of the communities concerned. This is because the declaration suggests the GoK 
was seeking to enforce rights entitled to the communities and therefore failure to 
do that, conversely, had left them in a position where their rights continued to be 
violated, thus making the declaration challengeable in judicial review proceedings.  
 
94 Be that as it may, as the declaration was made within the context of a 
development project, it seems arguable that the communities could have relied 
on it as a basis for resisting eviction notices on the basis that the declaration was 
tantamount to a GoK act, omission or decision, capable of affecting their legal 
rights or interests and therefore amenable to adjudication on judicial review 
grounds. Arguments of this nature are easier to make now following the 
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enactment of the Fair Administrative Act 2015 and maybe less so during the 
NRMP. It is possible, however, that judges may be reluctant to make findings 
relating to a development project funded by international agencies such as IDA on 
grounds that they have no jurisdiction in matters of a development project. 
Arguably however, if human rights are at the heart of such a challenge, the courts 
should take a different view, along the lines of those discussed in the Afrison 




95 Firstly, development projects may lead to the realisation of indigenous 
communities’ land rights but there are a lot of factors at play which may make this 
an unstable platform for indigenous communities to place their hopes on. One of 
those factors is the Bank’s hypocrisy, the kind that is said pursues ‘reform goals 
and formal structural changes’ sometimes recklessly, in order to align with 
‘environmental expectation, to mould public opinion and fend off external 
criticism (and) to secure needed resources’ leading to nothing.1278 In the case of 
the NRMP, the gap between rhetoric and reality had adverse effects on the 
indigenous communities involved.  
 
96 Secondly, it is unlikely to be the case that development projects of this nature are 
originally, genuinely pursued with a view to securing indigenous communities’ 
communal tenure, especially in Kenya’s context with its complex land history. And 
so if the issue of these rights arises, this is likely to be because it is part of the 
Bank’s ‘financialising’ land relations agenda1279 which no longer denigrates 
communal land tenure. The state in this case will be pursuing the land reforms 
knowing it is what is expected of it. The Bank will also be financially supporting the 
reforms because it is part of its duty and it also has to be seen as doing the right 
thing whether or not it actually does. 
                                                          
1277 See Chapter 4’s discussion on the case (n 801). 
1278 Weaver (n 160). 
1279 Manji (n 32). 




97 Thirdly, in cases where the state genuinely seeks funding in order to address 
indigenous communities land rights or it genuinely proposes to deal with these 
rights as they have become coincidental or incidental to another project, given 
what is required for an exercise of this nature, this may not actually be possible 
and one of the projects will have to give way to the other. And where it is pursued, 
the project must not attempt to deal with the issue of land rights superficially, as 
discussed earlier. 
 
98 Indeed the Bank is powerful and its resources as a development agency means it 
has funding prowess, which gives it the clout to generate action not previously 
forthcoming from reluctant states. In the case of the NRMP, it had the power and 
resources to assist the GoK to address the indigenous land rights’ question and 
take firmer steps where this is not done. Its 2017 Environmental and Social 
Framework, as noted earlier, has an explicit human rights focus: it seeks to 
‘remove barriers against those who are often excluded from the development 
process…..to ensure that (their) voice(s)….can be heard’ and to do so by realising 
human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by 
assisting states to meet their human rights obligations.1280  It further provides that 
where the Bank cannot ascertain that free, prior and informed consent has been 
obtained from indigenous communities in respect of a development project it will 
‘not proceed further with aspects of the project that are relevant to those 
indigenous communities’.1281 It further provides that where the Bank has required 
the borrowing nation to take certain remedial action within a certain period of 
time, and it does not, the Bank is at liberty to apply its own remedies according to 
OP 10.00- Investment Project Financing.1282 These ‘include suspension of 
disbursements of, and cancellation of, unwithdrawn amounts of the financing.’1283 
The question is whether it will. This is doubtful. 
 
                                                          
1280 ESMF (n 1158). 
1281 ibid. 
1282 ibid, 7. 
1283 OP 10.00 (n 1159) para 25. 
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99 The fact is that the Bank has been pursuing an agenda all along, one focused on 
opening up of the land markets and to some degree it has been successful in doing 
that. It was in favour of the privatisation of land upon Kenya’s independence, 
supported the state in achieving this and managed at the same time to meet the 
state’s goal of buying back the land from white settlers.  The Bank and the state’s 
priorities aligned. In the case of indigenous communities and security of their 
communal tenure, if this is a shared priority of the Bank and the state, it will 
happen. Currently, despite the rhetoric it is not. 
 
100 Another way of engendering positive action, from what may otherwise be 
resistant states, is said to be for development agencies to ‘structure their action 
and language to match nationally constructed rights agendas’.1284 This means that 
the Bank should structure its action and language based on the 2010 constitution 
and the NLP which are favourable to recognition of indigenous communities’ land 
rights. This did not happen with the NRMP and although it could be said that at 
the time the project started in 2007 Kenya’s rights agenda was non-existent, in 
2010 the constitution had been enacted but this did not elicit change in Bank or 
government behaviour. 
 
101 Further in the alternative, influencing the government can be done indirectly. 
A good example of this is in the case of DFID and SIDA’s work on the denial of 
identity cards to indigenous communities by the Bolivian Government. They were 
able to circumvent the government’s resistance to the issue by supporting a civil 
society driven initiative to bring about change that was seen as less threatening to 
the government and was embraced by the 2003 government,1285 although that 
government was short-lived. The Bank can in the future engage them civil society 
in initiatives which can generate some positive steps in the direction of realisation 
                                                          
1284 IDS, ‘Policy Briefing’ (May 2003) Issue 17< https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Pb17.pdf> accessed 27 January 2019. 
1285 Rosalind Eyben, ‘Linking Power and Poverty Reduction’ (Institute of Development Studies 2004) in Ruth Alsop 
(ed), ‘Power, Rights and Poverty: Concepts and Connections’, (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank and the Department for International Development 2004). 
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of those rights but land is a different kettle of fish to identity cards. No change to 
land is likely to circumvent the GoK but that is not to say the Bank cannot work 
with civil society. Establishing the probability; and the pro and cons of this is a 
subject ripe for research but cannot be undertaken here. 
 
102 In terms of what steps can be taken by communities where both the Bank and 
the GoK let them down, indigenous communities should be more robust in using 
the national courts particularly relying on constitutional arguments as discussed 
earlier. At the very least such processes if successful should halt continuing 






















1 This thesis has established that the law in Kenya provides opportunities for 
indigenous communities to realise their land rights. These can be summarised 
as: 
i) Recognition of indigenous communities
a. Kenya is in a unique position in as far as indigenous communities are
concerned. In the East African region, as seen in chapter 2, its
constitution in Article 260 is the only one that speaks of indigenous
communities in a way that distinguishes them from the rest of society.
This suggests that in the Kenyan context, although all communities may
be indigenous to Kenya, there is a different understanding of
indigenousness and one that may be close to the characteristics set out
regionally and internationally. Article 260 defines marginalised
communities as including an 'indigenous community that has retained
and maintained a traditional lifestyle and livelihood based on a hunter
or gatherer economy'. It further describes marginalised communities
as being small in population, as suffering from social and economic
disadvantage, as those with unique cultures but have been subjected
to forced assimilation, as pastoralist communities who are nomadic or
sedentary but have experienced minimal social and economic
integration in the country and those who have been subjected to
discrimination on grounds including ethnicity, culture, religion, belief
or social origin thereby suffering disadvantage. Although other
communities not identifying as indigenous may satisfy these
characteristics, there seems to be a legal intention in the manner
hunter-gatherers and pastoralists are set apart in the constitution to
distinguish them from other communities which is significant.
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b. Despite what may be said by the Kenyan government, whether in
regional litigation1286 or in response to regional and international peer
review mechanisms that would suggest it is resistant to the concept of
indigenousness as interpreted regionally and internationally, it has
clearly intended to distinguish groups identifying as indigenous from
the rest of Kenyan society, in the 2010 constitution, and has promised
to meet their needs.
ii) Recognition of communal land
c. Kenya’s 2009 National Land Policy, notwithstanding the politics of its
evolution, provides that it is determined to address once and for all,
land issues requiring special intervention. These land issues include
those relating to indigenous communities’ land grievances. The policy
promises to deal with these. It also recognises that it is not right for
indigenous communities’ customary rights to land to remain
subservient to dismissive laws. The policy legitimises those rights, in
stark contrast to the manner in which things have been for the last 100
years. And to reinforce that position, these plans are now
constitutionally enshrined and have introduced another feature of
Kenya’s law that distinguishes it from the majority of East African
States,1287  community land. Article 63 of the constitution describes
this as including land that is ‘lawfully held, managed or used as forest
communities, grazing areas or shrines’; and ‘ancestral lands and lands
traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities’. Kenya’s
previous constitutions did not include this category of land.
1286 Although it is noted that unlike the Endorois case where it sought to argue that the Endorois were not a distinct 
community, it did not make similar arguments in the Ogiek case. 
1287 Uganda also recognises customary land in its Constitution and confirms that those owning land under that 
tenure may obtain certificates of ownership. See Constitution of Uganda, Article 237. 
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iii) Favourable landmark regional decisions
d. Thirdly, Kenya is also in the unique position of being the only state in
Africa which has had two landmark indigenous land rights’ decisions
made by the African Commission and the African Court i.e. the
Endorois and the Ogiek decisions respectively. These decisions have
reinforced entitlement of indigenous communities to their ancestral
lands and associated rights, not only in Kenya but in other African
States and globally.  Notably the Endorois case was the first decision to
find that indigenous communities were entitled to a right to
development. And the Ogiek case is the first indigenous land rights case 
to be heard by the African Court. This shows how pivotal these
decisions are to the communities concerned but also for the African
regional system.
iv) Existence of constitutional bodies
e. The 2010 constitution has established the following constitutional
bodies: the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights as the
national human rights institution whose mandate includes ensuring
compliance with obligations under treaties and conventions relating to
human rights;1288 the Commission of Administration of Justice as the
Office of the Ombudsman in Kenya whose role it is to investigate state
conduct; and the National Land Commission whose mandate includes
investigating complaints into historical land injustices and
recommending appropriate redress and managing public land on
behalf of the state.  These bodies have mandates which can engender
implementation of the Endorois and Ogiek regional decisions.
1288 2010 Constitution, Article 59(2)(g). 
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v) Functioning Judiciary, Legislature and Executive
f. Kenya’s judiciary in the past has been resistant to human rights-related
arguments but in the current dispensation seem to be more alive to
these issues, albeit not all. Its’ Constitutional and Judicial Review and
the Constitutional and Human Rights Divisions of the High Court have
in the decisions discussed in chapter 3 shown themselves to be
progressive in interpretation of the constitution and socioeconomic
rights.
g. Furthermore, Kenya has a functioning parliament which is empowered
under the constitution by the Kenyan people,1289 to represent them
and legislate on their behalf. Parliament approved the 2009 national
land policy, 2010 Constitution, the  Community Land Act 2016 and
various other domestic laws that indigenous communities can rely on
to claim their land rights. There is an existing parliamentary committee
scrutiny system which can summon persons to give oral evidence,
inquire into matters and make recommendations and can form sub-
committees to deal with specific issues including indigenous
communities’ land rights.
v) Membership to human rights bodies
h. Kenya is a state party to the African Union and the East African
Community (EAC) and has human rights obligations arising from its
membership. Its obligations under the African Charter have facilitated
the Endorois and Ogiek decisions. The EAC has various instruments
which indigenous communities can use to buttress their land rights
claims. Furthermore one of the advantages of the EAC forum is that it
does not require exhaustion of remedies and cases are likely to be
1289 2010 Constitution, Article 94(1). 
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considered in a less delayed manner as the sub-region only serves 5 
members unlike the 55 at the African Union. The EACJ has presently 
before it an indigenous community’s land rights case which may impact 
on how EAC partner states deal with indigenous communities’ land 
rights.  
2 However, as observed at the outset, Kenya’s land regime is complex and has 
created problems which are deeply entrenched. The system is still suffering 
from its colonial legacy of land deprivation of the poor and vulnerable in 
society. Like indigenous communities in other regions like Australia, Canada, 
Belize and Paraguay to name a few, what indigenous communities like the 
Endorois, Ogiek and Sengwer are experiencing, stems from the decisions made 
during colonial conquest. In Kenya’s case this conquest took place over 120 
years ago and cases in the other regions, several centuries ago. 
3 The fact that indigenous communities’ land rights cases are being litigated and 
are succeeding shows that law is catching up with the factual position, this 
being that the lands they claim as their ancestral lands, are actually theirs and 
must be returned to them as the rightful owners. The apparent challenge 
seems, however, to be that the law serves no purpose if it is not realised. In 
other words it must bear actual results and so when a judgment orders 
restitution of ancestral lands, realisation of the law must mean just that.  
4 The Ndungu Commission report discussed in Chapter 1 explains why it may not 
be possible for the Ogiek judgment, for example, to be implemented, at this 
point. Their land currently belongs to other entities: the state and private 
individuals. The fact that the public land provisions in Article 62 of the 
constitution apply to forests which are not community forests reinforces this 
further. And so actual results would necessitate both the state and the private 
entities acquiescing their entitlement to the forest. For the state, it would need 
to accept that the forest actually constitutes community land under Article 63 
and for the private entities, they would need to hand in their title needs and if 
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not, the state would have to make the deeds of no effect. Thus the kind of 
expropriation that was proposed by the Ndungu Commission would need to 
be enforced. 
5 The fact is, had the Ndungu Commission’s recommendations been given 
effect, the Ogiek community would not have resorted to the African regional 
system. As they now have, they have returned to the same position that the 
Ndungu Commission left them in, being told what they already know: that they 
are the true owners of the land and they should get it back.  
6 The highly politicised nature of land in Kenya coupled with the involvement of 
international donors like the World Bank in Kenya’s affairs means that, things 
are never as they seem. And so where one may argue that the present 
constitutional landscape in Kenya in respect of, human rights protection, 
recognition and protection of communal land tenure and creation of 
constitutional bodies to monitor land relations and human rights compliance, 
are great advancements and are all that is required to return to indigenous 
communities the land they are entitled, this would be imprecise. Both the state 
and the Bretton Woods institutions have very clear agendas. Those in authority 
are above the law and wish to retain power and land enables them to do that. 
They will therefore see to it that the law does not have the effect that the naïve 
mind i.e. the mind oblivious to the existence of these agendas, thinks it should. 
The Bank’s agenda is to maintain market liberalization, satisfy its funders and 
pander to its critics by assuming a human rights-compliant façade.  
7 If all things being equal and where the state’s agenda were actually in line with 
the law, the legislation considered in chapter 2 could make a huge difference 
to indigenous communities’ land rights and the institutions discussed in 
chapter 3 would enable that. And where the state’s agenda was not that way 
inclined (as is the case presently) but the Bank’s agenda was to actually bring 
to realisation indigenous communities’ land rights, it (the Bank) would have 
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sufficient influence to make the state take requisite steps to make that 
happen.  
8 What about the EAC? Well, its language of good governance, human rights, 
poverty eradication etc., seems to echo the rule of law project and therefore 
appears tokenistic. Given its membership of East African states including 
Kenya, this may be the case. Having said that the EAC’s court, the EACJ is a 
defiant court which has ensured that the EAC’s treaty provisions that contain 
those promises are respected in its decisions. Nevertheless even if the EACJ 
were to make decisions in favour of a Kenyan indigenous community, that 
judgment would still need to be implemented by Kenya whose agenda, as 
established, currently necessitates non-compliance of judgments against it.  
9 In light of the foregoing, does the situation lend itself to the ratification of the 
ILO Convention 169 as recommended by the TJRC or as suggested during 
Universal Periodic Reviews? Ratification will require parliamentary approval 
and even if approved, application of its provisions will still be subject to the 
state agenda, which is focused on maintaining the status quo.  
10 This agenda goes against the Government’s constitutional executive authority 
and essentially everything that a government should stand for. Article 129 of 
the 2010 constitution provides that: ‘(1) Executive authority derives from the 
people of Kenya and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution. 
(2) Executive authority shall be exercised in a manner compatible with the
principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their well-being and
benefit.’ This authority includes implementing the Bill of Rights,1290
progressively realising socioeconomic rights1291 and meeting the needs of
indigenous communities.1292 Those in leadership have failed to act in
accordance with this executive authority to the detriment of indigenous
communities.
1290 2010 Constitution, Article 21(1). 
1291 ibid, Article 43. 
1292 ibid, Article 47(4). 
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11 So what then? Notwithstanding the above, this thesis maintains its original 
position that the law presents opportunities which the indigenous 
communities must continue to use. The African Commission has observed that 
indigenous communities have linked themselves up with the global movement 
to expose their human rights sufferings. These communities have continued 
to rise each time they are beaten down, have repeatedly returned to their 
ancestral homes when they have been driven out and have consistently used 
the law to seek resolution of their land rights. Indigenous communities must 
continue to use the law in the domestic courts and regional and sub-regional 
courts. They should use the constitution as a basis for approaching various 
bodies like the KNHRC, the NLC and the CAJ and reminding them of their 
mandates and their responsibilities. They should begin to lobby 
parliamentarians sympathetic to their cause. The collective voice of indigenous 
communities needs to get louder and louder until it gets to a point where 
those in power will see them as a force to be reckoned with, and using the 
operation of the law, as seen in other jurisdictions, will one day achieve that.  
12 As depressing as the situation may appear, it is important to recognise that the 
African Commission made its decision in the Endorois case a decade ago, at a 
time when the domestic law painted a very different picture. The Ogiek 
judgment was made three years ago and the African Court is still currently 
seized of the matter as it has yet to make its judgment on reparations. All this 
has happened, in spite of the agendas spoken of. This means therefore that 
notwithstanding the criticisms made of the Community Land Act 2016, 
indigenous communities should begin to use it or demand that the authorities 
concerned apply it. Where there is a failure to operationalise the system, 
communities should consider approaching the CAJ or the courts. As the system 
is fairly new, further research should investigate the operationalisation of the 
community land registration process.  
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13 Finally communities should be encouraged, with their representative bodies, 
to network with indigenous communities elsewhere in the region and 
internationally, such as those in Canada, other states in the Americas and 
Australia, to canvass strategies on how to persist amidst the challenges and 
deal with resistant governments and obtain results.   
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Appendix- List of Interviewees 
1. 6/09/2013- Lawrence Ole Mbelati, Land and Natural Resources Right Officer,
Manyoito Pastoralists Integrated Development Organization (MPIDO), Kenya
2. 12/09/2013- Faith Rotich, Lawyer, Kituo Cha Sheria, Kenya
3. 12/09/2013- Eunice Sinoro Parsitau Nkopio, Programme Officer, Manyoito
Pastoralists Integrated Development Organization (MPIDO), Kenya
4. 14/09/2013 & 17/07/2018- Daniel Kobei, Director, Ogiek Peoples
Development Programme, Nakuru, Kenya
5. 16/09/2013- Ogiek elder- Mr Kiprono Chouma Timboroa, Nakuru,  Moinyatza
village
6. 20/09/2013 - Odenda Lumumba, Kenya Land Alliance, CEO, Kenya
7. 20/09/2013- Commissioner, National Land Commission, name not to be
disclosed, Nairobi, Kenya
8. 23/09/2013- David Achero Mufuayia, Programs Officer, Justice and Equality,
CEMIRIDE, Kenya
9. 24/09/2013- Gordon O. Wayumba, Senior Lecturer in Cadastral Surveying and
Land Administration at The Technical University of Kenya, Kenya
10. 4/07/2018- Lucy Claridge, Director of Strategic Litigation, Office of the Senior
Director of International Law and Policy, Amnesty International (and
previously Legal Director, Minority Rights Group International), London
11. 4/07/2018- Chris Chapman, Adviser/Researcher on Indigenous Peoples at
Amnesty International, London
12. 18/07/2018- Rachel Murray, Director, Human Rights Implementation Centre,
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
13. 21/07/2018- Nelson Sidney Ndeki, Associate Litigation Officer, Pan African
Lawyers Union (PALU), Tanzania
14. 31/07/2018- Tom Lomax Lawyer & Coordinator, Legal and Human Rights
Programme, Forest Peoples Programme, UK
15. 16/10/2019- Wachira Waheire- Kenya’s National Victims and Survivors
Network
313 
Table of Cases 
Kenyan cases 
Alexkor Ltd and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Richtersveld Community 
and Others [2003] Case CCT 19/03 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) 
Bahola Mkalindi v Michael Seth Kaseme & 2 Others [2013], Land Case 168 of 2012, 
(Environment and Land Court at Malindi) 
Beatrice Wanjiku & another v Attorney General & another [2012] Petition 190 of 2011 
(High Court of Kenya) 
C K (A Child) through Ripples International as her guardian & next friend) & 11 others 
v Commissioner of Police / Inspector General of the National Police Service & 3 others 
[2013] Petition 8 of 2012 (High Court at Meru) 
James Kaptipin & 43 Others v The Director of Forests & 2 others [2014] Constitutional 
Petition no 6 of 2012 (High Court of Kenya) 
Joseph Letuya & 21 others v Attorney General & 5 others [2014] Elc Civil Suit 821 of 
2012 (Os) 
Karen Njeri Kandie v Alssane Ba & another [2015] Civil Appeal 20 of 2013 (Court of 
Appeal) 
Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 others v Attorney General [2013] Petition 19 & 115 (High Court 
of Kenya) 
Mitu-Bell Welfare Society vs. Attorney General and 2 Others [2013] Petition No.164 of 
2011 (High Court of Kenya) 
National Land Commission v Attorney General and others [2015] Advisory Opinion 
Reference 2 of 2014 (Supreme Court of Kenya) 
Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017: Raila Odinga (1) And Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka (2) 
v Independent Electoral And Boundaries Commission (2), The Chairperson Of The 
Independent Electoral And Boundaries Commission (2) And H.E. Uhuru Miugai 
Kenyatta (3) 
Satrose Ayuma & 11 others v Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff 
Retirement Benefits Scheme & 3 others [2010] Petition No.65 of 2010 (High Court of 
Kenya) 
Simion Swakey Ole Kaapei & 89 others v Commissioner of Lands & 7 others [2014] 
314 
Republic v Speaker of the Senate & another Ex parte Afrison Export Import Limited & 
another [2018] Miscellaneous Civil Application 82 of 2018 (High Court of Kenya) 
William Yatch Sitetalia, William Arap Ngasia et al. v Baringo County Council, High Court 
Judgment of 19 April 2002, Civil Case No. 183 of 2000 
African Commission cases 
Communication 211/98: Legal Resources Foundation v Rwanda [2001] (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) 
Communication 276/03: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya [2009] 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Communication no: 155/96 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and 
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) versus Nigeria, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 
African Court cases 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of Kenya, Application 
No.006/2012, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v the Republic of Kenya, Order of 
Provisional Measures, Application No.006/2012, 15 March 2013, African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 
East African Court of Justice cases 
Case of: 1.Ololosokwan Village Council 2. Oloirien Village Council 3. Kirtalo Village 
Council 4. Arash Village Council v The Attorney General of the United Republic of 
Tanzania Application No.15 of 2017 (Arising from Reference No.10 of 2017), 25 
September 2018 East African Court of Justice First Instance Division 
Emmanuel Mwakisha Mjawasi & 748 Others v the Attorney General of the Republic of 
Kenya [2011] Ref no.2 of 2010 & Appeal No.4 of 2011 (East African Court of Justice) 
Independent Medical Unit v Attorney-General of Kenya and 4 Others [2011] Reference 
No.3 of 2010 (East African Court of Justice) 
Katabazi and Others v Secretary-General of the East African Community and Another 
(Reference No.1 of 2007) [2007] EACJ 3 
Ole Njogo and 7 Others v The Honorable Attorney General and 20 Others, Civil case 
No. 91 of 1912 (5 E.A.L.R. 70) 
315 
Other African sub-regional cases 
Gongo v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 05/2008 (SADC, Dec. 9, 2010) 
Tembani v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 07/2008 (SADC, Aug. 14, 2009) 
Campbell v. Zimbabwe, Judgment, Case No. SADCT: 2/07 (SADC, Dec. 13, 2007) 
Karaou v Niger [2008] ECW/CCJ/JJD/06/08 (ECOWAS Court of Justice) 
United States cases 
Budha Ismail Jam et al v International Finance Corporation, No 17-1011 (Supreme 
Court of the United States) 
Juana Doe et al v IFC Asset Management Company, LLC, C.A. No. 17-1494-VAC-SRF 
(District Court for the District of Delaware) 
United Kingdom cases 
Lumba (WL) V Secretary Of State for The Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 
Matua & Others v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB) 
International cases 
Aurelio Cal v Attorney General of Belize and Manuel Coy v Attorney General of Belize 
(the Maya Land Rights case (2007) 71 WIR 110 
Calder v The Attorney General of British Coloumbia [1973] SCR 313, [1973] 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Judgment of 27 June 2012 
Lovelace v Canada, Merits, Communication No 24/1977, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (HRC). 
Mabo and Others v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014 
(High Court of Australia) 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua Merits, reparations and costs 
[2001] IACHR Series C No 79 
316 
Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. The Attorney General of Belize Caribbean Court of 
Justice [2015] CCJ 15 (AJ) 
Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize Case 12.053, Report No. 
40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.12 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 24 August 2010, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
317 
Table of Legislation 
Kenyan law 
Commission on Administrative Justice Act 2011 (No.23 of 2011) 
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1962 No. CAP 102 
Community Land Act 2016 (No. 27 of 2016) 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act 1997 (Act No. 13 Of 1997) 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘Draft Bill to Amend the Constitution’ 
(Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2002) 
Draft Constitution of Kenya (Bomas Draft) 15 March 2004 
Environment Management and Co-Ordination Act 1999 (No.8 of 1999) 
Fair Administrative Act 2015 (No.4 of 2015) 
Forest Conservation and Management Act (Act No.34 of 2016) 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act 2011 (No. 14 of 2011) 
National Land Commission (Act No.5 of 2012) 
The Commissions of Inquiry (Amendment) Bill 2009 
The Commissions of Inquiry Act 1962 Cap. 102 
The Constitution of Kenya 1963 
The Constitution of Kenya 1969 
The Constitution of Kenya 2010 
The Constitution of Kenya Review Act 1997 (Act No. 13 of 1997) 
The Forests Act 2005 (Chapter 385) 
The Land Act 2012 (No. 6 of 2012) 
The Land Laws (Amendment) Act 2016 (No. 28 of 2016) to the Land Registration Act 
(No. 3 of 2012) 
The Land Registration Act 2012 (No.3 of 2012) 
The Land Registration Act 2016 (No. 28 of 2016) 
The Natural Resources (Classes of Transactions Subject To Ratification Act) 2016 (Act 
No.41 of 2016) 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Amendment) Act 2013 (Act No. 44 of 
2013) 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act 2008 (Act No. 6 of 2008) 
318 
Wako Draft Constitution of Kenya 2005 
Water Act 2016 (No.43 of 2016) 
Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 2013 (No.47 of 2013) 
Kenyan policy 
Republic Of Kenya Ministry of Lands, ‘Sessional Paper No.3 of 2009 on National Land 
Policy’ (Ministry of Lands 2009) 
The Kenya Vision 2030 Popular Vision, Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007 
Other jurisdictions 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act 1945 (UK) 
Constitution of the Central African Republic 2016 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972 
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 
Constitution of the Republic of Burundi 2005 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 
Constitution of the Central African Republic 2016 
The Forest Act of 2002 (No.10 of 2002) (Tanzania) 
319 
 
Table of Treaties and Other International Instruments 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Principles And Guidelines On The 
Implementation Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights In The African Charter On 
Human And Peoples’ Rights’ (ACHPR 2011) 
 
Agenda 21, UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992 
 
Agreement Amending the Treaty of The Southern African Development Community 2008 
 
Atlantic Charter 1941 
 
Basic Principles And Guidelines On The Right To A Remedy And Reparation For Victims 
Of Gross Violations Of International Human Rights Law And Serious Violations Of 
International Humanitarian Law, Adopted And Proclaimed By General Assembly 
Resolution 60/147 Of 16 December 2005 
 
C169- Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (No. 169) 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
Draft East African Community Bill of Rights 
East African Community Gender Equality and Development Bill 2016. 
East African Community Treaty 1967 
Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ (Resolution 2075 
(2015) Council of Europe 30 September 2015) 
 
National Parliaments: Guarantors of Human Rights in Europe’ (Resolution 1823 (2011) 
Council of Europe 23 June 2011) 
 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘General Recommendation No. 23: 
Indigenous Peoples (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1997) 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1998 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa 2003 
 
The EAC Plan of Action on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in East Africa 2008 
320 
 
The EAC Policy on Persons with Disabilities (2012) 
The East African Community Forests Management and Protection Bill 2015 
The East African Community Human and Peoples’ Rights Bill 2011 
The East African Community Protocol on Good Governance (Draft) 
The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market 2010 
 
The SADC Protocol on Forestry 2002 
 
The Treaty for East African Cooperation 1967 
 
The Treaty for the Establishment of The East African Community 1999 
 
Treaty of The Economic Community of West African States 1975 
 
Treaty of The Southern African Development Community 1992 
 






Abelson P, Project Appraisal and Valuation of the Environment: General Principles and 
Six Case-Studies in Developing Countries (Macmillan Press Limited 1996) 
Anaya S, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen 2009) 
Barume A, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa with Special Focus on Central, 
Eastern and Southern Africa (IWGIA 2010) 
Barume A, Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa with Special Focus on Central, 
Eastern and Southern Africa (IWGIA 2014) 
Boone C, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 
Deininger K, Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, (World Bank and 
Oxford University Press 2003) 
Dersso S, ‘Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ 
(Pretoria University Law Press 2010) 
García A, ‘Contesting Control Land and Forest In The Struggle For Loita Maasai Self-
Government In Kenya’ (African Studies Centre 2015) 
Hornsby C, Kenya: A History since Independence (I.B Taurus 2012) 
Keal P, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral 
Backwardness of International Society (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
Kimaiyo T, Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Land Injustices 1902-2004 (Ogiek Welfare 
Council 2004) 
Kufuor K, African Human Rights System, Origin and Evolution (Palgrave Macmillan 
2010) 
Laher R and Sing’Oei K, Indigenous People in Africa, Contestations, Empowerment 
and Group Rights (Africa Institute of South Africa 2012) 
Lennox C & Short D, Handbook of Indigenous Peoples (Routledge 2015) 
Lund C, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa (Cambridge University 
Press 2008) 
322 
Manji A, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa: From Communal Tenure to Free 
Markets (Zedbooks 2006) 
McAuslan P, Land law Reform in Eastern Africa: Traditional or Transformative? A 
critical review of 50 years of land law reform in Eastern Africa 1961-2011 (Routledge 
2013) 
Miller J R, Ruru J, Behrendt L and Lindberg T, Discovering Indigenous Lands: the 
Doctrine of Discovery (Oxford University Press 2010) 
Muchemi J and Ehrensperger A, Ogiek Peoples Ancestral Territories Atlas: 
Safeguarding Territories, Cultures and Natural Resources of Ogiek Indigenous Peoples 
in Kenya (ERMIS Africa and CDE 2011) 
Murray R and Long D, The Implementation of The Findings Of The African Commission 
On Human And Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge University Press 2015) 
Ndahinda F, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment 
of Marginalised Communities’ (INTERVICT 2011) 
Odhiambo M and Chituga R, The Civil Society Guide to Regional Economic 
Communities, The East African Community (African Minds Publishers 2016) 
Sen A, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999) 
Thornberry P, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press 
2002) 
Viljoen F, The Realisation of Human Rights In Africa Through Sub-Regional Institutions 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 
Weaver C, Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform (Princeton 
University Press 2008) 
Contributions to Edited Books 
Babb S and Kentikelenis A, ‘International Financial Institutions as Agents of 
Neoliberalism’ in D. Cahill, M Cooper, M Knonings & D Primrose (eds), The SAGE 
Handbook of Neoliberalism (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications 2018) 
Baldwin C and Morel C, ‘Group Rights’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986-
2006 (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 
Okoth-Ogendo H, ‘Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation: Exploring the Role of 
Land Reforms in Africa’ in Nathalie Chalifour and others (eds.), Land Use Law for 
   
323 
 
Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research Studies 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 
 
Kameri-Mbote P, ‘Land Tenure, Land Use, and Sustainability in Kenya: Toward 
Innovative Use of Property Rights in Wildlife Management’ in Nathalie Chalifour and 
others, Land Use Law for Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy of Environmental 
Law Research Studies Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) 
 
Gilbert J and Couillard V, ‘International Law and Land Rights in Africa: The Shift from 
States’ Territorial Possessions to Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership Rights’ in Robert 
Home (ed), Essays in African Land Law (Pretoria University Law Press 2011). 
 
Maiga S, ‘Gender And Indigenous Peoples Rights’ in Ridwan Laher and Korir Sing’Oei  
(eds), Indigenous People in Africa, Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights 
(Africa Institute of South Africa 2012) 
 
Morel C, ‘From theory to practice, Holistic strategies for effective strategy’ in 
Corinne Lennox and Damien Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
(Routledge 2016) 
 
Morishima A, ‘Challenges of Environmental Law – Environmental Issues And Their 
Implications To Jurisprudence’ in Nathalie Chalifour and others (eds.), Land Use Law 
For Sustainable Development (IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research 
Studies, Cambridge University Press 2006) 
 
Viljoen F, ‘The African Human Rights System and Domestic Enforcement’ in Malcolm 
Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito & Julieta Rossi (Eds.), Social Rights Judgments 
and the Politics of Compliance: Making it Stick (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
 
Ndahinda F, ‘Historical Development of Indigenous Identification and Rights in 
Africa' in Ridwan Laher and Korir Sing’Oei (eds), Indigenous People in Africa, 
Contestations, Empowerment And Group Rights (Africa Institute Of South Africa 
2012) 
 
Young L, ‘A Challenging Nexus, Transitional Justice and Indigenous Peoples in Africa’ 
in Ridwan Laher and Korir Sing’Oei (eds), Indigenous People in Africa, Contestations, 





Africa Centre for Open Governance, ‘?Mission Impossible? Implementing the 
Ndung’u Report’ (Africa Centre for Open Governance 2009) 
   
324 
 
African Centre for Open Governance, ‘First Report: A Study of Commissions of 
Inquiries in Kenya’ (Africog Reports 2007) 
Adeagbo O, ‘Post Election Crisis in Kenya and Internally Displaced Persons: A Critical 
 Apraissal’ (2011) Vol 4. No. 2 Journal of Politics and Law 
Boone C, ‘Land Conflicts and Distributive Politics in Kenya’ (2012) Volume 55 
Number 1 African Studies Review 75 
Dlamini C, Larwanou M and Chirwa P, ‘A Review of Capacities of Public Forest 
Administrations for Interventions in Climate Change Activities in the Dry Forest and 
Woodland Countries of Sub-Sahara Africa’ (2015) Vol.17 (S3) International Forestry 
Review 
Ebobrah S, ‘A Rights-Protection Goldmine or a Waiting Volcanic Eruption? 
Competence of, and Access to, the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice’ (2007) Volume 7 No 2 AHRLJ 307 
Ebobrah S, ‘Human Rights Developments in African Sub-Regional Economic 
Communities during 2011’ (African Human Rights Law Journal 2012) 
Fransesca Di Matteo, ‘Community Land in Kenya: Policy Making, Social Mobilization 
and Struggle for Legal Entitlement’ (2017) Department of International 
Development Working Paper Series No.17-185 
Fikfak V, ‘Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (The European Journal of International Law Vol.29 no.4 2019) 
Flint M, Rance S and Richardson L, ‘Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes, Country 
Study: Bolivia 2000-2004’ (Department for International Development 2005) 
Hoffmann C, ‘Disability Rights Movement In East Africa, The Role and Impact of Self-
Representation Of Persons With Disabilities On National, Transnational And Regional 
Level (Max Planck Institute For Social Law And Social Policy 2014) 
<Https://Ecpr.Eu/Filestore/Paperproposal/60b58c73-A93a-44ab-92db-
0fb846577fd8.Pdf> accessed 14 April 2016 
Institute of Economic Affairs, ‘Reassessing Kenya’s Land Reform’ Issue No.40 The 
Point Bulletin of the Institute of Economic Affairs (Institute of Economic Affairs 2000) 
International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya in Crisis’, Africa Report N°137 (International Crisis 
Group 21 February 2008) 
Kimathi L, ‘Contesting Local Marginalization through International Instruments: The 
Endorois Community Case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
   
325 
 
(IDEA Case Study Research on “Successful Marginalized Group Inclusion in 
Democratic Governance Structures and Processes” March 2012) 
Klopp J and Sang J, ‘Maps, Power, and the Destruction of the Mau Forest in Kenya’ 
(Science and Technology 2011) 
Leo C, ‘Who Benefited from the Million Acre- Scheme?  Toward a Class Analysis of 
Kenya’s Transition to Independence’, Volume 15. No. 2 Revue (Canadienne des 
Études Africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies 1981) 
Mwathane I, ‘The Contribution of Land to the Recent Violence in Kenya: Implications 
for the Ongoing Land Policy Dialogue’ (Land Development and Governance Institute 
(LDGI) 2010) 
Murungi L and Gallinetti J, ‘The Role Of Sub-Regional Courts In The African Human 
Rights System’ (2010), Volume 7, N13, International Human Rights Journal 
Oette L, ‘Bridging The Enforcement Gap: Compliance Of States Parties With 
Decisions Of Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2010) Volume 16 Number 2 Interights 
Bulletin 51 
Ostry J D, Loungani P and Furceri D, ‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’ Finance & 
Development June 2016 
Porter-Bolland L and others, ‘Community Managed Forests and Forest Protected 
Areas: An Assessment of Their Conservation Effectiveness Across the Tropics’ (2012) 
Volume 268 Forest Ecology and Management< 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/articles/AGuariguata1101.pdf>accesse
d 10 December 2018 
Sola P, ‘Forest Law Enforcement and Governance and Trade in the Southern African 
Development Community’ (2011) Working Paper Series Vol 1 Issue 9 African Forest 
Forum 51 
Solomon T. Ebobrah, ‘Litigating Human Rights Before Sub-Regional Courts In Africa: 
Prospects and Challenges’ (2009), Volume 17, Issue 1, African Journal Of 
International And Comparative Law, 79 
Syagga P, ‘Public Land, Historical Land Injustices and the New Constitution’ (2018) 
Society for International Development Constitution Working Paper Series No.9 < 
http://sidint.net/docs/WP9.pdf> accessed 3 January 2019) 
Odhiambo W and Nyangito H, Land Laws and Land Use in Kenya: Implications for 
Agricultural Development (Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 
2002) 
   
326 
 
Young L and Korir S, ‘Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples’ in ‘Indigenous 
Peoples’ Access to Justice, Including Truth and Reconciliation Processes’ (Institute 
for the Study of Human Rights, Colombia University 2014) 
News Articles 
Aluanga L, ‘A dozen reports on land later, but no remedy’ The Standard Media 
(Nairobi, 15 November 
2009)<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=1144028411&pageNo=1>acc
essed 2 January 2018 
BBC News, ‘Kenyans Reject New Constitution’ (BBC News, 22 November 
2005)<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4455538.stm>accessed 10 January 
2018 
BBC News, ‘Truth Commission for Kenya’ (BBC News, 15 October 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3194834.stm>accessed 10 January 2018 
Brandi Morin, ‘Where does Canada sit 10 years after the UN Declaration on the Right 
of Indigenous Peoples?’ CBC News (13 September 
2017)<https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/where-does-canada-sit-10-years-
after-undrip-1.4288480 >accessed 30 January 2019  
Burke J, ‘Dar es Salaam official creates taskforce aimed at finding and punishing LGBT 
community’, The Guardian (London 5 November 
2018)<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/05/tanzania-gay-people-in-
hiding-lgbt-activists-crackdown> 27 December 2018 
CapitalNews, ‘Land Commissioners Finally Sworn in’ CapitalNews (Nairobi, 27 
February 2013) <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/02/land-commissioners-
finally-sworn-in/>aAccessed 8 October 2018 
Chavkin S and others, ‘Investigation: Evicted and Abandoned: How The World Bank 
Broke Its Promise To Protect The Poor’ Premium Times (19 April 2015) 
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/181677-investigation-
evicted-and-abandoned-how-the-world-bank-broke-its-promise-to-protect-the-
poor.html>accessed 11 January 2019 
Chavkin S and Anderson M, ‘The World Bank Breaks its own Rules as Millions Lose 
Land and Livelihoods’ The Guardian (London, 16 April 
2015)<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/apr/16/world-
bank-breaks-own-rules-indigenous-people-forced-off-land >accessed 26 January 
2019 
   
327 
 
Daily Nation, ‘Banned gay film ‘Rafiki’ film reveals Kenya’s sexuality progress’ Daily 
Nation (Nairobi, 8 May 2018)<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/What-ban-of-gay-
film--Rafiki--indicates-about-Kenya/1056-4549802-r5p0flz/index.html> accessed 24 
January 2019 
Kentish B, ‘Theresa May Government found in Contempt of Parliament over failure 
to publish full Brexit legal advice’, The Independent (London, 4 December 
2018)<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/contempt-parliament-
vote-theresa-may-brexit-legal-advice-government-geoffrey-cox-a8667091.html> 
accessed 16 December 2018 
Metcalf S, ‘Neoliberalism: The Idea that Swallowed the World’ (The Guardian, 18 
August 2017)<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-
the-idea-that-changed-the-world>accessed 5 October 2019 
News5, ‘Toledo Maya Land Rights Commission Holds Consultations to Draft Land 
Tenure Policy’ (News5, 26 September 
2018)<https://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/172483>accessed 1 October 
2019 
News5, ‘Maya Land Rights Commission Heads Training Workshop in Toledo’ (News5 
18 January 2019) <https://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/178887>accessed 1 
October 2019 
Ngugi T, ‘In Kenya, politicians sit on top of the pay pyramid as workers scrumble for 
crumbs’ The East African (Nairobi, 18 April 
2018)<https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/Kenya-politicians-sit-on-
top-of-the-pay-pyramid/434750-4421386-ja3lsn/index.html> accessed 10 January 
2019 
Odote C, ‘Debunking The Fallacies, Community Land Rights: Which Way Forward, 
Now That They Are a Reality?’ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 6 May 2013) 
Provost C and Kennard M, ‘World Bank lending arm sees off lawsuit by Indian 
fishermen’ The Guardian (London 30 March 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/30/world-bank-
lending-arm-ifc-sees-off-lawsuit-by-indian-fishermen-power-plant> accessed 12 
January 2019 
Provost C, ‘Farmers Sue World Bank Lending Arm Over Alleged Violence In 
Honduras’ The Guardian (London, 8 March 
2017)<Https://Www.Theguardian.Com/Global-
Development/2017/Mar/08/Farmers-Sue-World-Bank-Lending-Arm-Ifc-Over-
Alleged-Violence-In-Honduras>accessed 12 January 2019 
   
328 
 
Rutter J, ‘David Cameron’s implementation taskforces could be good for Whitehall’, 
The Guardian (London 9 June 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-
network/2015/jun/09/david-cameron-implementation-taskforces-whitehall> 
accessed 8 December 2018 
 
Vogelsang J, ‘Opinion: A Historic Step Towards Securing Community Land Rights in 
Kenya’ (Thomas Reuters Foundation News 30 July 2019)< 
http://news.trust.org/item/20190730151357-yl708/>accessed 1 October 2019 
 
Websites and Blogs  
African Press Organization, ‘Heads of human rights commissions review EAC draft 
bill of rights’ (African Press Organization, 2 June 
2010)<https://appablog.wordpress.com/2010/06/02/heads-of-human-rights’-
commissions-review-eac-draft-bill-of-rights/>accessed 22 December 2018 
Blomley T and Iddi S, ‘Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: 1993 – 2009 
Lessons learned and experiences to date’ (Tz Online, September 2009) 
<http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/participatoryforestmanagement2009.pdf>accessed 
12 December 2018 
Brandt M and Others, ‘Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process’ 
(Interpeace 2011)< https://www.interpeace.org/resource/constitution-making-
and-reform-options-for-the-process-2/> accessed 12 September 2016 




ces.pdf>accessed 8 December 2018. 
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Kenya: The 
Ufugamano/Ufungamano Church Movement; members; types of activities 
undertaken in process of advocating for constitutional changes; treatment of 
pastors who advocate for constitutional change (1999-2001)’ (Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada 10 July 
2001)  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be5211.html> accessed 28 December 
2017 
Commonwealth Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, ‘Malaysia: A National 
Inquiry into the land Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (Commonwealth Forum for 
National Human Rights Institutions, 13 April 
2016)<http://cfnhri.org/spotlight/suhakams-national-inquiry-into-the-land-rights-
of-indigenous-peoples>accessed 8 December 2018 
   
329 
 
Copley A, ‘Kenya Rebases GDP and Becomes Ninth-Largest African Economy’ 
(Brookings 3 October 2014)<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2014/10/03/africa-in-the-news-kenya-becomes-a-middle-income-country-
mo-ibrahim-index-released-south-sudan-peace-talks-yield-promise/> accessed 23 
January 2019 
Cultural Survival, ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist IUCN plans for the Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest’ (Cultural Survival) <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/loita-and-purko-
maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest>accessed 9 January 2019 
Commission on Administrative Justice, ‘What Results From A Complaint?’ 
(Commission on Administrative 
Justice)<Http://Www.Ombudsman.Go.Ke/Index.Php/Complain-Here/What-Results-
From-A-Complaint>accessed 13 December 2018 
Daily News Reporter, ‘Tanzania: Govt Forms Taskforce to Quell Land Conflicts’ All 
Africa (Kigoma, 9 November 2018) 
<https://allafrica.com/stories/201811090486.html> accessed 7 January 2019 
East African Community Secretariat, ‘EAC Protocol on Good Governance in Final 
Stages’ (East African Community Secretariat, 11 May 2011) 
<Http://Federation.Eac.Int/Index.Php?Option=Com_Content&View=Article&Id=15
6:Eac-Protocol-On-Good-Governance-In-Final-Stages-
&Catid=40:News&Itemid=147> accessed 4 April 2016 
East African Legislative Assembly, ‘The East African Community Human and Peoples 
Rights Bill 2011 Memorandum’ (East African Legislative Assembly 12 August 
2011)<http://www.eala.org/documents/view/the-eac-human-and-peoples-rights-
bill2011 >accessed 17 June 2016 
Earth Rights International, ‘Budha Ismail Jam, et al v. IFC’ (Earth Rights 
International)<https://earthrights.org/case/budha-ismail-jam-et-al-v-ifc/>accessed 
12 January 2019 
 
Earth Rights International, ‘Juana Doe et al. v. IFC’ (Earth Rights 
International)<https://earthrights.org/case/juana-doe-et-al-v-ifc/#documentsff69-
1a905f26-f4b6>accessed 12 January 2019 
East African Community, ‘List of all Council Decisions, EAC/CM15/DC36’ (East African 
Community 
2008),<http://www.eac.int/council_decisions/decision.php?pageNum_qry=65&tot
alRows_qry=1051>accessed 12 April 2016 
East African Court of Justice, ‘Recent-Decisions’ (East African Court of Justice) 
<http://eacj.eac.int/?page_id=2298>accessed 4 October 2019 
   
330 
 
East African Legislative Assembly, ‘EALA Passes Key Gender Bill on International 
Women’s Day’ (EALA 8 March 2017) <https://www.eac.int/press-releases/146-
gender,-community-development-civil-society/729-eala-passes-key-gender-bill-on-
international-women-s-day>accessed 28 September 2018 
Ecoterra Intl, ‘Facts of The Post-Election Violence’ (Ecoterra Intl. 1992-2015)< 
http://ogiek.org/news-1/facts-post-el-violence.htm> accessed 21 January 2018 
Ecoterra Intl, ‘Ogiek Language’ (Ecoterra Intl. 1992-
2015)<http://ogiek.org/indepth/ogiek-language.htm> accessed November 2013 
Ecoterra Intl, ‘Paramilitary Units Hunt Ogiek, while Kikuyu Arsonists Burn Houses of 
Fleeing Ogiek to the Ground’ (Ecoterra Intl. 1992-2015 19 January 2008) 
<http://www.ogiek.org/news-1/news-post-08-01-213.htm>accessed 21 January 
2018 
ESCR-Net, ‘First meeting of the Kenyan Task Force for the Implementation of the 
Endorois decision’ (ESCR-Net, 24 November 2014)<http://www.escr-
net.org/node/365690>accessed 17 October 2017 
Frontline Defenders, ‘EU Statement on the Killing of a Member of the Sengwer 
Community of Kenya’ (Frontline Defenders, 17 January 
2018)<Https://Www.Frontlinedefenders.Org/En/Statement-Report/Eu-Statement-
Killing-Member-Sengwer-Community-Kenya>accessed 29 September 2018 
Government of Belize Press Office, ‘Press Release: Toledo Maya Land Rights 
Commission Hosts Two-Day Training in Punta Gorda Town’ (Government of Belize 
Press Office 18 January 
2019)<https://www.facebook.com/GOBPressOffice/posts/press-releasetoledo-
maya-land-rights-commission-hosts-two-day-training-in-punta-
/2019596151409211/>accessed 1 October 2019 
Howard-Hassmann R, ‘Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent Persons’ 
(Cahiers d’Études Africaines 
2004)<https://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/4543>accessed 12 
November 2018 
IDS, ‘Policy Briefing’ (May 2003) Issue 17< https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Pb17.pdf> 
accessed 27 January 2019  
 
Independent Online (IOL), ‘Kibaki Hails Government of National Unity’, (IOL, 30 June 
2004) < https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/kibaki-hails-government-of-national-
unity-216081>accessed 11 January 2018 
331 
Institute for Government, ‘Public Inquiries’ (Institute for Government) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/public-inquiries>accessed 
20 October 2018 
IWGIA, ‘New Community Land Act lacks resources for implementation’ (IWGIA 14 
August 2019)< https://www.iwgia.org/en/kenya/3387-kenya-community-land-act>  
accessed 1 October 2019 
Kabiru D, ‘Chairperson’s Remarks-Ogiek Victory Celebrations’ (KNHCR, 26 May 2018) 
<http://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1021>accessed 8 October 
2018 
Katiba Institute, ‘About the CKRC Process’ (Katiba Institute Archives 2014) 
<http://katibainstitute.org/Archives/index.php/ckrc-process/about-the-ckrc-
process> accessed 28 December 2017 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘KNCHR’s Engagement with 
Indigenous Peoples’  
(KNHCR)<http://www.knchr.org/Articles/ArtMID/2432/ArticleID/1046/KNCHR’s-
Engagement-with-Indigenous-People>accessed 7 October 2018 
Kibii E, ‘Commissions or Omissions of Inquiry? Why Kenya has failed to address 
historical and other injustices’ The Elephant (5 April 2018) 
<https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/04/05/commissions-or-omissions-
of-inquiry-why-kenya-has-failed-to-address-historical-and-other-
injustices/>accessed 27 December 2018 
Lang C, ‘Ogiek threatened with eviction from Mau Forest, Kenya’ (REDD, 19 
November 2009) <https://redd-monitor.org/2009/11/19/ogiek-threatened-with-
eviction-from-mau-forest-kenya/>accessed 18 April 2014
Manji A, ‘The Grabbed State: Lawyers, Politics and Public Land in Kenya’ (2012) 50 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 467 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-
studies/article/grabbed-state-lawyers-politics-and-public-land-in-
kenya/EC25B795BE332A1B352670D1B92DC6D5> accessed 17 October 2018 
Mayallah E, ‘East Africa: EAC Gender Bill Eases Through’ (AllAfrica.com, 7 February 
2016) <http://sjdspace.sagepub.com/?p=1264> accessed 7 April 2016 
Minority Rights Group International, ‘Kenya Task Force formed to implement the 
2010 Endorois ruling’ (MRG, 29 September 
2014)<‘https://minorityrights.org/2014/09/29/kenyan-task-force-formed-to-
implement-the-2010-endorois-ruling/>accessed 7 October 2018 
   
332 
 
Minority Voices, ‘Reforestation, Corruption and Evictions: The Ogiek of the Mau 
Forest, Kenya’ (Minority Voices Newsroom 28 September 
2010)<www.minorityvoices.org>accessed 24 November 2014 
Nkannebe R, ‘Kenyan politics, judicial activism and lessons for Africa (1)’ Punch (5 
September 2017) <https://punchng.com/kenyan-politics-judicial-activism-and-
lessons-for-africa-1/>accessed 27 December 2018 
Pan African Lawyers Union, ‘Ololosokwan village Council and 3 Others vs. The 
Attorney General of United Republic of Tanzania: Ref no. 10 of 2017: The Loliondo 
Case (Pan African Lawyers Union 5 February 2019) 
https://lawyersofafrica.org/ololosokwan-village-council-and-3-others-vs-the-
attorney-general-of-united-republic-of-tanzania-ref-no-10-of-2017-the-loliondo-
case/> accessed 4 October 2019  
Parliament of Kenya, ‘The Place and Functions of the Committee System’ 
(Parliament of Kenya)<http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php/the-national-
assembly/commitees>(accessed 10 August 2018) 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, ‘Committees in Full’ (Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa)< 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/committees?perPage=100> accessed 29 January 
2019 
SADC, ‘Request for Expressions of Interest, Selection of Individual Consultant, 
Reference Number: SADC/FANR/FORESTRYPROTOCOL/2017, Request for Services 
Title: Individual Consultancy to Undertake Regional Assessment Of Implementation 
Of The SADC Protocol on Forestry’ (SADC March 2017) 
<Https://Www.Sadc.Int/Opportunities/Procurement/Procurement-
Archive/Consultancy-Undertake-Regional-Assessment-Implementation-Sadc-
Protocol-Forestry1> accessed 2 November 2018 
Sayagie G, ‘Storm Brews over Mau as the Ogiek Resist Eviction’ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 
6 June 2018) <https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/narok/Storm-brews-over-Mau-
as-Ogiek-resist-eviction/1183318-4597524-pq84c0z/index.html>accessed on 17 
July 2018 
Sayagie G, ‘Task Force report on Mau yet to be implemented nine years later’ Daily 
Nation (Nairobi, 1 August 2018) <https://www.pressreader.com/kenya/daily-
nation-kenya/20180801/281642485981322> accessed 7 January 2019 
Southern African News Features, ‘SADC reviews forestry protocol implementation’ 
(SARDC, May 2017) <https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-
features/sadc-reviews-forestry-protocol-implementation>accessed 28 September 
2018 
   
333 
 
Survival International, ‘Honey-hunting Ogiek Tribe Caught up in Violence’ (Survival 
International, 30 January 2008, 
<https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/3057> accessed 21 January 2018 
Tax S, ‘Statement’ (Launch of the JICA-SADC Project on Conservation and Sustainable 
Management of Forest Resources in Southern Africa, Gaborone, Botswana, 23 
February 2016) 
<https://www.sadc.int/files/4214/5632/1862/Remarks_by_SADC_Executive_Secre
tary.pdf>accessed 28 September 2018 
Teta Rekuai & Gobierno Nacional, ‘Paraguay SIMOREPlus, About Simore’ (Teta Rekuai 
& Gobierno Nacional)<http://www.mre.gov.py/SimorePlus/Home/Page?idTipo=1> 
accessed 30 September 2019 
The Senate of the Republic of Kenya ‘Standing Committees’ (The Senate of the 
Republic of Kenya)< http://www.parliament.go.ke/the-
senate/committees/standing-committees>accessed 17 December 2018 
Thompson E, ‘What constitutional review processes in West Africa tell us’, 
Pambazuka News (West Africa 18 June 2014) 
<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/what-constitutional-review-processes-
west-africa-tell-us>accessed 8 January 2019 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Questionnaire to National Human 
Rights Institutions’ (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
2017)<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-
content/uploads/sites/19/2018/02/Malaysia.pdf> accessed 7 December 2018 
VicePresidencia De La República Del Paraguay, Gobierno Nacional, Mama, Paraguay 
de la Gente, ‘Comisión Interinstitucional para el Cumplimiento de las Sentencias 
Internacionales (CICSI)’ (VicePresidencia De La República Del Paraguay, Gobierno 
Nacional, Mama, Paraguay de la 
Gente)<http://www.vicepresidencia.gov.py/index.php/cicsi-1>accessed 30 
September 2019 
Wily L, ‘The Community Land Act in Kenya Opportunities and Challenge for 
Communities’ (MDPI 2018) <https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/7/1/12> accessed 
5 June 2018 
 
Other Secondary sources 
East African Community, ‘East Africa: EAC Receives Proposed Regional Bill of Rights 
4 months After Approving Appellate Wing of the EACJ’ (East African Community 23 
October 2007) 
   
334 
 
Kipkazi W,  ‘Statement by Endorois Welfare Council-Kenya at the 56th Ordinary 
Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 21st April to 7th 
May 2015 in Banjul, the Gambia’ (Endorois Welfare Council 
2015)<‘http://www.achpr.org/files/endorois_welfare_council_kenya.pdf>accessed 
12 November 2018>accessed 8 December 2018 
Okoth-Ogendo H, ‘Keynote Presentation’ (Workshop on Norwegian Land Tools 
Relevant to Africa, Oslo, Norway, 3-4 May 2007) 
<https://learning.uonbi.ac.ke/courses/GPR203_001/document/Property_Law_GPR
216-September,_2014/Articles/HWOOkoth-




HL Deb 04 May 1932, vol 84, cc305-20 
 
Parliamentary Debates 19 October 2004 ‘Ministerial Statement Release of Ndung’u 
Land Commission’, Kenya National Assembly Office Record (Hansard) 
  
Parliamentary Debates 11 November 2004, Kenya National Assembly Office Record  
(Hansard) 
 
Parliamentary Debates 9 December 2004 ‘Ministerial Statement Implementation of 
the Ndung’u Report on Irregular or Irregular Land Allocations’, Kenya National 
Assembly Office Record (Hansard) 
 
Parliamentary Debates 3 October 2007, Kenya National Assembly Office Record 
(Hansard) 
 
Parliamentary Debates 22 April 2008, Kenya National Assembly Office Record 
(Hansard) 
 
Parliamentary Debates 20 January 2009, Kenya National Assembly Official Record 
(Hansard) 
 




The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CI-No.78] Gazette Notice No. 6593 (26 November 1999) 
2278 
 
The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CXIX-No.167] Gazette Notice 6708 (10 November 2017) 
 
The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CX-No.62] Gazette Notice 7065 (1 August 2008) 




The Kenya Gazette, [Vol.CXVI-No.115], Gazette Notice 6708 (26 September 2014) 
 
The Kenya Gazette, Gazette Notice No. 2701 (17 April 2003) 
 







Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, ‘Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land’, (Commission 
of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land 2003) 
Commission of Inquiry Into The Land Law System of Kenya, ‘Report of The 
Commission of Inquiry Into The Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of A National 
Land Policy Framework, Constitutional Position of Land and New Institutional 
Framework For Land Administration’ (Commission of Inquiry Into The Land Law 
System of Kenya 2002) 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘Final Report of the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission’ (Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2005) 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘The Peoples’ Choice, The Report Of The 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Short Version’ (Constitution Of Kenya 
Review Commission 2002) 
East Africa Royal Commission, ‘East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, 
Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of 
Her Majesty June 1955’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, Cmd 9475 
Interim Coordinating Secretariat Mau Forests Complex, ‘Brief on the Rehabilitation 
of the Mau Forests Complex’ (Interim Coordinating Secretariat Mau Forests Complex 
2010) 
Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project, ‘Indigenous Peoples 
Planning Framework (Ogiek and Sengwer)’ (KAPAP 2009) 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report for the 2010/2011 
Financial Year’ (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2011) 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report for the 2012/2013 
Financial Year’ (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2013) 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report for the 2013/2014 
Financial Year’ Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2014) 
   
336 
 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Annual Report for the 2015/2016 
Financial Year’ (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2016) 
Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests Complex, 
‘Report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests 
Complex’ (Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forests 
Complex March 2009) 
Republic of Kenya Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, ‘Second 
Implementation Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification’ (National Environment Secretariat April 2002) 
Republic of Kenya Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation & 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, ‘Indigenous Peoples Planning 
Framework for the Western Kenya Community Driven Development and Flood 
Mitigation Project and the Natural Resource Management Project Final Report 
December 2006’ (IPP198, Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
& Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 1 December 2006)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/147881468283550135/pdf/IPP198.p
df > accessed 12 July 2016 
 
Republic of Kenya Twelfth Parliament Second Session, ‘The Senate, Votes and 
Proceedings, Tuesday June 05, 2018 at 2.30p.m.’ (Twelfth Parliament (No.032) 
Second Session 326, 5 June 
2018)<http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/201705/Senate_Votes_5.6.
18.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018 
Republic of Kenya, ‘Resettlement Policy Framework Natural Resource Management 
Framework’ (RP500, Republic of Kenya, January 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/124651468278041263/pdf/RP500.p
df> accessed 20 July 2016 
Task Force on The Establishment of a Truth, Justice And Reconciliation Commission, 
‘Report of The Task Force on The Establishment of a Truth, Justice And Reconciliation 
Commission’ (Task Force on The Establishment of a Truth, Justice And Reconciliation 
Commission 26 August 2003) 
The Kenya Human Rights Commission, Freedom of Information and Mid Rift Human 
Rights Network, ‘Damned Dams: Exposing Corporate and State Impunity in the Solai 
Tragedy’ (Kenya Human Rights Commission, Freedom of Information and Mid Rift 
Human Rights Network 2018) 
 
African Commission reports 
 
African Commission on Human And Peoples’ Rights And International Work Group 
For Indigenous Affairs, ‘Report of the ACHPR Working Group Of Experts On 
Indigenous Populations/Communities’ (ACHPR And IWGIA 2005) 
337 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs, ‘Indigenous Peoples: A Forgotten Peoples?’ (ACHPR and 
IWGIA 2006) 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Advisory Opinion of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 2007) 
African Court Reports 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Activity Report of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1January -31 December 2018’ (African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights 2018) 
East African Community Reports 
Committee of Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, ‘Report of the 
Committee of Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources on the EAC Forests 
Management and Protection Bill 2015: EAC Partner states Capitals, 9th to 15th 
September, 2015’ (Committee of Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources 2015) 
UN Reports 
Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, ‘Report of The Working Group On 
The Universal Periodic Review’, A/HRC/15/8, 17 June 2010 
Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Regarding the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Paraguay’ (Human Rights Council, 13 August 2015) 
Human Rights Committee, ‘Fourth Periodic Report Submitted by Paraguay under 
Article 40 of the Covenant Pursuant to the Optional Reporting Procedure, Due in 2017 
CCPR/C/PRY/4’ (Human Rights Committee, 7 November 2018) 
Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report 
of Paraguay CCPR/C/PRY/CO/4’ (Human Rights Committee, 20 August 2019) 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Addendum, MISSION TO 
KENYA’ (United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/4/32/Add.3 2006) 
338 
Other Reports 
Amnesty International, ‘Families Torn Apart: Forest Eviction of Indigenous 
Peoples in Embobut Forest, Kenya’ (Amnesty International 2018) 
Amnesty International, ‘Paraguay: Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 54th Session (23 February – 6 March 2015)’(Amnesty 
International Publications 2014) 
Cemiride and The Advocates for Human Rights, ‘Engaging Minorities and 
Indigenous Communities in Kenya TJRC, Recommendations and Comparative 
Practices Briefing Note 2010’ (Cemiride and The Advocates for Human Rights 
2010) 
Cobo M, ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations 
Final report submitted by the Special Rapporteur’ (10 
August 1982E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2 United Nations Economic and Social Council 
1982) 
Daniel C and others, ‘Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development 
Finance’ (SOMO, January 2016)  
Eyben R, ‘Linking Power and Poverty Reduction’ (Institute of Development 
Studies 2004) in Alsop R (ed), ‘Power, Rights and Poverty: Concepts and 
Connections’, (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank and the Department for International Development 2004) 
Griffiths T, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: experiences with 
participation’ (Forest Peoples Programme 2005) 
His Majesty’s Stationery Office, ‘Colonial Reports-Annual No. 1920: Annual 
Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Kenya 
Colony and Protectorate 1938’ (H.M. Stationery Office 1939) 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s 
Crisis of Governance’ (Human Rights Watch, 16 March 2008)  
IACHR ‘Access to Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards 
Strengthening Democracy in Bolivia’ (Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 34, June 28, 2007) 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Kenya: Country conditions since 
the election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC), in December 2002; and 
the present situation of opponents of the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU)’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2003) 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights 
over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.  Doc. 56/09 IACHR 
2009) 
   
339 
 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘The Indigenous World 2013’ 
(IWGIA 2013) 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, ‘The Indigenous World 2018’ 
(IWGIA 2018) 
Kenya Human Rights Commission, The Kenya Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists, International Centre for Policy and Conflict, ‘Transitional 
Justice in Kenya: Toolkit for Training and Engagement’ (Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, The Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
International Centre for Policy and Conflict 2010) 
Kenya Land Alliance and Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Ndung’u-
Land Report’ (Kenya Land Alliance and Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights)<http://cemusstudent.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Ndungu-Land-
Report.pdf> accessed 20 December 2017 
Kenya Ministry of Lands and Settlement, ‘A Summary of Land Policy Principles drawn 
from the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (‘Njonjo 
Commission’), The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), Proceedings 
of the National Civil Society Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question’ 
(Kenya Ministry of Lands and Settlement 2004)< http://mokoro.co.uk/land-rights-
article/a-summary-of-land-policy-principles-drawn-from-the-commission-of-
inquiry-into-the-land-law-system-of-kenya-njonjo-commission-the-constitution-of-
kenya-review-commission-ckrc-pr/>accessed 30 December 2018 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Report of the High Level 
Independent Fact-Finding Mission to Embobut Forest in Elgeyo Marakwet County’ 
(KNHCR 
2018)<http://knchr.org/portals/0/grouprightsreports/KNCHRFact_Finding_Mission
_to_Embobut_Forest.pdf> accessed 7 November 2018 
Kenya National Human Rights Commission, ‘About/Vision and Mission’ (Kenya 
National Human Rights Commission)<http://www.khrc.or.ke/about-
us/mission.html>accessed 10 January 2018 
Maya Leaders Alliance, ‘Update Report to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR 
for the 124th Session Review of Belize’ (Maya Leaders Alliance 7 September 2018) 
Minority Rights Group International, ‘State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples 2011: Events of 2010’ (MRG 2011) 
OECD and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World 
Bank, ‘Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, Experiences 
   
340 
 
and Challenges’ (Third Edition, Washington, OECD and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 2016) 
Ochieng Odhiambo O M, ‘A solution to the forced displacement of the Endorois in 
Kenya: Working Towards The Implementation of the African Commission on Human 
Rights’ Decision (November 2008 – October 2011): Report of Final Evaluation’ 
(Minority Rights Group International February 2012) 
Open Society Foundations, 'From Rights to Remedies, Structures and Strategies for 
Implementing International Human Rights Decisions’ (Open Society Foundations 26 
May 2013) 
Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Strategic Litigation Impacts: Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights’ (Open Society Foundations 2017) 
Rights and Resources Initiative, ‘Who Owns the World’s Land? A Global Baseline of 
Formally Recognized Indigenous & Community Land Rights’ (Rights and Resources 
Initiative September 2015) 
The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), ‘The Indigenous World 
2019’ (The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) 
2019)<https://www.iwgia.org/images/documents/indigenous-
world/IndigenousWorld2019_UK.pdf>accessed 28 September 2019 
The Law Commission, ‘Remedies against Public Bodies: A Scoping Report’ (The Law 
Commission, UK 10 October 2006) 
Theses 
Mburu P, ‘Strategies to Modernize the Land Registration System in Kenya’ (DPhil 
Thesis University of Groningen 2017) 
 
Wachira G, ‘Vindicating Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in Kenya’ (DPhil Thesis 
University of Pretoria 2008) 
 
Oral submissions 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, ‘African Commission’s Written 
Submissions to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27-8 November 
2014 in Application 006/2012: African Commission v The Republic of Kenya (The 
African Court on Human And Peoples’ Rights 27 to 28 November 2014) 
 
Kimani M, ‘Respondent’s Submissions in Application 006, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya’ (The African Court on Human And 
Peoples’ Rights 27 to 28 November 2014) 
 
   
341 
 
Lucy Claridge, ‘MRG Oral Intervention’ (African Commission On Human And Peoples’ 
Rights v The Republic Of Kenya, Application No.006/2012, African Court On Human 
And Peoples’ Rights, 27-28 November 2014) 
 
Manirakiza P, ‘Oral Submissions/Introduction African Commission on Human 
Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya, Application 006/2012’ (27 November 2014) 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Nyanduga B, ‘Applicant’s Final Submissions on the Merits in Application 006, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya’ (The African Court 
on Human And Peoples’ Rights 27 to 28 November 2014) 
 
Wily L, Expert evidence, Ogiek case (Addis Ababa 27 November 2014)  
 
World Bank Documents 
Financing Agreement (Natural Resource Management Project) Between Republic of 
Kenya and International Development Association, 7 May 2017 
IDA Articles of Agreement 1960 
 
IFC Articles of Agreement (as amended through 27 June 2012) 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International 
Development Association, ‘Progress Report to the Board of Executive Directors on 
the Implementation of Management's Action Plan in Response to the Inspection 
Panel Investigation Report on the Kenya Natural Resource Management Project’ 
(100227, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International 
Development Association 
2015)<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698141467987833169/pdf/1
00227-INVR-P095050-IDA-SecM2015-0210-Box393220B-OUO-9.pdf> accessed 27 
January 2019 
International Development Association ‘Borrowing Countries’ (International 
Development Association)<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries> 
accessed 12 May 2016 
International Development Association, ‘Contributor Countries’ (International 
Development Association)   <http://ida.worldbank.org/about/contributor-
countries> accessed 6 April 2016 
International Development Association, ‘History’ (International Development 
Association) <http://ida.worldbank.org/about/history> accessed 20 May 2016.  
   
342 
 
International Development Association, ‘IDA Graduates’ (International 
Development Association)   <http://ida.worldbank.org/about/ida-graduates 
>accessed 12 May 2016 
International Development Association, ‘The World Bank’s Fund for the poorest’ 
(International Development Association, February 
2016)<http://ida.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/images/fund-for-the-
poorest.pdf> accessed 15 May 2016 




The World Bank ‘Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet Restructuring Stage’ (Report No.: 
AC6311, The World Bank, 13 June 2011)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/916871468090305426/pdf/Integrate
d0Saf00Restructuring0Stage.pdf> accessed 21 July 2016 
The World Bank ‘Operational Manual OP 4.10- Indigenous Peoples’ (The World Bank 
July 2015) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Kenya - Natural Resource Management Project’ (The World Bank): 
http://projects.worldbank.org/P095050/kenya-natural-resource-management-
project?lang=en> accessed 24 January 2019 
 
The World Bank ‘Project Agreement (Natural Resource Management Project) 
International Development Agency and the National Irrigation Board’ (The World 
Bank 7 May 2007) 
 
The World Bank ‘The Inspection Panel, Report and Recommendation Kenya: Natural 
Resource Management Project (P095050)’ (Report No. 77959-KE The Inspection 
Panel, 29 May 2013)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/305841468276357879/pdf/779590I
PR0P09500lPN0REQUEST0RQ01302.pdf> accessed 12 September 2016 
 
The World Bank Group, ‘Kenya Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report 2004-
2008’ (The World Bank Group 
2004)<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KENYAEXTN/Resources/Kenya_CASPR.p
df > accessed 6 September 2016 
 
The World Bank IBRD-IDA, 'Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project’ (The 




   
343 
 
The World Bank IEG, ‘ICR Review’ (Report No.: ICRR 14893, IEG 23 February 2016)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/207631468194954362/pdf/ICRR148
93-P095050-Box394872B-PUBLIC.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Management Framework for the 
Western Kenya Community-driven Development and Flood Mitigation Project, and 
the Natural Resources Management Project Final Report’ November 2006 (E1520, 
Environmental Resources Management, November 2016)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/765061468272355570/pdf/E1520.p
df> accessed 8 August 2017 
 
The World Bank, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ (The World Bank IBRD-IDA) 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/indigenouspeoples<accessed 8 October 2018 
 
The World Bank, ‘Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet Appraisal Stage’ (Report No.: 
AC2608, The World Bank, 10 January 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/222201468273009863/pdf/Integrate
d0Saf1et010Appraisal0Stage.pdf> accessed 17 Jul 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Investment Lending Reform: Modernizing and Consolidating 
Operational Policies and Procedures’ (Operations Policy and Country Services, 1 
October 2012)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/777241468331877549/pdf/730380B
R0R20120C0disclosed010030120.pdf> accessed 25 January 2019 
 
The World Bank, ‘Justice and Rule of Law’ (The World Bank, 28 April 2015) 16 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/justice-rights-and-public-
safety>accessed 12 January 2019 
 
The World Bank, ‘Kenya- Natural Resource Management Project Restructuring 
Paper’ (Report No. 62490-KE, The World Bank 10 June 2011) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/509351468272106448/pdf/624900
PJPR0P090e0only0900BOX361487B.pdf> accessed 5 May 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Kenya: Natural Resource Management Project, Investigation 
Report’ (Report No. 88065-KE, The World Bank, 22 May 2014) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/191221468050686466/pdf/880650
REVISED0001400INSP0R201400001.pdf> accessed 20 July 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Land Reform’ (The World Bank May 1975) 
 
   
344 
 
The World Bank, ‘Memorandum to the Executive Directors and Alternates of the 
International Development Association, Request for Inspection Kenya: Natural 
Resource Management Project (P095050)’ (The Inspectional Panel, 1 August 2013> 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/744481468272734843/pdf/801490I
NSP0R200m00OUO0900Box379801B.pdf> accessed 4 July 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘OP 3.10 - Financial Terms and Conditions of IBRD Loans, IBRD 
Hedging Products, and IDA Credits’ (The World Bank, June 2003) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Operation Manual OP 10.00- Investment Project Financing’ (The 
World Bank April 2013) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.01- Environmental Assessment’ (The 
World Bank January 1999) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.04- Natural Habitats’ (The World Bank 
June 2001) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Operational Manual OP 4.36- Forests’ (The World Bank November 
2002) 
 
The World Bank, ‘Project Information Document (PID) Concept Stage’ (Report No.: 
AB1588, The World Bank 20 October 
2005)<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/696841468271848001/pdf/N
RM0PID010concept0stage.pdf>accessed 15 July 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Project Profile: Natural Resource Management Project’ (92518, 
The World Bank 2 April 2007)< 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534961468044080553/pdf/9251802
007Apr20t0Box0385367B0PUBLIC.pdf> 12 July 2016 
 
The World Bank, ‘Projects & Operations’ (The World Bank IBRD-
IDA)<http://projects.worldbank.org/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_
exact=KE >accessed 16 June 2017 
 
The World Bank, ‘The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework’ 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2017) 
 
The World Bank, ‘The World Bank’s Operations Manual BP 10.00’ (The World Bank 
April 2013 Revised July 2015) 
